- Reolink Innovation Inc. / Shenzhen Reolink Technology Co., Ltd. v. Throughtek Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 4, 2025 · IPR2024-00509 · APJ Michael J Strauss · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4 and 6–19 are unpatentable as obvious over Throughtek-2012 and the Lorex Video; claims 1–3, 6, 10, 12–14, 17, and 18 are also unpatentable under two other grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“II. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Relying on the testimony of Dr. Bims, Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’842 patent would have been a person having a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and two years of work experience with network and communication technologies. Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 15–16). Patent Owner does not provide any proposed qualifications for a person of ordinary skill in the art. In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The level of ordinary skill in the art is also reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We adopt the assessment offered by Petitioner as it is consistent with the ’842 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts “no claim elements need a formal construction for purposes of resolving the controversy in this proceeding.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶ 55; Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Google Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, 701 Fed. Appx. 946, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). Petitioner states “[a]ll claim terms should be construed according to the Phillips standard.” Id. (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1303; 37 C.F.R. §42.100). Patent Owner presents no proposed claim constructions. We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“In addition, “[n]egative claim limitations are adequately supported when the specification describes a reason to exclude the relevant limitation. Such written description support need not rise to the level of disclaimer.” Santarus, Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 694 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012). A reason to exclude an element may be found in “statements in the specification expressly listing the disadvantages of using” that element. Santarus, 694 F.3d at 1351. Another reason to exclude may be when the specification “distinguishes among” the element and alternatives to it. Inphi Corp. v. Netlist, Inc., 805 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2015). As the Federal Circuit explained, “[t]he common denominator of these examples [(i.e., the reasons to exclude an element)] is disclosure of the element.” Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Accord Healthcare, Inc., 38 F.4th 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2022). More particularly, “[s]ilence is generally not disclosure.” Novartis, 38 F.4th at 1017; see also Seabed Geosolutions (US) Inc. v. Magseis FF LLC, 8 F.4th 1285, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Accordingly, “the written description requirement cannot be met through simple disregard of the presence or absence of a limitation.” Novartis, 38 F.4th at 1017. Our reviewing court further notes that “it is possible that the written description requirement may be satisfied when a skilled artisan would understand the specification as inherently disclosing the negative limitation.” Novartis, 38 F.4th at 1017 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). Thus, “it is a question whether the application necessarily discloses that particular device . . . A description which renders obvious the invention for which an earlier filing date is sought is not sufficient.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting Jepson v. Coleman, 314 F.2d 533, 536 (CCPA 1963)) (emphasis added).” slip op. at 20
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportDecided for petitioner
“In addition, “[n]egative claim limitations are adequately supported when the specification describes a reason to exclude the relevant limitation. Such written description support need not rise to the level of disclaimer.” Santarus, Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 694 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012). A reason to exclude an element may be found in “statements in the specification expressly listing the disadvantages of using” that element. Santarus, 694 F.3d at 1351. Another reason to exclude may be when the specification “distinguishes among” the element and alternatives to it. Inphi Corp. v. Netlist, Inc., 805 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2015). As the Federal Circuit explained, “[t]he common denominator of these examples [(i.e., the reasons to exclude an element)] is disclosure of the element.” Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Accord Healthcare, Inc., 38 F.4th 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2022). More particularly, “[s]ilence is generally not disclosure.” Novartis, 38 F.4th at 1017; see also Seabed Geosolutions (US) Inc. v. Magseis FF LLC, 8 F.4th 1285, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Accordingly, “the written description requirement cannot be met through simple disregard of the presence or absence of a limitation.” Novartis, 38 F.4th at 1017. Our reviewing court further notes that “it is possible that the written description requirement may be satisfied when a skilled artisan would understand the specification as inherently disclosing the negative limitation.” Novartis, 38 F.4th at 1017 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). Thus, “it is a question whether the application necessarily discloses that particular device . . . A description which renders obvious the invention for which an earlier filing date is sought is not sufficient.