- PTAB · Dec 3, 2025 · IPR2025-01026 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–20 on all petition challenges because the Baliarda-543 challenges met the reasonable-likelihood threshold.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“to institute an inter partes review. We may institute an inter partes review only if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018- 01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). Based on the current record and for the reasons explained below, Petitioner has shown that there is a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we 1 Petitioner filed a confidential version of the Petition as Paper 3 and a public version of the Petition as Paper 4. We cite to the public version of the Petition. institute an inter partes review of claims 1–20 in the ’677 patent on all challenges included in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill as of the ’677 patent’s effective filing date would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar degree and at least four years of experience in applied electromagnetics with an emphasis on antennas.” Pet. 11 (quoting Ex. 1018 ¶ 32). Petitioner also asserts that “[a]lternatively, the person of ordinary skill in the art would have a master’s degree in electrical engineering (or similar discipline) and at least two years of similar experience.” Id. (quoting Ex. 1018 ¶ 32). Dr. van der Weide’s testimony supports Petitioner’s assertions. See Ex. 1007 ¶ 40. For purposes of the Preliminary Response only, Patent Owner employs Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan. Prelim. Resp. 17. Based on the current record and for purposes of this decision, we accept Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan because it comports with the technology and claims of the ’677 patent as well as the asserted references. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:26–6:47, 42:47–44:61, code (57); infra §§ III.E.1–III.E.2.” slip op. at 23
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“4. DISCUSSION “[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Based on the current record, we determine that no claim term, phrase, or limitation requires an explicit construction to decide whether Petitioner satisfies the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial.” slip op. at 26
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Although “Dou does not require its ‘diversity antenna architecture’ to provide spatial diversity,” Dou nevertheless requires a wireless device with some type of diversity antenna architecture. See, e.g., Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 14, 17–18, 22–24, 30, 32–34, codes (54), (57), claims 1 and 16. As an example, Dou’s independent claim 1 covering a “wireless device” requires a “first diversity antenna” and a “second diversity antenna.” Id. at claim 1. As another example, Dou’s independent claim 16 covering a “wireless device” also requires a “first diversity antenna” and a “second diversity antenna.” Id. at claim 16. As yet another example, Dou’s Abstract describes a “wireless device” including a “first diversity antenna” and a “second diversity antenna.” Id. at code (57). Petitioner does not explain how the proposed combination provides anything other than spatial diversity. See Pet. 33–35; Prelim. Reply 1–3; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 118–124. Based on the current record, we agree with Patent Owner that with Ciais-Quadband’s antenna used for Dou’s two antennas 206 and 208, the two identical quadband antennas would have:” slip op. at 46
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,031,677 - PTAB · Dec 3, 2025 · IPR2025-01027 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all petition challenges, finding a reasonable likelihood that Baliarda-543 anticipates or renders obvious those claims.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“to institute an inter partes review. We may institute an inter partes review only if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018- 01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential).” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Regarding spatial diversity, Dou explains that a first internal antenna and a second internal antenna “may be separated by a distance (D) that is no less than the quarter wavelength (>=λ/4) of the lowest frequency.” Ex. 1013 ¶ 24; see Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 35, 44. Consistent with Dou’s preference for at least a quarter-wavelength spacing between antennas at the lowest frequency, “a commonly accepted rule of thumb is that at least a quarter-wavelength spacing between antennas is necessary to provide effective spatial diversity.” Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 33, 35, 47. Effective spatial diversity requires sufficient spacing between antennas because that technique “uses multiple antennas to improve signal reliability and performance by mitigating the effects of multipath fading and other interference.” Ex. 2010 ¶ 33. “Multipath fading occurs when a wireless signal propagates along multiple different paths of differing lengths because of interactions with obstacles, resulting in portions of the signal energy arriving at a receiver with different phases slightly offset in time.” Id. Locations insufficiently separated in terms of wavelength “tend to experience similar fading and interference characteristics.” Id. Thus, closely spaced antennas “cannot provide effective spatial diversity.” Id. By providing sufficient spacing between antennas, however, “the likelihood increases that at least one of the antennas will be positioned at a location where the multipath or other interference is relatively low, thereby