• Uatp IP LLC v. Slick Slide LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 2, 2026 · PGR2024-00054 · APJ Brian D Range · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 22–26 are unpatentable based on obviousness; claims 1–17, 27, and 28 were not shown unpatentable. Patent Owner’s motion to terminate was denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “1. Mesh Layer Petitioner contends “no formal claim construction is necessary in this” slip op. at 13

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “5. Analysis On this complete record, we determine that Petitioner’s arguments do” slip op. at 31

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “form of nylon and some form of Teflon (and possible combinations thereof) having the specific coefficient of friction range given in limitation [1c] breaks down, because the building blocks of the obviousness argument are not sufficiently identified in Phillips alone, nor in the supporting testimony. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner’s arguments and evidence fail to show that Phillips renders the challenged claims obvious. 6. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, we determine that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–4, 6, and 7 would have been anticipated by or obvious in view of Phillips.” slip op. at 33

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “2. Products and Nexus We first consider the issue of whether certain evidence relied upon by” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 11,998,854 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 11,998,854
• Reolink Innovation Inc. / Shenzhen Reolink Technology Co., Ltd. v. Throughtek Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 4, 2025 · IPR2024-00509 · APJ Michael J Strauss · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4 and 6–19 are unpatentable as obvious over Throughtek-2012 and the Lorex Video; claims 1–3, 6, 10, 12–14, 17, and 18 are also unpatentable under two other grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “II. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Relying on the testimony of Dr. Bims, Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’842 patent would have been a person having a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and two years of work experience with network and communication technologies. Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 15–16). Patent Owner does not provide any proposed qualifications for a person of ordinary skill in the art. In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The level of ordinary skill in the art is also reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We adopt the assessment offered by Petitioner as it is consistent with the ’842 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts “no claim elements need a formal construction for purposes of resolving the controversy in this proceeding.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶ 55; Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Google Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, 701 Fed. Appx. 946, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). Petitioner states “[a]ll claim terms should be construed according to the Phillips standard.” Id. (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1303; 37 C.F.R. §42.100). Patent Owner presents no proposed claim constructions. We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “In addition, “[n]egative claim limitations are adequately supported when the specification describes a reason to exclude the relevant limitation. Such written description support need not rise to the level of disclaimer.” Santarus, Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 694 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012). A reason to exclude an element may be found in “statements in the specification expressly listing the disadvantages of using” that element. Santarus, 694 F.3d at 1351. Another reason to exclude may be when the specification “distinguishes among” the element and alternatives to it. Inphi Corp. v. Netlist, Inc., 805 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2015). As the Federal Circuit explained, “[t]he common denominator of these examples [(i.e., the reasons to exclude an element)] is disclosure of the element.” Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Accord Healthcare, Inc., 38 F.4th 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2022). More particularly, “[s]ilence is generally not disclosure.” Novartis, 38 F.4th at 1017; see also Seabed Geosolutions (US) Inc. v. Magseis FF LLC, 8 F.4th 1285, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Accordingly, “the written description requirement cannot be met through simple disregard of the presence or absence of a limitation.” Novartis, 38 F.4th at 1017. Our reviewing court further notes that “it is possible that the written description requirement may be satisfied when a skilled artisan would understand the specification as inherently disclosing the negative limitation.” Novartis, 38 F.4th at 1017 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). Thus, “it is a question whether the application necessarily discloses that particular device . . . A description which renders obvious the invention for which an earlier filing date is sought is not sufficient.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting Jepson v. Coleman, 314 F.2d 533, 536 (CCPA 1963)) (emphasis added).” slip op. at 20

