• Fluidmaster, Inc. v. Danco, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 5, 2026 · IPR2024-00634 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 8–13, 15, 16, and 19–24 are unpatentable over Brown and Ho, with claims 16 and 19 also relying on the Quick Connection Art; the remaining challenged claims were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner proposes that: A [person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”)] in the field to which the ’105 Patent is directed would have had at least a Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical engineering or a related field or, as a substitute, at least two years of work or” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “of “integrally molded with” as “molded together as a single structure.” Paper 21, 15.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Patent Owner responds that: a POSITA would not have been motivated to make the proposed modification, nor does the Petition include any analysis regarding why a POSITA would be motivated to move from a vertical extended portion to a radial extended portion. Indeed, a radial extended portion is directly counter to the stated goals of Brown (e.g., reducing noise caused by turbulence), at least insofar as it introduces another sudden directional change into the fluid flow system. PO Resp. 58–59 (citing Ex. 2013 ¶ 242).” slip op. at 32

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateEntitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner argues that the ’105 patent claims were “fully supported as of the filing date of at least the ’606 Application . . . March 11, 2004” because the ’606 Application discloses regulating water flow and a POSITA would know that appropriate devices for regulating water flow includes nonadjustable waterflow restrictors. PO Resp. 63–65; PO Sur-reply 26–29. Patent Owner’s argument is persuasive. The ’606 Application discloses: [W]hen the toilet fill valve 100 is open and water flows from the water inlet 103 to the water outlets 106 and into a toilet tank, an amount of water is also supplied to the bowl fill valve inlet 113 that flows through the bowl fill valve 109 and out the bowl fill valve outlet 116. By virtue of the manual setting of handle 119 of the bowl fill valve 109, the flow of water through the bowl fill valve 109 is regulated. In this manner, the flow of water is regulated so that enough water flows out of the bowl fill valve 109 to fill a toilet bowl without wasting any water down a drain. seen from the passage above, the ’606 Application discloses regulating an amount of water supplied to a toilet bowl using a valve (i.e., a water flow regulator). Ex. 2013 ¶ 288. Further, the ’606 Application states: The bowl fill valve 109 may be, for example, a ball valve, a gate valve, a globe valve, a plug valve, a diaphragm valve, a butterfly valve, a needle valve, a sliding gate, a quick turn valve, a knife valve or any other appropriate type of valve as can be appreciated by those with ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 42

  Patent outcomesUS 9,103,105 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,103,105
• Avation Medical, Inc. v. Emkinetics, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 7, 2026 · PGR2024-00043 · APJ Ryan H Flax · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–39 are unpatentable under Grounds 1–10; Petitioner did not prove lack of enablement under Ground 11, and Patent Owner’s motion to exclude was denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

    “REAL PARTIES-IN-INTEREST Petitioner identifies Avation Medical, Inc. as the real party-in-interest. Pet. x. Patent Owner identifies EMKinetics, Inc. as the real party-in-interest. Paper 5, 1; Paper 6, 1. Neither party contests the other’s assertions on this. C.” slip op. at 3

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A POSA at the time of the claimed invention would have had an undergraduate degree in the field of biomedical engineering or a related discipline, such as electrical engineering, and at least two years of experience in the design and/or analysis of biomedical devices. Additional work experience could substitute for a formal degree and vice versa. Ex.1003, ¶21. Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1003). Patent Owner does not contest this proposed definition or offer an alternative. See generally Resp. We accept and use Petitioner’s uncontested definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan, which appears to comport with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the ’943 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the prior art itself [may]” slip op. at 19

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “same claim construction standard that is used to construe patent claims in a civil action in federal district court. 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(b). In construing claims, district courts and the Board here, by default, give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, which is “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Petitioner states that, “no terms require construction for purposes of this Petition.” Pet. 21. Patent Owner presents no express position on claim construction. See generally Resp. We do not expressly construe any claim terms. E.” slip op. at 20

