- PTAB · May 20, 2024 · IPR2024-00114 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–8 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim would have been obvious over DiPerna964 and Strack.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“We determine below that Fintiv factors 1–5 do not favor discretionary denial. Thus, we do not reach the issue of whether the merits are compelling. CommScope Techs. LLC v. Dali Wireless, Inc., IPR2022- 01242, Paper 23 at 4–5 (PTAB Feb. 27, 2023) (precedential) (Board must first address Fintiv factors 1–5, and should engage the compelling merits question only if that analysis favors discretionary denial) (“CommScope”). 7. Balancing the Fintiv Factors Weighing against exercising our discretion to deny institution is factor 3 involving the parties’ limited investment and lack of substantive orders in the District Court litigation. Factor 4 concerning the limited overlap of the issues in the two cases also weighs against discretionary denial. Only factor 5, that Petitioner and the defendant in the District Court litigation are the same party, weighs in favor of discretionary denial. Factor 1 concerning the absence of a stay in the District Court litigation, and factor 2 concerning the close proximity between the start of trial in the District Court litigation and the estimated deadline for the final written decision, are neutral on the facts of this case. We therefore determine that the balance of factors 1–5 weighs against discretionary denial. Accordingly, we do not consider the issue of whether compelling merits have been shown under factor 6. See CommScope, Paper 23 at 4–5.2” slip op. at 13
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1006, 23) (emphasis added). From this passage, we understand the “safety” switch to be “separate” from the panic button, not a part of it. This understanding is reinforced by claim 7 which depends from claim 1 and recites that the mobile device “further compris[es] a safety switch,” meaning it is a separate element from the panic button. Ex. 1001, 9:3–4. Thus, moving the safety switch into position readies the panic button, which is not the same as the panic button readying itself to perform functions in claims 1–8 of the ’404 patent. Patent Owner does not sufficiently address this issue in its assertions. See Prelim. Resp. 5–7. Patent Owner’s reliance on disclosures elsewhere in the ’404 patent is likewise not persuasive. Prelim. Resp. 5–6. For example, the ’353 application mentions “ready” in relation to using a self-defense mechanism such as pepper spray, which has not been shown to be related to the panic button. Ex. 1006, 5, 9–10. Although Patent Owner relies on the ’353 application’s description of voice activation using a codeword, voice activation does not ready the panic button for activation to perform functions, but actually activates the panic button to perform those functions. Prelim. Resp. 6 (citing Ex. 1006, 17). Petitioner thus met its burden here to demonstrate that claims 1–8 of the ’404 patent lack written description support for a panic button adapted to “ready itself” to perform the recited functions because the limitation is not present in the ’353 application to which the ’404 patent claims priority. Pet. 8–10. The burden of production thus shifted to Patent Owner to demonstrate that the ’353 application has written description support for this limitation, which it has not done on this record. Prelim. Resp. 5–7.” slip op. at 17
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“of the proceeding, we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertions that at least one of claims 1–8 of the ’404 patent would have been obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 based on the ground set forth in the Petition. Accordingly, we institute trial for all challenged claims on all grounds asserted by Petitioner. See SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018). Our factual findings, conclusions of law, and determinations at this stage of the proceeding are preliminary, and based on the evidentiary record developed thus far. At this stage of the proceeding, we have not made a final determination with respect to the patentability of the challenged claims or to the construction of any claim term. V. ORDER For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review of claims 1–8 of the ’404 patent is hereby instituted on all challenges to patentability set forth in the Petition; and” slip op. at 31