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportDecided for petitioner

    “In addition, “[n]egative claim limitations are adequately supported when the specification describes a reason to exclude the relevant limitation. Such written description support need not rise to the level of disclaimer.” Santarus, Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 694 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012). A reason to exclude an element may be found in “statements in the specification expressly listing the disadvantages of using” that element. Santarus, 694 F.3d at 1351. Another reason to exclude may be when the specification “distinguishes among” the element and alternatives to it. Inphi Corp. v. Netlist, Inc., 805 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2015). As the Federal Circuit explained, “[t]he common denominator of these examples [(i.e., the reasons to exclude an element)] is disclosure of the element.” Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Accord Healthcare, Inc., 38 F.4th 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2022). More particularly, “[s]ilence is generally not disclosure.” Novartis, 38 F.4th at 1017; see also Seabed Geosolutions (US) Inc. v. Magseis FF LLC, 8 F.4th 1285, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Accordingly, “the written description requirement cannot be met through simple disregard of the presence or absence of a limitation.” Novartis, 38 F.4th at 1017. Our reviewing court further notes that “it is possible that the written description requirement may be satisfied when a skilled artisan would understand the specification as inherently disclosing the negative limitation.” Novartis, 38 F.4th at 1017 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). Thus, “it is a question whether the application necessarily discloses that particular device . . . A description which renders obvious the invention for which an earlier filing date is sought is not sufficient.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting Jepson v. Coleman, 314 F.2d 533, 536 (CCPA 1963)) (emphasis added).” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS RE47,842 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
• Uatp IP LLC v. Slick Slide LLCInstituted
  PTAB · Apr 8, 2025 · PGR2024-00054 · APJ Julia Heaney · PGR · Institution

  The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–17 and 22–28 and all asserted grounds, finding a sufficient likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Institution of a post-grant review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2018). Upon consideration of the parties’ submissions and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated that it is more likely than not that at least one claim challenged in the Petition is unpatentable. Further, Patent Owner has not persuaded us that it is appropriate to exercise our discretion not to institute review. Accordingly, we institute a post-grant review of all claims and all grounds asserted in the Petition.1” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedOther

    “On this record, we do not find Patent Owner’s proposed experience level of at least five years in measurement and analysis of coefficient of friction to be supported. As to the necessity of experience in textile engineering and fiber science, Patent Owner’s position, although not supported by declarant analysis of the factors listed above, is consistent with the disclosure of the ’854 patent, which describes features of a mesh layer in textile and fiber terms. See e.g., Ex. 1001, 10:17–11:14, 12:65–13:8, 14:20–24. On the whole, however, we do not discern on this record how specific experience in textile engineering and fiber science of a person of ordinary skill would materially alter the outcome at this stage of the proceeding. For purposes of this decision only, we apply Patent Owner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art, except for the requirement of five years of experience in measurement and analysis of coefficient of friction. The level of skill in the art remains an open issue in this proceeding. Further submissions by the parties may include argument and evidence that would assist in the resolution of this issue at the close of trial.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner contends “no formal claim construction is necessary in this proceeding.” Pet. 10; Reply 1, 4. Patent Owner contends the terms “mesh layer” and “coefficient of friction” require construction. Prelim. Resp. 14–16; Sur-reply 2–5. We have considered the parties’ arguments and discuss them below with regard to each of the terms Patent Owner contends should be construed. Because our determination that Petitioner demonstrates at least one challenged claim meets the threshold for institution (see SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1359–60) is not based on construing the term “mesh layer” or “coefficient of friction,” we determine we need not construe either claim term at this stage of the proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)). As further discussed below, we invite the parties to address claim construction at trial.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner that the ’854 patent specification does not include clear and explicit lexicography or a disclaimer that would support requiring “coefficient of friction” to be determined by a specific ASTM test method. The portion of the specification Patent Owner asserts as a definition of “coefficient of friction” (see Ex. 1001, 11:31–42) is a description of an embodiment; we find it does not express patentee intent to redefine the term. Further, the statement that “the coefficient of friction … may be determined using the … ASTM D1894 standard test method” (id. at 11:32–35) indicates that use of that specific test method is optional. Accordingly, in the absence of patentee lexicography or disavowal, we do not limit the scope of the term “coefficient of friction” to require that it be measured by a specific ASTM standard. Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., 814 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Absent lexicography or disavowal, we do not depart from the plain meaning of the claims.”); In re Am. Acad. Of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“We have cautioned against reading limitations into a claim from the preferred embodiment described in the specification, even if it is the only embodiment described, absent clear disclaimer in the specification.”). We note that the ’854 patent specification sets forth a definition for the coefficient of friction between the surfaces of the mesh material and the slide surface. Ex. 1001, 4:38–46. As stated above, however, we do not expressly construe any claim term at this stage of the proceeding. Should the parties address the construction of “coefficient of friction” at trial, we will make a determination after the close of evidence and any hearing.” slip op. at 13