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting Jepson v. Coleman, 314 F.2d 533, 536 (CCPA 1963)) (emphasis added).” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS RE47,842 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham - Continental Automotive Systems, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 5, 2023 · IPR2022-00972 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–10 are unpatentable because Speight anticipates them; the Board found Peisa anticipation and Peisa–Heo obviousness unproven for the challenged claims in those grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a Bachelor of Science in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or an equivalent field, as well as three years of experience in wireless communication technology, or a master’s degree in electrical engineering, or other equivalent degree,” and that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 47–49). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s contention or propose a level of skill. Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the technology described in the Specification and the cited prior art. On the complete record, we adopt this level of skill.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“agreement that this claim term should be read as reciting two mutually-exclusive alternatives with respect to the “third parameter.” Dec. 11. The parties do not challenge this construction in the Patent Owner Response, Reply, or Sur-reply. On the complete record, we construe “wherein resources are allocated for data of each channel having a second parameter above zero prior to another channel’s data for transmission having a third parameter less than or equal to zero” as reciting two mutually-exclusive alternatives with respect to the “third parameter.”” slip op. at 11
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner. The Petition is required to identify “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). Petitioner argued in the Petition that “as properly construed, the claimed ‘first parameter,’ ‘second parameter,’ ‘third parameter,’ and ‘fourth parameter’ are four different parameters.” Pet. 17–18. In the Institution Decision, Petitioner prevailed on that point and “we agree[d] with Petitioner that the second and third parameters are separate and different parameters, and not different instances of the same parameter for separate channels.” Dec. 14. Patent Owner “relie[d] on the Board’s construction ‘that the second and third parameters are separate and different parameters, and not different instances of the same parameter for separate channels,’” and proposed distinct parameters in the Specification that it alleges are examples of second and third parameters, albeit not the same two parameters proposed by Petitioner. PO Resp. 9, 29. Petitioner now proposes new constructions for the second and third parameters that would limit those parameters to the two examples it advanced in the Petition and improperly supports these new constructions with new expert testimony and an exhibit from the prosecution of a later patent. Reply 20–25; Ex. 1040 ¶¶ 20–29; Ex. 1038. See also Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (“TPG”)10 73 (“Petitioner may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g. to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability.”). As Patent Owner observes (Sur-reply 10 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated. 21), it has no opportunity to introduce rebuttal evidence contesting the new constructions. See TPG 73–74 (Nov. 2019) (“The sur-reply may not be accompanied by new evidence other than deposition transcripts of the crossexamination of any reply witness. Sur-replies should only respond to arguments made in reply briefs, comment on reply declaration testimony, or point to cross-examination testimony.”). We agree with Patent Owner that it would be unfair to consider Petitioner’s new construction. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b) (“A reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition, patent owner preliminary response, patent owner response, or decision on institution.”). Thus, Petitioner has forfeited its new claim construction arguments and they will not be considered. See TPG 74 (“While replies and sur-replies can help crystalize issues for decision, a reply or sur-reply that raises a new issue or belatedly presents evidence may not be considered.”). Moreover, these arguments would be unpersuasive even if considered. Petitioner has, at most, cited description in the Specification to show that its identified second and third parameters are examples corresponding to the recited second and third parameters. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 84–95. This description does not define the second and third parameters nor purport to exclude from the claims any parameter that would otherwise meet the language of the claims. The prosecution history to which Petitioner cites, that of a child application, took place after the prosecution of the ’466 patent and thus, does not constitute a definition or disclaimer of subject matter for claims of the ’466 patent. In any case, the brief argument in the cited response to office action, that “[i]n the algorithm, the first value is provided by the wireless network for each of a plurality of buffers where the buffer having the second value above a threshold transmits data first,” does not define the second and third parameters, disavow any values from those parameters, or even discuss the third parameter. Ex. 1038, 12. Petitioner’s extrinsic evidence, Dr. Akl’s testimony, does little more than repeat the arguments in the Reply and, thus, is of little value. Ex. 1040 ¶¶ 20–29. In sum, we maintain our construction that the second and third parameters are separate and different parameters, and not different instances of the same parameter for separate channels. Under this construction, RAAUq” and RAAUq’, respectively, could potentially be second and third parameters, as could RAAUq’ and RAAUq”, respectively, as long as they satisfy the rest of the pertinent language of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 15
