- PTAB · Aug 30, 2023 · IPR2023-00521 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 19–61 and 63–81 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Doud anticipates claims 19–61 and 63–75.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022). The standard for institution is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless the Director determines . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one claim of the ’740 patent. Accordingly, we grant institution of an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateOther
“the application describe the claim limitations exactly,” the application must demonstrate to persons of ordinary skill in the art that the applicants invented a composition including those limitations. Wertheim, 541 F.2d at 262. On its face, the range of “at least 0.01 wt. %” encompasses a range that is broader than 0.01–35 wt. %, and Patent Owner does not sufficiently explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand from merely a disclosure of 35 wt.% that the inventors were in possession of the entire claimed range for copper, cobalt, or nickel in the magnesium composition.” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date, deniedOther
“On this record, the term “at least 0.01 wt. %” in the ’740 patent encompasses values for nickel, copper, and cobalt that are higher than the 35 wt. % (nickel and copper) and 20 wt. % (cobalt) limits outlined in the parent and grandparent applications. Accordingly, we determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that claim 19 of the ’740 patent is not entitled to the benefit of the filing dates of its priority applications. Challenged claims 20–61 and 63–75 depend from claim 19 and there is no argument presented that these claims have independent written description support in Doud. For example, there is no evidence presented that any of these dependent claims narrow the ranges for each of copper, nickel, and cobalt recited in in the ’295 application for these claims.7 Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we apply Doud as prior art to challenged claims 19–61 and 63–75.” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“as the ’740 patent. For example, Doud and the ’740 patent both disclose a method of forming a novel magnesium composite that includes melting an AZ91D magnesium alloy containing 90 wt. % magnesium, 9 wt. % aluminum, and 1 wt. % zinc. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 45, 47; Ex. 1001, 21:43–51, 22:48–53, 33:32–43, 34:9–12. To this alloy is added either 7 wt. % nickel or 10 wt. % copper. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 45, 47, 53, 57; Ex. 1001, 21:48–51, 22:53–56, 33:35–36, 34:12–13. These additives are mixed in the magnesium alloy at a temperature that is less than the melting point of copper or nickel, and the casting is then cooled. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 45, 47, 53, 57; Ex. 1001, 21:51–54, 22:56–58, 33:35, 34:12-13. Doud reports that nickel and copper, when added to molten magnesium, will form Mg2Ni and CuMg2 intermetallic, galvanically-active, in situ precipitates. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 12–13. Doud discloses that the dissolution rate of the resulting casting material is either 325 mg/cm2-hr (nickel) or 50 mg/cm2-hr (copper) in a 3% KCl solution at 90° C. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 45, 47, 53, 57; Ex. 1001, 21:60–62, 22:61–63, 33:41–43, 34:15–17. Doud also discloses that the average particle diameter of the additives used in the invention is generally “at least about 0.1 microns” and “typically no more than about 500 microns.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 6. Petitioner explains how the identified disclosures of Doud anticipate independent claim 19. Pet. 39–40. Petitioner also identifies where the limitations of dependent claims 20–61 and 63–75 are disclosed in Doud. Id. at 41–45. Patent Owner does not address Petitioner’s anticipation arguments with respect to claims 19–61 and 63–75, apart from arguing that Doud is not prior art to these claims. Prelim. Resp. 27–39. demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that claims 19–61 and 63–75 are anticipated by Doud.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,689,740 - Offshore Technical Compliance, LLC v. Innovative Pressure Testing, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 28, 2021 · IPR2020-00923 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–17 were held unpatentable as obvious over BOP California, Wodjenski, and Winters; the revised motion to amend proposing claims 19–35 was denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther
“1 The Petition requested review of claims 1–18, but Patent Owner filed a statutory disclaimer of claim 18. Pet. 3; Ex. 2001; see 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e) (“The patent owner may file a statutory disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. 253(a) in compliance with § 1.321(a) of this chapter, disclaiming one or more claims in the patent. No inter partes review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”); Nobel Biocare Servs. AG v. Instradent USA, Inc., 903 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2018). claims on which we instituted trial. Based on the record before us, Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) claims 1–17 of the ’143 patent are unpatentable; and (2) Patent Owner’s proposed substitute claims 19–35 are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“B. Testimony of Mr. Anderson Patent Owner contends that the testimony provided by Petitioner’s” slip op. at 16
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining whether an invention would have been obvious at the” slip op. at 18
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other