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,998,854
• Ecto World, LLC / Sv3, LLC v. Rai Strategic Holdings, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Mar 10, 2025 · PGR2024-00049 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · PGR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show the patent was eligible for PGR; the challenged claims were supported by the 2006 priority application.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner does not demonstrate that it is more likely than not that the challenged claims lack written support in the Specification (and the ’634 application). That is, on this record, it appears that the challenged claims properly claim priority to the ’634 application and, accordingly, have an effective filing date in October 2006. 2. Conclusion: PGR Eligibility For the foregoing reasons, and based on the record before us, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated that it is more likely than not that the ’202 patent has, or had, at least one claim having an effective filing date on or after March 16, 2013. Accordingly, we determine that the ’202 patent is entitled to the filing date of the ’634 application (October 18, 2006), and, thus, the ’202 patent is not eligible for post-grant review.” slip op. at 18

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Accordingly, the ’202 patent consistently and repeatedly characterizes the invention as incorporating tobacco in some form and ties the stated benefits of the invention to the inclusion of tobacco. Moreover, the Specification is directed to smoking articles containing tobacco, all of the embodiments include tobacco, and “the present invention” is described as a smoking article, where the smoking article includes tobacco. Consequently, we determine that “smoking article” as it is used in the challenged claims is limited to devices that include tobacco. See Mosaic Brands, Inc. v. Ridge Wallet LLC, 55 F.4th 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (finding claimed “lip” is limited to “extrudable plastic materials” where specification states that “the device of the present invention is constructed of extrudable plastic materials” and “emphasizes the benefits of using extrudable plastics and describes them as benefits of the invention as a whole”); Poly-Am., L.P. v. described in the specification has inwardly extended short seals and every section of the specification indicates the importance of inwardly extended short seals. These two facts provide together a proper reason to limit the claims in this way.”); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“[T]he specification may reveal an intentional disclaimer, or disavowal, of claim scope by the inventor. In that instance as well, the inventor has dictated the correct claim scope, and the inventor’s intention, as expressed in the specification, is regarded as dispositive.”).” slip op. at 13

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateEntitled to earlier dateNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner’s argument is dependent on accepting Petitioner’s assertion that the claims include a smoking article that does not contain tobacco, which we have not done. Instead, as set forth above, we construe “smoking article” as being limited to devices that include tobacco. See § II.B.2, supra. Based on our construction of “smoking article” and the evidence of record in this proceeding, we determine that the challenged claims are supported by the specification of the ’202 patent, which is identical to the specification of all of the continuations in the chain leading back to the October 18, 2006 that the specification of the ’202 patent and every patent in its priority chain “have identical specifications”); Prelim. Resp. 13 (noting that Petitioner does not identify other limitations in the challenged claims “allegedly lacking support in the ’202 patent family’s applications dating back to U.S. App. No. 11/550,634, filed on October 18, 2006”). Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner does not demonstrate that it is more likely than not that the challenged claims lack written support in the Specification (and the ’634 application). That is, on this record, it appears that the challenged claims properly claim priority to the ’634 application and, accordingly, have an effective filing date in October 2006.” slip op. at 17

  Claim construction§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 11,925,202
• Microchip Technology Inc. v. Aptiv Technologies AGInstituted
  PTAB · Jul 15, 2024 · PGR2024-00011 · APJ Jean R Homere · PGR · Institution

  The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–15 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least claim 1 is obvious over Chang, Chang II, and POSITA knowledge.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “review. 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Section 324(a) provides that a post-grant review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . , if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Upon considering the evidence and arguments in the Petition (including its supporting testimonial evidence) and the evidence and arguments in the Preliminary Response (including its supporting testimonial evidence), we determine that the information presented shows that it is more likely than not that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute post-grant review on all” slip op. at 2

  • Other 314aDenied

    “Petitioner hereby stipulates that, if the PTAB institutes this post-grant review, Petitioner will not pursue invalidity of the Challenged Claims in a parallel district court proceeding on the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB in this Petition. Pet. 106. Petitioner cites the Director’s Memorandum, Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation, issued June 21, 2022 (“Guidance Memo”)3 in support of its contentions. Pet. 106.” slip op. at 11

