• Adama Agan Ltd. v. Bayer Cropscience LPInstitution denied
  PTAB · Feb 13, 2023 · PGR2022-00057 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · PGR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show it was more likely than not that claims 1–18 lacked written description or enablement, or were unpatentable over the asserted prior art.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Institution of post-grant review is authorized by statute only when “the information presented in the petition . . . demonstrate[s] that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324; see 37 C.F.R. § 42.4. Upon considering the Petition, Preliminary Response, and the cited evidence, we conclude that Petitioner has not satisfied its burden under 35 U.S.C. § 324 to show that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the Petition is unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “According to Petitioner, a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art (“POSA”) “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in agronomy, agricultural sciences, or a related field and at least 3-5 years of experience in the application of pesticides, including experience conducting weed science research, such as field trials to determine herbicide efficacy and safety.” Pet. 25 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 10). Patent Owner responds that it does not challenge Petitioner’s definition of a POSA at this stage of the proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 15. Because Petitioner’s definition of a person of skill in the art appears commensurate with the level of skill reflected in the asserted art in this case, as well as the ’463 patent itself, we apply Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art to determine whether it is more likely than not that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

    “When claim 1 is read in light of the Specification of the ’463 patent, we find that Petitioner’s construction is too expansive and not commensurate with the appropriate scope of claim 1 when the Specification of the ’463 patent is considered. As the Specification of the ’463 patent makes clear, indaziflam has been in use as an herbicide and is well-characterized. See Ex. 1001, 3:17–6:6. The Specification of the ’463 patent incorporates by reference U.S. Patent No. 8,114,991, which describes indaziflam, and the Specification of the ’463 patent also describes several commercially available herbicides incorporating indaziflam as their active ingredient. See id. at 3:22–27, 4:15–41. The Specification of the ’463 patent sets forth embodiments with specific ranges for the amount of indaziflam. See id. at 5:45–6:6. Finally, the Specification of the ’463 patent states: A person having ordinary skill in the art would understand how to adjust dosages and concentrations depending on whether the composition is to be applied to a desirable plant or seed, part or habitat thereof, or directly to a site in which no desirable plants are present or growing (e.g., a monoculture of unwanted annual grass).” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITANo construction needed

    “We find that Petitioner’s expansive construction of the claim phrase “a composition comprising a cellulose biosynthesis inhibitor” to be inconsistent with the meaning of the transitional phrase “comprising” within the context of the claim as a whole and also inconsistent with the teachings set forth in the Specification of the ’463 patent. The transitional phrase “comprising” is inclusive or open-ended and should be read to not exclude additional, unrecited elements or method steps. See, e.g., Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 327 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The transition ‘comprising’ in a method claim indicates that the claim is open-ended and allows for additional steps.”); Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Comprising” is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.”) (citing In re Baxter, 656 F.2d 679, 686 (CCPA 1981). Therefore, although the term “comprising” does not exclude additional steps or elements, that does not mean that any other step or element may or should be added, such as any other chemical, as Petitioner asserts. The Specification of the ’463 patent contemplates using indaziflam as the herbicidally active ingredient, but also contemplates the addition of other active ingredients in the composition. Ex. 1001, 5:59–65; 6:7–11. The Specification of the ’463 patent also contemplates the addition of other ingredients in the composition as well. Specifically, the Specification states: These formulations are produced in any desired or known manner, for example by mixing the active compounds with extenders, such as liquid solvents, pressurized liquefied gases and/or solid carriers, optionally with the use of surface-active agents, such as emulsifiers and/or dispersants and/or foam formers. Id. at 17:6–11. This and the remainder of the Specification does not suggest the expansive interpretation of the claim limitation argued by Petitioner. For example, the Specification explains that the point of the invention is to treat vegetation that is or will be consumed by livestock animals, and, more specifically, that such animals will provide food (e.g., milk or meat) for others (e.g., people or pets) further up the food chain. Id. at 2:31–35, 2:39– 59. Reason and the evidence of record support that such goals are not commensurate with co-applying any chemical in any amount to the same area. See also Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 22–23, 30, 34–36, 38–43, 55, 59–61, 63” slip op. at 13

