- Apple Inc. v. Paul PoniatowskiAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 2, 2025 · IPR2024-00731 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–6, 8–13, 15–20, and 22–27 are unpatentable as obvious over Wang, Dua, and Yong.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). For purposes of this proceeding, Petitioner argues a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or equivalent with one to two years of experience in the field of mobile transactions.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 35–37). Petitioner adds that “[a]dditional education or experience might substitute for the above requirements.” Id. Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp. 2 US Patent App. Pub. No. US 2002/0023215 A1 (Ex. 1004). 3 US Patent App. Pub. No. US 2006/0165060 A1 (Ex. 1005). 4 Korean Unexamined Patent App. Pub. No. 10-2007-0063899 (Ex. 1006). Petitioner submits Yong’s Korean-language patent application and a certified translation of the same. See id. We refer to the English-language translation of Yong. To the extent necessary, and for purposes of this Decision, we accept the assessment offered by Petitioner, as it is supported by Dr. Bederson’s testimony and appears consistent with the ’578 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); Ex. 1003 ¶ 36.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther
“We agree with Petitioner that nothing in the claim language or the Specification requires that the claimed optical input receive information concerning the prices of goods directly from the goods themselves. Patent Owner does not explicitly address the claim construction of this term. See PO Resp. Patent Owner, however, does assert that “it would be logical for those skilled in [the] art to apply any available technology to further modify and improve the shopping experience by taking a scan/pic of the products bar codes, instead of entering them manually.” Id. at 2–3. This assertion is not inconsistent with a finding that the scanned bar code information may be received indirectly. Accordingly, on this record, we construe the term “receiving information concerning the prices of goods” to encompass receiving pricing information from a server.” slip op. at 9
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that the Priority Applications do not disclose the optical input and network hub limitations or their equivalent. As Petitioner argues, “disclosure in a parent application that merely renders the later-claimed invention obvious is not sufficient to meet the written description requirement; the disclosure must describe the claimed invention with all its limitations.” Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997)) (“It is not sufficient…that the disclosure, when combined with the knowledge in the art, would lead one to speculate as to modifications that the inventor might have envisioned, but failed to disclose”). Reply 4. Accordingly, for the purposes of determining eligible prior art for this Decision, we rely on the ’578 patent’s application filing date of October 19, 2009.” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“We determine that the preponderance of the evidence supports Petitioner arguments that the cited references are analogous art. Our reviewing court has stated that “[t]wo separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor's endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotes omitted). While these two criteria are helpful in many instances, we must not lose sight of the key question at hand: what is “prior art” as that term is used in 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)? References that are “too remote to be treated as ‘prior art’” are excluded from the obviousness analysis. In re Sovish, 769 F.2d 738, 741, 226 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The non-analogous art test provides helpful insight on the underlying question of what is “prior art” within the meaning of the statute; we should not, however, be blind to the reality of the circumstances of the case before us. In re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036 (CCPA (1979). Nor should we adhere to rigid and mandatory formulas that overly limit the inquiry. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007). Focusing on the first of the two tests above, the test for analogous art “requires the PTO to determine the appropriate field of endeavor by reference to explanations of the invention’s subject matter in the patent application, including the embodiments, function, and structure of the claimed invention.” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325. We thus consider all explanations of the inventors’ subject matter while keeping in mind that prior art is analogous when it “is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed. . . .” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1320 (emphasis added). Thus, “field of endeavor” should not be defined narrowly based only upon the specific problem addressed.” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 8,270,578 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,270,578 - PTAB · Sep 19, 2025 · PGR2025-00025 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–19 and all asserted grounds, finding it more likely than not that claim 1 is anticipated by the Gatorade Label.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“if “the information presented in the petition . . . demonstrate[s] that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Post-grant review is available for patents that issue from applications that at one point contained at least one claim with an effective filing date on or after March 16, 2013. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), §§ 3(n)(1), 6(f)(2)(A). After considering the briefing and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has shown that the ’422 Patent is eligible for post-grant review and has shown it is more likely than not that at least one challenged claim of the ’422 Patent is unpatentable under § 324(a). Accordingly, we institute a post-grant review of the challenged claims of the ’422 Patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would possess at least (1) a Bachelor’s degree in chemistry or a related field, with (2) five years of experience in material identification and characterization using multiple analytical methods and field sampling, or equivalent research or professional experience.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1014 ¶ 24). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition for one of ordinary skill in the art nor provide a proposed definition of its own. See generally Prelim. Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed proposal regarding the level of one of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer foundDecided for patent owner