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied

    “§ 325(d), the Board uses the following two-part framework: (1) determining whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, determining whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. Med-El Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential). In applying the two-part framework, we consider several non-exclusive factors, including: (a) the similarities and material differences between the asserted art and the prior art involved during examination; (b) the cumulative nature of the asserted art and the prior art evaluated during examination; (c) the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during examination, including whether the prior art was the basis for rejection; (d) the extent of the overlap between the arguments made during examination and the manner in which petitioner relies on the prior art or patent owner distinguishes the prior art; (e) whether petitioner has pointed out sufficiently how the examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art; and (f) the extent to which additional evidence and facts presented in the petition warrant reconsideration of the prior art or arguments. Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, Paper 8 at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential as to Section III.C.5, first paragraph) (“Becton, Dickinson”). Becton, Dickinson factors (a), (b), and (d) relate to whether the art or arguments presented in the Petition are the same or substantially the same as those previously presented to the Office. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 10. Factors (c), (e), and (f) “relate to whether the petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office” in its prior consideration of that art or arguments. Id. Only if the same or substantially the same art or arguments were previously presented to the Office do we consider whether the petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office. Id. “At bottom, this framework reflects a commitment to defer to previous Office evaluations of the evidence of record unless material error is shown.” Id. at 9.” slip op. at 14

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “At the time of the invention, a POSITA would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or an equivalent, and two years of professional experience working with computer network protocols such as USB. Lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa. Id. (citations omitted). At this stage, we find Patent Owner’s proposed level of a POSITA to be consistent with the problems and solutions disclosed in the ’643 patent and prior art of record, and adopt it as our own for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (approving the determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art by appeal to the references of record). We nonetheless invite the parties to further address this issue, if they deem it necessary and appropriate. The parties should also specifically explain how different definitions for one of ordinary skill in the art relate to specific arguments and issues of unpatentability or claim construction, to the extent that a dispute remains as to who constitutes a POSITA.” slip op. at 20

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 11,681,643
• Intel Corporation v. Ax Wireless, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Mar 5, 2024 · IPR2023-01146 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on all grounds because Petitioner did not show Huang or Sun was prior art to claims 1–10, which it argued were obvious over those references.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “II. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standards Petitioner bears the burden to demonstrate unpatentability. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). For purposes of institution, Petition bears the burden to establish, by a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the challenged claims would have been obvious over the cited art. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Where unpatentability rests on a document that is prior art to a challenged patent but for that patent’s priority claim to an earlier effective filing date, such a priority claim is not presumed valid. PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that the USPTO does not routinely determine whether such priority claims meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 120).” slip op. at 5

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Id. at 13, 17. Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had at least a Master’s degree in electrical engineer-ing or a similar discipline, and/or at least two to three years of experience working or conducting research in wireless commu-nication protocols, or an equivalent combination of education and experience. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 71, 72). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s assertion as to the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 6. We are persuaded, on the present record, that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’146 patent and prior art of record. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Not reached

    “action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2022). The Board is required to construe “only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner and Patent Owner, in extended briefing, contest the construction of the phrase “detecting, from the received wireless packet, the second header field which repeats the first header field,” as it appears in claim 1. Pet. 9; Prelim. Resp. 1; Pet. Reply 3; PO Sur-Reply 3. However, both parties appear to agree that the plain and ordinary meaning of the term should apply. See Pet. 6; Prelim. Resp. 15. Further, Petitioner has clarified that its statements as to the scope of the term are directed to its assertions that the ’146 patent lacks support for the claimed subject matter in its parent applications. Pet. Reply. 5–6. Consequently, we address claim construction arguments in their context of the parties’ priority contentions. See infra at II.D.1.” slip op. at 7

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Entitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner has shown sufficient written description support for the claims, including the disputed “detecting” limitation. The “decode-to-learn- ‘D’” description in the specification of the ’146 patent and in the provisional application to which the ’146 patent claims priority describe a specific procedure for the claimed “detecting, from the received wireless packet, the second header field which repeats the first header field.”3 See Ex. 1001, 2 Petitioner specifically asserts that Huang qualifies under 35 U.S.C. §102(b). Pet. 2, 19 (“by more than a year”). However, Huang’s patent issuance date of April 28, 2020 does not qualify under § 102(b) because it is less than one year before the December 29, 2020 filing date of the ’146 patent. Nevertheless, Petitioner has made an effective showing that Sun would qualify as prior art sufficient to shift the burden of production to Patent Owner. 3 Patent Owner does not explicitly show support for each of the applications in the priority chain. Patent Owner also cites to a Pre-Grant Publication rather than the underlying application despite the fact that such a Publication may include amendments to the originally filed application that would not evidence written description. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.215 (a); MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE §1121; Ex. 2003, 7 (showing amendments 3:1–11; Ex. 2001 ¶ 35; Ex. 1008, 5–6; PO Sur-Reply 6. The “D” information is received in the wireless packet, and the receiver determines therefrom whether there is a second header field that repeats the first header field. See Ex. 1008, 5–6; PO Sur-Reply 6. The written description further includes descriptions of other embodiments for receiver detection with variable repetition, including detection “without knowing D a priori.” Ex. 1001, 2:18–3:59.” slip op. at 9