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Petitioner has shown sufficiently that a POSITA would have combined DiPerna964 and Strack with a reasonable expectation of success. Pet. 16–18. DiPerna964 and Strack are directed to similar mobile devices for use in security and emergency situations. Id. at 16–17. Petitioner demonstrates sufficiently that a POSITA would have regarded Strack’s arming and timer technique as an improvement that would have been useful with DiPerna964’s mobile device (at least in some circumstances) to provide the user with additional time to evaluate whether triggering the 911 call is warranted. Id. at 17–18. This amounts to the use of a known technique to improve similar devices in the same way, which is a recognized rationale for combining prior art references. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 401, 417 (2007). Accordingly, on this record, Petitioner has presented a reasonable likelihood that a POSITA would have combined DiPerna964 and Strack with a reasonable expectation of success. Pet. 16–18.” slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,265,404 - Cradlepoint, Inc. / Sierra Wireless, Inc. et al. v. Sisvel International S.A.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 18, 2022 · IPR2020-01102 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5, 15–20, 30, and 31 are unpatentable as obvious over Qualcomm and TS25.322; claims 6–14 and 21–29 were not shown unpatentable. Substitute claims 32–35, 45–49, 59, and 60 were denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention “would have a degree in electrical engineering or similar discipline, with at least three years of relevant industry or research experience in telecommunication, including familiarity with cellular communications technologies,” that this person “would also have familiarity with WCDMA,” and that “[t]his definition is approximate,” as “more education may substitute for industry experience or vice versa.” Pet. 12–13 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 30–34). We adopted Petitioner’s proposal at institution. See Decision 7–8. In its Response, Patent Owner “proposes that a person having ordinary skill at the time of invention—August 23, 2005—in the relevant art would be one with a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer sciences, or telecommunications, along with three to five or more years of practical experience in the field” and that “[a] combination of more experience in the field and less education or more education and less experience in the field would also suffice.” PO Resp. 8 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 27). Patent Owner asserts that “[a]lthough [its] proposed level of skill in the art is similar to Petitioners’ proposal, Patent Owner includes the qualification that a combination of more experience in the field and less education, or more education and less experience in the field would also suffice.” Id. The parties do not argue that the formulation of the level of skill in the art affects any issue in this case, and we maintain our adoption of Petitioner’s formulation, which we find to be generally consistent with the disclosures of the ’443 patent and the prior art, and which includes that “more education may substitute for industry experience or vice versa.”” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“length indicator” to mean “a single length indicator that provides two pieces of information: (1) that a first data octet of the protocol data unit is a first octet of a first service data unit; and (2) that at least one other octet of the protocol data unit is the last octet of another service data unit.” See Prelim. Resp. 9–10. We agreed with Patent Owner that the specification’s description of a single length indicator that conveys both types of information and the arguments made during prosecution that the claims required a “single LI” or “the same length indicator” to include both types of information were sufficient to support a construction that required a single length indicator to include both pieces of information. See Decision 9. Although it did not propose a construction in the Petition, Petitioner now argues that “the claim language uses the indefinite article ‘a’ to modify ‘length indicator’” and that “[p]recedent is well settled that ‘an indefinite article ‘a’ or ‘an’ in patent parlance carries the meaning of ‘one or more’ in open-ended claims containing the transitional phrase ‘comprising.’” Pet. Reply 5 (citing KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). While we agree with Petitioner that “a” may mean “one or more,” that simply means that the addition of more length indicators would not be excluded from the scope of the claim. Petitioner does not explain, and we do not see, how that affects the meaning of “length indicator” itself and, for the reasons argued by Patent Owner and adopted at institution, we maintain the earlier construction of “length indicator” as “a single length indicator that provides two pieces of information: (1) that a first data octet