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateNot shown unpatentable
“production, we still would find that a skilled artisan would not have been able to ascertain from the disclosure in the ’421 application that RAAUq’ could take values less than zero. Instead, even if we were to credit Dr. Lomp’s testimony, to conclude that RAAUq’ can take negative values, a skilled artisan would need to program computer software to simulate the ’421 application’s algorithm and correctly choose starting parameters and other context variables without guidance from the description in the ’421 application. This case is similar to that in New Railhead, where the written description was insufficient because “one of ordinary skill in the art must first make the patented invention before he can ascertain the claimed features of that invention.” 298 F.3d at 1295. This case also is similar to Los Angeles Biomedical Research Institute, in which an application’s written description was insufficient because assumptions and starting variables were not knowable from the disclosure in the application. 849 F.3d at 1058. Thus, even if we were to conclude that Patent Owner has met its burden of production, a preponderance of the evidence shows that the ’421 application does not provide written description support for Alternative A. In sum, we conclude that the ’421 application does not provide written description support for the challenged claims and that, therefore, Speight is prior art to the challenged claims.” slip op. at 41
Patent outcomesUS 9,681,466 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,681,466 - Sophos Ltd. / Sophos Inc. v. Open Text Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Nov 29, 2023 · PGR2023-00031 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show that any challenged claim was more likely than not unpatentable over the asserted obviousness or indefiniteness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review under 35 U.S.C. § 324 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4. A post-grant review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . , if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324 (2018). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated that it is more likely than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the patent is unpatentable. Accordingly, we do not institute a post-grant review of the challenged claims of the ’869 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 16). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal. Prelim. Resp. 33. Considering the subject matter of the ’869 patent, the background technical field, and the asserted prior art, we agree with Petitioner’s proposed qualifications for an ordinary level of skill, except we decline to adopt “at least” as that language is vague and open-ended. Otherwise, Petitioner’s proposed definition is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the Specification of the ’869 patent and the asserted prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, and based on the current record, except as noted above, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“We agree with Patent Owner that the claims are directed to the classification stage, as they require extracting “a plurality of static data points” from an executable file and “generating a feature vector from [that] plurality of static data points using a classifier” (emphasis added). The claims also recite that the classifier has been “trained to classify” (emphasis added). Further, the claims recite that “features of the feature vector” are selectively turned on or off, indicating that the feature vector has been generated. We also agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not shown that Ideses teaches or suggests a classification method in which one or more features of a feature vector generated from a plurality of static data points are selectively turned on or off based on the value of the static data point. As explained in the summary of Ideses above, Ideses describes “methods and systems for generating classifiers” (Ex. 1005 ¶ 2) in which “extracted features [may be] identified for pruning to generate the group of classifying features,” and “the selection [may be] based on identifying a classification effectiveness rank for each of the features of the training software applications” or “based on identifying resource requirements for each of the features of the training software applications.” See id. ¶¶ 98, 99. “[T]he group of classifying features [may be] selected based on the significance of the extracted features,” such that “[s]ignificant features, such as those that have a large effect on the classification outcomes, may be retained” and “[i]nsignificant features, such as those that have a small, negligible or no effect on classification outcome may be pruned.” Id. ¶¶ 101, 106. Petitioner argues that “Ideses explains that in the method depicted in Figure 1, ‘[t]he full feature list is optionally selectively pruned,’ i.e., ‘selectively turned off’ as required by [1.e],” and “[f]urther, ‘each feature of the group is selected from-the-ground-up; added to the group as opposed to removed from or retained within a larger group,’ i.e., ‘selectively turned on’ as required by [1.e].” Pet. 33 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 71). Petitioner also argues element 1.e is taught by Ideses’s “approaches to pruning insignificant features,” which Petitioner argues are “to selectively includ[e]/exclud[e] features based on whether a feature coefficient ‘is within a predetermined range’ as required” by element 1.e. Id. at 34 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 107, 109–110). But all of the selection and pruning described in Ideses concerns the” slip op. at 22