  Claim construction§ 112 disclosure
  Patents in suitUS 11,212,146
• Motorola Mobility LLC v. Largan Precision Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 3, 2024 · IPR2022-01156 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 6–16, 18–24, 28, and 29 are unpatentable as anticipated by Chen-069, which is prior art because the 2012 application lacks written-description support for their full scope.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’948 patent would have had “(i) a Bachelor’s degree in Physics, Optical Sciences, or equivalent education or training, as well as (ii) approximately three years of experience in designing multi-lens optical systems.” Id. at 12 (quoting Pet. 13–14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 28)). We also found that “[l]ack of work experience could have been offset by additional education, and vice versa,” and that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have understood the fundamentals of optical aberration theory, and understood and used standard techniques for making lenses cheaper and more effective, especially for lens systems used in mobile devices.” Id. (quoting Pet. 14; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 28, 30). We also agreed with Petitioner and found that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have known how to use lens design software such as Code V, Oslo, and ZEMAX, and would have taken a lens design course or had equivalent training.” Id. (quoting Pet. 14; Ex. 1003 ¶ 29). We also agreed with Petitioner and found that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have regularly used such software to create new lens designs, often using pre-existing lens designs as a starting point and then performing routine optimizations to reach a desired design.” Id. at 12–13 (quoting Pet. 14; Ex. 1003 ¶ 29). Patent Owner does not identify a level of skill in the art that one would have had at the time of the invention of the ’948 patent or identify any shortcoming in Petitioner’s formulation. See PO Resp. 16–17. Because Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art is consistent with the ’948 patent and the asserted prior art, we maintain it for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579; In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner argues that construing the challenged “claims to include first and second lens elements having the same refractive power . . . is improper.” PO Resp. 21. According to Patent Owner, one of ordinary skill in the art “would construe the [’]948 [p]atent claims to include first and second lens elements in the form of a ‘doublet,’ which requires the respective lens elements to have opposite refractive power, and thus includes only configurations” of “positive-negative” and “negative-positive” for the first and second lens elements, respectively. Id. at 20–21. In other words, “[t]he proper construction of the ’948 [p]atent claims is that the first and second lens elements may have positive-negative or negative-po[sitive] refractive powers, but would not include first and second lens elements having the same refractive polarity,” according to Patent Owner. Id. at 26. Thus, the parties agree that the challenged claims should be construed to encompass at least a lens system having a first lens element with a negative refractive power and a second lens element with a positive refractive power. See, e.g., Pet. 33; PO Resp. 21. We conclude that such a lens system is consistent with the plain language of the challenged claims. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 12:8–26, 13:14–38, 14:16–46 (reciting first and second lens elements without reciting a specific refractive power polarity for the independent claims). And we determine that no claim terms require further construction in light of our findings below. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”).” slip op. at 10

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “In sum, we determine that the 2012 application does not provide written description support for an imaging lens system with a negative refractive power first lens and a positive refractive power second lens. And the agreed scope of the challenged claims includes such a configuration, and thus, the written description of the 2012 application does not support the full breadth of the challenged claims. We therefore determine that the challenged claims of the ʼ948 patent do not benefit from the priority date of the 2012 application. Therefore, we determine that Chen-069 is prior art to the challenged claims of the ʼ948 patent.” slip op. at 23

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “After reviewing Petitioner’s arguments and evidence, which are not addressed by Patent Owner (see generally PO Resp.), we determine that Petitioner demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that Chen-069 anticipates claim 1. D. Remaining Challenged Claims Petitioner argues that Chen-069 discloses the limitations recited in claims 2–4, 6–16, 18–24, 28, and 29. Pet. 48–65. Patent Owner does not address Petitioner’s arguments directed to these claims. See generally PO Resp. 32–34. Based on the evidence and arguments of record, we find that Petitioner demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that Chen-069 anticipates claims 2–4, 6–16, 18–24, 28, and 29.” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 9,784,948 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,784,948
• Continental Automotive Systems, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 5, 2023 · IPR2022-00972 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10 are unpatentable because Speight anticipates them; the Board found Peisa anticipation and Peisa–Heo obviousness unproven for the challenged claims in those grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a Bachelor of Science in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or an equivalent field, as well as three years of experience in wireless communication technology, or a master’s degree in electrical engineering, or other equivalent degree,” and that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 47–49). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s contention or propose a level of skill. Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the technology described in the Specification and the cited prior art. On the complete record, we adopt this level of skill.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “agreement that this claim term should be read as reciting two mutually-exclusive alternatives with respect to the “third parameter.” Dec. 11. The parties do not challenge this construction in the Patent Owner Response, Reply, or Sur-reply. On the complete record, we construe “wherein resources are allocated for data of each channel having a second parameter above zero prior to another channel’s data for transmission having a third parameter less than or equal to zero” as reciting two mutually-exclusive alternatives with respect to the “third parameter.”” slip op. at 11