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedReference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “question, based on factual findings. VidStream, 981 F.3d at 1063–64. Moreover, public accessibility is the touchstone in determining whether a reference is a printed publication and such depends on whether the reference was available to interested, ordinarily skilled persons exercising reasonable diligence, which is determined on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 1065. Particularly pertinent here is that “[w]hen there is an established publisher there is a presumption of public accessibility as of the publication date.” Id. Hulu (which cites VidStream on this issue) concerned, inter alia, whether certain asserted references were shown to be publicly available and could be considered as prior art. Hulu, 2021 WL 487622. Hulu holds that, although testimonial evidence is one way to prove public accessibility, there are also a variety of hallmarks of publication and other evidence that may be considered as a totality of the evidence to determine if an asserted reference was publicly accessible and prior art. Id. at *10–13, 21. Facts to be considered in analyzing the issue, other than testimonial evidence, include, for example, whether there is an established publisher, a copyright date/notice, other publication-related dates (impression, printing, etc.), an ISBN number, citations to the reference before (and to a lesser degree, after) the priority date at issue corroborating its availability and/or that the publisher was established, and whether the reference’s “purpose of publishing . . . was ‘dialogue with an intended audience.’” Id. at *10–21 (citing Valve Corp. v. Ironburg Inventions Ltd., 8 F.4th 1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2021)).” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 11,844,943 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,844,943
• Fluidmaster, Inc. v. Danco, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 15, 2025 · IPR2024-00633 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 7–15, 19, and 20 are unpatentable over Brown and Ho; claims 2–6 and 16–18 were not shown unpatentable on the asserted grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Brown’s adapter tube 23 (i.e., the extended portion) does not extend radially from a longitudinal axis of valve assembly 13 (i.e., the toilet fill valve). Ex. 1021, Fig. 1. Mr. Jobin testifies that a POSITA would not be motivated to move adapter tube 23 from a vertical position to a radial position because “a radial extended portion is directly counter to the stated goals of Brown (e.g., reducing noise caused by turbulence), at least insofar system.” Ex. 2013 ¶ 251; see Ex. 1021, 1:9–62. Patent Owner’s argument is persuasive. Petitioner’s analysis and Dr. Cameron’s testimony is conclusory and does not sufficiently explain why a POSITA would be motivated to make the proposed modification to Brown. For example, Petitioner does not sufficiently explain how such a modification would result in a more compact toilet fill valve system that could be adapted to fit in more toilet tank designs. Further, neither Petitioner nor Dr. Cameron sufficiently address Mr. Jobin’s testimony regarding Brown’s desire for a quieter toilet. See Pet. Reply 23; Ex. 1036 ¶ 84. Petitioner fails to meet its burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 2 is unpatentable over Brown and Ho.” slip op. at 35

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateEntitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner

    “description is an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a POSA. Using this test, the invention must be described in a manner sufficient to demonstrate that the inventor actually invented the claimed invention. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010). “One shows that one is ‘in possession’ of the invention by describing the invention, with all its claimed limitations, not that which makes it obvious.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Written description is a question of fact judged as of the relevant filing date. Falko–Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006). An ipsis verbis disclosure, however, is not necessary to satisfy the written description requirement. Vas–Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The disclosure need only reasonably convey to a POSA that the inventor had possession of the subject matter in question, even if every nuance of the claims is not explicitly described in the specification. Id.; see Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. Patent Owner argues that the ’993 patent claims were “fully supported as of the filing date of at least the ’606 Application . . . March 11, 2004” because the ’606 Application discloses regulating water flow and a POSITA would know that appropriate devices for regulating water flow includes nonadjustable waterflow restrictors. PO Resp. 68; PO Sur-reply 28–30. Patent Owner’s argument is persuasive. The ’606 Application discloses: [W]hen the toilet fill valve 100 is open and water flows from the water inlet 103 to the water outlets 106 and into a toilet tank, an amount of water is also supplied to the bowl fill valve inlet 113 that flows through the bowl fill valve 109 and out the bowl fill valve outlet 116. By virtue of the manual setting of handle 119 valve 109 is regulated. In this manner, the flow of water is regulated so that enough water flows out of the bowl fill valve 109 to fill a toilet bowl without wasting any water down a drain. Ex. 1012, 47, ¶ 8 (emphasis added); see also Ex. 1001, 2:28–39. As can be seen from the passage above, the ’606 Application discloses regulating an amount of water supplied to a toilet bowl using a valve (i.e., a water flow regulator). Ex. 2013 ¶ 288.” slip op. at 48

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference not prior artNot shown unpatentable