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that the claims are directed to the classification stage, as they require extracting “a plurality of static data points” from an executable file and “generating a feature vector from [that] plurality of static data points using a classifier” (emphasis added). The claims also recite that the classifier has been “trained to classify” (emphasis added). Further, the claims recite that “features of the feature vector” are selectively turned on or off, indicating that the feature vector has been generated. We also agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not shown that Ideses teaches or suggests a classification method in which one or more features of a feature vector generated from a plurality of static data points are selectively turned on or off based on the value of the static data point. As explained in the summary of Ideses above, Ideses describes “methods and systems for generating classifiers” (Ex. 1005 ¶ 2) in which “extracted features [may be] identified for pruning to generate the group of classifying features,” and “the selection [may be] based on identifying a classification effectiveness rank for each of the features of the training software applications” or “based on identifying resource requirements for each of the features of the training software applications.” See id. ¶¶ 98, 99. “[T]he group of classifying features [may be] selected based on the significance of the extracted features,” such that “[s]ignificant features, such as those that have a large effect on the classification outcomes, may be retained” and “[i]nsignificant features, such as those that have a small, negligible or no effect on classification outcome may be pruned.” Id. ¶¶ 101, 106. Petitioner argues that “Ideses explains that in the method depicted in Figure 1, ‘[t]he full feature list is optionally selectively pruned,’ i.e., ‘selectively turned off’ as required by [1.e],” and “[f]urther, ‘each feature of the group is selected from-the-ground-up; added to the group as opposed to removed from or retained within a larger group,’ i.e., ‘selectively turned on’ as required by [1.e].” Pet. 33 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 71). Petitioner also argues element 1.e is taught by Ideses’s “approaches to pruning insignificant features,” which Petitioner argues are “to selectively includ[e]/exclud[e] features based on whether a feature coefficient ‘is within a predetermined range’ as required” by element 1.e. Id. at 34 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 107, 109–110). But all of the selection and pruning described in Ideses concerns the” slip op. at 22
§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 11,409,869 - Vmware, Inc. v. Cirba Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 7, 2022 · PGR2021-00098 · APJ Russell E Cass · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–63 are unpatentable under § 112(a) because the patent lacks written-description support for the claimed “already placed” and “issue instructions” limitations.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Pet. 20–54. With its Petition, Petitioner submitted the Declaration of Dr. Erik Zadok. Ex. 1006. Patent Owner elected to waive its Preliminary Response. Paper 11. We instituted trial on all grounds of unpatentability. (Paper 12 (“Inst. Dec.”)).” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownNo construction neededDecided for petitioner
“term “placing” requires more than a theoretical placing or planning to place as part of an analytical solution. Turning first to the claim language, we agree with Petitioner that the language of the independent claims is consistent with “placement” occurring after and separately from the analytical evaluation process. See Pet. Reply 3. For example, claim 1 is directed to a system for “determining placement of source computer systems on target systems,” the system configured to “determine a placement” by employing operations to “evaluate compatibility.” Ex. 1001, 40:2–4, 40:8– 36. The second “evaluate compatibility” operation is “to determine if the specific source system can be placed with those other source systems on the specific target system,” which suggests that what is being evaluated is whether the source system can be actually placed (e.g., moved or transferred) to the target system. Id. at 40:18–27 (emphasis added). Similarly, the third “evaluate compatibility” operation involves “evaluating the impact on resource utilization of the specific target system of placing the specific source system on the specific target system,” which suggests that what is being evaluated is the impact on resource utilization once the source system is actually moved or transferred to the target. Id. at 40:28–32 (emphasis added). Additionally, the claim states that, based on the “evaluate” operations, the claimed system “determine[s]” a placement, not that it executes the placement. Id. at 40:8–11. The actual placement seemingly occurs after the final claimed operation of “issu[ing] instructions to place” the source system(s) on to the target system “in accordance with the determined placement.” Id. at 40:37–39. Independent claims 32 and 63 include similar language. Id. at 42:36–43:3, 45:1–46:19. Had the patent applicant wanted to cover systems that were merely “hypothetically placed,” language to that effect could have been added to the claim.” slip op. at 19
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateUnpatentable
“As noted above, the claim language requires evaluating compatibility between a specific source system and one or more other source systems “already placed” on the target system. Paragraph 82 does not disclose the evaluation of compatibility of a source system and another source system as part of the “forward consolidation.” Additionally, paragraph 82 does not disclose that “existing target systems 16” have source systems “already placed” on them. Thus, paragraph 82 does not provide the level of detail recited in the limitation under either party’s definition of “placed.” In addition, as noted above, we have interpreted “placed” to require an actual placement rather than merely “planning to place” or a theoretical placement. See § II.A.2, supra. Therefore, even if the “existing target system 16” had theoretical or hypothetical systems added to it as part of the consolidation analysis, those would not be systems that are “already placed” on the target system.” slip op. at 34
Patent outcomesUS 10,951,459 unpatentableClaim construction§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 10,951,459 - Dell Technologies Inc. / Dell Inc. v. Videolabs, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 4, 2022 · IPR2022-00701 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because JP029 supports claims 1–4 as of April 26, 2002, making the June 2002 Draft H.264 Standard unavailable as prior art for the asserted obviousness ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). Institution of an inter partes review requires that “the information presented in the petition and . . . any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The dispositive issue here is whether Patent Owner shows that the effective filing date of the ’059 patent extends to the filing date of its foreign application, thereby antedating two of Petitioner’s asserted prior art references. For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner does not show that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to the sole challenged claim. Accordingly, we deny inter partes review of the ’059 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateEntitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner
“Ex. 2001 ¶ 46 (emphasis added) (citing Ex. 1004 (H.324, 1998), Fig. 1, 1–2). In other words, according to the testimony of Dr. Richardson, which the record supports and Petitioner does not dispute, the applicable standards, known to artisans of ordinary skill prior to the filing date of JP029, show multiplexing and demultiplexing the coded audio and video, thereby satisfying claim 1’s limitations for multiplexing and demultiplexing coded audio data, contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments. See Pet. 25.” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer not foundDecided for patent owner
“argument, Petitioner has not shown that such a disclaimer exists in the prosecution history. The purported disavowal of claim scope with respect to the plain meaning of a claim term must be unambiguous, clear, and unmistakable to one of ordinary skill in the art. Elbex Video, Ltd. v. Sensormatic Elecs. Corp., 508 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Petitioner has not made such a showing. Rather, Petitioner points to language that was added to the claim during prosecution, namely, “performing arithmetic coding on a first bit of the binary data corresponding to each absolute value of the coefficients,” and concludes that this language requires coding a first bit separately from the remaining bits, using separate probability tables. Pet. Reply 10 (citing Ex. 1012, 656). We agree with Patent Owner, that the plain meaning of this claim language does not require coding a first bit separately from the remaining bits, using separate probability tables. Prelim. Resp. 57–58. Turning to the prosecution history, Petitioner does not explain how the applicant’s remarks to the Examiner in the prosecution history show a clear and unmistakable disavowal of claim scope. See Pet. Reply 9–10. Further, the applicant did not state to the Examiner that the claim requires coding a first bit separately from the remaining bits, using separate probability tables. See Ex. 1012, 662–664. On this limited record, it is not clear how the applicant’s arguments in the prosecution history persuasively show that the applicant made a clear and unmistakable disavowal of claim scope. Therefore, we construe the claim according to its plain and ordinary meaning, which does not require coding a first bit separately from the remaining bits using separate probability tables as alleged by Petitioner.” slip op. at 25
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner. Petitioner’s claim construction regarding prosecution history disclaimer does not address “unanticipated and incorrect statements” made by Patent Owner “regarding the law with respect to written description and the disclosure of the subject patent and priority applications, to which Petitioners need to respond.” Ex. 1041. Specifically, Petitioner does not allege an incorrect statement in Patent Owner’s contention that “Petitioner admits that JP029 discloses performing the encoding on all bits of binary data, including the ‘first bit’ of data.” Prelim. Resp. 55 (citing Pet. 29). Nor does Petitioner allege an incorrect statement in Patent Owner’s contention that “Petitioner’s expert opines – with no explanation or citation – that the claims require ‘separately arithmetically encoding/decoding a first bit of binary data using a separate probability table from the probability table (or tables) used to encode/decode the remaining bits of binary data.’ Nothing in the claims require this.” Id. at 57 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 52). Instead, Petitioner, for the first time in its Reply, proposes construing the claim beyond its plain and ordinary meaning in order to rebut Patent Owner’s contention that the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim does not require coding a first bit separately from the remaining bits, using separate probability tables. Petitioner has not explained how Patent Owner made an incorrect statement, nor has Petitioner explained why Patent Owner’s construction of the claim based on the claim’s plain and ordinary meaning was unanticipated. See Pet. 7 (“[T]he Petition does not present any controversy over claim meaning and the Board need not construe any terms.”); see id. at 8 (“Petitioner maintains that the Challenged Claims would have been obvious under any reasonable construction.”). Petitioner’s new claim construction alleging prosecution history disclaimer, and Petitioner’s corresponding new argument based on the alleged disclaimer, are untimely.” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 112 disclosurecites GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,970,059 - Dell Technologies Inc. / Dell Inc. v. Videolabs, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 4, 2022 · IPR2022-00629 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Patent Owner established claim 1’s priority to JP665, antedating the references relied on in both obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). Institution of an inter partes review requires that “the information presented in the petition and . . . any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The dispositive issue here is whether Patent Owner shows that the effective filing date of the ’878 patent extends to the filing date of its foreign application, thereby antedating two of Petitioner’s asserted prior art references. For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner does not show that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to the sole challenged claim. Accordingly, we deny inter partes review of the ’878 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Entitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner
“. . . each application in the chain leading back to the earlier application must comply with the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. §112.” Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1571. To satisfy this written description requirement, a priority application must “reasonably convey[] to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Ariad Pharm., 598 F.3d at 1351. “It is the specification itself that must demonstrate possession,” and “a description that merely renders the invention obvious does not satisfy the requirement.” Id. at 1352.” slip op. at 12
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Relying on its expert, Dr. Schonfeld, Petitioner contends as follows: A POSITA at the time would have had at least an undergraduate degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, Computer Engineering, or a related field (or equivalent work experience in the that field), and two or more years of experience with audio, image, or video coding. Ex. 1003, ¶ 24. The relevant experience would include a working understanding of the then-existing audio and video coding standards, including ongoing work on emerging standards. Id. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 24). Dr. Schonfeld adds that “a POSITA would have a working understanding of the then existing audio and video encoding standards (e.g., H.263), as well as ongoing work on emerging standards (e.g., H.26L/H.264).” 1003 ¶ 24. Dr. Richardson, Patent Owner’s expert, agrees with, and applies, Dr. Schonfeld’s proposed level of ordinary skill. Ex. 2001 ¶ 30 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 24). Based on a review of the preliminary record, for purposes of the Institution Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, as agreed upon by Dr. Schonfeld and Dr. Richardson, because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and ’878 patent specification.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“As Petitioner argues, it is not necessary to explicitly construe any claim terms. See Pet. 7. Any construction would have no effect in the analysis of the dispositive priority issue here. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 112 disclosurecites GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,139,878 - Dell Technologies Inc. / Dell Inc. v. Videolabs, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 4, 2022 · IPR2022-00628 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Patent Owner established priority to JP665, antedating the references asserted against sole challenged claim 1.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). Institution of an inter partes review requires that “the information presented in the petition and . . . any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The dispositive issue here is whether Patent Owner shows that the effective filing date of the ’238 patent extends to the filing date of its foreign application, thereby antedating two of Petitioner’s asserted prior art references. For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner does not show that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to the sole challenged claim. Accordingly, we deny inter partes review of the ’238 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not reached
“In summary, contrary to Petitioner’s arguments, an artisan of ordinary skill would not have read JP665’s disclosed video improvements to H.26L as limited only to a coded video system (i.e., without audio) in the face of known related audio/video coding standards specifically contemplating video coding standards including H.26L and its predecessor H.263. Moreover, the parties agree that an artisan of ordinary skill would have known of the existing audio and video encoding standards. Ex. 1003 ¶ 24; Ex. 2001 ¶ 30; supra § IIIB. Therefore, Patent Owner shows that JP665 conveys possession of a component (video) used in a known system as defined by known standards (coded audio and video in multiplexing and demultiplexing systems) as required by claim 1’s preamble, element 1a, and element 1b. Based on the full record as generally summarized above, Patent Owner establishes priority of the ’238 patent to JP665, thereby antedating Bjontegaard and JVT-C167, which the Petition relies upon to allege obviousness in Grounds 1 and 2, respectively. This priority showing is fatal to the Petition’s obviousness showing.” slip op. at 22