improving overall signal quality and reliability.” Id. As Patent Owner contends, the proposed combination modifies Dou’s ground plane 310 to replicate Jing’s ground plane with dimensions of 36 mm × 60 mm and limits “the extent of Dou’s ground plane 310 so that it [does] not extend behind Jing’s antenna at 306, just like Dou does not extend it behind antenna 308.” See Pet. 35–36; Prelim. Resp. 20 (quoting Pet. 35); Prelim. Sur-reply 1; Ex. 1007 ¶ 120; Ex. 2010 ¶ 45. The lowest frequency of Jing’s antenna is 900 MHz. Ex. 1011, 2657–58; see Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 118, 154; Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 37, 44. The wavelength (λ) corresponding to a frequency of 900 MHz is 333.3 mm, and a quarter wavelength (λ/4) is 83.3 mm. Ex. 2010 ¶ 44. In the proposed combination, a distance of 60 mm separates the” slip op. at 49
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“To satisfy the written-description requirement, the inventor must have possession of the claimed invention as interpreted to encompass an allegedly infringing product. See Rivera, 857 F.3d at 1319–22; ICU Med., 558 F.3d at 1372–73, 1377–79. For purposes of the written-description requirement, the “invention” is “whatever is now claimed.” Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1564 (emphasis omitted). Based on the current record, and as Petitioner asserts, LTE band 12 was not available for “use with mobile communications” or “use in any cellular communication, let alone LTE or 4G communication,” as of the ’429 application’s December 21, 2006, filing date. See Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 229, 231; Pet. 76–77. For instance, a Federal Communications Commission report adopted on July 31, 2007, notes that the 698-806 MHz spectrum “currently is occupied by television broadcasters in TV Channels 52-69.” Ex. 1045, 1, 3; see Ex. 1007 ¶ 231. The 698-806 MHz spectrum includes LTE band 12 with 698-716 MHz for uplink and 728-746 MHz for downlink. See Ex. 1026, 11 (Table 1); Ex. 1039, 498 (Table 20.1). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute that as of July 31, 2007, the 698-806 MHz spectrum was “occupied by television broadcasters in TV Channels 52-69.” See Prelim. Resp. 2–3, 23–30; Prelim. Sur-reply 5. Thus, based on the current record, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that as of the ’429 application’s December 21, 2006, filing date, the ’429 application did not “reasonably convey[] to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession” of “an antenna configured to send or receive signals in the 698-806 MHz spectrum,” including LTE band 12 that Patent Owner relies on in the Geotab litigation, for “communication with any ‘4G communication standard’ because those frequencies were not usable for any mobile device communications at the time of filing.” See Pet. 78 (emphasis omitted); Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 231, 233–234, 236–237; Ex. 1045, 1, 3; Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. Accordingly, based on the current record, Petitioner demonstrates a” slip op. at 63
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“To satisfy the written-description requirement, the inventor must have possession of the claimed invention as interpreted to encompass an allegedly infringing product. See Rivera, 857 F.3d at 1319–22; ICU Med., 558 F.3d at 1372–73, 1377–79. For purposes of the written-description requirement, the “invention” is “whatever is now claimed.” Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1564 (emphasis omitted). Based on the current record, and as Petitioner asserts, LTE band 12 was not available for “use with mobile communications” or “use in any cellular communication, let alone LTE or 4G communication,” as of the ’429 application’s December 21, 2006, filing date. See Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 229, 231; Pet. 76–77. For instance, a Federal Communications Commission report adopted on July 31, 2007, notes that the 698-806 MHz spectrum “currently is occupied by television broadcasters in TV Channels 52-69.” Ex. 1045, 1, 3; see Ex. 1007 ¶ 231. The 698-806 MHz spectrum includes LTE band 12 with 698-716 MHz for uplink and 728-746 MHz for downlink. See Ex. 1026, 11 (Table 1); Ex. 1039, 498 (Table 20.1). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute that as of July 31, 2007, the 698-806 MHz spectrum was “occupied by television broadcasters in TV Channels 52-69.” See Prelim. Resp. 2–3, 23–30; Prelim. Sur-reply 5. Thus, based on the current record, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that as of the ’429 application’s December 21, 2006, filing date, the ’429 application did not “reasonably convey[] to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession” of “an antenna configured to send or receive signals in the 698-806 MHz spectrum,” including LTE band 12 that Patent Owner relies on in the Geotab litigation, for “communication with any ‘4G communication standard’ because those frequencies were not usable for any mobile device communications at the time of filing.” See Pet. 78 (emphasis omitted); Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 231, 233–234, 236–237; Ex. 1045, 1, 3; Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. Accordingly, based on the current record, Petitioner demonstrates a” slip op. at 63
