- PTAB · Mar 19, 2024 · PGR2022-00052 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · PGR · Final written decision
The Board cancelled claims 1–27 and denied substitute claims 28–51 because the original disclosure lacked written-description support for the claimed CSP limitations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In our Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, with the exclusion of “at least” because it introduces ambiguity. Inst. Dec. 8. Patent Owner “does not dispute the Board’s findings on the qualifications of a POSA [person of ordinary skill in the art] for purposes of this proceeding.” See RMTA 13. We determine that Petitioner’s definition, with the exclusion of “at least,” is consistent with the prior art of record and the skill reflected in the Specification of the ’034 patent and we use this level of skill here in the evaluation of the Revised Motion to Amend.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner argues that “claim construction is not necessary” and that “the meaning of the claims would be easily understood by a POSA.” RMTA 13. In the Petition, Petitioner proposed constructions for the terms “client device” and “first server,” and the original claims were rendered obvious under this construction. Pet. 23–27. Petitioner does not assert that the substitute claims of the Revised Motion to Amend are anticipated or rendered obvious by prior art or are patent ineligible. See generally RMTA Opp. Nor does Petitioner’s patentability challenge of the substitute claims contend that express construction is needed. See generally id. For purposes of this Decision, we determine that express claim construction is unnecessary. We need only construe terms that are necessary to resolve disputes. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 10
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateDenied
“written description requirement. In re Wright, 866 F.2d 422, 425 (Fed. Cir. 1989); All Dental Prodx LLC v. Advantage Dental Prods., 309 F.3d 774, 779 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The issue here, however, is whether the disclosure of the ’034 patent would have reasonably conveyed to a person of ordinary skill that the inventors had possession of the CSP Limitations. Ariad, 598” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part
“to cancelling claims 1–27; and deny-in-part the Motion to Amend as to proposed substitute claims 28–51. In summary: Motion to Amend Outcome Claim(s) Original Claims Cancelled by Amendment 1–27 Substitute Claims Proposed in the Amendment 28–51 Substitute Claims: Motion to Amend Granted Substitute Claims: Motion to Amend Denied” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 11,272,034 - Hulu, LLC v. Sito Mobile R&D IP, LLC And Sito Mobile, Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · May 4, 2022 · IPR2021-00265 · APJ Joni Y Chang · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 15–19, 21, 24, and 27 are unpatentable as obvious over Eyal and Wiser; claims 15, 16, 19, 21, and 27 are also unpatentable over Madison and Wiser.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“The Specification sets forth the following definition: “[a] reservation is a feature that enables the streaming system 102 to reserve system resources, such as switches, processors, or media, either now or in the future, to ensure a quality media experience.” Ex. 1001, 11:59−62 (emphasis added). The Federal Circuit has recognized that “the specification may reveal a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess,” and “[i]n such cases, the inventor’s lexicography governs.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (citing CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Therefore, consistent with the definition in the Specification, we construe “reservation” as “a feature that enables the streaming system . . . to reserve system resources, such as switches, processors, or media, either now or in the future, to ensure a quality media experience.” Ex. 1001, 11:59−62. We agree with Patent Owner that the construction of the term “reservation” does 7 not require “a set of instructions uniquely identifying the communication device.” As to “reservation identification,” we adopt Patent Owner’s construction, construing the term “reservation identification” as “identification of a reservation” because this construction is consistent with the term’s plain and ordinary meaning, without requiring the identification to be unique.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“is a feature that enables the streaming system 102 to reserve system resources, such as switches, processors, or media, either now or in the future, to ensure a quality media experience.” Ex. 1001, 11:59−62 (emphasis added). The Federal Circuit has recognized that “the specification may reveal a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess,” and “[i]n such cases, the inventor’s lexicography governs.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (citing CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Therefore, consistent with the definition in the Specification, we construe “reservation” as “a feature that enables the streaming system . . . to reserve system resources, such as switches, processors, or media, either now or in the future, to ensure a quality media experience.” Ex. 1001, 11:59−62. We agree with Patent Owner that the construction of the term “reservation” does 7 not require “a set of instructions uniquely identifying the communication device.” As to “reservation identification,” we adopt Patent Owner’s construction, construing the term “reservation identification” as “identification of a reservation” because this construction is consistent with the term’s plain and ordinary meaning, without requiring the identification to be unique.” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Here, Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art of the ’360 patent would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical or computer engineering, or equivalent.” Pet. 16. And, such an artisan also would have had “at least two years of experience in distributed systems, multimedia streaming, and various HTTP-related technologies, or an equivalent amount of relevant work or research experience,” citing to the Declaration of Henry Houh, Ph.D., for support. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 59−61). Patent Owner’s declarant, Mr. Michael Adams, provides similar assessment, but also testifies that such an artisan, alternatively, would have had “at least five years of work experience and training in the design and development of distributed network systems and/or multimedia streaming.” Ex. 2012 ¶ 28. Neither party points out any meaningful difference between the parties’ assessments. We apply Patent Owner’s assessment on the level of ordinary skill in the art. However, our analysis would be the same under either party’s description.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableUnpatentable
“added). Dr. Houh testifies that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have used Wiser’s voucher ID in Eyal’s play-list because delivery servers may have a “limited number of active streams of data being delivered at any one time,” so that generating and tracking reservations by the content server using voucher IDs is necessary. Ex. 1003 ¶ 144 (citing Ex. 1006, 14:65−15:1). We agree with and credit Dr. Houh’s testimony, and we find that such an artisan of ordinary skill would have understood that, in Eyal in combination with Wiser, the voucher ID provided in the play-list is uniquely associated with the client device and a viewing session of the media. Ex. 1003 ¶ 151 (citing Ex. 1006, 8:30−33, 15:23−28). We do not agree with Patent Owner’s assertion that “Wiser teaches away from video.” PO Resp. 33 (citing Ex. 2012 ¶ 174). “A reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Here, nothing in Wiser would discourage a relevant artisan from applying its teachings to video media, as Patent Owner alleges. Patent Owner’s argument of teaching away is based on speculation. As discussed above, Wiser’s disclosure is not limited to audio media. Ex. 1006, 1:5−8, 1:23−26, 3:8−10; Ex. 1083, 145:20−147:21. The “mere disclosure of alternative designs does not teach away.” In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Moreover, KSR instructs us that “if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize 20 that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. As Dr. Houh testifies, “[s]ervers’ limited streaming capacity was a common media delivery problem, and well-known solutions existed before the ’360 Patent, including generating a reservation to ensure resource availability for streaming media to the user.” Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 106, 167 (citing Ex. 1019, 263 (Discussion on Resource Reservation Protocols (RSVP) in the book entitled “Communication and Computing for Distributed Multimedia Systems”); Ex. 1023 (RSVP Specification); Ex. 1024, 194 (Discussion on the Reservation Protocol in the book entitled “Multimedia Servers”)).” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 9,591,360 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,591,360 - Hulu, LLC v. Sito Mobile R&D IP, LLC And Sito Mobile, Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · May 4, 2022 · IPR2021-00219 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5, 7, 11–13, 17, 18, 20, and 22 are unpatentable as obvious over Eyal and ASX Files and over Madison and Holtz.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art of the ’635 patent would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical or computer engineering, or equivalent, and at least two years of experience in distributed systems, multimedia streaming, and various HTTPrelated technologies, or an equivalent amount of relevant work or research experience.” Pet. 20 (citing Houh Decl. ¶¶ 57–60). Patent Owner contends a person of ordinary skill “would have: (a) a Bachelor of Science degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or computer engineering (or a related academic field), and at least two additional years of work experience in the design and development of distributed network systems and/or media streaming, or (b) at least five 5 Neither party presents evidence or arguments regarding objective evidence of non-obviousness. 14 years of work experience and training in the design and development of distributed network systems and/or media streaming.” PO Resp. 6–7. Neither party points out any meaningful difference between the” slip op. at 14
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“have been obvious to combine two references. Reply 14. We do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument, that just because Eyal’s system “works perfectly well,” a person of ordinary skill would not seek to improve its performance. We rely, instead, on Dr. Houh’s testimony, summarized above, that there would be advantages in combining the teachings of Eyal and ASF Files. Houh Decl. ¶¶ 140–141. For example, as discussed supra, Dr. Houh testifies that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to modify Eyal to utilize the ASX files “to improve the ability of its play-lists to work effectively with Windows Media Player end user terminals.” 