• Charles River Laboratories, Inc. v. Seikagaku CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 8, 2026 · PGR2025-00023 · APJ Per Curiam · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 are unpatentable as anticipated by the ’629 publication; the claims are not entitled to the 2013 priority date.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “We find that a rigid requirement as to the subject of a POSITA’s doctoral degree (e.g., biochemical engineering, enzymology), or experience working specifically with horseshoe crab proteins, is not consistent with the evidence of record. See, e.g., Ex. 1067, 20:23–21:2 (Dr. Schaefer testifying that the fact the “name of [his] Ph.D. is immunology . . . does not change the fact that the core of [his] thesis training was really in molecular biology”), 22:3–15 (explaining that “the fact that the production of proteins recombinantly is mostly species agnostic”); Ex. 1069, 45:20–47:17 (Dr. Morris testifying that whether a person is a POSITA depends on the person’s “experience, [ ] publications,” and work done for the Ph.D. rather than the name of the Ph.D. program). We also find that evidence of record supports Petitioner’s assertion that, for purposes of defining a POSITA, “[m]ore education could substitute for experience, and vice versa.” See, e.g., Pet. 22; Ex. 1065, 99:14–100:3. Accordingly, based on the entirety of the trial record, we find a POSITA with respect to the claims of the ’109 patent would have had a two years of experience with cloning genes, expressing cloned genes as proteins, and/or characterizing such cloned genes and proteins, with more education being able to substitute for experience, and vice versa. A POSITA may also have collaborated with others, including those with specific experience in utilizing or assessing horseshoe crab Factor C for endotoxin detection and quantitation.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Neither party proposes an express construction of any claim term. See Pet. 22–23 (not proposing any constructions); PO Resp. 23 (“Patent Owner agrees that the terms can be afforded their plain and ordinary meaning.”). However, Patent Owner states that some of Petitioner’s arguments implicitly construe claim 1 in an erroneous manner. PO Resp. 23–28. “For example, Petitioner argues that ‘an adequate written description would have to either disclose representative examples of the possible working cascades of various proteins or some accurate structural feature of the claimed proteins that allow them to function in the claimed assay as a whole.’” Id. at 23 (quoting Pet. 35). Patent Owner argues that, contrary to what Petitioner’s argument allegedly implies, “Claim 1 is directed to a method for producing an endotoxin assay agent” and does not require the use – Owner that claim 1 does not require the use of endotoxin assay agent. However, the claimed endotoxin assay agent must be capable of performing the assay, as counsel for Patent Owner acknowledged. Tr. 83:5–9.” slip op. at 10

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “In this case, to show that the claims of the ’109 patent are unpatentable for lack of written description, Petitioner would have needed to show that the specification as filed (i.e., the ’420 application) fails to reasonably convey to those skilled in the art that Patent Owner had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the July 3, 2023, filing date. Petitioner did not. Pet. 23–24. Nor does Petitioner’s declarant offer testimony that could support such a showing. See Ex. 1003 ¶50 (“I have been asked to provide my opinions as to the state of the art in this field for purposes of determining what the inventors disclosed as their invention as of December 10, 2013.”), ¶51 (“Whenever I offer an opinion in this declaration about the knowledge of a POSA, the manner in which a POSA would have understood the claims of the ’109 patent or its description, the manner in have been led to do based on the prior art, I am referencing the December 10, 2013 timeframe.”). In our Institution Decision, we stated: Although the ’420 application is essentially identical to the ’767 application, the person of ordinary skill in 2013 is not the same as in 2023. See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351 (“[T]he [written description] test requires an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” (emphasis added)). Thus, the information presented in the Petition, which is limited to the perspective of a 2013 POSITA, does not demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the Petition is unpatentable for lack of written description. Inst. Dec. 12 (alterations in original). During trial, Petitioner did not present any further arguments in support of Ground 1. See generally Pet. Reply. Petitioner has failed to prove that claims 1–9 are unpatentable for failing to meet the written description requirement set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).” slip op. at 12

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot shown unpatentable

    “Although the evidence before us shows that, in 2013, a POSITA knew how to recombinantly express genes in expression systems such as CHO or HEK-293 cell lines, the evidence shows that this was true only for genes whose genetic sequences were known or readily available. See, e.g., Ex. 1069, 34:11–22 (“Q. Okay. So you would agree that the creation of the recombinant protein requires the underlying sequence of, as you said, the original animal? A. Of course.”) Because it is undisputed that, in 2013, the genetic sequence for Limulus polyphemus Factor C was unknown, or least not publicly available, Falko-Gunter does not support a finding of adequate written description here. See, e.g., Tr. 48:18–19 (“Patent Owner agrees that there had not been, as of 2013, the full length cDNA sequence for Limulus polyphemus Factor C published.”).” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 11,959,109 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosure
  Patents in suitUS 11,959,109
• Inari Agriculture, Inc. v. Corteva Agriscience LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 18, 2025 · IPR2024-01014 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Final written decision