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,349,200 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Maxell LtdNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 31, 2025 · IPR2024-00777 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 16–27 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner failed to account for limitations 16[b] and 16[i] and their counterparts across the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Computer Science, Human Computer Interaction, or a related technical field, with at least one year of experience working in the field of user interfaces and/or content management.” PO Resp. 11 (citing Ex. 2040 ¶ 53). The Decision on Institution adopted Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. Inst. Dec. 10. We find Patent Owner’s stated level to be less precise than that proposed by Petitioner in that the modifier “at least” used by Patent owner imposes no upper bound on the amount of experience possessed by one of ordinary skill in the art. Also, Patent Owner states: “The difference between the Board’s definition and Patent Owner’s (EX2040. ¶53) does not change the arguments set forth herein.” PO Resp. 11. Thus, we continue to adopt Petitioner’s stated level of ordinary skill in the art.4 4 All of our findings and conclusions would still be the same, however, had we applied Patent Owner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 8
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner
“In its Reply, Petitioner does not assert that the district court’s construction is incorrect. We agree with Patent Owner that the district court’s construction is better than Petitioner’s proposed construction, because for reasons indicated by Patent Owner, which are not disputed by Petitioner, settings in the computer, e.g., dedicated folders for each user are the user profiles, rather than simply data alone of any kind. Further, when asked about the appropriateness of the district court’s construction, counsel for Petitioner expressed that Petitioner has no objection to the Board’s adopting the district court’s construction for “user profile”: JUDGE LEE: So, you’d be fine with just going with the District Court’s construction? MR. HEINTZ: Yes, Your Honor. Tr. 15:22–24. For the foregoing reasons, we adopt the district court’s construction for “user profile,” i.e., “a collection of settings and information associated with a user.”” slip op. at 13
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“PO Resp. 30–31 (Figure 26 omitted). In its Reply, Petitioner still does not provide an articulated reason for placing user profile selection buttons, labeled with user names, within Horn’s panes 2601 or 2602. Reply 12–14. Although Horn does describe personalized profile, Petitioner points to no disclosure of Horn as to how a user would have selected his or her own profile from among a plurality of user profiles. Petitioner presents no reason for placing these user profile selection buttons, labeled with user names, gleaned from or suggested by Baumgartner, within either pane 2601 or pane 2602 in Horn’s workspace view. Further, pane 2602 contains “a list of all collections defined by MFS and the user,” and pane 2601 lists the source examined by the user to create his or her collections. Ex. 1005, 19:41–46. That disclosure suggests the contents of panes 2601 and 2602 are tied to one particular user. No rational basis is articulated by Petitioner to place user profile selection buttons within these panes which appear to be in the profile space of one user. For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has not adequately accounted for limitation 16[b].” slip op. at 22
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“The test for sufficiency of a written description under 35 U.S.C. § 112 is whether the earlier application’s disclosure “reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). The specification must “clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed.” Id. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has explained: One shows that one is “in possession” of the invention by describing the invention, with all its claimed limitations, not that which makes it obvious. Id. (“[T]he applicant must also convey to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention. The invention is, for purposes of the ‘written description’ inquiry, whatever is now claimed.”) (emphasis in original). One does that by such descriptive means as words, structures, figures, diagrams, formulas, etc., that fully set forth the claimed invention. Although the exact terms need not be used in haec verba, see Eiselstein v. Frank, 52 F.3d 1035, 1038, 34 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 (Fed.Cir.1995) (“[T]he prior application need not describe the claimed subject matter in exactly the same terms as used in the claims. . . .”), the specification must contain an equivalent description of the claimed subject matter. A description which renders obvious the invention for which an earlier filing date is sought is not sufficient. Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1997).” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 11,017,815 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,017,815 - Phison Electronics Corporation v. Vervain, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Apr 28, 2025 · PGR2024-00048 · APJ Stacey G White · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show it was more likely than not that claims 1–6 were unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review under 35 U.S.C. § 324 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). We may not institute a post-grant review unless “the information presented in the petition . . . , if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2024). Upon considering the evidence and arguments presented, we determine, as discussed below, that Petitioner has not demonstrated that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the Petition is unpatentable. Therefore, we deny1 Petitioner’s request to institute post-grant review of claims 1–6.