    “1. Analysis of Claims 1–18 Schuster is available as prior art if the ’993 patent is only entitled to its January 27, 2014, filing date and not entitled to claim priority to earlier filing dates of the parent applications. On its face, the ’993 patent claims priority to a number of earlier parent applications, including Application No. 12/786,904 (the ’904 Application) filed May 25, 2010, and the Application code 63. Petitioner contends that the ’993 patent is not entitled to claim priority to the filing date of the earlier parent applications, and, thus, Schuster, a parent application of the ’993 patent, is available as prior art.15 Pet. 91–92. Petitioner alleges that the earlier parent applications, specifically Application No. 12/786,904 (the ’904 Application), do not provide written description support for the ’993 patent’s claim term “water flow regulator.” According to Petitioner, “water flow regulator” encompasses both adjustable devices for restricting the flow of water (i.e., valves) and fixed devices for restricting the flow of water (i.e., restrictors). Pet. 15. Petitioner contends that the ’904 Application does not provide support for water flow restrictors and, thus, does not provide support for the broader claim term water flow regulators. Id. at 14–15, 91–92. Petitioner argues that only adjustable water flow devices (i.e., valves) are supported by the ’904 Application. Id. Petitioner, thus, asserts that earliest effective filing date of the ’993 patent’s claims is the filing date of its application, January 27, 2014. Id. at 92. To be entitled to claim the benefit of an earlier filing date under 35 U.S.C. § 120 each application in the priority chain must comply with the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). See Hollmer v. 14 The parties do not dispute that the ’993 patent and the earlier parent applications, including the ’904 Application and the ’606 Application, have the same pertinent portions of their specifications. See PO Resp. 71, n.16; Ex. 1004 ¶ 324. 15 Schuster issued on January 31, 2012, from Application No. 12/786,904, filed on May 25, 2010. Ex. 1029, code (21), (22), (45). Schuster, thus, issued more than one year prior to January 27, 2014.” slip op. at 46

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentable

    “2. Analysis of Claims 19 and 20 Claim 19 depends from claim 14 and additionally recites, “wherein the waterflow regulator comprises an adjustable water flow regulator that is configured to adjust the flow rate of the second portion of the water based at least in part on a setting of the adjustable water flow regulator.” Ex. 1001, 12:16–20. Claim 20 depends from claim 14 and recites the same additional limitation. Id. at 12:21–24. Claims 19 and 20, thus, require the water flow regulator to be an adjustable water flow regulator. Petitioner indicates that the earlier parent applications provide written description support for an adjustable water flow regulator. Pet. 91 (“[T]he ’904 application specification makes it clear that the adjustability of the bowl fill valve is a desirable and essential feature of the invention”); PO Surreply 28. Accordingly, Petitioner fails to meet its burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 19 and 20 are unpatentable over Schuster.” slip op. at 50

  Patent outcomesUS 9,139,993 mixed
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,139,993
• Straumann USA, LLC v. Smart Denture Conversions, LLCInstituted
  PTAB · Dec 10, 2025 · PGR2025-00054 · APJ Ryan H Flax · PGR · Institution

  The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–16 on all four grounds, finding at least one claim more likely than not unpatentable based on obviousness, indefiniteness, or lack of written description.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “institute trial in a post-grant review. We institute a post-grant review only if the information presented in the petition filed under 35 U.S.C. § 321, if unrebutted, shows that it is more likely than not that at least one claim challenged in the petition is unpatentable. 35 U.S.C. § 324. On the existing record, we conclude that Petitioner demonstrates it is more likely than not that Petitioner would prevail in showing that at least one challenged claim of the ’781 patent is unpatentable under a presented ground. See generally Pet. Therefore, we grant institution of post-grant review. Our reasoning is discussed below.” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityDecided for petitioner

    “STANDING Petitioner states that it certifies that: (1) the ’781 patent is available for post grant review because its earliest claimed effective filing date is October 9, 2018, and the patent issued less than nine months ago, on December 3, 2024; and (2) Petitioner is not barred or estopped from requesting a post grant review on the grounds in this petition. Pet. 5. This is sufficient. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(note)(A)–(B), § 321; 37 C.F.R. § 42.204(a). Patent Owner does not contest standing. See generally Prelim. Resp. B. REAL PARTIES-IN-INTEREST Petitioner states that “[t]he real parties-in-interest are Petitioner Straumann USA, LLC and its affiliates Institut Straumann AG and JJGC Indústria e Comércio de Materiais Dentários S.A.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner raises no objection and itself identifies “Smart Denture Conversions, LLC is the real party-in-interest.” Paper 4, 2; see generally Prelim. Resp. C.” slip op. at 3

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “At this point, we find little meaningful difference between the two proposed definitions. In fact, neither does Patent Owner’s witness, Mr. Leinsing, who states that his “opinions would not change under either definition.” Ex. 2011 ¶ 42. And, as set forth above, Patent Owner asserts that, for the sake of its present arguments, it matters not which of the two proposed definitions we use for this proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 21. Thus, at this stage, we accept and use Petitioner’s proposed definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan, which, unlike Patent Owner’s, does not implicate reliance on the knowledge of people other than the individual ordinarily skilled artisan. Petitioner’s definition appears to comport with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the ’781 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” of ordinary skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). This issue may be further developed at trial by the parties, if desired. C.” slip op. at 19

