- Aroma360, LLC v. Air Esscentials, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00706 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 4, and 7–10 are unpatentable as obvious over Goubet and anticipated by Gao; proposed substitute claims 20 and 21 are denied as indefinite and lacking written-description support.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In the Response, Patent Owner states that it “does not dispute” the definition of one of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner, but Patent Owner “reserves the right to address [the definition] should new issues materialize.” PO Resp. 6. Patent Owner did not address this issue in the Sur-reply. As noted in the Decision on Institution, Petitioner’s proposed definition appears generally consistent with the record, including the prior art. See Dec. Inst. 8 (citing In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579). We remove the phrase “at least” in both listed options, however, as that phrase adds ambiguity. Further, Patent Owner has not argued at trial that Petitioner’s proposal for the level of ordinary skill leads to an improper understanding of how a skilled artisan would have understood either the challenged patent or the prior art. In the analysis below, we continue to apply the level of ordinary skill in the art adopted in the Decision on Institution, as proposed by Petitioner.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther
“Network LLC, 929 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2019). At first glance, the language of the limitation at issue—which, again, recites “the compressed air and the operative fluid mix together in said mixing chamber to form the fluid dispersion”—would seem to require the “fluid dispersion” (under the stipulated construction) to be fully formed in the “mixing chamber.” In other words, the language of the limitation alone would seem to support Patent Owner’s proposed construction for the “form the fluid dispersion” limitation. But the claim construction analysis does not end with consideration of the claim language alone. Next, we turn to the Specification. The Federal Circuit has said that the specification “is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). Here, the discussion in the Specification of precisely the same language as in the limitation at issue strongly supports that “to form a fluid dispersion” in the limitation at issue requires only initial mixing of the compressed air and operative fluid in the mixing chamber, with further “formation” of the ”fluid dispersion” occurring downstream of the mixing chamber: More importantly, the “predetermined amount” of compressed air and the “preselected amount” of the operable fluid are initially mixed together in the mixing chamber 226 to form a fluid dispersion. The diffusion chamber 112" is further structured to facilitate the formation of a plurality of substantially uniform droplets, as defined hereinabove, in the fluid dispersion prior to discharge from the diffusion chamber 112" through discharge port 132. Ex. 1001, 10:62–11:2 (emphasis added) (discussing Figure 6), quoted, in part, at Pet. Reply 6–710; see also Ex. 1001, 5:64–6:4 (same language, except without double primes, in a discussion of Figures 1 and 2). To be sure, certain passages in the Specification could be read to indicate that a “fluid dispersion” must be fully formed in the “mixing chamber.” See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 6:11–12 (“More in particular, the suppression chamber 232 receives the fluid dispersion from the mixing chamber 226.”); see also id. at 7:22–33, 11:39–52 (both implying that a “fluid dispersion” is formed in the mixing chamber). But the passage block quoted directly above (and the similar one bridging columns 5 and 6) more directly addresses the issue at hand—i.e., the scope of “form the fluid dispersion”—by using the same” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedMixed
“As an initial matter, the record here does not support any sound basis to disregard the entirety of Dr. Micklow’s Declaration for allegedly not reviewing the parties’ claim constructions. See Pet. Reply 2 (citing Ex. 1046, 115:15–18). Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, in the cited discussion, Dr. Micklow does not indicate that he applied an incorrect understanding of a claim term. Cf. Cordis Corp. v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 658 F.3d 1347, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (disregarding testimony “based on an incorrect understanding of the claim construction”), cited at Pet. Reply 1. Instead, we read Dr. Micklow’s testimony as clarifying that he was not involved in claim construction at all and that, as stated, he “made [his] opinions based on what [he] read in the patents.” Ex. 1046, 112:11–12; see also id. at 115:15–18 (“I don’t know if I would even apply claim construction. I applied engineering principles to a document that had been published with the patent office.”).” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“To satisfy its burden of proving obviousness, a petitioner cannot employ mere conclusory statements. The petitioner must instead articulate specific reasoning, based on evidence of record, to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016); TriVascular, Inc. v. Samuels, 812 F.3d 1056, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Although the KSR test is flexible, the Board ‘must still be careful not to allow hindsight reconstruction of references . . . without any explanation as to how or why the references would be combined to produce the claimed invention.’”) (citation omitted). Based on the complete record, we agree with Patent Owner that “Petitioner’s asserted motivation boils down to the conclusory statement that given Goubet and Kaiser, ‘it was well known in the field at the time of the invention that droplets of greater uniformity result in uniform droplet evaporation.’” PO Resp. 31 (quoting Pet. 59). We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s discussion of the alleged reasons to combine (Pet. 59) is insufficient to support the proposed combination here. See Magnum Oil, 829 F.3d at 1380. Specifically, we are not persuaded that Kaiser’s teachings—which relate to combustion (Ex. 1014 at 43)—would have led one of ordinary skill in the art to the proposed modifications, which would allegedly “improve the smoothness (i.e., less harsh) of the aroma generated as the oil droplets evaporate in the surrounding airspace.” See Pet. 59 (emphasis added); White Pet. Decl. ¶ 251 (same); see PO Resp. 32 (“Rather, Dr. White merely describes the ability to achieve the effect as in the claimed patent, not why a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would look to the field of electrospray injection and combustion in mesoscale power-generation systems, using high-voltage electric fields to generate charged fuel droplets for controlled combustion in catalytic micro-combustors when considering atomization for scents.”). For these reasons, we determine, in light of the complete record, that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had reason to combine Goubet and Kaiser, as proposed. slip op. at 32
Patent outcomesUS 10,583,449 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · NautilusPatents in suitUS 10,583,449 - Intex Recreation Corp. v. Team Worldwide Corp.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 29, 2020 · PGR2019-00015 · APJ James J Mayberry · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5 are unpatentable as indefinite under § 112(f)/112(b) and for lack of written description under § 112(a); the prior-art grounds did not show them unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“We find that the level of ordinary skill in the art reflects aspects of each party’s definition. First, we agree with Petitioner’s characterization that the breadth of experience is in the field of inflatable product pump design. The field of “pneumatic pumps” is broad and encompasses pumps with operating parameters outside the needs identified in the ’979 patent and prior art of record. See e.g., Ex. 1004, 1:24–32 (identifying the types of inflatable objects as having applications “in hospitals for patients, outdoors for recreations and indoors for comfort”); Ex. 1006, 6:54–65 (identifying a low pressure blower and a low volume supplemental pump); Ex. 1007 (involving a pump for supplying breathing air for a continuous positive airway pressure device); Ex. 1010, 1:19–22, 3:21–27 (disclosing a low output circulation pump for “mattresses, chairs, couches and other patient support devices”); Ex. 1013, 11:34–37 (“The blower provides an air flow of 50 cubic feet per minute, without back pressure, and is capable of generating a maximum pressure of about 30 inches of water.”); Ex. 1014, 15:60–16:15 (disclosing gauge air pressures in the range of 0.16 to 0.65 pounds per square inch for an air bed); Ex. 1017, 10:62–64 (“The blower preferably is a 24 v.d.c. model producing 29.29 in Hg at 70 degrees F.”). Second, we agree with Patent Owner that the level of ordinary skill in the art encompasses a person with an advanced engineering degree and broader experience, with inflatable product pumps. Accordingly, we find that a person having of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had: (1) a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or an equivalent field, and two years of experience in inflatable product pump design, or an advanced degree in mechanical engineering or an equivalent field and two years in teaching, research, or experience relating to pneumatic pumps; or (2) an associate’s degree in mechanical engineering, or an equivalent field, and four years of practical experience in inflatable product pump design. Also, our claim construction and patentability analyses presented below would reach the same findings and determinations under either party’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Cf. Ex. 2020 ¶ 89 (“My opinions expressed in this declaration remain the same under either definition of a POSA.”).” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesTerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“The Federal Circuit emphasizes “that the essential inquiry is not merely the presence or absence of the word ‘means’ but whether the words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348. To overcome the presumption that § 112(f) does not apply, the burden is on Petitioner to “demonstrate[] that the claim term fails to ‘recite sufficiently definite structure’ or else recites ‘function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.” Id. at 1349; see Advanced Ground Info. Sys., Inc. v. Life360, Inc., 830 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“In determining whether this presumption has been rebutted, the challenger must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the claims are to be governed by § 112[(f)].”); see also Diebold Nixdorf, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 