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Khatri, proposes a definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. Ex. 2001 ¶ 24. Dr. Khatri, however, notes that his opinions would be the same under either his proposal or Petitioner’s proposal. Id. ¶¶ 25–26. Patent Owner states that, for purposes of the Preliminary Response, it “adopts Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 13 (citing Pet. 22–23; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 22–26). We determine that the current record supports Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan. For purposes of this Decision, therefore, we adopt Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan. We also note that the applied prior art reflects the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention. See Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner proposes constructions for the claim terms “MLC memory modules” and “SLC memory module.” Pet. 23–28. Patent Owner disagrees with Petitioner’s constructions, but does not contest them because it argues that construction of these terms is not necessary to resolve the parties’ disputes. Prelim. Resp. 14. Based on the record presented, we determine that no claim term requires an explicit construction to decide whether Petitioner satisfies the “more likely than not” standard for instituting a post- grant review. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017).” slip op. at 13
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateNot shown unpatentable
“using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same.” The Federal Circuit has held that “[t]he written description requirement is met when the disclosure relied on for support ‘reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.’” RAI Strategic Holdings, Inc. v. Philip Morris Prods. S.A., 92 F.4th 1085, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (quoting Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citation omitted)). The written description inquiry is a question of fact, is context specific, and must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351 (citing Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, Inc., 772 F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). “[T]he level of detail required to satisfy the written description requirement varies depending on the nature and scope of the claims and on the complexity and predictability of the relevant technology.” Id. (citing Capon, 418 F.3d at 1357–58). Factors used to evaluate the sufficiency of a disclosure include: 1) “the existing knowledge in the particular field”; 2) “the extent and content of the prior art”; 3) “the maturity of the science or technology”; and 4) “the predictability of the aspect at issue.” Id. (citing Capon, 418 F.3d at 1359). As support for the term “memory space,” the ’612 patent explains that because “the SLC NAND flash is used to boost the lifetime (endurance) of the storage system, it can be considerably lesser in amount than the MLC NAND flash.” Ex. 1001, 5:20–23; see Ex. 2001 ¶ 51. As an example, the ’612 specification states that “a system may set SLC NAND flash equal to 12.5% or 25% of MLC NAND flash (total non-volatile memory storage space=MLC+SLC).” Ex. 1001, 5:23–25; see Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 51, 62. In addition, we find persuasive Dr. Khatri’s testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that “there are two spaces—MLC and SLC—where data is stored, and the total memory space is the combination of the two.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 51. Further, the ’612 patent’s Figure 1 depicts “memory space,” e.g., dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) 20, one or more disks 24, MLC NAND flash memory module 26, and SLC NAND flash memory module 28. Ex. 1001, 5:37–45, Fig. 1; see Ex. 2001 ¶ 64. The ’612 patent’s Figure 4 also depicts “memory space,” e.g., NAND flash memory bank 56 comprising “a plurality of MLC NAND flash memory modules 60a and a plurality of SLC NAND flash memory modules 62a” and NAND flash memory bank 58 comprising “a plurality of MLC NAND flash memory modules 60b and a plurality of SLC NAND flash memory modules 62b.” Ex. 1001, 7:8–14, Fig. 4; see Ex. 2001 ¶ 64. On the record before us, we find the above noted disclosures to be sufficient to support the disputed claim language. For these reasons, the ’612 patent’s disclosure “reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 11,854,612 - Phison Electronics Corporation v. Vervain, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Mar 17, 2025 · PGR2024-00047 · APJ Steven M Amundson · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show it was more likely than not that any of claims 1–7 was unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“to institute a post-grant review. We may not institute a post-grant review unless we determine that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 321, if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2024).” slip op. at 2
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Not shown unpatentable
“2. PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS Petitioner challenges the ’546 patent’s claims as encompassing a” slip op. at 20
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not shown unpatentable
“2. PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS Petitioner challenges the ’546 patent’s claims as failing to satisfy” slip op. at 26
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Enablement (Wands, Amgen full scope)Not shown unpatentable
“2. PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS Petitioner challenges the ’546 patent’s claims as failing to satisfy” slip op. at 36