“336. The applicant explained that not all combinations of shrink films and light blocking materials are recyclable. Id. at 335. The applicant explained that films can be compatible with PET recycling in two ways, (1) the film can float in water and be separated from PET that sinks in water or (2) the PET films crystallize and “can be recovered with the PET stream.” Id. at 336 (citing “A Resource Document by the Association of Plastic Recyclers (APR)”) (found at Ex. 1002, 323–332) (emphasis omitted). The applicant explained that “removing the label before or during the recycling process is not evidence of the recyclability of the label” and that “[r]emoving the label during the recycling process is not equivalent to actually recycling the label.” Id. at 335. As such, a POSITA reading the prosecution history would understand that a label is not recyclable with a PET container, as recited by the independent claims, by removing the label from the PET recycle stream before or during the recycling process.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther
“To determine how a person skill in the art would determine if a shrink label is “recyclable” as recited in the independent claims, we look to how the Specification of the ’422 Patent describes or defines recyclable shrink labels. For example, the ’422 Patent states that PET shrink films are generally considered recyclable if no inks are retained on the film after a caustic wash cycle typically used in PET reclaiming processes. Ex. 1001, 6:61–65. The ’422 Patent further states that labels are fully recyclable if the polymers used are clear, preferably clear PET, and the labels include inks that can be washed off in a “typical PET recycling wash (caustic wash).” Id. at 11:44– 49; see also id. at 11:49–54 (describing embodiments in which the labels are free or substantially free of inks that cannot be washed off in a caustic wash or where the labels are free or substantially free of color plastics that cannot be recycled). The ’422 Patent further discusses “industry standards” for determining whether various embodiments of shrink labels are recyclable. See, e.g., id. at 11:29–53. For example, the Specification states that the “Association for Plastic Recyclers (APR) Critical Guidance Protocol for Clear PET Articles with Labels and Closures (PET-CG-02)” (Ex. 1005) can certify that a film is fully recyclable with a container or bottle. Id. at 11:34– 38. Additionally, the Specification states that labels “are recyclable according to the Evaluation of the Near Infrared (NIR) Sorting Potential of a Whole Plastic Article (SORT-B-01)” (Ex. 1010) and/or the “Evaluation of Sorting Potential for Plastic Articles Utilizing Metal, Metalized, or Metallic Printed Components (SORT-B-03)” (Ex. 1011). Ex. 1001, 11:39–44. The ’422 Patent further states that embodiments of the labels “are fully recyclable. For example, the labels may include inks that can be washed off in a typical PET recycling wash (caustic wash) and the polymers” are preferably clear PET. Id. at 11:44–48. The ’422 Patent thus provides various descriptions or standards to determine the recyclability of shrink labels. For the purposes of addressing the anticipation and obviousness grounds, we determine that any of these standards can be used to determine if a shrink label is “recyclable.” We note that our construction is preliminary and is based on the present record. We invite the parties to further the address the construction of “wherein the recyclable shrink label is recyclable with a PET container” during trial.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · NautilusPatents in suitUS 11,961,422 - Motorola Mobility LLC v. Largan Precision Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 3, 2024 · IPR2022-01156 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4, 6–16, 18–24, 28, and 29 are unpatentable as anticipated by Chen-069, which is prior art because the 2012 application lacks written-description support for their full scope.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’948 patent would have had “(i) a Bachelor’s degree in Physics, Optical Sciences, or equivalent education or training, as well as (ii) approximately three years of experience in designing multi-lens optical systems.” Id. at 12 (quoting Pet. 13–14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 28)). We also found that “[l]ack of work experience could have been offset by additional education, and vice versa,” and that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have understood the fundamentals of optical aberration theory, and understood and used standard techniques for making lenses cheaper and more effective, especially for lens systems used in mobile devices.” Id. (quoting Pet. 14; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 28, 30). We also agreed with Petitioner and found that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have known how to use lens design software such as Code V, Oslo, and ZEMAX, and would have taken a lens design course or had equivalent training.” Id. (quoting Pet. 14; Ex. 1003 ¶ 29). We also agreed with Petitioner and found that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have regularly used such software to create new lens designs, often using pre-existing lens designs as a starting point and then performing routine optimizations to reach a desired design.” Id. at 12–13 (quoting Pet. 14; Ex. 1003 ¶ 29). Patent Owner does not identify a level of skill in the art that one would have had at the time of the invention of the ’948 patent or identify any shortcoming in Petitioner’s formulation. See PO Resp. 16–17. Because Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art is consistent with the ’948 patent and the asserted prior art, we maintain it for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579; In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner argues that construing the challenged “claims to include first and second lens elements having the same refractive power . . . is improper.” PO Resp. 21. According to Patent Owner, one of ordinary skill in the art “would construe the [’]948 [p]atent claims to include first and second lens elements in the form of a ‘doublet,’ which requires the respective lens elements to have opposite refractive power, and thus includes only configurations” of “positive-negative” and “negative-positive” for the first and second lens elements, respectively. Id. at 20–21. In other words, “[t]he proper construction of the ’948 [p]atent claims is that the first and second lens elements may have positive-negative or negative-po[sitive] refractive powers, but would not include first and second lens elements having the same refractive polarity,” according to Patent Owner. Id. at 26. Thus, the parties agree that the challenged claims should be construed to encompass at least a lens system having a first lens element with a negative refractive power and a second lens element with a positive refractive power. See, e.g., Pet. 33; PO Resp. 21. We conclude that such a lens system is consistent with the plain language of the challenged claims. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 12:8–26, 13:14–38, 14:16–46 (reciting first and second lens elements without reciting a specific refractive power polarity for the independent claims). And we determine that no claim terms require further construction in light of our findings below. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”).” slip op. at 10