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 11,166,463
• BJ Energy Solutions, LLC v. Yantai Jereh Petroleum Equipment & Technologies Co., Ltd.Institution denied
  PTAB · Sep 7, 2021 · PGR2021-00060 · APJ Ryan H Flax · PGR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the petition did not show claims 1–7 likely unpatentable, and a possible § 112(a) issue for claims 8–9 did not justify instituting on all claims and grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “not demonstrated with particularity that it is more likely than not that most claims challenged in the petition are unpatentable under the asserted grounds. Although there is a reasonable argument that claims 8 and 9 may be unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), as discussed above, this analysis is applicable to only these two dependent claims under a single ground for unpatentability, leaving Petitioner’s other ten grounds insufficient regarding independent claim 1 and dependent claims 2–7. As discussed above, instituting trial under these circumstances would not be an efficient use of the Board’s or the parties’ time and resources. See Chevron, IPR2018- 00923, Paper 9, 10–11; Deeper, UAB v. Vexilar, Inc., IPR2018-01310, Paper 7, 41–43 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (informative). Our decision at this stage derives from our review of the record presented. In accordance with the Court’s decision in SAS (138 S. Ct. at 1359– 60) and Office guidance, we deny institution of a post-grant review of the challenged claims of the ’631 patent on any grounds alleged by Petitioner. This decision does not reflect a final determination on the patentability of any claim.” slip op. at 66

  • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “Even when a petitioner satisfies the minimum statutory institution standard (e.g., demonstrating a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to one or more claims in an inter partes review or that it is more likely than not that at least one claim is unpatentable in a post-grant review), institution of review remains discretionary. SAS Inst. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (2018); Harmonic, Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“First of all, the PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.”). Under such circumstances, the Board takes into account other considerations, including efficiency and fundamental fairness for all parties. See Adaptics Limited v. Perfect Co., IPR2018-01596, Paper 20 at 17 (PTAB Mar. 6, 2019) (informative); Chevron Oronite Co. LLC v. Infineum USA L.P., IPR2018-00923, Paper 9 (PTAB Nov. 7, 2018) (informative); see also Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 84 FR 64280, 53– 63 (2019) (addressing various considerations at institution phase, including efficiency and fundamental fairness for all parties).1 We conclude that Petitioner has not demonstrated in the petition that it is more likely than not that challenged claims 1–7 are unpatentable under any asserted grounds for unpatentability. Although it is a closer question as to whether Petitioner has demonstrated it is more likely than not that dependent claims 8 and 9 are unpatentable based on a single asserted unpatentability ground under § 112, we determine based on the record here that instituting a trial with respect to all challenged claims under all eleven asserted grounds for unpatentability is not an efficient use of the Board’s or the parties’ time and resources. Therefore, we do not institute post-grant review pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 324. See SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1359–60 (requiring institution on all claims, if any); see also Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 55 (providing guidance in view of SAS).” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “to read the concept of “flush with” into the claims. We agree with Petitioner’s position that such an interpretation is not supported by the ’631 patent’s written description, which illustrates and describes two embodiments, each having a turbine engine and reduction gearbox configured to be flush with one another, but refers to only the configuration of Embodiment 1 as being “directly connected” and refers to the configuration of Embodiment 2 as being merely “connected.” See Ex. 1001, 5:27–28, 5:62–6:2, Figs. 2, 3; see also Ex. 2001 ¶ 63 (Patent Owner’s expert witness confirming there is a difference between merely “connected” and “directly connected”). Thus, the intrinsic record supports a conclusion that the concept of “directly connected” is not related to whether one component is “flush with” another component. This disclosure of the ’631 patent also illuminates the meaning of “directly connected.” As shown in Embodiment 2, something may be connected with another thing even if there are intervening components, e.g., a transmission shaft or coupling; however, as shown in Embodiment 1, the ’631 patent uses the term “directly connected” only where no such intervening components are disclosed. Ex. 1001, 5:15– 6:19, Figs. 2, 3. Besides the guidance provided with respect to the embodiments discussed above, the ’631 patent does not otherwise expressly define the term “directly connected.” See generally Ex. 1001. Thus, we consider what the ordinarily skilled artisan would consider to be its ordinary and customary meaning. In this respect, Patent Owner also uses the word “uninterrupted” to describe “directly connected.” See Prelim. Resp. 6; see also Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 61–71. We conclude based on this record that the concept of “uninterrupted” is more apt than the concept of “flush with,” and find it to be a better description for the ordinary and customary meaning of “directly connected.” For example, the ’631 patent describes, in Embodiment 1, “the turbine engine 19 is connected to the plunger pump 18.” Ex. 1001, 5:26–27 (emphasis added). However, it is without question that Embodiment 1 positions a reduction gearbox between the turbine engine and plunger pump; thus, the engine and pump may be connected, but they are not directly connected. See, e.g., Fig. 2. On the other hand, regarding this same Embodiment 1, the ’631 patent describes that “the turbine engine 19 is directly connected to an input end of the reduction gearbox 24,” and there are no components illustrated or described as being between the turbine engine and reduction gearbox. Id. at 5:28–30 (emphasis added), Fig. 3. The connection between the turbine engine and reduction gearbox shown in Embodiment 1 is more aptly described as being uninterrupted. Thus, this illuminates the meaning of “directly connected.” In view of the above, we ascribe to the term “directly connected” its ordinary and customary meaning as it would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art, and we find that ordinary and customary meaning to require that the turbine engine and reduction gearbox are connected with nothing intervening there-between so that their connection is uninterrupted.” slip op. at 29