23 Id. ¶ 140. Further, we credit his testimony that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine Eyal’s disclosure with ASX Files to improve advertising features disclosed in Eyal. Id. at 141. He testifies that a person of ordinary skill would have had “a reasonable chance of success” because the ASX file format is XML, “a common format for data exchange on a network.” Id. ¶ 142. In contrast, Mr. Adams testifies that “there is no motivation to add the use of ASX files to Eyal.” Adams Decl. ¶ 139. Mr. Adams supports this testimony by asserting that “the Eyal system builds a simple play list and nothing more.” Id. We disagree with this assertion by Mr. Adams and with the implication that follows, that because the Eyal system is “simple,” a person of ordinary skill would not seek to improve it. See discussion of Dr. Houh’s testimony, supra. We are also not persuaded by Mr. Adams’s testimony that Eyal’s disclosure of Windows Media Player is “not in [and] of itself” a reason to consider using ASX files in Eyal, “when Eyal works perfectly well without it.” Adams Decl. ¶ 141. This testimony is unavailing for several reasons. First, the evidence of record links Windows Media Player with use of ASX Files. See Ex. 1017, 1 (“ASX files are simply text files that act as links from Web pages to ASF files on Windows Media Services or HTTP servers.”). Also, Mr. Adams’s testimony assumes (incorrectly) that because Eyal may work with other files, a person of ordinary skill would ignore the teachings that ASX files are used by Windows Media Player.” slip op. at 23
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“filing date because the ’519 application does not disclose the claimed “play script” or the claimed “instructions.” Pet. 11–12; Reply 11–14. We agree and find that the ’635 patent is not entitled to that earlier date for the reasons given by Petitioner. As Petitioner points out, the ’519 application does not refer to a play script. Reply 8. The written description of the play script was not added until 2002. Id. Patent Owner contends that in the priority documents, “play script is used interchangeabl[y] with play list.” PO Resp. 34–45. Patent Owner fails to demonstrate persuasively that lacking the 11 description added in 2002, the “play list” disclosed in the ’519 application has the required elements of the play script claimed in the ’635 patent. Reply 12. One of those required elements of the claimed play script is “one or more instructions for use by the communication device together with the at least one URL to cause the at least one portion of the requested media to be streamed to the communication device.” See claim element 1.c.4, Ex. 1001, 51:8–11. We find that there is inadequate written description in the ’519 application of “instructions . . . to enable the communication device to obtain the at least one portion of the requested media.” Reply 8–9. We agree with Petitioner that the “presentation identification” relied on by Patent Owner (Ex. 2015, 7) does not provide “instructions…to enable the communication device to obtain the at least one portion of the requested media.” Reply 13. Instead, the “presentation identification” “identifies a particular presentation . . . and its associated media.” Id. (quoting PO Resp. 36). Absent an adequate written description in the ’519 application of these claimed features, Patent Owner’s attempt to obtain the benefit of the filing date of that application for the challenged claims of the ’635 patent fails. “It is elementary patent law that patent claims are entitled to the benefit of the filing date of an earlier filed application only if the disclosure of the earlier application provides support for the claims of the later application, as required by 35 U.S.C. § 112.” PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008).” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
Patent outcomesUS 9,135,635 unpatentable§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,135,635 - Hulu, LLC v. Sito Mobile R&D IP, LLC And Sito Mobile, Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · May 4, 2022 · IPR2021-00206 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 10, 11, 14, 34, 35, 37, 39, 43, and 47–50 are unpatentable as obvious over the stated prior-art combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“U.S. Patent No. 8,825,887 (“the ’887 patent”). The claims of that patent include the same term referring to “at least one portion,” and the ’887 patent shares its written description with the ’636 patent. In our Final Written Decision in CBM2020-00028 (Paper 33, 9−13), we found that the plain and ordinary meaning of this term encompasses one or more portions of the “requested media,” as well as the entirety of the “requested media.” CBM2020-00028, Paper 33 at 10–11. We declined to adopt Patent Owner’s implicit claim construction because it improperly imports extraneous limitations into the claims and excludes a preferred embodiment. Id. at 11–” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“as “a file containing one or more media references and other information used by a communication device to obtain media.” PO Resp. 14–17. Patent Owner contends that “a play script is not itself limited to being a list.” Id. at 15. Patent Owner argues that a script “is a file, which can be processed by a computer to obtain media” because the claims recite that the play script contains “instructions.” Id. Patent Owner also cites the district court’s adoption of this construction. Id. at 13–14. Whether or not a playlist is a file is not a meaningful distinction for the purposes of this Final Written Decision. As Petitioner notes, all of the “play scripts” identified by Petitioner in the prior art are files. Reply 6. We agree with Petitioner that we need not determine which party’s construction applies for purposes of our analysis. Nidec, 868 F.3d at 1017.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“reservation. Patent Owner now proposes the following construction: “arrangement regarding reserved resources of a streaming system.” PO Resp. 17. Patent Owner cites the specification and Mr. Adam’s testimony 13 for support. Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 10:33−37; Adams Decl. ¶ 110). Mr. Adam relies on the ’636 patent specification, which states that “[a] reservation is a feature that enables the streaming system 102 to reserve system resources, such as switches, processors, or media, either now or in the future, to ensure a quality media experience.” Ex. 1001, 10:33–37. Further, “[t]he reservation uniquely identifies the viewer 118 or 120 and the customized play script.” Id. at 10:27–28, 10:34–37. The Federal Circuit has recognized that “the specification may reveal a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess,” and “[i]n such cases, the inventor’s lexicography governs.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (citing CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Based on the description in the specification, we construe “reservation” as “a feature that enables the streaming system 102 to reserve system resources, such as switches, processors, or media, either now or in the future, to ensure a quality media experience.” Ex. 1001, 10:33–37.” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Neither party points out any meaningful difference between the parties’ assessments. We therefore apply Patent Owner’s more detailed assessment on the level of ordinary skill in the art. This proposal is consistent with the ’636 patent, the prior art of record, and is supported by 16 the testimony of Mr. Adams. Adams Decl. ¶¶ 27–29. However, our analysis would be the same under either party’s description.” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 9,135,636 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,135,636 - Hulu, LLC v. Sito Mobile R&D IP, LLC And Sito Mobile, Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 25, 2022 · IPR2021-00308 · APJ Joni Y Chang · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 39, 40, 45, 47, 52, 68, 98–101, 103, 105, 111, and 115–117 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted prior-art combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“streaming media. When asked “what is the point of having commercials in streaming media” during cross-examination, Mr. Adams admitted that “[t]here are a number of different reasons why you might want to include commercials,” such as “to generate revenue for the service.” Ex. 1083, 40:10–18 (emphasis added). We agree with and credit Dr. Houh’s testimony that such an artisan would have recognized the benefits of applying Wolfe’s teachings of targeted advertisements, revenue sharing, and settlement recording to Madison’s system—e.g., “tracking played advertisements to more accurately report effectiveness and tailor billings and revenues based on ad impressions by making ‘an accounting . . . of the total advertising air time used and . . . [billing] advertisers . . . accordingly.’” Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 295– 296, 309; Ex. 1044, 1:24–31, 1:43–48, 1:55–60, 5:37–44. “[W]hen a patent ‘simply arranges old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform’ and yields no more than one would expect from such an arrangement, the combination is obvious.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (quoting Sakraida, 425 U.S. at 282).” slip op. at 76
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“’887 patent makes clear that the presentation itself, not the presentation ID, “may include special instructions, such as special media sequencing instructions, late binding media instructions, and/or special routing instructions.” Ex. 1001, 8:27–32. Therefore, Patent Owner’s argument that the presentation ID is an instruction executed by the communication device “to obtain at least one portion of the requested media,” as required by the claims, is not supported by the ’993 application, the ’519 application, or the draft application, and it is also inconsistent with the Specification of the ’887 patent. For the foregoing reasons, we find that none of the three applications provides adequate written description for the claimed “instructions.”” slip op. at 52
Patent outcomesUS 8,825,887 unpatentable§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,825,887 - Hulu, LLC v. Sito Mobile R&D IP, LLC And Sito Mobile, Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 15, 2022 · IPR2021-00158 · APJ Joni Y Chang · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5, 6, 19–21, 23, 26, 27, 30, 31, and 33 are unpatentable as obvious over Eyal and Wiser; claims 1–3 and 6 are also unpatentable over Madison and Holtz.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“I. INTRODUCTION Hulu, LLC (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition requesting an inter partes review (“IPR”) of claims 1−3, 5, 6, 19−21, 23, 26, 27, 30, 31, and 33 (“the challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 9,026,673 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’673 patent”). Paper 2 (“Pet.”), 1. SITO Mobile R&D IP, LLC and SITO Mobile Ltd. (collectively, “Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response (Paper 6, “Prelim. Resp.”). On April 20, 2021, we instituted the instant inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims for all of the grounds of unpatentability asserted in the Petition. Paper 9 (“Dec.”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelOther
“C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“server to validate and authenticate the user requesting the media file.” Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 150−151. “[W]hen a patent ‘simply arranges old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform’ and yields no more than one would expect from such an arrangement, the combination is obvious.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (quoting Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976)). For the foregoing reasons, we find that Petitioner has articulated an adequate reason to combine the teachings of Eyal and Wiser. 8. Conclusion on Obviousness over Eyal and Wiser” slip op. at 50
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“For the foregoing reasons, we agree with Petitioner that neither the” slip op. at 54