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “same claim construction standard that is used to construe patent claims in a civil action in federal district court thus, by default, we give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, which is “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(b); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Petitioner indicates that None of the claim terms of claims 1–16 need to be construed to determine the patentability issues presented in this petition. The petition applies the ordinary meaning of the claim language as it would be understood by a POSA after reading the ’781 patent. Ex. 1002, ¶130. Petitioner will propose a construction if Patent Owner argues or the Board determines that one is required for any term. Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1002). And, Patent Owner presents no express position on claim construction at this point. See generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding, we do not expressly construe any claim terms; however, this position is preliminary and we may change it based on the fully developed record at trial.8 D.” slip op. at 19

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 12,156,781
• Straumann USA, LLC v. Smart Denture Conversions, LLCInstituted
  PTAB · Nov 21, 2025 · IPR2025-00956 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–12 under all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim is unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “institute trial in an inter partes review. We institute an inter partes review only if the information presented in the petition filed under 35 U.S.C. § 311, and any preliminary response filed under § 313, shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314. After reviewing the parties’ submissions in view of the existing record, we conclude that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood it would prevail in showing that at least one challenged claim of the ’992 patent is unpatentable under the presented grounds. See Pet. Therefore, we grant institution of inter partes review. Our reasoning is discussed below. A.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “These two proposed definitions of the ordinarily skilled artisan share many consistencies, for example, the types of degrees and experience such a person would have had, but differ in the number of years of experience. Petitioner proposes the ordinarily skilled artisan would have had at least five years of experience and Patent Owner proposes at least three years (which would necessarily include five years, too). Patent Owner also proposes that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have consulted a dentist, oral surgeon, prosthodontist, or periodontist with experience in dental implants and prosthetics. At this point, we find little meaningful difference between the two proposed definitions. In fact, neither does Patent Owner’s witness, Mr. Leinsing, who states that his “opinions would not change under either definition.” Ex. 2011 ¶ 40. Thus, at this stage, we accept and use Petitioner’s proposed definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan, which, unlike Patent Owner’s, does not implicate reliance on the knowledge of people other than the individual ordinarily skilled artisan. Petitioner’s definition appears to comport with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the ’992 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” of the ordinary level of skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). This parties may further developed this issue at trial, if desired. C.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “The Board interprets claim terms in an inter partes review using the same claim construction standard that is used to construe patent claims in a civil action in federal district court. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). In construing claims, district courts and the Board here, by default, give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, which is “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).” slip op. at 14

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “Here, the first claim limitation at issue is broad, i.e., different thread pattern/profile between a definite and a temporary screw, and the Specification’s and priority applications’ disclosure is narrow and specific, asymmetric buttress style threads in a temporary screw and symmetrical threads in a definite screw (are different). Any apparent predictability in or maturity of the relevant field here must be contrasted with the fact that the Specification, considering the ’992 patent itself or any of the identified priority applications, never once even discusses the (claimed) concept of specifically differing the thread style between a temporary and a definitive screw. Any differences in thread style are not called out by the disclosure, but are described and can be discerned only in relation to the respective threads’ functionality, i.e., Fig. 75’s temporary screw 190 has buttress-style threading so it can be pulled out rather than unscrewed from the abutment; Fig. 9’s definitive screw 75 has male threads that fill the female threads of the abutment 8 for a secure permanent engagement. Ex. 1001, 15:23–30, 21:25–44, 23:3–36; Ex. 1012, 97–98, Figs. 9, 75. And, although it is possible for a single disclosed species to provide written description support for a claimed genus, “a sufficient description of a genus . . . requires the disclosure of either a representative number of species falling within the scope of the genus or structural features common to the members of the genus so that one of skill in the art can ‘visualize or recognize’ the members of the genus.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350; see also Synthes USA, LLC v. Spinal Kinetics, Inc., 734 F.3d 1332, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2013). That does not appear to be the case here—the present record does not support that the described asymmetrical buttress, serrated style of different temporary screw threading (relative to that of the definitive screw and regardless of the direction of the threads for rotation) is sufficiently representative of the genus’s “different” thread patterns/profiles. See, e.g., Ex. 1006 (a buttress style thread does not function the same as a buttress reverse or 75º joint profile or rounded, or trapezoidal thread).” slip op. at 30