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner’s evidence shows that the Apollo 1 apparatus has two gearboxes and a clutch between its turbine engine and plunger pump, thus the Apollo 1 does not meet the claim limitation “the plunger pump is a plunger pump integrated with a reduction gearbox, the turbine engine is directly connected to an input end of the reduction gearbox integrated on the plunger pump.” Ex. 1001, 6:51–54. Petitioner’s Exhibit 1017 is explained by Mr. Zhang11 as having these two gearboxes and clutch, where at least one of the gearboxes and the clutch forecloses the system from having a single reduction gearbox that is both integrated on a pump and directly connected to a turbine engine. Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 8–12. Petitioner presents no evidence contradicting Mr. Zhang’s understanding of the Apollo 1 configuration and, notably never attempted to explain exactly what is shown in the above-reproduced photograph from its own Exhibit 1017, even when given the opportunity to address Mr. Zhang’s testimony in its Reply. See generally Reply.” slip op. at 50

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 10,865,631
• Lassen Therapeutics 1, Inc. v. Singapore Health Services Pte Ltd., And National University Of SignaporeInstitution denied
  PTAB · Feb 6, 2020 · PGR2019-00053 · APJ Jamie T Wisz · PGR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show it was more likely than not that claims 1–10 were unpatentable on any asserted ground.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

    “review under 35 U.S.C. § 324 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). We may not institute a post-grant review unless “the information presented in the petition . . . , if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). Applying that standard, and upon consideration of the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we determine that the information presented fails to demonstrate it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the challenged claims of the ’603 patent is unpatentable. Accordingly, we deny institution of post-grant review of claims 1–10 of the ’603 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner states that, for purposes of the preliminary response only, it does not challenge Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 19. Based on the current record and for the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed description of the person of ordinary skill in the art. Furthermore, we find that the prior art of record reflects this level of skill in the art at the time of the invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that “Interleukin 11 receptor α (IL- 11Rα) antibody” should not be construed to include antibodies that bind to IL-11Rα of non-human species but not to the human version of this protein because such a construction does not comport with the language of claim 1, which is clearly directed to treating a human subject. See Pause Tech. v. TiVo, 419 F.3d 1326, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (rejecting interpretation of claim element that ignored “other language appearing later in the claim” in stating that ‘“[p]roper claim construction . . . demands interpretation of the entire claim in context, not a single element in isolation.’”) (citing Hockerson– Halberstadt, Inc. v. Converse Inc., 183 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed.Cir.1999)). Construing this term to include antibodies that bind solely to non-human IL- 11Rα would be inconsistent with a claim directed to treatment of a human. Accordingly, for purposes of this decision, we construe “Interleukin 11 receptor α (IL-11Rα) antibody” to mean “any natural or synthetic, monoclonal or polyclonal antibody made using any animal system including phage, or fragment or derivative thereof, that binds to human IL-11Rα.”” slip op. at 9