Patent outcomesUS 9,026,673 unpatentable§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,026,673 - Flex Logix Technologies, Inc. v. Venkat KondaRehearing deniedPTAB · Sep 16, 2020 · IPR2020-00261 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing requests, leaving institution of review of claims 1–7, 11, 15–18, 20–22, 32, and 47 in place.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Patent Owner, as the party challenging the Decisions, has the burden of showing that the Decisions should be modified. Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. Id. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000).” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“in our Decision on Institution. In the Decision, we directly addressed Patent Owner’s arguments that Dr. Baker is not qualified to testify in this proceeding because he is neither a person of ordinary skill in the art, nor an expert in the relevant art. See Dec. 7–8. In particular, we explained that there is no requirement “that the expert’s experience perfectly match the relevant field, or that the expert is a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. at 7. We also explained that Dr. Baker testifies as to his education and qualifications and provides his curriculum vitae. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 3–12; Ex. 1003. At this preliminary stage, we cannot say that Dr. Baker’s scientific, technical, and other specialized knowledge will not be helpful in understanding the evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 702(a). On this record, we are not persuaded that Dr. Baker’s testimony should be disregarded. Id. at 8. Therefore, even if Dr. Baker were not a person of ordinary skill in the art as Patent Owner contends, it does not follow that he is unqualified to testify in these proceedings. Nothing was misapprehended or overlooked in considering Dr. Baker’s testimony.” slip op. at 6
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(Ex. 2001). In the Preliminary Response, Patent Owner cited the Konda Declaration when discussing the experience and qualifications of the named inventor of the ’523 patent. Prelim. Resp. 8–9. The education level of the inventor, however, is just one of several factors that we may consider in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (enumerating six factors that “may be considered in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art” (quoting Evt’l Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983))). And, as Patent Owner noted in the Preliminary Response, “these factors are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 7–8 (citing Daiichi Sankyo, 501 F.3d at 1256). In any event, in the Decision we also considered Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposed definitions of the level of ordinary skill in the art, noted the differences between them, and stated that “[o]ur determination regarding Petitioner’s challenge does not turn on the differences between Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s definitions.” Dec. 7. Therefore, our evaluation of Petitioner’s challenges and Dr. Baker’s testimony in support thereof would have been the same under Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposed definitions of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See id. (“[W]e note that our conclusions would be same under either definition.”).” slip op. at 7
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateNot reached
“Moreover, in the Decision, we directly addressed Patent Owner’s argument with respect to whether the ’394 provisional and ’605 PCT provided support for the claim limitation “said routing network comprising a plurality of stages y, in each sub-integrated circuit block, starting from the lowest stage of 1 to the highest stage of y, where y≧1” when y=1. Dec. 14. In particular, we found that Patent Owner’s arguments, as we understand them, are directed only to the disclosure of a network with only one stage (y=1). [Prelim. Resp.] at 15–39. Patent Owner does not address the other limitations of claim 1, and does not point to any disclosures in the priority applications that describe a sub-integrated circuit block with only one stage that also comprises pluralities of forward connecting links and backward connecting links as required by claim 1. Id. Thus, we did not overlook Patent Owner’s arguments, but rather evaluated the disclosures in the ’394 provisional and ’605 PCT and determined, on the record at this stage of the proceeding, that they do not provide sufficient written description support for the challenged claims. The parties will have the opportunity to further develop the record on these issues during trial, and the Board will evaluate the fully-developed record at the close of the evidence. D. Public Availability of the ’394 provisional” slip op. at 9
§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 8,269,523 - Flex Logix Technologies, Inc. v. Venkat KondaRehearing deniedPTAB · Sep 16, 2020 · IPR2020-00260 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied the Patent Owner’s rehearing requests, leaving institution in place for claims 1–7, 11, 15–18, 20–22, 32, and 47.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Patent Owner, as the party challenging the Decisions, has the burden of showing that the Decisions should be modified. Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. Id. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000).” slip op. at 2
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedOther
“Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 90. The Consolidated Trial Practice Guide goes on to state that “[a]bsent a showing of ‘good cause’ prior to filing the request for rehearing or in the request for rehearing itself, new evidence will not be admitted.” Id. (citing Huawei, Paper 19 at 4).” slip op. at 4