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,937,992
• Xencor, Inc. v. Merus N.V.Instituted
  PTAB · Sep 26, 2025 · IPR2025-00605 · APJ Tawen Chang · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–7 and all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is anticipated by Desjarlais or Moore or obvious over Lazar alone.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1356. Thus, because we determine, based on the arguments and evidence on the present record, that there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioner would prevail with respect to claim 1, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims under each Ground presented in the Petition. Id.; see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”). III. CONCLUSION For the reasons provided above, we find that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing at trial that at least one of the challenged claims of the ’859 patent is unpatentable under at least one ground. Accordingly, we institute inter partes review of all challenged claims based on all the Grounds presented in the Petition.” slip op. at 49

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “As Petitioner points out, the cited disclosure in the ’935 provisional does not “mention[] positions 364 and 368 together as a pair of positions for potential mutations on two chains.” Pet. 28 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 109–19). Although Patent Owner is correct that examples or actual reduction to practice are not required for adequate written description and “[a] specification may . . . contain a written description of a broadly claimed 34 invention without describing all species that [the] claim encompasses,” Prelim. Resp. 15 (quoting Ariad Pharms., 598 F.3d at 1352 and Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic AVE Inc., 339 F.3d 1352, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2003)), the ’935 provisional must still “reasonably convey[] to those skilled in the art that the inventor[s] had possession of the claimed subject matter” as of the relevant date. Regeneron Pharms., Inc. v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 127 F.4th 896, 914 (Fed. Cir. 2025); Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. In this case, Table A of the ’935 provisional discloses a list of CH3 domain interface residues and identifies, for each interface residue in heavy chain A, the contacting residue in the corresponding chain B. Ex. 1030, 17, Table A. Table A does not, however, describe any particular substitutions or pairs of substitutions that should be made to the CH3 domains. See, e.g., Pet. 28 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 109–119). Table 7 of the ’935 provisional does identify specific amino acid substitutions in CH3 domains, including substitutions resulting in a positively charged residue at position 364 (e.g., S364K) and a negatively charged residue (e.g., L368D) at position 368. Ex. 1030, 52, Table 7. Patent Owner argues that this table “discloses specific positions for ‘identification of novel charge pair mutants.’” Prelim. Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 2010 ¶ 48). As Petitioner points out, however, while Example 13 of the ’935 provisional relates to identification of novel charge pair mutants, Table 7 itself was only a “first step” in this identification process. Ex. 1030, 51:6–17. In this step, “many interface contact residues in the IgG CH3 domain were scanned one by one or in groups for substitutions that would result in repulsion of 35 identical heavy chains” so that identified substitutions can then be used to generate antibodies “by engineering matched pairs of CH3 residues in one or more IgG heavy chains – CH3 regions” in follow up experiments. Id. Accordingly, Table 7 does not appear to describe heterodimer combinations, such as those that would result from a pairing of chains with different substitutions. Pet. 29–30 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 111–118). As Petitioner further points out, the follow up experiments testing the matched pairs of CH3 residues did not include paired substitutions at positions 364 and 368. Id. at 29–31. Patent Owner points to disclosure in the ’935 provisional describing, as a distinguishing feature of its invention, the substitution of non-charged or neutral amino acids in wildtype CH3 with charged residues, which according to the ’935 provisional has the “advantage that at least one additional charge-charge interaction in the CH3 interface is created.” Prelim. Resp. 12 (citing, e.g., Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 42–48). For the same reasons discussed above, Petitioner has sufficiently established, for purposes of institution, that such disclosure would not reasonably convey to an ordinarily skilled artisan that the inventors had possession of the entire genus of heterodimeric antibodies comprising CH3 domains wherein a non-charged amino acid is replaced with a charged residue so as to create an additional charge-charge interaction in the CH3 interface. In this regard, we also note that “a description that merely renders the invention obvious does not satisfy the [written description] requirement.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352.” slip op. at 34