  Petitioner did not show claims 1–8 unpatentable because they are entitled to the 2004 priority date, making Barbour unavailable as prior art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Enablement (Wands, Amgen full scope)Entitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner

    “For a claim to a biological material, the enablement requirement of § 112, first paragraph, does not require such assured access to a microorganism deposit as of the filing date; what is required is assurance of access (to the microorganism culture by the public upon issuance of a patent on the application) prior to or during the pendency of the application, so that, upon issuance of a U. S. patent on the application, the public will, in fact, receive something in return for the patent grant. Feldman, 517 F.2d at 1355. Patent Owner has persuaded us that such exception not only applies to a deposit, but also extends to a biological material known and readily available. See 52 Fed. Reg. 34080, 34081. In this case, it is undisputed that TC1507 germplasm was known and readily available to the public by Barbour’s publication date in 2006 (Pet. 49–53), years before the 2014 issuance date of the ’378 patent (Ex. 1001, code 45). Thus, based on the record developed through trial, we agree with Patent Owner that the 2004 application satisfies the enablement requirement as of its application date in 2004. PO Resp. 16–18 (citing 52 Fed. Reg. 34080, 34081). As a result, the challenged claims are entitled to the 2004 priority date and, thus, Barbour does not qualify as prior art.” slip op. at 15

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedDecided for patent owner

    “In this case, it is undisputed that TC1507 germplasm was known and readily available to the public by Barbour’s publication date in 2006 (Pet. 49–53), years before the 2014 issuance date of the ’378 patent (Ex. 1001, code 45). Thus, based on the record developed through trial, we agree with Patent Owner that the 2004 application satisfies the enablement requirement as of its application date in 2004. PO Resp. 16–18 (citing 52 Fed. Reg. 34080, 34081). As a result, the challenged claims are entitled to the 2004 priority date and, thus, Barbour does not qualify as prior art. Because all of Petitioner’s challenges rely on Barbour (Pet. 6), all those challenges fail.” slip op. at 15

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference not prior artNot shown unpatentable

    “In this case, it is undisputed that TC1507 germplasm was known and readily available to the public by Barbour’s publication date in 2006 (Pet. 49–53), years before the 2014 issuance date of the ’378 patent (Ex. 1001, code 45). Thus, based on the record developed through trial, we agree with Patent Owner that the 2004 application satisfies the enablement requirement as of its application date in 2004. PO Resp. 16–18 (citing 52 Fed. Reg. 34080, 34081). As a result, the challenged claims are entitled to the 2004 priority date and, thus, Barbour does not qualify as prior art. Because all of Petitioner’s challenges rely on Barbour (Pet. 6), all those challenges fail.” slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “would understand that the term “‘flanked by’ permits overlap between the expression cassette and the DNA sequence it is flanked by.” Pet. 24–26. Patent Owner does not propose any claim construction. PO Resp. 6–7. On this record and for purposes of this Decision, we see no need to expressly construe any claim term.” slip op. at 9

  Patent outcomesUS 8,901,378 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,901,378
• Charles River Laboratories, Inc. v. Seikagaku CorporationInstituted
  PTAB · Sep 9, 2025 · PGR2025-00023 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · PGR · Institution

  Instituted PGR on claims 1–9 because the Board found it more likely than not that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable over the ’629 publication.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Institution of a post-grant review requires that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 321, if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable” or that “the petition raises a novel or unsettled legal question that is important to other patents or patent applications.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a)–(b). Determining whether to institute has been delegated to the Board. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Upon consideration of the Petition and the Preliminary Response, and for the reasons explained below, we determine that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the Petition is unpatentable. Accordingly, we grant the Petition.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “III. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have a Ph.D. degree in biological, chemical or biochemical engineering, molecular biology, or biochemistry and at least two years of experience in the field of utilizing or assessing horseshoe crab zymogen proteins (lysate, purified native and/or recombinantly produced) for endotoxin detection and quantitation. More education could substitute for experience to a certain extent, and vice versa. Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶48–49). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s description of a POSITA in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 10. 1 In addition to other changes to Title 35, the AIA introduced amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 102. Because Patent Owner concedes that the ’725 application “contains, or contained at any time, a claim to a claimed invention that has an effective filing date on or after March 16, 2013” (Ex. 1022), the AIA version of § 102 applies to the ’109 patent. AIA § 3(n)(1)(B); Ex. 1001, 1:11–14 (claiming priority to the ’725 application). 2 US 2019/0241629 A1, published August 8, 2019 (“the ’629 publication” (Ex. 1015)). At this stage, we find Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art sufficiently supported by the record and apply it for purposes of this decision.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Neither party proposes an express construction of any claim term. See Pet. 22–23; Prelim. Resp. 10. We determine that no express claim construction is necessary based on the present record.” slip op. at 10