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner. The Petition is required to identify “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). Petitioner argued in the Petition that “as properly construed, the claimed ‘first parameter,’ ‘second parameter,’ ‘third parameter,’ and ‘fourth parameter’ are four different parameters.” Pet. 17–18. In the Institution Decision, Petitioner prevailed on that point and “we agree[d] with Petitioner that the second and third parameters are separate and different parameters, and not different instances of the same parameter for separate channels.” Dec. 14. Patent Owner “relie[d] on the Board’s construction ‘that the second and third parameters are separate and different parameters, and not different instances of the same parameter for separate channels,’” and proposed distinct parameters in the Specification that it alleges are examples of second and third parameters, albeit not the same two parameters proposed by Petitioner. PO Resp. 9, 29. Petitioner now proposes new constructions for the second and third parameters that would limit those parameters to the two examples it advanced in the Petition and improperly supports these new constructions with new expert testimony and an exhibit from the prosecution of a later patent. Reply 20–25; Ex. 1040 ¶¶ 20–29; Ex. 1038. See also Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (“TPG”)10 73 (“Petitioner may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g. to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability.”). As Patent Owner observes (Sur-reply 10 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated. 21), it has no opportunity to introduce rebuttal evidence contesting the new constructions. See TPG 73–74 (Nov. 2019) (“The sur-reply may not be accompanied by new evidence other than deposition transcripts of the crossexamination of any reply witness. Sur-replies should only respond to arguments made in reply briefs, comment on reply declaration testimony, or point to cross-examination testimony.”). We agree with Patent Owner that it would be unfair to consider Petitioner’s new construction. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b) (“A reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition, patent owner preliminary response, patent owner response, or decision on institution.”). Thus, Petitioner has forfeited its new claim construction arguments and they will not be considered. See TPG 74 (“While replies and sur-replies can help crystalize issues for decision, a reply or sur-reply that raises a new issue or belatedly presents evidence may not be considered.”). Moreover, these arguments would be unpersuasive even if considered. Petitioner has, at most, cited description in the Specification to show that its identified second and third parameters are examples corresponding to the recited second and third parameters. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 84–95. This description does not define the second and third parameters nor purport to exclude from the claims any parameter that would otherwise meet the language of the claims. The prosecution history to which Petitioner cites, that of a child application, took place after the prosecution of the ’466 patent and thus, does not constitute a definition or disclaimer of subject matter for claims of the ’466 patent. In any case, the brief argument in the cited response to office action, that “[i]n the algorithm, the first value is provided by the wireless network for each of a plurality of buffers where the buffer having the second value above a threshold transmits data first,” does not define the second and third parameters, disavow any values from those parameters, or even discuss the third parameter. Ex. 1038, 12. Petitioner’s extrinsic evidence, Dr. Akl’s testimony, does little more than repeat the arguments in the Reply and, thus, is of little value. Ex. 1040 ¶¶ 20–29. In sum, we maintain our construction that the second and third parameters are separate and different parameters, and not different instances of the same parameter for separate channels. Under this construction, RAAUq” and RAAUq’, respectively, could potentially be second and third parameters, as could RAAUq’ and RAAUq”, respectively, as long as they satisfy the rest of the pertinent language of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 15