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “adequately describes a heterodimeric antibody comprising the recited charged residues at the recited positions of the CH3 domains, i.e., “a positively charged amino residue at position 364” at a first CH3 domain and “a negatively charged amino acid residue at position 368” of the second CH3 domain. Having considered the evidence of record at this preliminary stage of the proceeding, and for the reasons set forth below, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown sufficiently, for purposes of institution, that the ’935 provisional does not provide adequate written description support for claim 1 of the ’859 patent and that, accordingly, Desjarlais and Moore qualify as prior art to that claim. As Petitioner points out, the cited disclosure in the ’935 provisional does not “mention[] positions 364 and 368 together as a pair of positions for potential mutations on two chains.” Pet. 28 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 109–19). Although Patent Owner is correct that examples or actual reduction to practice are not required for adequate written description and “[a] specification may . . . contain a written description of a broadly claimed 34 invention without describing all species that [the] claim encompasses,” Prelim. Resp. 15 (quoting Ariad Pharms., 598 F.3d at 1352 and Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic AVE Inc., 339 F.3d 1352, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2003)), the ’935 provisional must still “reasonably convey[] to those skilled in the art that the inventor[s] had possession of the claimed subject matter” as of the relevant date. Regeneron Pharms., Inc. v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 127 F.4th 896, 914 (Fed. Cir. 2025); Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351.” slip op. at 34

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “The ’859 patent does not provide an explicit definition of “immunoglobulin class.” Nevertheless, we do not construe that term to require “two heavy chains with four domains, VH, CH1, CH2, and CH3, and two Fab arms.” As an initial matter, the Specification teaches that antibodies include, 16 e.g., IgE and IgM — which have an additional CH4 domain in their heavy chains — as well as functional derivatives and/or fragments of known antibody isotypes. Ex. 1001, 11:44–48. Patent Owner’s proposed construction, which limits antibodies to those having two Fab arms and “two heavy chains with four domains, VH, CH1, CH2, and CH3,” excludes these embodiments and cannot be correct. Moreover, the ’859 patent defines antibody as containing “one or more domains” that bind an epitope on an antigen. Ex. 1001, 11:39–44. Thus, an antibody does not require two Fab arms as in a native immunoglobulin molecule.12 The ’859 patent also describes a preferred embodiment as “Ig-like molecules.” Id. at 11:49–52. Thus, we look to the definition of “Ig-like molecule” in the ’859 patent, i.e., “a proteinaceous molecule that possesses at least one immunoglobulin (Ig) domain,” to inform our understanding of the phrase “immunoglobulin class of proteins.” Ex. 1001, 11:4–6. Accordingly, we further construe “immunoglobulin class of proteins” to mean proteinaceous molecules comprising at least one domain that is derived from or shares sequence homology with an immunoglobulin domain.” slip op. at 16

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,926,859
• Catalyst Orthoscience Inc. v. Shoulder Innovations, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Apr 24, 2025 · PGR2025-00001 · APJ James A Tartal · PGR · Institution

  The Board denied institution of post-grant review of claims 1–22, exercising its discretion under § 324(a) based on the Fintiv factors.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied

    “1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Fintiv 5−6. We consider these factors to assess “whether efficiency, fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding.” Id. at 6. In” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “parties, we do not find the merits to be particularly strong on the current record. For example, limitation [1-4] recites, in part, “a locking nut having . . . an external thread on an outside surface of the locking nut.” Ex. 1001, 9:46–47. In alleging obviousness based in part on Orphanos, Petitioner equates the claimed “locking nut” to Orphanos’s collet 230 in a first embodiment of Orphanos, or Orphanos’s collet portion 1052 in a second embodiment of Orphanos. Pet. 37–38. Petitioner acknowledges that the collet and collet portion do not have external threads, but rather are designed to have a snap-fit engagement with the inner sidewall of the baseplate’s central throughbore. Id. at 38. Petitioner argues that modifying the collet and collet portion to have external threads would have been obvious to the skilled artisan in view of Orphanos’s teachings and the knowledge of a person having ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 38–42 (arguing, inter alia, that it would have been “a substitution of a known part for a known problem” and “obvious as a matter of design choice”). Petitioner does not allege that replacing the snap-fit coupling with external threads would either: (1) result in any advantages; or (2) preserve any of Orphanos’s stated benefits of its snap-fit arrangement. See Pet. 34–37. That Petitioner describes no advantages to making its proposed modification potentially undermines Petitioner’s case that the skilled artisan would have done so. Cf. Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit . . . should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.”).” slip op. at 16