“D. Claim Construction The Board uses “the same claim construction standard that would be” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 9,207,143 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,207,143 - ROKU, Inc. v. Universal Electronics, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · May 13, 2021 · IPR2019-01595 · APJ Minn Chung · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing of its decision denying institution on claims 1 and 2, finding no abuse of discretion on priority entitlement or motivation to combine Darbee and Golender.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW “The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision,” and the challenging party “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed” in a 1 Petitioner also filed a request for the Precedential Opinion Panel (“POP”) to review the Decision (Paper 13 (Notification of Receipt of POP Request)), which the POP denied (Paper 14 (Order)). paper of record. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Because Petitioner seeks rehearing of our Decision denying institution of trial based on the Petition, it must show an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) (“When rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.”). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Thus, a request for rehearing is not an opportunity merely to disagree with the Board’s assessment of the arguments or weighing of the evidence, or to present new arguments or evidence that could have been presented in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Entitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner
“issue upon which the priority determination turns—what the priority applications reasonably would have conveyed to a person of ordinary skill in the art—because Dr. Medvidovic did not provide any testimony on that issue. And we did not overlook or misapprehend any testimony of Dr. Medvidovic regarding what the priority applications reasonably would have conveyed to a person of ordinary skill in the art because we could not have overlooked or misapprehended any testimony that was not presented in the Medvidovic Declaration. As discussed above, Dr. Medvidovic’s testimony based on what is expressly disclosed in or necessarily follows from the disclosures of the priority applications was insufficient because Dr. Medvidovic did not explain adequately why the disclosures in the priority applications would not reasonably have conveyed to a person of ordinary skill in the art the subject matter of the User Action Limitation. Thus, Dr. Medvidovic’s testimony was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of what the priority applications reasonably would have conveyed to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Although Patent Owner’s declarant, Mr. Bear, provided detailed testimony and explanations regarding how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the priority applications to describe the subject matter recited in the User Action Limitation (see Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 111–122, 126–127), Dr. Medvidovic did not provide adequate testimony or explanations to the contrary on the issue (see Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 53–63).” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“misapprehend or overlook 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c). The mere fact that Dr. Medvidovic provided testimony different from the testimony of Mr. Bear does not by itself raise a genuine issue of material fact. See Mortgage Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1325–26 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The mere existence in the record of dueling expert testimony does not necessarily raise a genuine issue of material fact.”). As the Request acknowledges, Dr. Medvidovic in his Declaration (Ex. 1010, “Medvidovic Declaration”) testified that the subject matter of the User Action Limitation is “neither expressly disclosed [in] nor necessarily follows from” the descriptions in the priority applications about event journal data. Req. 3 (emphases added) (citing Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 57–62). As discussed above, however, the test for determining compliance with the written description requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 112 is whether the original disclosure of the earlier-filed application reasonably would have conveyed to a person of ordinary skill in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter at the time of the earlier-filed application. Ariad Pharm., 598 F.3d at 1351. The record shows that Dr. Medvidovic did not provide any testimony in his Declaration as to what the disclosures in the priority applications reasonably would have conveyed to a person of ordinary skill in the art. See Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 53–63. Nor did Dr. Medvidovic explain adequately in his Declaration why the disclosures in the priority applications would not reasonably have conveyed to a person of ordinary skill in the art the subject matter of the User Action Limitation. See id.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Under Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, however, “less education can be remedied with additional work experience (e.g., 5–6 years).” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 64–67). As stated in the Bear Declaration, Mr. Bear’s work experience includes at least 9 years of computer software programming using a variety of coding languages, such as BASIC, Pascal, C, C++, and 68000 Assembly Language. See Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 10–12. Thus, Mr. Bear is qualified to testify from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art under Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. As discussed in the Decision, although we did not find the parties’ proposals for the level of ordinary skill in the art to be materially different, to the extent the testimony from the parties’ declarants on the level of ordinary skill in the art raised a genuine issue of material fact, we adopted and applied Petitioner’s definition for purposes of the Decision, being mindful of the rule that “a genuine issue of material fact created by such testimonial evidence will be viewed in the light most favorable to the petitioner solely for purposes of deciding whether to institute an inter partes review.” Dec. 9 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c)). Thus, the record shows that, under Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art adopted in consideration of § 42.108(c), the Decision appropriately credited Mr. Bear’s testimony on what the priority applications reasonably would have conveyed to a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11