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“In sum, we determine that the 2012 application does not provide written description support for an imaging lens system with a negative refractive power first lens and a positive refractive power second lens. And the agreed scope of the challenged claims includes such a configuration, and thus, the written description of the 2012 application does not support the full breadth of the challenged claims. We therefore determine that the challenged claims of the ʼ948 patent do not benefit from the priority date of the 2012 application. Therefore, we determine that Chen-069 is prior art to the challenged claims of the ʼ948 patent.” slip op. at 23
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“After reviewing Petitioner’s arguments and evidence, which are not addressed by Patent Owner (see generally PO Resp.), we determine that Petitioner demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that Chen-069 anticipates claim 1. D. Remaining Challenged Claims Petitioner argues that Chen-069 discloses the limitations recited in claims 2–4, 6–16, 18–24, 28, and 29. Pet. 48–65. Patent Owner does not address Petitioner’s arguments directed to these claims. See generally PO Resp. 32–34. Based on the evidence and arguments of record, we find that Petitioner demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that Chen-069 anticipates claims 2–4, 6–16, 18–24, 28, and 29.” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 9,784,948 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,784,948 - PTAB · Apr 10, 2023 · IPR2022-01406 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 under all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Google would prevail on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and any preliminary response shows that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to the challenged claims and grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“declarant Dr. Madisetti, that McCarthy does not provide written description support for the ’005 claims. McCarthy makes no mention of virtual machines and there is nothing in McCarthy that would suggest to one of ordinary skill in the art that the applicants had in mind the use of virtual machines as an embodiment of their invention. Our determination is informed by our interpretation, discussed in Section III.C above, that “virtual machine” encompasses software that mimics or emulates at least the basic functionality of a computer processor, but that merely virtualizing a resource such as memory or I/O devices does not create a virtual machine. Patent Owner’s attorney arguments are unpersuasive as citing irrelevant examples of virtual machines that interact with physical resources such as a host computer, memory or I/O devices, but which nevertheless mimic or emulate at least the basic functionality of a computer processor, unlike the partitions of McCarthy, which physically contain computer processors. McCarthy narrowly describes physical partitions, which do not mimic or emulate a computer processor and are not virtual machines. We understand that the statement in McCarthy that the “present invention” may be “implemented in software” (at paragraph 57 of McCarthy) merely refers to the fact that such components as the PLM, WLM, and performance monitor are software modules running on physical processors. We also agree with Petitioner that the reference to virtual partitions in McCarthy refers to the possibility that a partition hardware can be located in more than one computer, and has nothing to do with the use of virtual machines. Reply 2. Nor are we persuaded that the possibility of more than one partition residing in a single computer means that the partitions must be virtual, given that multiple processors can be in a single computer and a single processor can be partitioned by physically allocating its resources to multiple processes. Ex. 1013, Figs. 1A, 1B, ¶¶ 4, 8. As Petitioner argues, the ’005 patent explicitly distinguishes virtual machines from partitions as two separate species of the computer domain genus: Although some representative embodiments have been described in terms of allocating physical resources between partitions, representative embodiments may allocate resources between any suitable computing domain. Another suitable computing domain is a virtual machine. Reply 2 (citing Ex. 1001, 13:37–41). Unlike the ’005 patent, McCarthy confines its disclosure to partitions, and makes no mention of a computer domains genus or a virtual machines species. Accordingly, we determine, on the current record and for purposes of this decision, that the information presented in the Petition demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in establishing that McCarthy is prior art to the ’005 patent claims.6” slip op. at 21
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date, deniedDecided for petitioner
“declarant Dr. Madisetti, that McCarthy does not provide written description support for the ’005 claims. McCarthy makes no mention of virtual machines and there is nothing in McCarthy that would suggest to one of ordinary skill in the art that the applicants had in mind the use of virtual machines as an embodiment of their invention. Our determination is informed by our interpretation, discussed in Section III.C above, that “virtual machine” encompasses software that mimics or emulates at least the basic functionality of a computer processor, but that merely virtualizing a resource such as memory or I/O devices does not create a virtual machine. Patent Owner’s attorney arguments are unpersuasive as citing irrelevant examples of virtual machines that interact with physical resources such as a host computer, memory or I/O devices, but which nevertheless mimic or emulate at least the basic functionality of a computer processor, unlike the partitions of McCarthy, which physically contain computer processors. McCarthy narrowly describes physical partitions, which do not mimic or emulate a computer processor and are not virtual machines. We understand that the statement in McCarthy that the “present invention” may be “implemented in software” (at paragraph 57 of McCarthy) merely refers to the fact that such components as the PLM, WLM, and performance monitor are software modules running on physical processors. We also agree with Petitioner that the reference to virtual partitions in McCarthy refers to the possibility that a partition hardware can be located in more than one computer, and has nothing to do with the use of virtual machines. Reply 2. Nor are we persuaded that the possibility of more than one partition residing in a single computer means that the partitions must be virtual, given that multiple processors can be in a single computer and a single processor can be partitioned by physically allocating its resources to multiple processes. Ex. 1013, Figs. 1A, 1B, ¶¶ 4, 8.” slip op. at 21