899 F.3d 1291, 1299–1300 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[I]n appropriate cases, a party advocating that a claim limitation that does not recite the word ‘means’ is subject to § 112[(f)] can overcome the presumption against its application solely by reference to evidence intrinsic to the patent.”). preponderance of the evidence, that “pressure controlling assembly” is a means-plus-function term. Patent Owner, citing Zeroclick, LLC v. Apple Inc., 891 F.3d 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2018), argues that Petitioner has not rebutted the presumption that the term “pressure controlling assembly” does not invoke § 112(f) by showing that the term is a nonce word. Sur-reply 4–5. As we detail below, we do not agree. We determine that Petitioner has met its burden in demonstrating that the term “pressure controlling assembly” is a means-plus-function term, invoking the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). We determine that the intrinsic evidence on which Petitioner relies is sufficient to overcome the presumption that the lack of the word “means” indicates that the term does not invoke § 112(f). See Diebold Nixdorf, Inc., 899 F.3d at 1299–1300.9 In our analysis below, we review the intrinsic evidence, extrinsic evidence (and, particularly whether the extrinsic evidence would support a finding that the term is used in common parlance or by persons of skill in the pertinent art to designate structure, including either a particular structure or a class of structures), and relevant case law.” slip op. at 18
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“We find that the Specification fails to disclose corresponding structure for all the recited functions of the “pressure controlling assembly.” “Where there are multiple claimed functions, as we have here, the patentee must disclose adequate corresponding structure to perform all of the claimed 18 This image differs from Figure 1 of the ’979 patent, which does not include reference numeral 4 or its associated lead line. Compare Ex. 1004, Fig. 1, with Ex. 1003, 17. of the recited functions, as it is dispositive to our finding. Claim 1 requires, in part, the pressure controlling assembly functions to “automatically activate the supplemental air pressure providing device.” Ex. 1004, 5:54–56. Patent Owner takes the position that item 121 and item 122 combine to form the pressure controlling assembly. PO Resp. 25 (“A POSA would understand the region of [Figure] 2a denoted by 121/122 as a disclosed pressure controlling assembly.”). Patent Owner then includes rod 12 as part of item 121. See PO Resp. 24 (showing rod 12 and item 121 in red); id. at 25 (indicating a “rod (also red)” associated with item 121). Patent Owner characterizes item 121 as a “flexible diaphragm” and argues that “flexible diaphragm 121 (red) of [Figure] 2a of the ’979 [p]atent acts as a pressure sensor. Its associated rod (also red) will slide up and down based on the pressure of the inflatable (blue) versus the ambient pressure (green) and force applied to it by the adjusting input (e.g., spring 11 of [Figure] 2a).” PO Resp. 25 (referencing Ex. 2020 ¶ 41). Significant to our analysis, Patent Owner argues, relying on Dr. Stevick’s verbatim testimony, that the movement of the rod is sensed by limit switch 13, which turns the supplemental air pressure providing device on and off. See PO Resp. 25 (referencing Ex. 2020 ¶ 41).” slip op. at 56
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateUnpatentable
“For similar reasons that we found that the ’979 patent did not disclose corresponding structure for the means-plus-function limitation “pressure controlling assembly,” we find that the ’847 application fails to provide written description support for the “pressure controlling assembly.” Specifically, we find that the ’847 application fails to demonstrate that the inventors were in possession of a “pressure controlling assembly” that “automatically activate[s] the supplemental air pressure providing device” as required by claim 1. We do not agree with Patent Owner that the cited sections of the ’847 application disclose to a person having ordinary skill in the art that automatically operate the supplemental air pressure providing device. The ’847 application itself is silent as to any limit switch operating the supplemental air pressure providing device. See, e.g., PO Resp. 34–35 (presenting two sections of the ’847 application that allegedly support Patent Owner’s position, where the text of the application never mentions limit switches). We also do not credit Dr. Stevick’s testimony in this regard. Again, Dr. Stevick’s declaration essentially mimics the Patent Owner Response, down to the bolding of language from the ’847 application. Compare Ex. 2020 ¶¶ 53–54, with PO Resp. 34–35. Also, Dr. Stevick’s declaration states that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have understood that a “pressure controlling assembly provides limit switching to automatically turn the supplemental air pressure providing device on when the pressure of the inflatable object is at a lower limit and to turn it off when the pressure is at an upper limit to maintain an air pressure of the inflatable object.” Ex. 2020 ¶ 54. The sole basis for this statement is a reference to Exhibit 1003, Figures 1 and 2a, without any further explanation. Such a conclusory opinion that is not adequately supported is entitled to little weight. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). We also find Patent Owner’s post hoc reliance on the CN ’302 application as confirmation of its position inapposite. As an initial point, there is no dispute that the CN ’302 application cannot be directly relied upon for written description support of the “pressure controlling assembly,” with respect to any disclosure in that application that does not appear in the ’847 application.19 Patent Owner’s use of the information in the application 19 See supra note 8.” slip op. at 63