§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Alice · Mayo · Phillips · KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 11,830,546 - PTAB · Jan 8, 2025 · IPR2024-00798 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 1–36 because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of proving at least one challenged claim obvious over McClure-997.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the briefing and the evidence of record, we determine that the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute inter partes review on all of the challenged claims based on all of the grounds identified in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner filed a document which ranks the petitions in the instant case and IPR2024-00799. Paper 4 (Statement Regarding Multiple Petitions). Specifically, Petitioner ranks this Petition as the first petition we should consider. Id. at 1. Additionally, Petitioner argues that we should consider multiple petitions because (1) the two petitions are based on different prior art based on the ’602 patent having different effective filing dates and (2) there are a large number of claims. Id. at 1–5. Patent Owner argues that the Board routinely denies institution of multiple petitions even when there is a dispute as to the effective filing date. Prelim. Resp. 45–47. Patent Owner further argues that Petitioner has not sufficiently explained why it could not have addressed all of the claims in a single petition. Id. at 47. Because this is the first ranked petition (Paper 4, 1), we do not exercise our discretion to deny this petition on the basis of multiple parallel petitions. Although Patent Owner has presented arguments why Petitioner may not be entitled to two petitions,12 Patent Owner does not persuasively argue why we should not institute on at least one of the ranked petitions.” slip op. at 37
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have had either (1) a bachelor of science in industrial design or mechanical engineering and three years of experience designing mobile phones or (2) a master of science in industrial design or mechanical engineering and two years of experience in designing mobile phones.” Prelim. Resp. 9–10 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 24). Patent Owner further argues that “[a] person with a different degree but with additional relevant experience could still qualify if the additional experience compensates for the different educational background.” Id. at 10 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 24). Alternatively, Patent Owner argues that “[a] person with less experience designing mobile phones could still qualify if the person has additional education that compensates for their lesser experience.” Id. (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 24). Although Patent Owner proposes a different formulation of the person having ordinary skill in the art than Petitioner, Patent Owner argues that it “does not believe the differences in the definition of a [person having ordinary skill in the art] impact the issues presented herein for the purposes of Institution.” Prelim. Resp. 10 (citing Pet. 16). Accordingly, “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition.” Id. Petitioner’s recitation of the level of ordinary skill is consistent with the invention disclosed in the ’602 patent. It is also not disputed by Patent Owner at this time. Prelim. Resp. 10. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s formulation of the person having ordinary skill in the art.6” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner argues that the “[c]laims should be construed according to the ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a” person having ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 16. Petitioner also proposes a construction of the term “housing . . . forming enclosed exterior lateral sides and a rear side.” Id. at 17. “Patent Owner agrees that the claims should be construed according to the ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a” person having 6 If Patent Owner disagrees with this formulation of the level of skill in the art, it must raise that disagreement in its Response. If a different level of skill would affect the outcome in this case, the parties must brief that issue as well. The failure of Patent Owner to describe how a different level of skill in the art is determinative will be a forfeiture of that argument. If there is a dispute regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art, then the parties are also encouraged to submit evidence, other than conclusory expert testimony, that supports their position. ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 10. Patent Owner further argues that there is no need to construe the “housing” limitation at this time. Id. at 11. For the purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).7” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,473,602 - Apple Inc. v. Carbyne Biometrics, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Aug 1, 2024 · IPR2024-00507 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Apple did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 2, 4–6, 12, 15, 21, 23–25, 31, and 34 obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the contentions and the evidence of record before us, we conclude Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’105 patent. Accordingly, we decline to institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“The test for written description support is whether the application reasonably would have conveyed to one with ordinary skill in the art “the inventor possessed the invention at the time of that original disclosure.” Pandrol USA, LP v. Airboss Ry. Prods., Inc., 424 F.3d 1161, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“the applicant must also convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, she or he was in possession of the invention”). The disclosure in the provisional application as cited by Patent Owner regarding policies is broad and does not convey with reasonable clarity what specifically are the policies, such as a policy for backup based on whether the first and second devices are of the same brand. The broad disclosure does not provide written description support for the narrow and specific limitation recited in independent claims 1, 18, and 25, i.e., “based at least in part on the first device being a same brand as a second device, initiating a backup, to the second device, of at least a portion of the at least one record.” Ex. 1001, 25:7–10, 26:30–32, 28:23–25.” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in [] electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least two years of experience in the research, design, development, and/or testing of authentication techniques, and related firmware and software, or the equivalent, with additional education substituting for experience and vice versa.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 18–22). On this record, we adopt Petitioner’s statement of the level of ordinary skill in the art, except for the qualifier “at least” which applies to experience and which would improperly extend the scope of experience to the realm of an expert. It is supported by the testimony of Dr. McDaniel and not disputed by Patent Owner (Prelim. Resp. 11). Further, it appears consistent with what is reflected by the content of the applied prior art. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill).” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not found
“and assuming that Cheng discloses backing up of data from a first user device to a second, new user device, without any user service bureau in between, Petitioner has not shown sufficient motivation to combine the teachings of Kodama with the teachings of Kesanupalli and Cheng to account for the remainder of limitation [1.8], i.e., initiate the backup “based at least in part on the first device being a same brand as a second device.” Ex. 1001, 25:7–10. Petitioner explains:” slip op. at 40
§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,475,105 - Apple Inc. v. Carbyne Biometrics, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Aug 1, 2024 · IPR2024-00333 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was obvious over the asserted prior-art combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“The test for written description support is whether the application reasonably would have conveyed to one with ordinary skill in the art “the inventor possessed the invention at the time of that original disclosure.” Pandrol USA, LP v. Airboss Ry. Prods., Inc., 424 F.3d 1161, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“the applicant must also convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention”). The disclosure in the provisional application as cited by Patent Owner regarding policies is broad and does not convey with reasonable clarity what specifically are the policies, such as a policy for backup based on whether the first and second devices are of the same brand. The broad disclosure does not indicate possession by the inventor the narrow and specific limitation recited in independent claims 1, 18, and 25, i.e., “based at least in part on the first device being a same brand as a second device, initiating a backup, to the second device, of at least a portion of the at least one record.” Ex. 1001, 25:7–10, 26:30–32, 28:23–25. Patent Owner states: “A determination ‘based on’ policies and the identity of the device would have conveyed to a POSITA that the backup could have been based on a policy including the device being of the same brand as the second device.” Prelim. Resp. 46 (emphasis in original). The assertion is misplaced because it refers to what “could have been” a policy, rather than what policy the provisional application disclosure conveys the inventor actually possessed. What potentially “could have been” is mere speculation, not written description indicating possession.” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Citing testimony from Dr. McDaniel, Petitioner asserts a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in [] electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least two years of experience in the research, design, development, and/or testing of authentication techniques, and related firmware and software, or the equivalent, with additional education substituting for experience and vice versa.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 18–22). 9 The record does not include any evidence of secondary considerations of nonobviousness. On this record, we adopt Petitioner’s statement of the level of ordinary skill in the art, except for the qualifier “at least” which applies to experience and which would improperly extend the scope of experience to the realm of an expert. It is supported by the testimony of Dr. McDaniel and not disputed by Patent Owner (Prelim. Resp. 12). Further, it appears consistent with what is reflected by the content of the applied prior art. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). C.” slip op. at 16