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“onto Modern System Architectures,” is a paper presented at the “UniForum 1992 Conference Proceedings” in January, 1992. Ex. 1014, Ex. A. Petitioner presents evidence and argument directed to the public availability of Gien as pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) prior art to the ’005 patent. Pet. 24– 25 (citing Ex. 1014, Statutory Declaration of Anthony William Corsini & Ex. A). Patent Owner argues that the Corsini declaration, and Gien, are inadmissible “for lack of a perjury and warning statement.” Prelim. Rep. 13 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1001; 28 U.S.C. § 1746; 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.68, 42.2). However, the declaration is made in London pursuant to the United Kingdom Statutory Declarations Act 1835. In addition, the Declaration of James L. Mullins supports a finding of public accessibly of Gien. Ex. 1029. At this stage, we accord Gien prior art status.9 9 Although we do not address at this stage whether additional evidence on this issue would be called for, we note that under similar circumstances supplemental declarations have been allowed. Hulu v. Sound View Innovations, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 (Dec. 20, 2019): “[I]f the patent owner challenges a reference’s status as a printed publication, a petitioner may submit a supporting declaration with its reply to further support its argument that a reference qualifies as a printed publication. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.2 (affidavit), 42.23.”” slip op. at 26
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,748,005 - PTAB · Jan 26, 2023 · IPR2022-01172 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1–4, 6, and 9 on both grounds: anticipation by Chen359 and obviousness over Tanaka and Bareau.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“Turning to the first part of the framework, there is no dispute that, although Chen359 is an ancestor to the ʼ397 patent, it was not previously presented to the Office in the context of determining patentability of the claims of the ʼ397 patent. Instead, Patent Owner argues that the Examiner issued the challenged claims without finding that they lack written description support from the Specification of the ’397 patent, and therefore, implicitly, also from the 2011 application. Prelim. Resp. 16 (citing Ex. 1002, 1213–17). A review of the prosecution history of the ’397 patent, however, shows that there were no arguments raised regarding written description support or whether any of the prior applications in the chain constituted prior art to the ʼ397 patent. Nor were there any arguments otherwise calling into question the priority date of the ʼ397 patent. And there certainly were no arguments made that Chen359 was prior art to the ʼ397 patent. The Examiner, therefore, did not analyze written description support in relation to these prior applications. We therefore conclude that, as to the first ground, the same or substantially the same art or arguments were not previously presented to the Office. Because we determine that the facts do not satisfy the first part of the Advanced Bionics framework, we need not address the second part of the framework.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“Notably, Petitioner argues that “Sunny is not time-barred” from filing a Petition challenging the ʼ397 patent (Prelim. Reply 1) and Patent Owner does not dispute this contention. We thus find that for purposes of institution, we need not address whether Sunny is an unnamed real party-ininterest “because, even if it were, it would not create a time bar or estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 315.” SharkNinja Operating LLC v. iRobot Corp., IPR2020-00734, Paper 11 at 18 (PTAB Oct. 6, 2020) (precedential); see also Intel Corp. v. Alacritech, Inc., IPR2017-01391, Paper 8 at 3–6 (PTAB Nov. 28, 2017) (holding that the Board will not address the argument for purposes of institution that a litigation co-defendant should be a named a real party-ininterest in the absence of an allegation that the co-defendant would be time barred under section 315(b)). We find that this “approach better serves the interest of cost and efficiency.” SharkNinja, Paper 11 at 20; 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b). Accordingly, we find that Patent Owner’s arguments concerning Sunny not being named as a real party-in-interest do not form a basis to deny institution under our circumstances.” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“V. CONCLUSION Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’397 patent. At this stage of the proceeding, however, we have not made a final determination with respect to the patentability of the challenged claims. VI. ORDER For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review of claims 1–4, 6, and 9 of the ’397 patent is instituted with respect to all grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition; and FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(c) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(b), inter partes review of the ’397 patent shall commence on the entry date of this Order, and notice is hereby given of the institution of a trial.” slip op. at 40
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“In order to determine whether the 2011 application provides written description support for the claims of the ʼ397 patent, we look to see whether the specification of the 2011 application “reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter [of the challenged claims] as of the filing date [of the 2011 application].” Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). “[T]he purpose of the written description requirement is to ‘ensure that the scope of the right to exclude, as set forth in the claims, does not overreach the scope of the inventor’s contribution to the field of art as described in the patent specification.’” Id. at 1353–54 (quoting University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 358 F.3d 916, 920 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Thus, whether the specification complies with the written description requirement calls for the comparison of the scope of the claim with the scope of the description to determine whether the inventor has demonstrated possession of the claimed invention. First, we look to the claims to determine their scope. Here we agree with Petitioner that independent claim 1 of the ʼ397 patent does not limit the first lens element to having a particular refractive power. The plain language of claim 1 recites “a first lens element” without specifying the lens as having a specific refractive power or any other configuration or characteristic. Ex. 1001, 31:65. Thus, we determine that the scope of claim 1 encompasses a first lens having either a positive or negative refractive power. Next, we look at the written description of the 2011 application. The Summary of the Invention section of the 2011 application repeatedly describes the invention as having “a first lens element with positive refractive power.” Ex. 1005, 2:10–11; see 2:22–23 (“the first lens element with a positive refractive power”); 3:9–11 (“the first lens element with the positive power provides partial refractive power needed by the optical imaging system and reduces the total optical length.”). The Detailed Description of the Preferred Embodiments likewise describes a “first lens element 110 with a positive refractive power.” Id. at 7:13. Each of the eight embodiments and associated figures show the first lens as having a positive refractive power. Id. at 18:2, 21:2, 24:2, 27:2, 30:2, 33:2, 36:2, Tables 1-2, 2-2, 3-2, 4-2, 5-2, 6-2, 7-2, 8-2, Figs. 1A, 2A, 3A, 4A, 5A, 6A, 7A, 8A.