Patent outcomesUS 9,989,979 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,989,979 - Motionpoint Corporation v. Transperfect Global, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 15, 2015 · CBM2014-00060 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · CBM · Final written decision
Claims 1–28 are unpatentable for lack of adequate written description under § 112, first paragraph.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“that “hyperlink” is a well-understood term that the ’022 patent uses in accordance with its ordinary meaning. As explained above, the Microsoft Computer User’s Dictionary makes clear that a hyperlink includes a connection to another element or document. Patent Owner points to no persuasive evidence that the ’022 patent describes a hyperlink as separate from this connection such that the connection can be changed with the hyperlink remaining the same. Indeed, the ’022 patent describes “replac[ing] all links in the translated web page 7 with links that point to the translation manager 4” as part of the translation process. Ex. 1001, 3:37–38. Thus, as described in the patent, changing the connection to point to the translation manager requires a new link. This is consistent with the ordinary meaning of a hyperlink as including a specific connection from one document to another element or document. Our preliminary construction of “hyperlink” included “a link or connection” but did not include a recitation of the element or document linked. To resolve the parties’ dispute, consistent with the ordinary meaning and the specification, we conclude, on the full record before us, that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have understood “hyperlink” to mean “a connection between an element in a hypertext document, such as a word, phrase, symbol, or image, and a different element in the document, another hypertext document, a file, or a script.”” slip op. at 10
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“First, the inter partes reexamination of the ’022 patent is relevant to our consideration of the claim construction issues presented here because claim construction was at issue in the reexamination. Second, we see no risk of undue prejudice that would outweigh the probative value of the documents and evidence submitted in the reexamination. Of note, is that this proceeding is not a jury trial and, thus, the risk of prejudice in this forum is less than what may otherwise exist before a jury. Third, we agree with Petitioner that Exhibit 1013 is not hearsay at least under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(B) because the testimony in Dr. Nakhimovsky’s Declaration was submitted by, and on behalf of, Patent Owner to the Patent Office, thus evidencing that Patent Owner manifested a belief that the statements contained therein were true. Accordingly, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude as applied to Exhibit 1013 is denied.” slip op. at 22
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateUnpatentable
“Patent Owner’s first argument is contrary to our constructions of the term “hyperlink” and the phrase “said hyperlink.” As reflected in our construction, “said hyperlink” in each of independent claims 1, 17, and 26, refers back to the original recitation of “one or more hyperlinks” in the original (untranslated) electronic communication. The portion of the specification relied upon by Patent Owner does not disclose providing translation of said further electronic communications when the original one or more hyperlink is activated. Rather, this disclosure indicates that the translation manager may replace all of the links (i.e., hyperlinks) in the translated web page with links that point to the translation manager. These replaced links are in the translated electronic communication (e.g., web page 7), and not in the original untranslated electronic communication (e.g., web page 2). Thus, this disclosure does not reasonably convey to one of ordinary skill in the art that the inventors had possession of a translation manager that provides translation of further electronic communications when the one or more hyperlinks in the original untranslated electronic communication is activated (i.e., one or more hyperlinks with unmodified destination addresses). See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).” slip op. at 25
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Definiteness (Nautilus)Not reached
“E. Indefiniteness of Claims 23 and 25–28 Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, Second Paragraph Our determination that each challenged claim is unpatentable for lack of an adequate written description renders it unnecessary to reach Petitioner’s contentions that claims 23 and 25–28 of the ’022 patent are indefinite.” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 6,857,022 unpatentableClaim construction§ 112 disclosurecites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 6,857,022
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.