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITANot reached

    “Petitioner’s arguments regarding the central post and locking nut include an implicit claim construction argument that these components need not be separate structures. Pet. 74, 76–81. Patent Owner, on the other hand, would have us interpret the claim to require that they be separate structures. Patent Owner raises credible evidence to support its theory. Specifically, Patent Owner directs us to the language of claim 1, which separately recites “a central screw” and “a locking nut.” Prelim. Resp. 51; see Ex. 1001, 9:44–53. Patent Owner further contends, in view of the claim language, that the claimed central post and locking nut are separate and distinct components. According to Patent Owner, however, Lefebvre’s main head and anchor rod portions are parts of a single monolithic anchoring screw. Prelim. Resp. 53–58. Where a claim lists elements separately, there is a rebuttable presumption that these elements have separate and distinct physical structures. See Google LLC v. EcoFactor, Inc., 92 F.4th 1049, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (citing Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 663 F.3d 1221, 1231–1232 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). The presumption may be rebutted by the intrinsic record. Id. At this stage, however, Petitioner does not address that claim 1 appears to separately recite a central post and a locking nut, and does not direct us to any portion of the intrinsic record that might rebut the presumption that these elements are, therefore, separate and distinct structures. See Pet. 73–77. Petitioner also argues that the claim terms “baseplate central channel” and “central channel . . . configured to interface with the baseplate” are indefinite. Pet. 95–102. Patent Owner argues that the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms is clear and that Petitioner “had no problem” arguing how the asserted art purportedly rendered the claims obvious. Prelim. Resp. 69–77.” slip op. at 17

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Definiteness (Nautilus)Not reached

    “Petitioner also argues that the claim terms “baseplate central channel” and “central channel . . . configured to interface with the baseplate” are indefinite. Pet. 95–102. Patent Owner argues that the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms is clear and that Petitioner “had no problem” arguing how the asserted art purportedly rendered the claims obvious. Prelim. Resp. 69–77. In sum, even if Petitioner’s contentions show it is more likely than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition is unpatentable, we find Patent Owner’s arguments identify credible weaknesses in Petitioner’s contentions. Accordingly, we find that that the sixth Fintiv factor is neutral and does not weigh against discretionary denial.” slip op. at 18

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 12,023,254
• Catalyst Orthoscience Inc. v. Shoulder Innovations, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Dec 19, 2024 · PGR2024-00042 · APJ Lisa L Tsang · PGR · Institution

  The Board denied institution of PGR challenging claims 1–16, finding the first five Fintiv factors favored denial and the petition did not present compelling merits.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

    “during the conference and in the Minute Entry, and in the court’s subsequent Order Regarding Schedule. We also note that the evidence shows the district court may intend to reschedule the trial to a date substantially earlier than March 9, 2026. See Ex. 2010, 5; Ex. 1029, 10−11. However, given that the Order does not unambiguously set a trial date for December 1, 2025, or even sometime in December 2025 or January 2026 (see Ex. 1028), we decline to speculate as to what date the court may ultimately select for trial. Moreover, the record shows that Petitioner has consistently opposed moving the trial to a date earlier than March 9, 2026. See Ex. 2010, 5; Ex. 1026, 2−4; Ex. 1029, 11. We view Petitioner’s opposition as creating yet more ambiguity as to the trial date in the co-pending litigation. Therefore, we find that factor 2 is neutral because the exact trial date in district court is uncertain.” slip op. at 14

  • BurdenNot reached

    “if unrebutted in trial, would plainly lead to a conclusion that one or more claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence.” Guidance Memo 4. This standard is only met “if it is highly likely that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim.” OpenSky Indus., LLC v. VLSI Tech. LLC, IPR2021-01064, Paper 102 at 49 (Vidal Oct. 4, 2022) (precedential) (citing Guidance Memo 4). We have reviewed Petitioner’s challenges and Patent Owner’s arguments. For the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner’s challenges have not risen to the threshold of compelling merits. Before addressing the parties’ arguments regarding the asserted grounds, we address: (a) the level of ordinary skill in the art, (b) claim construction, and (c) relevant principles of law; and we provide (d) overviews of the asserted art.” slip op. at 18

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that its proffered additional level of ordinary skill in the art appears consistent with the experience Petitioner describes. See Pet. 16. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the level of ordinary skill in the art articulated by Petitioner and supplemented by Patent Owner, because, based on the current record, it is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’561 patent and prior art of record. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We note, however, that the open-ended language “at least” expands the range of education and experience indefinitely with no upper bound. Therefore, we do not adopt this aspect of Petitioner’s formulation.” slip op. at 19

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “In this regard, Mr. Fallin testifies that I have decades of experience working directly with joint replacement systems, including hip joint replacement systems, knee replacement systems, and facet joint replacement systems. My work on these joint replacement systems included my direct engagement or supervision of and professionals in the inventing, designing, fabricating, testing, obtaining regulatory approvals, ensuring regulatory compliance, commercializing, and patenting of these systems. Ex. 1002 ¶ 10. Mr. Fallin also testifies that his experience “includes working directly with supervising professionals whose responsibilities included designing, developing, and commercializing joint replacement systems and similar device[s].” Id. ¶ 67 As such, Mr. Fallin identifies “decades” of experience with joint replacement systems. Ex. 1002 ¶ 10. Moreover, Patent Owner does not persuasively explain why Mr. Fallin’s “direct engagement” and “working directly with,” as well as “supervision” of, other individuals designing joint replacement systems, does not at least imply personal design experience. See Prelim. Resp. 10–11. Therefore, we determine that the current record reflects that Mr. Fallin is qualified to testify as to the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 20