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,564,397 - Apple Inc. v. Ericsson Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Oct 28, 2022 · IPR2022-00715 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–9 under both § 103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Apple would prevail over Luo and Zhang, and Luo, Zhang, and Nilsen.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and any preliminary response shows that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to the challenged claims and grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- BurdenOther
“preponderance of the evidence that the claims are unpatentable. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d). “In an IPR, the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (2012) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to the patent owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review).” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal at this stage of the proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 8–9. Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). On this record, the level of ordinary skill is neither in dispute nor dispositive of any challenge. For purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s articulation.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther
“Petitioner’s constructions of internal and external networks are consistent with the definitions in the ’454 Specification, quoted in Section II.A above, and we adopt them for the purposes of this Decision. Ex. 1001, 5:37–39. Petitioner’s proposed requirement that “transitioning communications from said first network to said second network” comply with the “make-before-break” embodiment disclosed in the ’454 Specification is not appropriate given the broad language of this claim element. See Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enter., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004): Though understanding the claim language may be aided by explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim limitations that are not part of the claim. For example, a particular embodiment appearing in the written description may not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the embodiment. Petitioner’s proposed statement of the functions and corresponding disclosed structures for the “means-plus-function” elements of claims 6, 7, and 9 are unchallenged and appear reasonable, and we adopt them for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,792,454 - PTAB · Oct 11, 2022 · IPR2022-00462 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–22 on all challenges, finding a reasonable likelihood that Apple would show the claims obvious over Young.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“to institute an inter partes review. We may institute an inter partes review only if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018- 01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). Based on the current record and for the reasons explained below, Petitioner has shown that there is a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–22 in the ’726 patent on all challenges included in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference is prior artPriority date awardedDecided for petitioner
“The test for written-description support “is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc); Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA, Inc., 851 F.3d 1275, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see Prelim. Resp. 12 (citing Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1344–45). The test “requires an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. The analysis for disclosure sufficiency may consider “such descriptive means as words, structures, figures, diagrams, formulas, etc.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Here, the ’510 provisional reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the UE prohibits itself from sending additional PPI requests. Ex. 1006, 4–5, 38–43; see Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 58–59. In particular, the provisional explains that “once the UE is aware of its current state (e.g. normal configuration or power-optimized configuration), the UE may use the state information to determine an appropriate set of response behaviors.” Ex. 1006, 4; see Ex. 1002 ¶ 59. For example, “a UE in power-optimized configuration may employ inhibit/prohibit mechanisms (e.g. configure prohibit counters, timers, or other parameters) to prevent the UE from sending additional PPI requests to the eNB for a predetermined amount of time.” Ex. 1006, 4; see Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 58–59. By employing inhibit/prohibit mechanisms to control its behavior, the UE prohibits itself from sending additional PPI requests.” slip op. at 21
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateDecided for petitioner
“The test for written-description support “is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc); Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA, Inc., 851 F.3d 1275, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see Prelim. Resp. 12 (citing Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1344–45). The test “requires an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. The analysis for disclosure sufficiency may consider “such descriptive means as words, structures, figures, diagrams, formulas, etc.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Here, the ’510 provisional reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the UE prohibits itself from sending additional PPI requests. Ex. 1006, 4–5, 38–43; see Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 58–59. In particular, the provisional explains that “once the UE is aware of its current state (e.g. normal configuration or power-optimized configuration), the UE may use the state information to determine an appropriate set of response behaviors.” Ex. 1006, 4; see Ex. 1002 ¶ 59. For example, “a UE in power-optimized configuration may employ inhibit/prohibit mechanisms (e.g. configure prohibit counters, timers, or other parameters) to prevent the UE from sending additional PPI requests to the eNB for a predetermined amount of time.” Ex. 1006, 4; see Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 58–59. By employing inhibit/prohibit mechanisms to control its behavior, the UE prohibits itself from sending additional PPI requests.” slip op. at 21