§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 8,015,446 - Flex Logix Technologies Inc. v. Venkat KondaAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 16, 2021 · PGR2019-00042 · APJ Norman H Beamer · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7, 9–15, and 17–19 are unpatentable under §§ 102(a)(1) and 103; the revised motion to amend and motion to exclude are denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We find Petitioner’s proposal consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Therefore, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed position as to the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Because only those claim terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy, we do not expressly construe any claim term for purposes of this Decision. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017).” slip op. at 17
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Ex. 1001, 49:9–18. Petitioner argues, and we agree, that this language is non-limiting as reciting optional features that “may or may not” be present, and therefore irrelevant to the issue of anticipation.9 Pet. 54–57.” slip op. at 23
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“In light of these and other disclosures in Wong ’308, Petitioner argues that a POSITA would have been motivated to implement the switches of the ’756 PCT application using multiplexers. Pet. 102; Ex. 1002 ¶ 182. Patent Owner does not challenge this fact — the references to multiplexers (also referred to a “muxes”) in the ’342 patent suggest that Patent Owner would concede this point. E.g., Ex. 1001, 9:67, 14:33. Upon review of the record, we are persuaded that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the combination of the ’724 provisional application and Wong ’308 renders claims 1–7, 9–15, and 17–19 obvious.” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 10,003,553 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 10,003,553 - BMW Of North America, LLC v. Stragent, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 13, 2018 · IPR2017-00677 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 51–59 are unpatentable: claims 51–59 over Staiger and Millsap, and claims 51 and 54–57 over each OSEK-based obviousness ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“We have reviewed the relevant deposition testimony, in which Dr. Miller was asked to identify the standard he used when construing claim terms in his Declaration. Ex. 1025, 27:1–34:14. We agree with Petitioner that Dr. Miller did not provide responses sufficient to conclude that he was aware of and/or applied the correct claim-construction standard. See id. at 27:5–6 (“I used what is generally accepted in the field.”), 27:9–11 (“So to – for construing the claim terms is providing a definition of what the term is. So I provided a general definition for the terms.”), 30:3–6 (“Well, that’s the standard that I used for construing the claim terms in this Declaration. I don’t know if that’s the legal qualification for construing claim terms.”), 32:18–23 (“broadest reasonable interpretation” would mean “when you’re defining a term that you would define it in a way that is, first of all, reasonable, that it makes sense and that it’s broad, meaning general and that it’s interpreting the phrase or the term”). Nevertheless, we are not persuaded that the appropriate remedy is exclusion of Dr. Miller’s testimony. As Patent Owner asserts, “[t]he role of the expert witness under the Federal Rules of Evidence is to ‘help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.’” Paper 24, 2–3 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702) (emphasis by Patent Owner). As Patent Owner further asserts, Petitioner does not “impugn[]” Dr. Miller’s credibility as an expert in the subject matter at issue. Id. at 3–4. We agree with Patent Owner that “Petitioner’s attack on the sufficiency of the evidence is improper in a motion to exclude.” Id. at 4 (citing Microsoft Corp. v. Surfcast, Inc., Case IPR2013-00292 at 52–53 (Paper 93) (PTAB Oct. 14, 2014)). We accordingly deny Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude.” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedOther
“Petitioner alternatively argues in its Reply that “Because Dr. Miller did not apply the correct claim construction standard, his opinions on claim construction (Ex. 2001, §§16-21) should be afforded no weight.” Reply 2. Although we agree that the weight to be accorded to Dr. Miller’s testimony on claim construction is impacted by the uncertainty of the analytical procedure he followed, we are not persuaded that his testimony should be discounted wholesale. Dr. Miller provides relevant opinions on a number of issues, particularly including how a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand certain terms in light of the Specification, that are helpful to us as the trier of fact. “There is no more certain test for determining when experts may be used than the common sense inquiry whether the untrained layman would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the subject involved in the dispute.” Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 414, 418 (1952).” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“shared “in real time utilizing a second network protocol . . . ,” and dependent claim 59 recites that information is processed “to create, in real-time, messages in at least two other message formats . . . .” Petitioner argues that the Specification of the ’843 patent expressly defines “real-time”: “In the context of the present description, real-time may include any response time that may be measured in milli- or microseconds, and/or is less than 1 second.” Ex. 1001, col. 3, ll. 35–38. Accordingly, Petitioner proposes that “‘real-time’ should be construed as responses that occur in less than one second.” Pet. 13. Patent Owner contends that the definition from the Specification should be adopted. PO Resp. 15. We construe “real-time” as Petitioner proposes, i.e., as including responses that occur in less than one second. The first part of the quote cited above provided in the Specification (“may be measured in milli- or microseconds”) is not limiting because any response time, no matter how large or small, may be measured in milli- or microseconds.” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“been reached in association with the storage request.” Petitioner proposes that “threshold” be construed consistent with a dictionary definition it provides, as a “value above which something is true or will take place and below which it is not or will not.” Pet. 13–14 (citing Ex. 1016, 5). Observing that the Specification of the ’843 patent uses “threshold” in the context of an elapsed time, Petitioner further proposes that this construction “include the maximum value (i.e., time-out) of a timer.” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, col. 8, ll. 21–25, col. 8, ll. 47–51). We agree, and accordingly construe “threshold” as Petitioner proposes.3 3. “heterogeneous networks” Dependent claim 55 recites that the “apparatus is operable such that the first network and the second network are heterogeneous networks.” The Specification of the ’843 patent defines “heterogeneous networks”: “In the context of the present description, heterogeneous networks may refer to any different communication networks with at least one aspect that is different.” Ex. 1001, col. 7, ll. 26–29. In light of this explicit definition, for purposes of this Decision, we construe “heterogeneous networks” as Petitioner proposes, i.e., as “networks having at least one aspect that is different.” Pet. 14 (citing 3 Patent Owner advocates for the same construction advanced by Petitioner, but omits inclusion of the maximum value of a timer. PO Resp. 15. Although Patent Owner asserts that the construction is otherwise “the definition provided by the ‘843 Patent,” it does not cite to the ’843 patent to support its assertion, and we are unable to identify such a definition in the patent. Nevertheless, we agree with Petitioner that any distinction between the constructions is not material to any grounds. See Reply 6.” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 8,566,843 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,566,843 - Search America, Inc. v. Transunion Intelligence, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 3, 2015 · CBM2013-00037 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · CBM · Final written decision
Claims 1–14 are unpatentable: the TDHS System anticipates claims 1–3, 5–8, and 10–14; the asserted obviousness grounds and written-description ground also succeed.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“First, Patent Owner contends that the plain meaning of “derived” to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of filing the application was “obtained by reasoning” or “calculated.” Id. In support of this contention, Patent Owner cites the Declaration of Stephen Gray,1 which refers to one of the definitions provided by Random House Webster’s Dictionary, 4th ed., Ballantine Books (New York 2001). Ex. 2002 ¶ 104 (citing Ex. 2002E). But as Petitioner points out, Mr. Gray refers to the last definition in the dictionary entry, although the first definition provided for the word “derive” is “to receive or get from a source.” Reply 4. Second, Patent Owner refers to a statement in the specification of the ’937 patent that “the debt to income ratio can be computed,” reasoning that “one of ordinary skill would understand that the credit information input into the method of claim 1 could not have been mere data taken from a credit report but rather would have been the result of some calculation or computation.” PO Resp. 21 (citing Ex. 1001, col. 3, ll. 65–66; Ex. 2002 ¶ 104). We disagree with Patent Owner’s reasoning, because the statement in the specification merely provides an example of a calculation. Furthermore, as Petitioner observes, Patent Owner’s position is untenable because the context of the identified statement refers to calculation of “qualification 1 As discussed below, we deny Petitioner’s motion to exclude the Gray Declaration. criteria” rather than of “credit information.” See Reply 5. The claim’s text distinguishes between “qualification criteria” and “credit information.” In addition, and as Petitioner also observes, the prosecution history supports that credit information need not be calculated to be input. See id.” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“a credit report of the patient.” Petitioner contends that the Data Broker module obtained a computerized report on each applicant at the request of an eligibility worker, extracted certain credit information, and combined the extracted credit information with data about the applicant to provide a combined report to the eligibility worker for viewing in the TDHS System. Pet. 38. Patent Owner contends that the credit information extracted from the computerized report is not “credit information derived from a credit report” (emphasis added). PO Resp. 20–21. We disagree. In accordance with our construction of “derived” as “received from a source,” we conclude that the Data Broker module inputs “credit information derived from a credit report.”” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“Patent Owner responds the “Belford has nothing to do with providing financial assistance for medical care of financially needy people” and that “Petitioner provides no reasoning why a person of ordinary skill in the art would be motivated to combine the teaching of a reference that discusses providing loans to people that have the ability to pay (credit worthiness) with needy people that cannot pay (charity).” PO Resp. 28. Patent Owner characterizes the relevant disclosures too narrowly. Belford is reasonably pertinent to the problem identified by Petitioner, namely the need for a patient to pay some amount even after receiving financial assistance. See In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Identification of the problem and how it is solved by Belford provides sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinnings to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (cited with approval in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)). We conclude that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 9 would have been obvious over the TDHS System and Belford.” slip op. at 27
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“Evidence of commercial success, or other secondary considerations, is only significant if there is a nexus between the claimed invention and the commercial success.” Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1311–12 (Fed. Cir. 2006). To establish a proper nexus, Patent Owner must offer “proof that the sales were a direct result of the unique characteristics of the claimed invention—as opposed to other economic and commercial factors unrelated to the quality of the patented subject matter.” In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). slip op. at 30
Patent outcomesUS 7,333,937 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSRPatents in suitUS 7,333,937
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.