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not shown unpatentable

    “To show that the claims of the ’109 patent are unpatentable for lack of written description, Petitioner would have needed to show that the specification as filed (i.e., the ’420 application) fails to reasonably convey to those skilled in the art that Patent Owner had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the July 3, 2023, filing date. Petitioner did not. Pet. 23– 24. Nor does Petitioner’s declarant offer testimony that could support such a showing. See Ex. 1003 ¶50 (“I have been asked to provide my opinions as to the state of the art in this field for purposes of determining what the inventors disclosed as their invention as of December 10, 2013.”), ¶51 (“Whenever I offer an opinion in this declaration about the knowledge of a POSA, the manner in which a POSA would have understood the claims of the ’109 patent or its description, the manner in which a POSA would have understood the prior art, or what a POSA would have been led to do based on the prior art, I am referencing the December 10, 2013 timeframe.”). Although the ’420 application is essentially identical to the ’767 application, the person of ordinary skill in 2013 is not the same as in 2023. See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351 (“[T]he [written description] test requires an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” (emphasis added)). Thus, the information presented in the Petition, which is limited to the perspective of a 2013 POSITA, does not demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the Petition is unpatentable for lack of written description.” slip op. at 12

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosure
  Patents in suitUS 11,959,109
• Dr. Reddy’S Laboratories, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., Hoffman-La Roche AG, And Abbvie Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 16, 2024 · IPR2023-00052 · APJ Jeffrey N Fredman · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1–4, 8–14, and 18–26 not shown unpatentable because they were entitled to priority before the November 2018 Venclexta Label, which therefore was not prior art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “We do not discern a substantive difference between the parties’ respective definitions for the level of ordinary skill in the art. Although Petitioner did not expressly recite hematological malignancies, Petitioner did refer to expertise in clinical oncology, which would encompass the blood cancers recited in the claims. Neither party identifies a difference in the analysis or conclusions that would be based on differences in the ordinary skill in the art analysis. Accordingly, we find the parties’ respective definitions to be equivalent and consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art as reflected by the prior art in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “The parties do not identify any issue relating to the preamble that would impact our analysis. We recognize that Patent Owner is suggesting that Petitioner’s expert, at least, is reading the word “clinical” into the treatment language of claim 1. However, the plain language of the claim 1 preamble states “treating lymphoma or leukemia in a human patient” and is supported by a straightforward definition in the Specification of the ’087 patent, expressly limiting the invention to treatment of human patients. See Ex. 1001, 16:25–38. We therefore find that the preamble terms do not need claim construction because there is no actual dispute suggesting that, for example, claim 1 implicitly recites the term “clinical.” See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 5

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Enablement (Wands, Amgen full scope)EnabledEntitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner

    “d. Analysis Considering the Wands factors as a whole, we find that the limited breadth of the claims, presence of several working examples, significant amount of direction and guidance provided by the ’087 patent, predictability in treating blood cancers with Bcl-2 inhibitors like GDC-0199, and high level of skill in the art are balanced against a large quantity of experimentation. Based on our consideration of the entirety of the evidence, we find that a preponderance of the evidence supports the conclusion that undue experimentation would not have been required to make and use the invention commensurate in scope with the claims of the ’087 patent. One underlying theme of Petitioner’s contentions and Petitioner’s expert testimony is the repeated contention that clinical trials were not completed by Patent Owner. See, e.g., Pet. 48 (“venetoclax (GDC-0199) was not FDA-approved”); Ex. 1020 ¶ 193. We find these arguments unpersuasive as we agree with Patent Owner that “[i]t is well established that a patent may be secured, and typically is secured, before the conclusion of clinical trials.” In re Montgomery, 67 F.3d 1375, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Particularly as to the dependent claims, a preponderance of the evidence of record does not support a finding that undue experimentation would have been required to administer three different doses of GDC-0199 starting with 100 mg, to use multiple daily dosing cycles of one day, to continue until disease progression occurs, or to combine with other treatment compounds. We find that a preponderance of the evidence does not support Petitioner’s position that any of the dependent claims fail to comply with the enablement requirement.” slip op. at 23