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Enablement (Wands, Amgen full scope)EnabledDecided for petitioner
“To be enabling, the specification of a patent [application] must teach those skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without ‘undue experimentation.’” Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). As Dr. Wells testifies, the ’510 provisional: (1) “includes a detailed Appendix A totaling 52 pages” such that implementing its disclosure would have been “well within the abilities” of an ordinarily skilled artisan; and (2) “provides detailed block diagrams illustrating the hardware involved in the wireless transmitter and receiver system in accordance with the claimed invention” that “would further allow” an ordinarily skilled artisan “to build the claimed system and perform the claimed method.” Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 60–61. At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner cites no evidence rebutting Dr. Wells’s testimony. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 16–20. Nor does Patent Owner identify any evidence that “undue experimentation” would have been needed to make and use the full scope of Young’s claim 5. See, e.g., id. at 16–20. Instead, Patent Owner presents attorney argument. Attorney argument “cannot take the place of evidence.” In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974). Further, the Federal Circuit has held that “regardless of the forum, prior art patents and publications enjoy a presumption of enablement, and the patentee/applicant has the burden to prove nonenablement for such prior art.” Apple Inc. v. Corephotonics, Ltd., 861 F. App’x 443, 450 (Fed. Cir. 2021). During the trial, we invite the parties to address whether that principle applies to a provisional application that (1) becomes publicly available when a nonprovisional application publishes or a patent issues and (2) may have a somewhat different disclosure than the published nonprovisional application or the issued patent. (c) slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,832,726 - Arkema Inc. / Arkema France v. Honeywell International Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 25, 2022 · PGR2016-00012 · APJ Sheldon M Mcgee · PGR · Remand
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable under § 102(a) for prior public use; the Board did not reach the remaining anticipation, obviousness, and enablement grounds.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“On October 1, 2019, the Federal Circuit held that we “abused [our] discretion by assuming the authority that 35 U.S.C. § 255 expressly delegates to the Director: to determine when a Certificate of Correction is appropriate,” and vacated our Final Written Decision. Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Arkema Inc., 939 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2019). The Federal Circuit instructed us to “authorize Honeywell to file a motion seeking leave to petition the Director for a Certificate of Correction.” Id. at 1351. Pursuant to the Federal Circuit’s mandate, we gave our authorization, and Patent Owner filed its Motion for Leave to Request a Certificate of Correction. PGR11 Paper 61; PGR12 Paper 41. After additional briefing from the parties was complete, we granted Patent Owner’s Motion. PGR11 Paper 77; PGR12 Paper 57. Patent Owner filed its Request for a Certificate of Correction, as well as a Petition to Accept [Unintentionally] Delayed Claim to Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 120 and 37 C.F.R. § 1.78. PGR11 Ex. 2174; PGR12 Ex. 2172.” slip op. at 3
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“Synthes USA, LLC v. Spinal Kinetics, Inc., 734 F.3d 1332, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2013). And, although there are no bright-line rules for the amount of disclosure needed in an unpredictable art, that amount “necessarily changes with each invention” and “changes with progress in the field.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. Here, we find that the art of AAC was unpredictable and that a heat-transfer composition for AAC required specific technical features that were unpredictable and unexpected. Thus, we conclude that the ’525 application requires a more-detailed disclosure than would be required in a predictable field to adequately demonstrate possession of a heat-transfer composition consisting essentially of HFO-1234yf and PAG for use in AAC. (iii) Disclosure in the ’525 Application With these background findings in mind, we now turn to the four corners of the ’525 application—and we find that the ’525 application does not contain the detailed disclosure needed in this case to reasonably convey possession of a heat-transfer composition consisting essentially of HFO- 1234yf and PAG for use in AAC.” slip op. at 37
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner
“develops new refrigerants for use as heat transfer fluids. Ex. 1002 ¶ 149. Such a person would have had a Ph.D. in Chemistry, Chemical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, Material Science, or a related field or discipline and at least 3 to 5 years of experience, or alternatively an M.S. degree and 5 to 10 years of experience. Id. Patent Owner’s Declarant, Dr. Bivens, provides a similar description of the person of ordinary skill in the art, stating that such a person would have a B.S. degree in Chemical Engineering or Chemistry, and five years of work experience, or a Ph.D. or M.S. degree and 2–3 years of experience. Ex. 2001 ¶ 23. Based on these descriptions, we find that the parties’ definitions of ordinary skill in the art are substantially the same, and agree with the parties that an ordinarily skilled artisan would be educated in the Chemical and Chemical Engineering arts or related disciplines. We also agree with the parties that a person having less formal education, such as a B.S. or M.S. degree, would require more years of experience than a person with more formal education, such as a Ph.D., to qualify as an ordinarily skilled artisan. We also find that neither party states how any difference in the parties’ articulated levels of skill impacts this proceeding. Thus, our analysis would be the same regardless of any minor differences between the parties’ respective articulations. Finally, we note that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 20