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Entitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner
“In summary, contrary to Petitioner’s arguments, an artisan of ordinary skill would not have read JP665’s disclosed video improvements to H.26L as limited only to a coded video system (i.e., without audio) in the face of known related audio/video coding standards specifically contemplating video coding standards including H.26L and its predecessor H.263. Moreover, the parties agree that an artisan of ordinary skill would have known of the existing audio and video encoding standards. Ex. 1003 ¶ 24; Ex. 2001 ¶ 30; supra § IIIB. Therefore, Patent Owner shows that JP665 conveys possession of a component (video) used in a known system as defined by known standards (coded audio and video in multiplexing and demultiplexing systems) as required by claim 1’s preamble, element 1a, and element 1b. Based on the full record as generally summarized above, Patent Owner establishes priority of the ’238 patent to JP665, thereby antedating Bjontegaard and JVT-C167, which the Petition relies upon to allege obviousness in Grounds 1 and 2, respectively. This priority showing is fatal to the Petition’s obviousness showing.” slip op. at 22
§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,769,238 - Shure Incorporated v. Clearone, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 14, 2022 · PGR2020-00079 · APJ David C Mckone · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–24 were not shown unpatentable because the petitioner failed to prove the asserted §112 grounds and obviousness grounds by a preponderance of the evidence.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“As we stated in the Institution Decision (at 30), Petitioner’s proposal is reasonable in light of the descriptions in the ’653 patent and prior art, and is supported by expert testimony. We further find that Patent Owner’s proposed addition, that a skilled artisan would have had experience with digital signal processing, is consistent with the descriptions in the ’653 patent and prior art. Because the parties do not contend that their disagreement over “at least” has any bearing on this proceeding, we need not evaluate whether a skilled artisan might have had more than three years of work experience or whether that would lead to vagueness. Instead, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal, with Patent Owner’s addition, and omit “at least”: A skilled artisan would have possessed: (i) a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, physics, or acoustical engineering that included coursework on the design of acoustic and/or antenna arrays, phased arrays, and/or beamforming; or (ii) three years of work experience in the field of directional microphone arrays; and the skilled artisan would have had experience with digital signal processing.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We disagree with Patent Owner that the claim limitation at issue here specifies a single device that has multiple properties. Rather, claim 1 broadly recites “a ceiling tile combined with the beamforming microphone array.” We agree with Petitioner that the plain language of claim 1 does not require that the entire beamforming microphone array is physically integrated into a single ceiling tile, as combining a ceiling tile and a microphone array is broader than physically installing the microphone array in the ceiling tile. Nor can the language of claim 1 reasonably be read to exclude combining more than one ceiling tile with the microphone array. Where claim 1 assigns specific properties to a ceiling tile, it does so expressly, reciting “the ceiling tile being sized and shaped to be mountable in a drop ceiling in place of at least one of a plurality of ceiling tiles included in the drop ceiling.” Thus, the plain language of claim 1 requires at least one ceiling tile combined in some way with a beamforming microphone array, and each ceiling tile (if there is more than one) is a particular size and shape.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Second, Patent Owner argues that our construction “should reflect the fact the microphones of a [beamforming microphone array] are located in positions relative to each other, by design, to establish constructive interference in one or more preferred beam directions.” PO Resp. 18–19 (citing Ex. 2013 ¶¶ 31–37, 48). Petitioner responds that claim 1 recites “beamforming” broadly and that Patent Owner attempts to limit “beamforming” to one technique out of several, including techniques that determine time delay between microphones rather than knowing the distances between the microphones. Reply 3 (citing Ex. 1029 ¶¶ 11–21). The parties’ competing proposals here are directed to Petitioner’s allegations that CTG System and Levit render the challenged claims obvious. However, as explained below, Petitioner has not established whether CTG System performs beamforming under either proposed construction. Thus, we need not resolve the parties’ claim construction dispute. See Nidec, 868 F.3d at 1017; Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803.” slip op. at 19
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Definiteness (Nautilus)DefiniteNot shown unpatentable