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateEntitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner

    “Applying Rai and Wertheim to the instant facts, we agree with Patent Owner that, factually and legally, in the ’087 patent “the claimed dosages of 100 mg, 200 mg, and/or 400 mg of GDC-0199 are adequately supported.” PO Second Suppl. Brief 2 (citing PO Resp. 11, 27–29; PO Sur-reply 19, 21– 22; Ex. 1001, 24:20–29.) In particular, the ’087 patent describes all three specific dosage values 100 mg, 200 mg, and 400 mg in the context of an escalating drug dosage series and Petitioner points to no persuasive statements in the specification that dispute either the effectiveness or the operability of GDC-0199 at any of these dosages.” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 11,110,087 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosure
  Patents in suitUS 11,110,087
• Kinderfarms LLC v. Genexa Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Mar 25, 2024 · PGR2023-00051 · APJ Deborah Katz · PGR · Institution

  Instituted PGR of claims 1–24 on all asserted grounds; the Board found the §103 challenges more likely than not to render claim 1 unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” See 35 U.S.C. § 324(a).” slip op. at 6

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “B. Level of Skill Each party puts forth a characterization of the ordinarily skilled artisan in the field of the claims of the ’795 patent. (See Pet. 13 (citing Crowley Decl., Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 90–91); see Prelim. Resp. 3–4.) The parties’ proposed characterizations of the ordinarily skilled artisan are sufficiently similar that adoption of either would lead to the same result, institution. Thus, for the purposes of this Decision only, we adopt Patent Owner’s characterization of the ordinarily skilled artisan as having a bachelor of science degree in a relevant life sciences field, such as, chemistry, biochemistry, or pharmacy, with at least two years of work or laboratory experience in pharmaceutical formulations, and access to one or more team members having experience in pharmaceutical formulation and pharmaceutical regulatory approvals, or, in the alternative, at least three to four years of work or laboratory experience in pharmaceutical formulations, and access to one or more team members having experience in pharmaceutical formulation and pharmaceutical regulatory approvals. (See Prelim. Resp. 3–4.) We also note that the level of skill of an ordinarily skilled artisan is revealed by the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the absence of specific findings on the level of skill in the art does not give rise to reversible error “the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown.” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163, 225 USPQ 34, 38 (Fed.Cir.1985)).” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction Petitioner puts forth constructions of certain terms used in the claims of the ’795 patent. (See Pet. 14–19.) Patent Owner does not dispute any of these constructions specifically, but at this point, argues that we need not construe any terms “to resolve the present controversy.” (Prelim. Resp. 2.) We agree that an express construction is not required at this point in the proceeding. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference; nor is it that the claimed invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the references. Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). Thus, at this point in the proceeding, Patent Owner’s argument is not persuasive because it does not address the teachings in the prior art that Petitioner asserts would render the formulations claimed in the ’795 patent obvious.” slip op. at 20

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 11,617,795
• Nextremity Solutions, Inc. / Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc. et al. v. Extremity Medical, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 26, 2023 · IPR2022-00802 · APJ Jeffrey N Fredman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 59 is unpatentable as anticipated by Brumfield, Marcus, and Chandran; the motion to amend proposing substitute claim 62 is denied because claim 62 is unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “We find this argument unpersuasive. As Patent Owner notes, Petitioner’s expert provides a definition of POSITA that is very similar to that recited by Patent Owner in its Motion to Amend, substantively differing only in the number of years of experience of the engineer at issue. This congruity supports the conclusion that the level of ordinary skill in the art may be recognized in the prior art itself. Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355 (“the absence of specific findings on the level of skill in the art does not give rise to reversible error ‘where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown’”).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner

    “In our Institution Decision, we agreed with Petitioner that the “portion of the preamble reciting ‘for compressing bone’ is not limiting to the claim” and found that other terms did not require construction. Dec. 8–9. We agreed with Petitioner that “[t]he phrase ‘for compressing bone’ merely identifies an intended use.” Pet. 20; Dec. 9. Patent Owner does not dispute this interpretation. See generally PO Resp. We agree with Petitioner that “the patentability of apparatus or composition claims depends on the claimed structure, not on the use or purpose of that structure.” Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 809 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Therefore, having considered the entire record developed during trial, we adhere to the preliminary construction that the limitation “for compressing bone” does not impose a structural limitation on claim 59 and that the other terms do not require construction.” slip op. at 11