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the contentions and the evidence of record before us, we conclude Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’105 patent. Accordingly, we decline to institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner asserts: Kodama recognizes “if data restoration is to be performed to a different product or a different manufacturer, the format and product proprietary information of data between the products will differ.” APPL-1010, [0157]. POSITA would recognize this differing format can create compatibility issues and thus would recognize an advantage of, and reason for, basing the initiation of data transfer to the second device on brand and thereby avoiding these compatibility issues as taught by Kodama. APPL- 1003, ¶190. Pet. 60. But the same brand requirement of Kodama is not provided to solve any problem with differing formats. Kodama states: At Step 1313 of the restoration processing, if data restoration is to be performed to a different product of a different manufacturer, the format and product proprietary information of data between the products will differ. Thus, before the restoration processing function of the online backup service system 0128 sends the data read at Step 1318 to the HDD recorder 0116, the data format is converted into the file format of the HDD recorder 0116 of the restoration destination. Ex. 1010 ¶ 157. Kodama does not describe format compatibility as presenting any problem. Requiring brand identity between the first device and the other devices of the user in Jakobsson ’351 to synchronize data among all of the user’s devices is also not an advantage. The devices of the user in Jakobsson ’351 are devices the user already owns, possesses, and uses. They are not a new device as in the case of Kodama, where a broken device may be expected to lead to the user acquiring a new device of the same brand as replacement. Petitioner provides no explanation as to why one would expect all of the user’s devices in Jakobsson ’351 would be of the same brand. Applying a same-brand requirement would substantially undermine and may even render inoperative Jakobsson ’351’s feature of synchronizing user data among all of the user’s devices. We do not see this result as either an advantage or an improvement.” slip op. at 51
§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,475,105 - PTAB · Jul 15, 2024 · PGR2024-00011 · APJ Jean R Homere · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–15 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least claim 1 is obvious over Chang, Chang II, and POSITA knowledge.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Section 324(a) provides that a post-grant review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . , if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Upon considering the evidence and arguments in the Petition (including its supporting testimonial evidence) and the evidence and arguments in the Preliminary Response (including its supporting testimonial evidence), we determine that the information presented shows that it is more likely than not that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute post-grant review on all” slip op. at 2
- Other 314aDenied
“Petitioner hereby stipulates that, if the PTAB institutes this post-grant review, Petitioner will not pursue invalidity of the Challenged Claims in a parallel district court proceeding on the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB in this Petition. Pet. 106. Petitioner cites the Director’s Memorandum, Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation, issued June 21, 2022 (“Guidance Memo”)3 in support of its contentions. Pet. 106.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“§ 325(d), the Board uses the following two-part framework: (1) determining whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, determining whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. Med-El Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential). In applying the two-part framework, we consider several non-exclusive factors, including: (a) the similarities and material differences between the asserted art and the prior art involved during examination; (b) the cumulative nature of the asserted art and the prior art evaluated during examination; (c) the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during examination, including whether the prior art was the basis for rejection; (d) the extent of the overlap between the arguments made during examination and the manner in which petitioner relies on the prior art or patent owner distinguishes the prior art; (e) whether petitioner has pointed out sufficiently how the examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art; and (f) the extent to which additional evidence and facts presented in the petition warrant reconsideration of the prior art or arguments. Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, Paper 8 at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential as to Section III.C.5, first paragraph) (“Becton, Dickinson”). Becton, Dickinson factors (a), (b), and (d) relate to whether the art or arguments presented in the Petition are the same or substantially the same as those previously presented to the Office. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 10. Factors (c), (e), and (f) “relate to whether the petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office” in its prior consideration of that art or arguments. Id. Only if the same or substantially the same art or arguments were previously presented to the Office do we consider whether the petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office. Id. “At bottom, this framework reflects a commitment to defer to previous Office evaluations of the evidence of record unless material error is shown.” Id. at 9.” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“At the time of the invention, a POSITA would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or an equivalent, and two years of professional experience working with computer network protocols such as USB. Lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa. Id. (citations omitted). At this stage, we find Patent Owner’s proposed level of a POSITA to be consistent with the problems and solutions disclosed in the ’643 patent and prior art of record, and adopt it as our own for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (approving the determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art by appeal to the references of record). We nonetheless invite the parties to further address this issue, if they deem it necessary and appropriate. The parties should also specifically explain how different definitions for one of ordinary skill in the art relate to specific arguments and issues of unpatentability or claim construction, to the extent that a dispute remains as to who constitutes a POSITA.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 11,681,643 - Intel Corporation v. Ax Wireless, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Mar 5, 2024 · IPR2023-01146 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all grounds because Petitioner did not show Huang or Sun was prior art to claims 1–10, which it argued were obvious over those references.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“II. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standards Petitioner bears the burden to demonstrate unpatentability. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). For purposes of institution, Petition bears the burden to establish, by a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the challenged claims would have been obvious over the cited art. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Where unpatentability rests on a document that is prior art to a challenged patent but for that patent’s priority claim to an earlier effective filing date, such a priority claim is not presumed valid. PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that the USPTO does not routinely determine whether such priority claims meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 120).” slip op. at 5
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Id. at 13, 17. Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had at least a Master’s degree in electrical engineer-ing or a similar discipline, and/or at least two to three years of experience working or conducting research in wireless commu-nication protocols, or an equivalent combination of education and experience. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 71, 72). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s assertion as to the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 6. We are persuaded, on the present record, that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’146 patent and prior art of record. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Not reached
“action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2022). The Board is required to construe “only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner and Patent Owner, in extended briefing, contest the construction of the phrase “detecting, from the received wireless packet, the second header field which repeats the first header field,” as it appears in claim 1. Pet. 9; Prelim. Resp. 1; Pet. Reply 3; PO Sur-Reply 3. However, both parties appear to agree that the plain and ordinary meaning of the term should apply. See Pet. 6; Prelim. Resp. 15. Further, Petitioner has clarified that its statements as to the scope of the term are directed to its assertions that the ’146 patent lacks support for the claimed subject matter in its parent applications. Pet. Reply. 5–6. Consequently, we address claim construction arguments in their context of the parties’ priority contentions. See infra at II.D.1.” slip op. at 7
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Entitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner has shown sufficient written description support for the claims, including the disputed “detecting” limitation. The “decode-to-learn- ‘D’” description in the specification of the ’146 patent and in the provisional application to which the ’146 patent claims priority describe a specific procedure for the claimed “detecting, from the received wireless packet, the second header field which repeats the first header field.”3 See Ex. 1001, 2 Petitioner specifically asserts that Huang qualifies under 35 U.S.C. §102(b). Pet. 2, 19 (“by more than a year”). However, Huang’s patent issuance date of April 28, 2020 does not qualify under § 102(b) because it is less than one year before the December 29, 2020 filing date of the ’146 patent. Nevertheless, Petitioner has made an effective showing that Sun would qualify as prior art sufficient to shift the burden of production to Patent Owner. 3 Patent Owner does not explicitly show support for each of the applications in the priority chain. Patent Owner also cites to a Pre-Grant Publication rather than the underlying application despite the fact that such a Publication may include amendments to the originally filed application that would not evidence written description. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.215 (a); MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE §1121; Ex. 2003, 7 (showing amendments 3:1–11; Ex. 2001 ¶ 35; Ex. 1008, 5–6; PO Sur-Reply 6. The “D” information is received in the wireless packet, and the receiver determines therefrom whether there is a second header field that repeats the first header field. See Ex. 1008, 5–6; PO Sur-Reply 6. The written description further includes descriptions of other embodiments for receiver detection with variable repetition, including detection “without knowing D a priori.” Ex. 1001, 2:18–3:59.” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 11,212,146
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.