“Despite an obligation to identify in the Petition the evidence that supports its indefiniteness allegations,5 Petitioner largely failed to discuss the Specification. Pet. 30; see also Dec. 41 (“Despite enumerating five techniques that it contends exemplify ‘adaptive acoustic processing,’ Petitioner does little to address the description of those techniques in the Specification.”). In one passage cited by Petitioner, the Specification states that an “embodiment of Array 116 may include adaptive acoustic processing that automatically adjusts to the room configuration for the best possible audio pickup.” Ex. 1001, 6:13–16. Petitioner argues that this description “lacks any disclosure providing objective boundaries of the claim’s scope, either through definitions or working examples.” Pet. 30. Petitioner also acknowledges that the Specification “discusses acoustic echo cancellation (in general) as an additional feature from adaptive acoustic processing,” and admits that a skilled artisan “would have recognized that echo cancellation processing occurring automatically in response to a room configuration would be a meaning of adaptive acoustic processing.” Id. at 35 (citing Ex. 1001, 6:5–22). However, Petitioner does not discuss the rest of the Specification in the Petition. Petitioner should have addressed in the Petition the express descriptions of Dr. Vipperman’s enumerated examples of adaptive acoustic processing in the Specification in order to support its 5 Our rules require Petitioner to make its case in the Petition, including identifying “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed,” “the specific part of the claim that fails to comply with the statutory grounds raised and . . . how the identified subject matter fails to comply with the statute,” and “specific portions of the evidence that support the challenge.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.204(b). Indeed, “[t]he Board may exclude or give no weight to the evidence where a party has failed to state its relevance or to identify specific portions of the evidence that support the challenge.” Id. at § 42.204(b)(5). otherwise conclusory statement that “[n]one of these techniques are described in the specification,” Pet. 32. If it was Petitioner’s position that these express descriptions were nevertheless not examples of adaptive acoustic processing, Petitioner should have made those arguments in the Petition.” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 10,728,653 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,728,653 - Intel Corporation v. Acqis LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jan 18, 2022 · IPR2021-01114 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 17–19, 26–31, 35, and 36 because substantially the same arguments were previously presented and Petitioner did not show material Office error.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) based on the framework set forth in Advanced Bionics, LLC v. Med-El Elektromedizinische Geräte GMBH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential). In Advanced Bionics, the Board applied a two-part framework in considering whether to exercise discretion to deny institution under § 325(d): “(1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of [the] first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims.” Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8. Only if the same or substantially the same art or arguments were previously presented to the Office do we then consider whether petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office. Id. at 10. “At bottom, this framework reflects a commitment to defer to previous Office evaluations of the evidence of record unless material error is shown.” Id. at 9.” slip op. at 10
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateDecided for patent owner
“For the foregoing reasons, the ’882 application identified the ’886 provisional with particularity and would have directly led an ordinarily skilled artisan to the document intended to be incorporated. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner fails to show that the Examiner erred in determining that the ’882 application (Chu ’330) incorporated the ’886 provisional by reference.” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelOther
§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denial - Offshore Technical Compliance, LLC v. Innovative Pressure Testing, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 28, 2021 · IPR2020-00923 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–17 were held unpatentable as obvious over BOP California, Wodjenski, and Winters; the revised motion to amend proposing claims 19–35 was denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther
“1 The Petition requested review of claims 1–18, but Patent Owner filed a statutory disclaimer of claim 18. Pet. 3; Ex. 2001; see 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e) (“The patent owner may file a statutory disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. 253(a) in compliance with § 1.321(a) of this chapter, disclaiming one or more claims in the patent. No inter partes review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”); Nobel Biocare Servs. AG v. Instradent USA, Inc., 903 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2018). claims on which we instituted trial. Based on the record before us, Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) claims 1–17 of the ’143 patent are unpatentable; and (2) Patent Owner’s proposed substitute claims 19–35 are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“B. Testimony of Mr. Anderson Patent Owner contends that the testimony provided by Petitioner’s” slip op. at 16
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining whether an invention would have been obvious at the” slip op. at 18
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other
“D. Claim Construction The Board uses “the same claim construction standard that would be” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 9,207,143 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,207,143
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.