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Patent Owner disputes the Petition generally but Patent Owner does not identify any error in Petitioner’s foregoing arguments. Accordingly, we adopt the factual statements regarding the specific teachings of the references as findings of fact. See generally In re NuVasive, 841 F.3d 966, 974 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that the Board need not make specific findings as to claim limitations that Patent Owner does not dispute are disclosed in the prior art). We have reviewed Petitioner’s analysis and the underlying evidence cited in support and conclude that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the limitations of claim 59 are disclosed by Brumfield.” slip op. at 26

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied

    “For the reasons discussed below, Patent Owner has shown that proposed substitute claim 62 meets the statutory and regulatory requirements set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.121. For the reasons discussed below, however, Petitioner has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that proposed substitute claim 62 is unpatentable over prior art. Therefore, we deny Patent Owner’s Revised Motion to Amend.” slip op. at 38

  Patent outcomesUS 8,303,589 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 8,303,589
• Pelican Biothermal, LLC v. Va-Q-Tec AGSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 16, 2023 · PGR2021-00085 · APJ Barry L Grossman · PGR · Final written decision

  The Board granted the motion to amend but held amended claim 64 unpatentable as anticipated by NanoCool 98596-type products and obvious over the cited combinations; all other amended claims were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part

    “VI. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that amended claim 64 is unpatentable; FURTHER ORDERED that Patent Owner’s Non-Contingent Motion to Amend is granted for claims 64 and denied for all other amended claims; and” slip op. at 77

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “A. Status as Prior Art Is a Substantive Issue, Not an Evidentiary Issue. A motion to exclude is not an appropriate mechanism for challenging the sufficiency of evidence, such as whether a reference qualifies as prior art, or the proper weight that should be afforded an argument. See Flir Systems, Inc. v. Leak Surveys, Inc., IPR2014-00411, Paper 113, 4, 8–9 (PTAB September 3, 2015); PTAB Consol. Trial Practice Guide 79 (Nov. 30 Mr. Zumwalt testifies that other NanoCool products, designated by product number 85430 and 98630, also have the same configuration as the 98830 product and are made by the same process. Thus, “the 98830, 85430, and 98630 products can be collectively referred to as ‘98830-type’ products all having the same relevant design.” Ex. 1030 ¶ 17. 2019) (“A motion to exclude . . . may not be used to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to prove a particular fact. A motion to exclude is not a vehicle for addressing the weight to be given evidence—arguments regarding weight should appear only in the merits documents.”); Caterpillar Inc. v. Wirtgen Am., Inc., IPR2017-02187, Paper 42,17 (PTAB May 21, 2019) (status as prior art “is a substantive issue, not an evidentiary issue.”) Thus, whether the NanoCool 98830 product is prior art is not the proper basis for Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude evidence concerning the NanoCool 98830 product.” slip op. at 29

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “Neither Petitioner nor Mr. Harber provide any analysis of the factors pertinent to a determination of the level of ordinary skill, identified above, to support their conclusory statements. We give Mr. Harber’s conclusory testimony minimal probative weight. 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Moreover, there is no persuasive evidence to which we have been directed of the need for specific education or experience in biological or chemical technologies related to the claimed containers and inserts.” slip op. at 26