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner appears to have overlooked the ’603 patent Specification’s disclosure of anti-IL-11Rα antibodies. Specifically, the ’603 patent lists “monoclonal antibody clone 025 (Sino Biological), clone EPR5446 (Abcam), clone 473143 (R & D Systems), clones 8E2 and 8E4 described in US 2014/0219919 A1 [Edwards] and the monoclonal antibodies described in Blanc et al (J. Immunol Methods. 2000 Jul. 31; 241(1–2); 43–59).” Ex. 1001, 18:41–46; Ex. 1003 ¶ 176.6 Edwards, which Petitioner relies on for its obviousness and anticipation grounds, is directed to antibodies “that bind to IL-11Rα and neutralize IL-11 signaling.” Ex. 1008 ¶ 13. Table 1 of Edwards lists clones 8E2 and 8E4 and sixty-three other antibodies (including variants of 8E2) as “exemplary IL-11Rα-binding proteins.” Id. ¶ 362. Table 1 of Edwards also includes the sequence ID numbers for the heavy and light chains of the variable regions of each of these sixty-five clones and the amino acid sequences for each are disclosed in the sequence listing. Id. ¶ 362, p. 46– 104.7” slip op. at 12

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,106,603
• Hospira, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Jul 27, 2017 · IPR2017-00739 · APJ Robert A Pollock · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on claims 1–11 and 14–17 under § 325(d), finding the priority issue and Nabholtz ground had been considered during prosecution.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • BurdenDecided for patent owner

    “Prelim. Resp. 10–11; see also id. 11, n.3 (arguing that Applicant demonstrated support for a three-part combination comprising a “further therapeutic agent”). Having considered the Specification of the ’649 Application and the arguments raised during prosecution, as discussed section II(B), above, Petitioner has not presented any further evidence in this proceeding that would persuade us to reach a conclusion different from the Examiner’s position that the challenged claims are adequately disclosed in the priority document.” slip op. at 14

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateDecided for patent owner

    “established priority for those claims based upon the parent application’s specific disclosure of using growth inhibitory agents as part of the present invention. (Ex. 1119-5 at 179 (citing Ex. 1121 at 20 (16:11- 24), 39 (35:6-14), 41 (37:9-18).) Based upon that disclosure, the examiner agreed that the claims reciting a combination with “a further growth inhibitory agent” were supported by, and thus entitled to priority to, the parent applications. (Ex. 1119-5 at 41; id. at 292-93; Ex. 1119- 6 at 245.) Prelim. Resp. 10–11; see also id. 11, n.3 (arguing that Applicant demonstrated support for a three-part combination comprising a “further therapeutic agent”). Having considered the Specification of the ’649 Application and the arguments raised during prosecution, as discussed section II(B), above, Petitioner has not presented any further evidence in this proceeding that would persuade us to reach a conclusion different from the Examiner’s position that the challenged claims are adequately disclosed in the priority document.” slip op. at 14

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Enablement (Wands, Amgen full scope)EnabledDecided for patent owner

    “combination are needed to demonstrate that they can be usefully combined,’” flatly contradicts Patent Owner’s position that the ’649 Application and ’346 Provisional Application adequately disclose the claimed invention. Pet. 17–18 (citing Ex. 1119-5, 308–09). We do not find Petitioner’s argument persuasive. As an initial matter, Petition fails to address the “Wands” factors in its enablement analysis. See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).” slip op. at 15

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied

    “As discussed in section II(B), above, the Examiner considered fully the written description and enablement issues underlying Applicant’s claim to priority in allowing the claims to issue, and Petitioner has not presented new evidence or arguments that would convince us that the Examiner’s determination was unreasonable. The Examiner’s decision to withdraw the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) over Nabholtz was expressly predicated on that priority determination, which removed Nabholtz as prior art. In Ground I of this Petition, Petitioner also asserts that the claims are unpatentable under § 102(b) over Nabholtz, thus raising “the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously [] presented to the Office” as contemplated under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Under the circumstances of this case, we exercise our discretion under § 325(d) and decline to institute inter partes review based on Ground I.” slip op. at 18