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateNot shown unpatentable

    “production, we still would find that a skilled artisan would not have been able to ascertain from the disclosure in the ’421 application that RAAUq’ could take values less than zero. Instead, even if we were to credit Dr. Lomp’s testimony, to conclude that RAAUq’ can take negative values, a skilled artisan would need to program computer software to simulate the ’421 application’s algorithm and correctly choose starting parameters and other context variables without guidance from the description in the ’421 application. This case is similar to that in New Railhead, where the written description was insufficient because “one of ordinary skill in the art must first make the patented invention before he can ascertain the claimed features of that invention.” 298 F.3d at 1295. This case also is similar to Los Angeles Biomedical Research Institute, in which an application’s written description was insufficient because assumptions and starting variables were not knowable from the disclosure in the application. 849 F.3d at 1058. Thus, even if we were to conclude that Patent Owner has met its burden of production, a preponderance of the evidence shows that the ’421 application does not provide written description support for Alternative A. In sum, we conclude that the ’421 application does not provide written description support for the challenged claims and that, therefore, Speight is prior art to the challenged claims.” slip op. at 41

  Patent outcomesUS 9,681,466 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 9,681,466
• Huhtamaki Flexible Packaging Germany GmbH & Co. KG v. Danapak Flexibles A/SInstituted
  PTAB · Jun 20, 2023 · PGR2023-00008 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · PGR · Institution

  The Board instituted post-grant review of claims 1–13 on all petitioned grounds, finding it more likely than not that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “To institute post-grant review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition, “if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). For the reasons discussed below, after considering the parties’ submissions and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated that it is more likely than not that at least one of the challenged claims of the ’624 patent is unpatentable. Thus, we institute post-grant review.” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied

    “evaluated the subject matter of Riis during examination of the ’624 patent, we agree that Riis was before the Office, as discussed in connection with our analysis of the first part of the Advanced Bionics framework, above. Examiner T presumably was aware of Riis by virtue of having initialed an IDS containing Riis in the ’624 patent’s application and also by virtue of having initialed an IDS containing Riis in the ’067 Application, but Examiner T did not apply Riis in connection with the examination of the ’624 patent. On this record, Patent Owner also fails to show that the claims of the child application leading to the ’624 patent are substantially similar to those of the parent ’814 patent in which Examiner S considered Riis, and, thus, consideration of Riis during the prosecution of the ’814 patent does not equate to consideration of Riis during the prosecution of the ’624 patent. Regarding Patent Owner’s argument (2) that Petitioner fails to sufficiently show how the Examiner erred in evaluating the prior art, we find Petitioner’s arguments demonstrate that Examiner T, the examiner of the ’624 patent, did not apply Riis (or Wypych or Tatarka) during the examination of the’624 patent. As Petitioner argues, the error lies in that “the Examiner failed to consider the relevance of Riis as it applied to the pending method claims,” because although “Riis was considered during examination of the parent ’999 application, Riis was not similarly considered during examination of the ’018 application which led to the ’624 patent.” Pet. 76–77. We determine that the circumstances here demonstrate that the Examiner erred in evaluating the prior art.” slip op. at 12

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityNot reached

    “35 U.S.C. § 322(a)(2) to deny institution, arguing that the Petition fails to identify every RPI. Prelim. Resp. 10–11, 56–60. Patent Owner argues that the Petition “should also have identified its parent corporation, Huhtamäki Oyj . . . as well as the related corporation Huhtamaki, Inc. . . . as RPIs to comply with the statutory requirements for a PGR.” Id. at 10. On this record, we determine that we need not address whether Huhtamäki Oyj and Huhtamaki, Inc. are unnamed RPIs because, even if they were, it would not create a time bar or estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 325. See SharkNinja Operating LLC v. iRobot Corp., IPR2020-00734, Paper 11 (PTAB Oct. 6, 2020) (precedential); Lumentum Holdings, Inc. v. Capella Photonics, Inc., IPR2015-00739, Paper 38 at 6 (PTAB Mar. 4, 2016) (precedential) (Board’s jurisdiction to consider a petition does not require a “correct” identification of all RPIs in a petition); see also Blue Coat Sys., Inc. v. Finjan, Inc., IPR2016-01444, Paper 11 at 10 (PTAB July 18, 2017) (“evidence [of failure to identify all RPIs] is, at best, suggestive regarding an issue that is not jurisdictional”); Mayne Pharma Int’l Pty. Ltd. v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp., 927 F.3d 1232, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“[I]f a petition fails to identify all real parties in interest . . . the Director can, and does, allow the petitioner to add a real party in interest.” (quoting Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1374 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc))). Here, notwithstanding the arguments devoted to the RPI issue in the Preliminary Response, Preliminary Reply, and Preliminary Sur-Reply, we are not persuaded that Petitioner is barred or estopped from this proceeding, or that Petitioner purposefully omitted Huhtamäki Oyj or Huhtamaki, Inc. to gain some advantage. As Petitioner argues, the “RPI analysis is not necessary at institution, because Patent Owner has not alleged Petitioner would be time barred or otherwise estopped based on unnamed RPIs.” Prelim. Reply 5 (quoting SharkNinja, IPR2020-00734, Paper 11 at 18). As SharkNinja states, certain Board decisions go through extensive analysis to determine whether parties should have been named as RPIs, whereas other Board decisions determine that “such a lengthy exercise is unnecessary for the purposes of rendering a decision on institution of trial.” SharkNinja, IPR2020-00734, Paper 11 at 19. Here, as in SharkNinja, we find the latter approach better serves the interest of cost and efficiency. Thus, at this time and on this record, we will not consider whether Huhtamäki Oyj or Huhtamaki, Inc. must be named as RPIs.” slip op. at 15