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “With regard to the level of ordinary skill in the art, Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill would have had “a bachelor’s degree or higher degree in biological, chemical or mechanical engineering, or related sciences, and at least two to five years of experience in designing and testing ISCs [insulated shipping containers] depending on education level.” Pet. 9 (emphasis added) (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 23–24). Exhibit 1002 is the Declaration testimony of Mr. Paul Haber. Mr. Harber actually states a slightly different level of ordinary skill. Mr. Harber testifies: The hypothetical POSITA would have: (i) at least a bachelor’s degree in biological, chemical or mechanical engineering, or related sciences, and have at least three to five years of experience in designing and testing ISCs [Insulated Shipping Containers][29]. Such a person may also have (ii) a higher level degree, such as a PhD and/or Master’s degree in engineering, or related sciences, and have at least two to three years of experience in designing and testing ISCs. 29 See Ex. 1002 ¶ 23. Ex. 1002 ¶ 24 (emphasis added). Mr. Harber also testifies that “[t]hese descriptions are approximate, and a higher level of education or specific skill might make up for less experience, and vice-versa.” Id.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 10,766,685 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,766,685
• Ricetec, Inc. v. BASF SEAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 8, 2023 · PGR2021-00114 · APJ Tina E Hulse · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–17 are unpatentable: they lack written description support and are anticipated by Hinga; the Board also found the challenged dependent claims obvious over the listed combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “As explained in our Institution Decision (Dec. Inst. 5–6), we do not discern a substantive difference between the parties’ respective definitions for the level of ordinary skill in the art. Although Petitioner states a POSITA must have one to two years of postdoctoral research experience and Patent Owner’s definition requires at least five years of “research experience,” Patent Owner’s definition does not indicate a specific time for that research (i.e., it could include research during or after a doctoral program). Neither party addresses or contests the other party’s definition in their post-institution papers. See generally PO Resp.; Pet. Reply; PO Sur-reply. Accordingly, we find the parties’ respective definitions to be equivalent and consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art as reflected by the prior art in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). Moreover, we find that Dr. Shaner and Dr. Somers are both qualified to opine from the perspective of a skilled artisan as both are persons of at least ordinary skill in the art, based on either party’s definition. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 4–15; Ex. 2036 ¶¶ 5–11, App’x A; see also Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 22 F. 4th 1369, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“To offer expert testimony from the perspective of a skilled artisan in a patent case—like for claim construction, validity, or infringement—a witness must at least have ordinary skill in the art.”).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “amount.” Pet. Reply 14. Patent Owner, however, argues that we erred in our construction because the Specification explicitly defines “effective amount” to mean “the amount of herbicide required to achieve at least about 65% phytotoxicity of conventional [i.e., wild, non-mutant] rice (e.g., red rice) in field applications.” PO Resp. 10 (quoting Ex. 1001, 6:34–37). Because the inventors served as their own lexicographers, Patent Owner asserts the Specification’s express definition controls. Id. at 10–11 (citing Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., 579 F.3d 1363, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“When a patentee explicitly defines a claim term in the patent specification, the patentee’s definition controls.”)). Nevertheless, Patent Owner acknowledges that the “less than 10% injury” language “is indeed a limitation of the ’346 Patent claims.” Id. at 11. Having considered the arguments and evidence presented at trial, we agree with Patent Owner that the inventors acted as their own lexicographer to define “effective amount” and that that definition governs its meaning. Phillips, 415 F.3d 1316 (“[O]ur cases recognize that the specification may reveal a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess. In such cases, the inventor’s lexicography governs.”). We, therefore, construe the term “effective amount” to mean “the amount of an herbicide required to achieve at least about 65% phytotoxicity of conventional rice (e.g., red rice) in field applications.” As explained further below, however, whether incorporated into the construction of “effective amount” or not, the claim language itself further requires that the “effective amount” encompass a specific range of amounts of herbicide (i.e., 14 g AI/Ha to 40 g AI/Ha of quizalofop) and cause “less than 10% injury” to the mutant rice. See Ex. 1001, claim 1.” slip op. at 10

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateUnpatentable

    “Mankin would derive the herbicide range suggested by Patent Owner and Dr. Somers from the “rules of thumb,” that range is much broader than the claimed range. Claim 1 recites that the effective amount is 14 g AI/Ha–40 g AI/Ha of quizalofop, but, according to Dr. Somers’s calculations from the Assure II herbicide label, a POSITA would understand the effective amount to be 19.25–154 (or 19.25–184.8) g AI/Ha. Ex. 2036 ¶ 54; PO Resp. 38. Patent Owner does not identify anything in the specification that would allow a POSITA to “immediately discern” the specific range limitations of the claims. See General Hospital, 888 F.3d at 1372. As the Federal Circuit has stated, “one cannot disclose a forest in the original application, and then pick a tree out of the forest and say here is my invention.” Purdue Pharma, 230 F.3d at 1326. Thus, we are not persuaded that the disclosure of a broad range of effective amounts via the Assure II herbicide label coupled with Dr. Somers’s undisclosed “rules of thumb” provide written description support for the narrower range limitations of the claims. Moreover, we agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner is impermissibly working backward from the claimed ranges to determine whether Dr. Somers’s “rules of thumb” can be used to re-create the claimed range from the herbicide label. Pet. Reply 15. That is not the test for written description. Written description “requires a statement of an invention, not an invitation to go on a hunting expedition to patch together after the fact a synthetic definition of an invention.” Indivior UK Ltd. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs. S.A., 18 F. 4th 1323, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Dr. Somers’s “rules of thumb” applied to the extrinsic herbicide label would be understood by a POSITA as a description in Mankin of the range limitation of the claims. Rather, as Dr. Somers concedes, his “rules of thumb” in conjunction with the herbicide label represent a starting point for a POSITA to test plants to determine what the effective amount range should be. See Ex. 2036 ¶ 53 (referring to a “dose response analysis” between 0.5x and 4x). But “a ‘mere wish or plan’ for obtaining the claimed invention is not sufficient.” See Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 636 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2011).” slip op. at 30