of the protocol data unit is a first octet of a first service data unit; and (2) that at least one other octet of the protocol data unit is the last octet of another service data unit.” See Decision 8; Prelim. Resp. 9–12; PO Resp. 10–13. slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“We also observe that, although Patent Owner characterizes this issue as one based on “teaching away” (see, e.g., PO Resp. 3; PO Sur-Reply 15– 16), the argument is not about teaching away because Patent Owner is not pointing us to any specific teaching in the prior art, or elsewhere, that would counsel against the proposed modification. Patent Owner is not arguing that something in the prior art disparages or discourages the use of one bit of an LI as a flag. Instead, Patent Owner is arguing that one of skill in the art would not pursue the Qualcomm approach because to do so would mean accepting other drawbacks that would flow from the use of the flag. In any event, we credit Patent Owner’s evidence that dedicating a bit of the LI for use as a flag would reduce the length that could be represented by the remaining bits of the LI and cause SDUs to be divided into more PDUs. See, e.g., Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 30, 32. However, the record also shows that use of the flag would provide a specific advantage, as described in Qualcomm. See Ex. 1006, 3; Ex. 1007 ¶ 253. This is the motivation advanced by Petitioner which, notably, Patent Owner does not dispute. We conclude that, even if Patent Owner is correct that the proposal in Qualcomm would reduce the permitted PDU size from 128 octets to 64, the change would merely be something a skilled artisan would need to weigh against the advantages that the Qualcomm technique would provide. Patent Owner may be correct that the reduced lengths would, in the end, render the modified system unsuitable for certain applications or for adoption in a standard. That would not, however, make the modification nonobvious, particularly where the exact change proposed in the combination was suggested by individuals working in the field, as evidenced by Qualcomm itself.7 The record shows that at least some of those working in the field, at the time of the invention, believed that the advantages of Qualcomm’s approach would outweigh the reduced lengths.” slip op. at 20
- BurdenMixed
“In TS25.322, the value “0000000” is a predefined, special value used to indicate that “[t]he previous RLC PDU was exactly filled with the last segment of an RLC SDU and there is no ‘Length Indicator’ that indicates the end of the RLC SDU in the previous RLC PDU.” See Ex. 1005, 36–37. However, although Qualcomm specifically contemplates implementing its flag scheme by “[r]e-arrang[ing] special LI values as they are now coded on less number of bits” (Ex. 1006, 4), the Petition did not argue a combination that includes modification of the special LIs for the independent claims. Instead, Petitioner relied on Qualcomm’s proposal to modify ordinary LIs that indicate the end of SDUs. See, e.g., Pet. 71–72 (describing and illustrating modification of the LI that identified the end of SDU 1: “[t]he green modified LI indicates that a first data octet of PDU is a first octet of SDU1 and another octet of the PDU is the last octet of SDU1”); Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 261–262. Petitioner’s argument with respect to these claims is thus not consistent with the argument it advanced for the independent claims from which these claims depend. Petitioner cannot reasonably rely on one type of prior art LI as the “length indicator” of claim 1, but then shift to a different type of prior art LI when addressing the very same “length indicator” recited in a dependent claim. Moreover, Petitioner fails to explain how or why the special LI “0000000” that is used to indicate the layout of the previous PDU could reasonably be used to also indicate the layout of the current PDU in which the LI appears. For example, if the previous PDU did not meet the condition identified by the “0000000” special value, then the LI would not appear in the next PDU even if that next PDU had a first SDU that ended in that PDU. For these reasons, Petitioner has not provided sufficient explanation or argument to establish obviousness of claims 6 and 21.9” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 7,894,443 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,894,443 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Acorn Semi, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 12, 2022 · IPR2020-01205 · APJ John R Kenny · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 6, 8–12, and 14–16 are unpatentable as anticipated by Grupp ’483; the priority applications do not support or enable the claims’ full scope.