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “of the invention “would have had a relevant technical degree in Chemical Engineering, Polymer Science, Materials Science, or the like, and 2–3 years of experience in laminate or film manufacture or similar packaging manufacture and that less experience may be necessary with additional education and vice versa.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 66–72). In its 4 Neither Patent Owner nor Petitioner appear to present any evidence directed to secondary considerations. See generally Pet.; Prelim. Resp.; Prelim. Reply; Prelim. Sur-Reply. Preliminary Response, Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s asserted level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. We adopt Petitioner’s definition, which is consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected by the prior art and the ’624 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 17

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 11,260,624
• Vmware, Inc. v. Cirba Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 7, 2022 · PGR2021-00098 · APJ Russell E Cass · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–63 are unpatentable under § 112(a) because the patent lacks written-description support for the claimed “already placed” and “issue instructions” limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Pet. 20–54. With its Petition, Petitioner submitted the Declaration of Dr. Erik Zadok. Ex. 1006. Patent Owner elected to waive its Preliminary Response. Paper 11. We instituted trial on all grounds of unpatentability. (Paper 12 (“Inst. Dec.”)).” slip op. at 3

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownNo construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “term “placing” requires more than a theoretical placing or planning to place as part of an analytical solution. Turning first to the claim language, we agree with Petitioner that the language of the independent claims is consistent with “placement” occurring after and separately from the analytical evaluation process. See Pet. Reply 3. For example, claim 1 is directed to a system for “determining placement of source computer systems on target systems,” the system configured to “determine a placement” by employing operations to “evaluate compatibility.” Ex. 1001, 40:2–4, 40:8– 36. The second “evaluate compatibility” operation is “to determine if the specific source system can be placed with those other source systems on the specific target system,” which suggests that what is being evaluated is whether the source system can be actually placed (e.g., moved or transferred) to the target system. Id. at 40:18–27 (emphasis added). Similarly, the third “evaluate compatibility” operation involves “evaluating the impact on resource utilization of the specific target system of placing the specific source system on the specific target system,” which suggests that what is being evaluated is the impact on resource utilization once the source system is actually moved or transferred to the target. Id. at 40:28–32 (emphasis added). Additionally, the claim states that, based on the “evaluate” operations, the claimed system “determine[s]” a placement, not that it executes the placement. Id. at 40:8–11. The actual placement seemingly occurs after the final claimed operation of “issu[ing] instructions to place” the source system(s) on to the target system “in accordance with the determined placement.” Id. at 40:37–39. Independent claims 32 and 63 include similar language. Id. at 42:36–43:3, 45:1–46:19. Had the patent applicant wanted to cover systems that were merely “hypothetically placed,” language to that effect could have been added to the claim.” slip op. at 19

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateUnpatentable

    “As noted above, the claim language requires evaluating compatibility between a specific source system and one or more other source systems “already placed” on the target system. Paragraph 82 does not disclose the evaluation of compatibility of a source system and another source system as part of the “forward consolidation.” Additionally, paragraph 82 does not disclose that “existing target systems 16” have source systems “already placed” on them. Thus, paragraph 82 does not provide the level of detail recited in the limitation under either party’s definition of “placed.” In addition, as noted above, we have interpreted “placed” to require an actual placement rather than merely “planning to place” or a theoretical placement. See § II.A.2, supra. Therefore, even if the “existing target system 16” had theoretical or hypothetical systems added to it as part of the consolidation analysis, those would not be systems that are “already placed” on the target system.” slip op. at 34

  Patent outcomesUS 10,951,459 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 112 disclosure
  Patents in suitUS 10,951,459

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.