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Dr. Baker testifies as to his education and qualifications and provides his curriculum vitae. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 3–12; Ex. 1003. At this preliminary stage, we cannot say that Dr. Baker’s scientific, technical, and other specialized knowledge will not be helpful in understanding the evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 702(a). On this record, we are not persuaded that Dr. Baker’s testimony should be disregarded. Id. at 8. Therefore, even if Dr. Baker were not a person of ordinary skill in the art as Patent Owner contends, it does not follow that he is unqualified to testify in these proceedings. Nothing was misapprehended or overlooked in considering Dr. Baker’s testimony.” slip op. at 6
- Skill levelOther
“(Ex. 2001). In the Preliminary Response, Patent Owner cited the Konda Declaration when discussing the experience and qualifications of the named inventor of the ’523 patent. Prelim. Resp. 8–9. The education level of the inventor, however, is just one of several factors that we may consider in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (enumerating six factors that “may be considered in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art” (quoting Evt’l Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983))). And, as Patent Owner noted in the Preliminary Response, “these factors are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 7–8 (citing Daiichi Sankyo, 501 F.3d at 1256). In any event, in the Decision we also considered Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposed definitions of the level of ordinary skill in the art, noted the differences between them, and stated that “[o]ur determination regarding Petitioner’s challenge does not turn on the differences between Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s definitions.” Dec. 7. Therefore, our evaluation of Petitioner’s challenges and Dr. Baker’s testimony in support thereof would have been the same under Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposed definitions of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See id. (“[W]e note that our conclusions would be same under either definition.”).” slip op. at 7
§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 8,269,523 - Texas Association Of Realtors v. Uber Technologies, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 4, 2017 · IPR2016-00615 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–28 are unpatentable under § 103(a); the contingent motion to amend is denied because substitute claims are obvious and lack written-description support.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableUnpatentable
“II. ANALYSIS Petitioner bears the burden of proving unpatentability of the challenged claims, and that burden never shifts to Patent Owner. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). To prevail, Petitioner must establish the facts supporting its challenge by a preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d). Petitioner relies on the Declaration of Michael Goodchild, Ph.D. (Ex. 1010) and the Reply Declaration of Dr. Goodchild (Ex. 1020). Patent Owner does not rely on any supporting declaration or cross-examination testimony. Below, we discuss whether Petitioner has met its burden with respect to claims 1–28. A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). Obviousness is resolved based on underlying factual determinations, including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness,2 i.e., secondary considerations. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“First, Petitioner argues that based on the dictionary definition of “demarcate,” the broadest reasonable interpretation of “demarcating” is “‘to determine or mark off the boundaries or limits of’ something.” Id. (quoting Ex. 1013, RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, (2d ed. 2001), 5); Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 35, 36. Next, Petitioner contends that the broadest reasonable interpretation of “delimiting” is “determining or marking off the boundaries or limits of something, such as by providing a perimeter line or highlighting.” Pet. 7; Ex. 1013, 4; Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 37–39. Petitioner reasons that the Specification provides examples of delimiting “via a perimeter line in any graphical way” and by highlighting. Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1001, 6:34–39, 8:13–19). Patent Owner does not address these interpretations in its Response, but at oral hearing Patent Owner agrees that Petitioner’s interpretations were “a fair assessment.” Tr. 92:19–94:3. Patent Owner also responds that there was no substantive difference between the two terms – “demarcating” and “delimiting.” Id. at 93:19–29. Petitioner’s proposed interpretations for “demarcating” and “delimiting” are consistent with the claim language, written description of the ’045 patent, and the plain meaning of each term. We therefore interpret “demarcating” to mean “determining or marking off the boundaries or limits of something,” and interpret “delimiting” to mean “determining or marking off the boundaries or limits of something, such as by providing a perimeter line or highlighting.”” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art The parties do not argue in the Petition or Patent Owner Response that we should adopt a specific formulation regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Dr. Goodchild, however, testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’045 patent “would have had a Bachelor of Science degree (or its equivalent), and three years’ experience in the development, management, and use of geographic information systems and related geospatial technologies.” Ex. 1010 ¶ 14. Based on the record presented, including our review of the ’045 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’045 patent and cited prior art, we agree with Dr. Goodchild’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art and therefore adopt it for purposes of this Decision. As noted, we have also considered the cited references as representative of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the level of ordinary skill in the art may be evidenced by the cited references themselves).