RulingsFinal written decision- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateEntitled to earlier dateMixed
“To support a claim to a genus, a specification must disclose “either a representative number of species falling within the scope of the genus or structural features common to the members of the genus so that one of skill in the art can ‘visualize or recognize’ the members of the genus.” Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). Here, the recited genus is an interface layer comprising a metal oxide, where the interface layer is configured to provide a specific contact resistivity between a contact metal and a semiconductor of than 1 Ω- μm2. Ex. 1001, 18:37–43. It is undisputed that the only species the pre- 2011 priority applications disclose is TiO2, as set forth in the following passage: Two other properties of the dielectric deserve mention. First is the property of the height of the barrier compared to the semiconductor conduction band (for electrons). In making the barrier thinner than a silicide barrier, the tradeoff may be a higher tunnel barrier (e.g., 2 eV for nitride, compared with about half the gap of 0.6 eV for silicide). Spacer layers may be used with lower barriers (e.g., TiO2 has a barrier of less than 1 eV). Nevertheless, even with the higher barrier to electrons, the present inventors have determined that the resistance can still be one hundred times lower than a contact to silicon with a silicide barrier. Id. at 17:59–18:2 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 18
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Enablement (Wands, Amgen full scope)Not enabledNot entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“evidence shows, that the disclosure does not enable specific contact resistance down to zero. Ex. 1016, Schubert Decl. ¶¶ 87–90. Instead, Patent Owner argues that one of skill in the art would have understood there to be an “inherent lower limit” and that the claims are enabled because one of skill in the art could achieve that lower limit through experimentation based on the disclosure of patent. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument, for two main reasons. First, we do not agree that the cases cited by Patent Owner establish that the enablement requirement is satisfied if one of skill in the art could experiment in accordance with the disclosure to find a practical end of an open ended range recited in a claim. Patent Owner principally relies on Andersen Corp. v. Fiber Composites, but the Federal Circuit in that case affirmed the jury verdict of enablement because “the upper limit of the Young’s modulus of the structural member would lie somewhere between the Young’s modulus of the wood fiber and that of the polymer used in the composition.” 474 F.3d at 1377. In other words, there were two known quantities that provided a fixed range. That is not the case here, where Patent Owner does not point to any such predefined limits. Patent Owner also cites a district court case, PerkinElmer Health Scis., Inc. v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 962 F. Supp. 2d 304, 310 (D. Mass. 2013). That case is not directly on point, because it was considering claim construction and not enablement, but that court also found an existing practical upper limit to the” slip op. at 36
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“Neither party asks for a construction of the subject claim language, and we determine that the plain meaning of “a specific contact resistivity . . . of less than 1Ω μm2” would encompass all specific contact resistances below 1 Ω-μm2 and down to zero.” slip op. at 35
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableReference is prior artUnpatentable
“reference for purposes of anticipation under section 102 [] differs from the enablement standard under section 112.” Rasmusson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 413 F.3d 1318, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Enablement under section 112, which is required for priority under section 120, requires enablement of the full breadth of a claim. Wyeth and Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories, 720 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2013); MagSil, 687 F.3d at 1384; 35 U.S.C. § 120. Enablement for anticipation does not; rather it requires only enablement of an embodiment or embodiments that fall within the scope of the claim. Chester v. Miller, 906 F.2d 1574, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“a CIP's claim for a genus might not be enabled by a parent's disclosure, but that parent may enable a species that anticipates the CIP's claim for a genus . . . . the Court of Custom and Patent Appeals [] made clear the differences between the requirements for claim-anticipating disclosures and for claim-supporting disclosures”) (citing In re Lukach, 442, F.2d 967, 969–970 (CCPA 1971)). Here, the enablement challenge for priority is for a lack of enablement of the full breadth of the recited range, and in particular, a lack of enablement of the lower part of the recited range (that which is at or near zero). No party has argued that the upper part of the recited range (just below 1 Ω-μm2) is not enabled by either the priority applications or Grupp ’483. See, e.g., Pet. 20; PO Resp. 1–2; Pet. Reply 27–28; PO Sur-reply 17– 18. And enablement by a prior art patent is presumed. In re Antor Media Pharm., Inc., 545 F.3d 1312, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Thus, the record does not reflect an inconsistency in holding the priority applications as not enabling the breadth of the recited range while treating Grupp ’483 as enabling the upper part of the range for anticipation. As set forth below, we find that Petitioner has proven that Grupp ’483 anticipates every challenged claim.” slip op. at 42
Patent outcomesUS 9,461,167 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosurecites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,461,167
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.