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Enablement (Wands, Amgen full scope)EnabledNot shown unpatentable

    “We are not persuaded. Given the state of the art in 2017, and the known availability of the G2096S seeds at that time, we find the ’346 patent specification enables the claims. The ’346 patent specification clearly describes the G2096S mutant ACCase rice and its use in the claimed method for treating rice. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 2:37–45, 57:51–61. Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the ’346 patent specification has not omitted the G2096S herbicide tolerant rice. Rather, the ’346 patent specification expressly identifies the G2096S mutant rice that possesses the phenotype of tolerance to the effective amounts of herbicides, and describes the method for treating that mutant rice with those effective amounts. See, e.g., id. at 8:8–12; 57:51–61. Thus, we are not persuaded that we erred in relying on Hinga’s seed deposits to determine that Petitioner has failed to meet its burden to prove that the ’346 patent specification fails to enable the challenged claims. Cf. Wands, 858 F.2d at 736 (stating “[n]o deposit is necessary if the biological organisms can be obtained from readily available sources.”).” slip op. at 46

  Patent outcomesUS 11,096,346 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,096,346
• Ricetec, Inc. v. BASF SEAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 8, 2023 · PGR2021-00113 · APJ Tina E Hulse · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–15 are unpatentable: they lack written-description support, and claims 1–3, 7, and 11–15 are anticipated by Hinga or Hinga2013.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “As explained in our Institution Decision (Dec. Inst. 6–7), we do not discern a substantive difference between the parties’ respective definitions for the level of ordinary skill in the art. Although Petitioner states a POSITA must have one to two years of postdoctoral research experience and Patent Owner’s definition requires at least five years of “research experience,” Patent Owner’s definition does not indicate a specific time for that research (i.e., it could include research during or after a doctoral program). Neither party addresses or contests the other party’s definition in their post-institution papers. See generally PO Resp.; Pet. Reply; PO Sur-reply. Accordingly, we find the parties’ respective definitions to be equivalent and consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art as reflected by the prior art in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). Moreover, we find that Dr. Shaner and Dr. Somers are both qualified to opine from the perspective of a skilled artisan as both are persons of at least ordinary skill in the art, based on either party’s definition. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 5–15; Ex. 2036 ¶¶ 5–11, App’x A; see also Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 22 F. 4th 1369, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“To offer expert testimony from the perspective of a skilled artisan in a patent case—like for claim construction, validity, or infringement—a witness must at least have ordinary skill in the art.”).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Having considered the arguments and evidence presented at trial, we agree with Patent Owner that the inventors acted as their own lexicographer to define “effective amount” and that that definition governs its meaning. Phillips, 415 F.3d 1316 (“[O]ur cases recognize that the specification may reveal a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess. In such cases, the inventor’s lexicography governs.”). We, therefore, construe the term “effective amount” to mean “the amount of an herbicide required to achieve at least about 65% phytotoxicity of conventional rice (e.g., red rice) in field applications.” As explained further below, however, whether incorporated into the construction of “effective amount” or not, the claim language itself further requires that the “effective amount” encompass a specific range of amounts of herbicide and cause “less than 10%” injury to the mutant rice. See Ex. 1001, claim 1. We determine it is unnecessary to expressly construe any other claim terms for purposes of this Decision. See Wellman, 642 F.3d at 1361.” slip op. at 11

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateUnpatentable

    “labels is akin to relying on literature that clearly provides, on its face, the missing disclosure, as in Falkner. Id. On the contrary, Patent Owner’s argument makes clear that the herbicide labels, by themselves, are insufficient to describe the claimed range limitation. Specifically, because the label ranges do not align with the claimed ranges, Dr. Somers had to make additional assumptions and inferences to support Patent Owner’s written description argument. For example, to calculate the potential effective amount range of herbicides, Dr. Somers applied several different “rules of thumb,” none of which are disclosed in the Mankin specification. See Ex. 2036 ¶¶ 34, 54. According to Dr. Somers, to determine the effective amount for a plant with an unknown response to an herbicide, a POSITA “would naturally test the lowest label (1X) rate of the herbicide, along with a few rates below (starting at about half-X) and above the 1X rate (up to 4X) of the herbicide, to determine the effective dose for this ‘uncharacterized’ plant.” Id. ¶ 34. Dr. Somers refers to this as a “dose response analysis.” Id. ¶ 53. In other words, to determine what the actual effective amount of herbicides should be, Dr. Somers explains that a POSITA would have to test the plants at these “rule of thumb” amounts to determine the effective range. Id. ¶ 34. Given the additional assumptions and inferences that must be made to the herbicide labels to arrive at the range limitations, we are not persuaded that relying on the extrinsic herbicide labels for written description support is proper in this case. That said, even if we were to allow Patent Owner to rely on the herbicide labels and the “rules of thumb” for determining the effective herbicide dose, Patent Owner admits that the ranges calculated from the herbicide labels are broader than the range limitations of the claims. See PO Resp. 39. As Petitioner notes, however, the Mankin Application does not provide any guidance as to whether the effective amount range of herbicide would include a 0.5x dose, a 2x dose, or the 4x dose, such that a POSITA could immediately discern the claimed range from the herbicide label.17 Pet. Reply 16.” slip op. at 30