  § 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 7,892,549
• Dr. Reddy’S Laboratories, Ltd. / Dr. Reddy’S Laboratories, Inc. v. Galderma Laboratories, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Feb 16, 2016 · IPR2015-01778 · APJ Robert A Pollock · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 7, 8, 14, 15, and 20 were unpatentable over the asserted references.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “CONCLUSION Petitioner does not convince us that non-provisional parent applications of the ’506 patent (as represented by the specification of the ’506 patent) fail to provide adequate written descriptive support for the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not agree with Petitioner’s contention that the ‘506 patent is not entitled to the benefit of the April 5, 2002, filing date of the earliest of those applications under 35 U.S.C. § 120 such that Ashley ’572, Ashley ’267, and/or ORACEA would qualify as prior art.10 Consequently, Petitioner has failed to establish a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that claims 1, 7, 8, 14, 15, and 20 are unpatentable in view of the asserted references. ORDER Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Petition is denied as to all challenged claims of the ’506 patent.” slip op. at 17

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateDecided for patent owner

    “We do not find Petitioner’s arguments persuasive. As an initial matter, we note that Petitioner has not established that the term “acne rosacea” was “antiquated and outdated” as of the earliest filing date of the chain of applications leading to issuance of the ’506 patent. Nor does Petitioner establish that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have understood that term to indicate rosacea—a condition commonly known to encompass inflammatory papules and pustules, albeit not comedones. See Pet. 22; Prelim. Resp. 18–19; Ex. 1004 ¶ 13; Ex. 1034, 144. To the extent a dermatologist would not, as Petitioner argues, “have lumped [acne vulgaris and rosacea] together in a single genus,” does not persuade us that written description is lacking. An inventor may choose to be his own lexicographer and give terms uncommon meanings if “done with reasonable clarity, deliberativeness, and precision.” See In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). In the present case, we find no ambiguity in the ’506 patent’s definition of the invention as directed to the treatment of “all known types of acne,” including both acne vulgaris and rosacea. See Ex. 1001, 4:31–43. The ’506 patent characterizes the genus acne as “a disorder of the skin characterized by papules, pustules . . . and other blemishes or skin lesions,” and notes that rosacea evinces specific characteristics of “inflammatory lesions (erythema) and permanent dilation of blood vessels (telangiectasia).” Id. at 4:23–30, 41–43. We are not persuaded that written description is lacking because not all of the symptoms attributed to the genus acne apply to rosacea, or that a symptom specific to rosacea (i.e, telangiectasia) may only be treated surgically. See Pet. 23. Rather, we find it sufficient that the specification teaches the treatment of papules and pustules of the genus “acne”—expressly defined by the inventor as including rosacea.” slip op. at 11

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedDecided for patent owner

    “CONCLUSION Petitioner does not convince us that non-provisional parent applications of the ’506 patent (as represented by the specification of the ’506 patent) fail to provide adequate written descriptive support for the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not agree with Petitioner’s contention that the ‘506 patent is not entitled to the benefit of the April 5, 2002, filing date of the earliest of those applications under 35 U.S.C. § 120 such that Ashley ’572, Ashley ’267, and/or ORACEA would qualify as prior art.10 Consequently, Petitioner has failed to establish a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that claims 1, 7, 8, 14, 15, and 20 are unpatentable in view of the asserted references.” slip op. at 17

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “i. Rosacea The parties agree that the ’506 patent identifies rosacea (“acne rosacea”) as a form of acne. Pet. 30–31; Prelim. Resp. 7. Although Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art would not classify rosacea as a form of acne (Pet. 22; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 12, 13), we apply the inventor’s clearly expressed definition that “acne include[s] . . . acne rosacea” (Ex. 1001 4:31–41). With respect to the symptoms of rosacea, however, neither party contends that uncommon meanings apply. Pet. 30– 31; Prelim. Resp. 6–8. We therefore construe rosacea as a form of acne having symptoms including papules, pustules, erythema, and telangiectasia, where the predominant lesions are papules and pustules. See Ex. 1001, 4:23–43; Ex. 1004, ¶¶ 7, 19 (“‘The predominant lesions [in rosacea] are papules and pustules.’ ([Ex. 1056] at 680; see also Exh. 1046, at 852, 958; Exh. 1047, at 1023, 1175.).”” slip op. at 9

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,603,506

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.