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › On-sale bar (Pfaff, Helsinn)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Tr. 114:15–115:18 (emphases added). Thus, we find that Patent Owner does not contest that a heat-transfer composition consisting essentially of HFO- 1234yf and PAG for AAC was in public commercial use before the March 26, 2014, filing date of the ’017 patent. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner’s evidence, together with Patent Owner’s concessions, demonstrates by a preponderance of evidence that the claimed subject matter of the ’017 patent was in commercial use before its March 26, 2014, effective filing date. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 399–409. In particular, as to claims 1, 3–10, 12, 13, and 15–20, we credit Dr. Brown’s uncontested testimony that the refrigerant-lubricant AAC composition of the Ford Transit Custom Bus, the Mazda CX 5 (2.0i and 2.2D), and the Opel Mocca used HFO-1234yf and a PAG lubricant as early as 2012. Ex. 1002 ¶ 399 (citing Ex. 101324, 2, 38, 55, 70). We also credit Dr. Brown’s 24 Behr Hella Services, Refrigerant and Oil Filling Quantities Passenger Cars & Commercial Vehicles 2014–15. PGR12 Ex. 1013. (“Service Guide”). PGR12 Ex. 1013. The Service Guide provides tables setting forth specifications for refrigerant type, refrigerant quantity, vehicle manufacturers’ original equipment compressor oil type, and oil filling quantity for the air-conditioning system of each vehicle listed in the tables. Id. at 2–3. Petitioner and Dr. Brown direct us to the Sevice Guide’s entries calculations, which show that the Ford Transit Custom Bus had an AAC refrigerant-lubricant composition of 26.7% of PAG lubricant and 73.3% of HFO-1234yf (Ex. 1002 ¶ 401 (citing Ex. 1013, 38)); the Mazda CX 5 2.0i had 16.7% PAG lubricant and 83.3% HFO-1234yf (Ex. 1002 ¶ 402 (citing Ex. 1013, 55)); the Mazda CX 5 2.2D had a 17.5% PAG lubricant and 82.5% HFO-1234yf (id.); and the Opal Mocca had 11.6% PAG lubricant and 88.4% HFO-1234yf (Ex. 1002 ¶ 402 (citing Ex. 1013, 70)). As to dependent claims 2, 11, and 14, which all require that the lubricant is present “in an amount from about 30% to about 50% weight,” we credit Dr. Brown’s uncontested testimony that the refrigerant-lubricant composition of the Ford Transit Custom Bus recited lubricant amount. Ex. 1002 ¶ 403. In particular, we agree with Dr. Brown that, because the lubricant accounts for 26.7% of the AAC refrigerant-lubricant composition in the Ford Transit Custom Bus, the lubricant makes up “about 30%” of the refrigerant-lubricant composition as claimed. Id. For these reasons, we find that Petitioner has met its burden to show that claims 1–20 are unpatentable for anticipation under § 102(a)(1).” slip op. at 55
Patent outcomesUS 9,157,017 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 9,157,017 - Arkema Inc. / Arkema France v. Honeywell International Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 25, 2022 · PGR2016-00011 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · PGR · Remand
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable under § 102(a) for prior public use; the Board did not reach the other anticipation, obviousness, and enablement grounds.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“On October 1, 2019, the Federal Circuit held that we “abused [our] discretion by assuming the authority that 35 U.S.C. § 255 expressly delegates to the Director: to determine when a Certificate of Correction is appropriate,” and vacated our Final Written Decision. Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Arkema Inc., 939 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2019). The Federal Circuit instructed us to “authorize Honeywell to file a motion seeking leave to petition the Director for a Certificate of Correction.” Id. at 1351. Pursuant to the Federal Circuit’s mandate, we gave our authorization, and Patent Owner filed its Motion for Leave to Request a Certificate of Correction. PGR11 Paper 61; PGR12 Paper 41. After additional briefing from the parties was complete, we granted Patent Owner’s Motion. PGR11 Paper 77; PGR12 Paper 57. Patent Owner filed its Request for a Certificate of Correction, as well as a Petition to Accept [Unintentionally] Delayed Claim to Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 120 and 37 C.F.R. § 1.78. PGR11 Ex. 2174; PGR12 Ex. 2172.” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“develops new refrigerants for use as heat transfer fluids. Ex. 1002 ¶ 149. Such a person would have had a Ph.D. in Chemistry, Chemical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, Material Science, or a related field or discipline and at least 3 to 5 years of experience, or alternatively an M.S. degree and 5 to 10 years of experience. Id. Patent Owner’s Declarant, Dr. Bivens, provides a similar description of the person of ordinary skill in the art, stating that such a person would have a B.S. degree in Chemical Engineering or Chemistry, and five years of work experience, or a Ph.D. or M.S. degree and 2–3 years of experience. Ex. 2001 ¶ 23. Based on these descriptions, we find that the parties’ definitions of ordinary skill in the art are substantially the same, and agree with the parties that an ordinarily skilled artisan would be educated in the Chemical and Chemical Engineering arts or related disciplines. We also agree with the parties that a person having less formal education, such as a B.S. or M.S. degree, would require more years of experience than a person with more formal education, such as a Ph.D., to qualify as an ordinarily skilled artisan. We also find that neither party states how any difference in the parties’ articulated levels of skill impacts this proceeding. Thus, our analysis would be the same regardless of any minor differences between the parties’ respective articulations. Finally, we note that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 20
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Petitioner that the ’525 application’s statement that the compounds are “adaptable for use” weighs against a finding of adequate written description. First, “adaptable for use” is vague, as Dr. Bivens acknowledges. See Ex. 1177, 151:15 (testifying that “adaptable for use can have a wide range of meaning”). Second, the ’525 application gives no direction on how a skilled artisan would need to adapt any particular composition for use in AAC, or even if any “adaptation” was necessary. We find that such a teaching is important in this case to show that the inventors had possession of the claimed invention, given our findings above that the art of AAC was unpredictable and that a heat-transfer composition for AAC required specific technical features that were unpredictable and unexpected. For completeness, we again reject Patent Owner’s argument that “[t]o show the inventors possessed claim 1 requires no more” than the statement in the written description that “‘the compositions of the present invention are believed to be adaptable . . . with or without system modification.’” PGR12 Resp. 27–28 (quoting Ex. 1001, 7:4–8). Regardless of the exact wording of claim 1, the inventors “still [had to have] describe[d] some way of performing the claimed methods.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1355. And here, with merely a passing reference to AAC, the ’525 application fails to provide any credible “technologic knowledge” to demonstrate to an ordinarily skilled artisan that Patent Owner “was in possession of the invention that is claimed.” Id.” slip op. at 43