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Dr. Somers, however, relies on the label for Fusilade II, which is a different fluazifop-P-butyl herbicide with a different range of 52.98–103.96 g AI/Ha, which—not surprisingly—aligns more closely with the claimed range of at least 56–150 g AI/Ha. Ex. 2036 ¶ 52. We note that Fusilade II does not appear to be one of the listed herbicides in Table 1, whereas Fusilade DX is. Ex. 2034 ¶ 219 (listing “Fusilade, Fusilade 2000, Fusilade DX, ICI-A 00009, ICI-A 00005, SL-236, IH-773B, TF-1169, and Fusion” as examples of synonyms and trade names for fluazifop-P-butyl). Regardless, that the dose range differs for the same herbicide calls into question the credibility of Dr. Somers’s assertion that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been able to discern the claimed range limitation by simply looking at the EPA-approved herbicide labels (and applying his “rules of thumb”).18, 19” slip op. at 33

  Patent outcomesUS 11,096,345 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,096,345
• Ricetec, Inc. v. BASF SEInstituted
  PTAB · Mar 11, 2022 · PGR2021-00113 · APJ Tina E Hulse · PGR · Institution

  The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–15 because Petitioner showed it is more likely than not that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable over Hinga or Hinga2013.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “We have authority under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), which provides that a post-grant review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . ., if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Upon considering the arguments and evidence presented by the parties, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated that it is more likely than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition is unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “We find Petitioner has shown sufficiently that the “effective amount” limitation of each of the challenged claims is not adequately supported by the Mankin Application. Although the Mankin Application does generally describe herbicidal compositions that “comprise an herbicidal effective amount” of at least one ACCase herbicide (Ex. 2034 ¶ 233), that generic disclosure is not sufficient written description support for the specific effective amounts recited in the claims. Indeed, we agree with Petitioner that the Mankin Application does not disclose any effective amounts of any of the recited herbicides within the claimed ranges, let alone one that causes less than 10% injury. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 90, 91. 94; Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 128, 237 (Table 1), 248, Fig. 17. description is satisfied because the Mankin Application’s disclosure of an herbicide tolerance study for a DIM herbicide would have led a person of ordinary skill in the art to the specific effective amounts of the FOP herbicides recited in the claims. Prelim. Resp. 72–73. Nor are we persuaded that there is adequate written description support because a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been able to ascertain the effective amounts for each herbicide based on the knowledge in the art. Id. at 73. That is not the test for written description. “It is not sufficient for purposes of the written description requirement of § 112 that the disclosure, when combined with the knowledge in the art, would lead one to speculate as to modifications that the inventor might have envisioned, but failed to disclose.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Rather, “[e]ach application in the chain must describe the claimed features.” Id.” slip op. at 15

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Enablement (Wands, Amgen full scope)EnabledNot shown unpatentable

    “We note that Petitioner does not appear to consider the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art in evaluating the amount of guidance needed to enable the claimed invention. As our reviewing court states, “[a] patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art.” Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Although the ’345 patent does not provide a specific working example of the G2096S mutation, we are not persuaded on this record that that necessarily weighs heavily in favor of undue experimentation given the prior knowledge in the art that that mutation confers herbicide tolerance to rice plants and the deposit of the G2096S mutation seed, as taught by Hinga and Hinga2013. Ex. 1003 ¶ 21; Ex. 1004 ¶ 54.” slip op. at 26

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

    “Analysis Anticipation requires that “each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). “To establish inherency, the extrinsic evidence ‘must make clear that the missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary skill.’” Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, to anticipate, a prior art reference must “disclose[] within the four corners of the document not only all of the limitations claimed but also all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim.” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. Verisign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008).” slip op. at 31

  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 11,096,345

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.