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 11,771,561
• Cimbria Srl v. 3u Vision SrlInstituted
  PTAB · Sep 20, 2024 · PGR2024-00018 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · PGR · Institution

  The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–15 and all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 6, and 10 are obvious over ElMasry.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), a post-grant review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . demonstrate[s] that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Post-grant review is available for patents that issue from applications that at one point contained at least one claim with an effective filing date on or after March 16, 2013. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), §§ 3(n)(1), 6(f)(2)(A). After considering the briefing and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has shown that the ’947 patent is eligible for post-grant review, and has shown it is more likely than not that at least one challenged claim of the ’947 patent is unpatentable under § 324(a). Accordingly, we institute a post-grant review of the challenged claims of the ’947 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have a B.S. degree in Electrical Engineering, Physics, Chemistry, or an equivalent field, and at least 2-3 years of academic or industry experience in engineering related to optical sorting systems.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶ 21). Patent Owner did not file a Preliminary Response to the Petition and, therefore, at this point, does not contest Petitioner’s definition for one of ordinary skill in the art. Petitioner’s proposed definition appears to be consistent with the disclosure of the ’947 patent, and we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that the prior art itself may “reflect[] an appropriate level” of ordinary skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Having considered the record, we determine that no express claim construction is necessary for any claim terms for the purposes of rendering a decision to institute trial. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). At this stage, we find it unnecessary to resolve whether “electronic control unit” and “processing module” should be construed as mean plus function limitations under § 112(f), because it is possible to address the obviousness grounds presented whether or not these limitations are so construed, and even if the claims were indefinite in the manner Petitioner contends. See Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 801, 813 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (noting indefiniteness of a means-plus-function limitation does not always render it impossible to adjudicate a prior-art challenge). We direct the parties to address the construction of these claim terms and Petitioner’s interpretation during trial.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted

    “We have reviewed Petitioner evidence and citations and, on the current record, we find that Petitioner has shown that it is more likely than not that ElMasry teaches all the limitations of claim 1, without need for any modification. Thus, we find that Petitioner has shown that it is more likely than not that claim 1 would have been unpatentable as obvious over ElMasry.” slip op. at 20

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosure
  Patents in suitUS 11,666,947
• Fluidmaster, Inc. v. Danco, Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Sep 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00633 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Institution

  Instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all asserted grounds; the Board found a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable over Brown and Ho.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Reply, the Sur-reply, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’993 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–20 of the ’993 patent on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied

    “presented to the Office.” Prelim. Resp. 31– 36. In determining whether to deny institution under § 325(d) we use a two-part framework, as follows: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of [the] first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential). The Becton, Dickinson factors provide useful insight into how to apply the framework under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Id. at 9 (referencing Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, Paper 8 at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential as to § III.C.5, first paragraph)).” slip op. at 8

  • BurdenDecided for petitioner

    “At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner provides no sufficient evidence to rebut Dr. Cameron’s testimony as to what a POSITA would have known from Guoxin and Ho’s drawings and as to the alleged motivations to combine Guoxin and Ho. Based on Petitioner’s evidence and analysis, and taking into account the Preliminary Response, at this stage of the proceeding, we determine that the information in the Petition shows a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable over Guoxin and Ho.” slip op. at 24

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “A [person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”)] in the field to which the ’993 Patent is directed would have had at least a Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical engineering or a related field or, as a substitute, at least two years of work or research experience in the design or development of toilet products, parts, and accessories. Prelim. Resp. 16. Petitioner’s declarant Dr. Cameron asserts that: A [POSITA] with respect to the subject matter of the ’993 patent at the time of the priority date, January 27, 2014, would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering, or other technical training in product design or equivalent work experience. This person would also possess at least one year of experience in developing and/or evaluating mechanical aspects of fluid systems. Ex. 1004 ¶ 29. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed definition of a POSITA, as it is consistent with the ’993 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). However, we see no material difference between the level of skill proposed by Patent Owner and that proposed by Dr. Cameron.” slip op. at 12

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,139,993

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.