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › On-sale bar (Pfaff, Helsinn)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“unless . . . the claimed invention was . . . in public use . . . before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1). “The proper test for the public use prong . . . is whether the purported use was accessible to the public or was commercially exploited.” Delano Farms Co. v. Cal. Table Grape Comm’n, 778 F.3d 1243, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted). “Commercial exploitation is a clear indication of public use . . . .” Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005).” slip op. at 53
Patent outcomesUS 9,157,017 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 9,157,017 - Google LLC / Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al. v. Parus Holdings, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 19, 2021 · IPR2020-00846 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 4–7, 9, 10, 13, and 14 are unpatentable as obvious over the stated prior-art combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenNew argument disregardedDecided for petitioner
“According to our rules, “[a]rguments must not be incorporated by reference from one document into another document.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3). For example, the Board has explained that “parties that incorporate expert testimony by reference in their petitions, motions, or replies without providing explanation of such testimony risk having the testimony not considered by the Board.” Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 35–36 (November 2019) (“TPG”)3 (citing Cisco Systems, Inc. v. C-Cation Techs., LLC, IPR2014-00454 (PTAB Aug. 29, 2014) (Paper 12) (informative)).” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner, relying on the testimony of Mr. Lipoff, contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a Bachelor’s Degree in electrical engineering, computer science or a related field, and at least two years of experience with voice interfaces and information processing,” and that “[m]ore education could substitute for less experience, and vice versa.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 41–48). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposal or offer an alternative. On the complete record, we are persuaded that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the technology 7 The complete record does not include allegations or evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness. described in the Specification and the cited prior art and adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill.” slip op. at 26
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“proposed combination with Kovatch. PO Resp. 37. According to the Federal Circuit, “[a] reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1333–34 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994)) (alteration in original). However, “the ‘mere disclosure of alternative designs does not teach away.’” Id. at 1334 (quoting In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Indeed, “just because better alternatives exist in the prior art does not mean that an inferior combination is inapt for obviousness purposes.” Id. (citing Gurley, 27 F.3d at 553). Specifically, Patent Owner (PO Resp. 37), points to disclosure in Neal describing disadvantages of a keyword search strategy (e.g., “users must be familiar with the appropriate key word terms that are likely to yield the desired data records”) and disadvantages of a classification search strategy (e.g., “users may not always anticipate the proper classification of certain records, and may search the wrong categories for their desired database record”). Ex. 1007, 2:16–65. Neal then describes a “preferred embodiment” in which “the system manager will expand the scope of the search strategies from ‘exact’ string matches, along a continuum of search methodologies, including perhaps fuzzy logic strategies.” Id. at 7:14–17. According to Neal, “[t]he purpose of expanding the search strategies is to avoid the situation wherein the search fails to identify the desired item from any data set, and thereby drops into logical block 222 a negative search result is reported to the user.” Id. at 7:28–32. Patent Owner argues that “Neal advocates for employing a sequence of search algorithms from the narrowest to the most broad.” PO Resp. 38 (citing Ex. 1007, 7:56–58; Ex. 2059 ¶ 124). Patent Owner contends that Neal teaches away from a combination “that employs a single keyword matching search strategy.” Id. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s combination of Kovatch and Neal results in a system that only sequentially searches datasets using a single keyword matching search strategy, and not the cascading sequence of search methodologies described by Neal. Id. at 37–39. We do not agree with Patent Owner that Neal teaches away from a system that employs a single keyword matching search strategy. Indeed, Neal’s preferred embodiment expressly contemplates such a system. For example, Neal describes employing a first “exact string search” methodology to search a first data set (Figure 2, block 206). Ex. 1007, 6:34– 46. This appears to be what Patent Owner considers a “single keyword matching search strategy.” PO Resp. 37–38. Neal describes that if this search of the first data set does not yield a match, the system searches a second data set using a second search methodology (Figure 2, block 210). Ex. 1007, 6:47–52. However, in the preferred embodiment there is no requirement that the second search methodology in 210 must be different from the first search methodology in 206. For example, if the first preferred supplier did not yield an exact string match to the input search term, the same search methodology could be applied to a second preferred supplier’s catalog. Id. at 6:59–65. Thus, Neal expressly teaches using a single keyword search strategy on a first dataset and the same keyword search strategy on a second dataset, without necessarily employing a cascading sequence of different search methodologies. See Reply 19.” slip op. at 39
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“advertisements while waiting for information to be retrieved; rather, it first retrieves the requested information and then generates an audio stream with both the commercials and retrieved information. Reply 22–23 (citing Ex. 1005, 14:1–8, 18:1–15; Ex. 1057 ¶ 18). Petitioner’s characterization of Kovatch is correct (and Patent Owner’s incorrect). Kovatch’s system first navigates to a destination and retrieves requested information (step 6), then generates commercials (step 8), then intermixes the commercials and information (step 9), and finally returns speech to the user (step 10). Ex. 1005, 14:1–8. We find unavailing Patent Owner’s argument that, when combined, Neal’s teachings would have an adverse impact on Kovatch’s generation and presentation of advertisements.” slip op. at 45
Patent outcomesUS 7,076,431 unpatentable§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,076,431
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.