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner also provides a persuasive rationale for combining the teachings of O’Clair and Tadman. Id. at 9–10, 14–15. Specifically, Petitioner contends both references are in “similar fields,” with both references referring to the mapping application Google Maps, and [a] person of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious and desirable at the time of the ’045 Patent’s filing to combine the features of Tadman into O’Clair to achieve, for example, the ability for a “user to conduct a joint query by using both spatial and non-spatial searches” and the other “advanced features” described by Tadman. Id. at 9–10 (quoting Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 50–51). As further explained by Dr. Goodchild, “[t]he combination of O’Clair’s systems and methods with Tadman’s teachings of polygon-based search would yield the predictable and desirable result of a GIS [geographic information] system which allowed a user to obtain search results located with a polygon-shaped area of interest.” Ex. 1010 ¶ 52; see also Tr. 17:17–19:19. In its Response, Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s rationale for combining features of Tadman and O’Clair, nor does Patent Owner challenge Petitioner’s rationale for combining any of the prior art. See Tr. 38:21–39:33 (counsel for Patent Owner agreeing lack of motivation to combine is not argued in the Patent Owner Response). We find persuasive Petitioner’s arguments as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the references’ teachings in the manner asserted.” slip op. at 15
Patent outcomesUS 8,510,045 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,510,045 - LG Display Co., Ltd. v. Delaware Display Group LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 23, 2016 · IPR2015-00506 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5 are unpatentable because Shinohara anticipates them.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Following institution, LG Electronics, Inc. filed timely a Petition and Motion for Joinder in Case IPR2015-01666, challenging the same claims of the ’973 patent on the same ground as that on which we instituted review in this proceeding, plus one additional ground. See Paper 24, 2. LG Electronics, Inc. agreed to abandon the additional ground should IPR2015- 01666 be joined with this proceeding. See id. at 2 n.1. To administer the proceedings more efficiently, we granted LG Electronics, Inc.’s Motion for Joinder, joining Case IPR2015-01666 with the instant proceeding. Id. at 5. For purposes of this Decision, we refer to LG Display Co., Ltd. and LG Electronics, Inc., jointly, as “Petitioner.”” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Patent Owner repeats its unsuccessful argument that, “[w]ithout offering a construction for this term, the Petitioner has failed to meet the burden of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3).” Id. Petitioner responds that this term (1) does not require construction; (2) is limited to a specific embodiment in the specification; (3) and imports a limitation from the specification into the claims. Reply 3–4. Having considered the full record developed during trial, we agree with Petitioner that this term does not require construction. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Patent Owner’s arguments distinguishing the prior art do not rely on a particular construction for this term. See infra.” slip op. at 6
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“the ’176 grandparent application is insufficient. “Entitlement to a filing date does not extend to subject matter which is not disclosed, but would be obvious over what is expressly disclosed.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1571–72 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Reply 5–6. We find that the cited disclosures in the ’176 grandparent application do not describe the density, size, depth, or height of the deformities at approximate midpoints between adjacent pairs of light sources. As discussed above, Patent Owner maintains that a skilled artisan reading the ’176 grandparent application would know that “the approximate midpoint between the two light sources is an area farther away from a light source.” PO Resp. 28 (emphasis added). We are not persuaded by this argument, for it does not establish that the approximate midpoint between adjacent pairs of light sources is the only area farther away from a light source. As Petitioner points out, “the increased distance from the light source is not limited to a distance along the length of the panel member, along the width of the panel member, or along any direction at all.” Reply 11. Thus, Patent Owner fails to meet its burden under Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. National Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (burden of production shifted to patent owner to prove entitlement to earlier filing date).” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date, deniedReference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“In view of the foregoing, we determine that Patent Owner has not demonstrated that the ’176 grandparent application, as originally filed, provides written description support for the disputed limitation. Therefore, we determine that claims 1–5 are not entitled to the benefit of the filing date of the ’176 grandparent application and Patent Owner is thus entitled only to the effective filing date of the application for the ʼ973 patent, February 9, 2007. As a consequence, we find that Shinohara qualifies as prior art.” slip op. at 11
Patent outcomesUS 7,434,973 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 7,434,973
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.