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  • PTAB · Oct 5, 2026 · IPR2025-00598 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–31 were not shown unpatentable under either § 103 ground because the asserted combinations did not teach required claim limitations.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “admissions by Patent Owner in litigation, contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a Master of Science (M.S.) degree in electrical engineering or computer science, and five years of work experience in a related field” and that “[a]dditional educational experience could substitute for some of the work experience.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art (Petition, 5) at this time.” PO Resp. 6. On the complete record, we adopt Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it is uncontested and is consistent with the technology described in the ’347 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “In the Preliminary Response, “Patent Owner accept[ed] the Petition’s claim construction.” Prelim. Resp. 6. However, in the Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner argues that “the claims of the ’347 Patent require no construction as they are valid under their plain and ordinary meaning.” PO Resp. 6. Based on the complete record, we do not find it necessary to provide express claim constructions of any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

      “Beel actually discloses the following: [0321] On the peripheral device 32 the video packets are received at the corresponding plug and play port, e.g. the USB port 11, read by the Human Interface Driver (HID) interface handler 13, unpacked to remove HID protocol headers in an unpacker 20 and then transmitted to the communications network by a transmitter 21. The network can be wireless for example WiFi or LiFi network. [0322] Having been routed over a communications network to the base unit 33, the incoming stream is read from the communications interface such as a WiFi access point 22, unpacked in an unpacker 25, decoded in a decoder 26 and then inserted into a suitable composition such as an OpenGL based composition in the compositor 29 for display on a central display device. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 321–322 (emphasis added to portions quoted by Petitioner). Patent Owner notes that “[t]he Petition mistakenly cites to ¶ 322 of Beel but quotes ¶ 321.” PO Resp. 20 n.3. However, it appears that Petitioner has grafted together a portion of paragraph 321 that introduces peripheral device 32 with a portion of paragraph 322, which discusses features of base unit 33. However, this grafting has been done in such a way as to convey (incorrectly) that peripheral device 32, not base unit 33, includes unpacker 25, decoder 26, and compositor 29 that process the first processed video data received by the first peripheral device to generate second video data. Dr. Almeroth’s testimony, which copies Petitioner’s incorrectly altered quotation to paragraph 322 of Beel, is unreliable as to this claim limitation and is entitled to no weight.4 Thus, Petitioner has no expert testimony on which to rely for this claim limitation.” slip op. at 19

    • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

      “5 At the oral argument, when challenged on its reliance on paragraph 322, Petitioner argued that paragraph 321 of Beel teaches this limitation. Tr. 22:26–23:24. Petitioner did not make this argument in the Petition and, instead, raised it for the first time during oral argument; thus, it will not be considered. See Dell Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC, 884 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Unless it chose to exercise its waiver authority under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(b), the Board was obligated to dismiss Dell’s untimely argument given that the untimely argument in this case was raised for the first time during oral argument.”). Even if we were to consider this new argument, it would not be persuasive. As Patent Owner observes (PO Resp. 20), any processing performed by peripheral device 32 in paragraph 321 is on data received from the processing device and destined for the base station via the network, rather than data flowing in the direction of the first processed video data of claim 1.” slip op. at 22

    Patent outcomesUS 11,966,347 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,966,347
  • PTAB · Aug 19, 2026 · PGR2025-00027 · APJ George R Hoskins · PGR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–6 and 8–20 are unpatentable under § 101; claim 7 was not shown unpatentable.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Pet.”) pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 321–329 to institute a post-grant review of U.S. Patent No. 11,966,920 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’920 patent”), claims 1–20. We issued an Institution Decision (Paper 12) granting the petitioned review. slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelOther

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends a person having ordinary skill in the art pertaining” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

      “thereby supporting our conclusion that the plain and ordinary meaning of “affordance” in claim 1 refers to an interactive user interface element.” slip op. at 30

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “For the foregoing reasons, we conclude Petitioner’s reliance on Low’s” slip op. at 21

    Patent outcomesUS 11,966,920 mixed
    Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Berkheimer · Enfish · Electric Power · KSR
    Patents in suitUS 11,966,920
  • PTAB · Jul 30, 2026 · IPR2025-00560 · APJ Barry L Grossman · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–29 are unpatentable under each asserted obviousness ground, including Chang and Fang, because Petitioner proved unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

      “Additionally, we note that Patent Owner did not cross-examine Mr. Ryan Bauer, who provided a detailed, 169-page expert report providing, on behalf of Petitioner, his opinions about the issues in this proceeding. See Exhibit 1003. Mr. Bauer’s testimonial evidence in this proceeding remains unrebutted.” slip op. at 3

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or a similar field and at least two years of experience designing human breast pump equipment. More education could substitute for experience and vice versa.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 15–18). Mr. Bauer’s Declaration testimony states he considered some of the factors listed above. Ex. 1003 ¶ 17. Mr. Bauer testifies that based on his background and experience, in his opinion, the level of ordinary skill is as stated by Petitioner. Id. at 18. Based on the prior art, the sophistication of the disclosed technology in the ’381 patent, and Mr. Bauer’s undisputed testimony, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 17

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner asserts that the Examiner construed the term “self- contained, in-bra wearable device” to mean “complete, or having all that is needed, in itself’ and is capable of being worn in a bra.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1005, 2290).14 According to Petitioner, “[Patent Owner] did not dispute this construction, and Petitioner applies it herein.” Id. Petitioner contends that all other terms “should receive their plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. We do not perceive the need to construe any claim limitation. Claims must be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 19 F.4th 1325, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. American Science & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe the claim preambles here where the construction is not ‘material to the [obviousness] dispute.’” (citations omitted)).” slip op. at 17

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

      “(3) 1[a][1] a diaphragm configured to prevent milk from reaching an air pump by forming a seal around its outer edge; Petitioner relies on Fang for the disclosure of a diaphragm, as stated in this clause. Pet. 25–26. Petitioner asserts the proposed combination of elements suggest a breast pump device that would have used a diaphragm pump including first and second diaphragm housing components and an elastic diaphragm, “in accordance with Fang’s suggestions.” Id. at 25. As also asserted by Petitioner, Fang discloses that flexible diaphragm 7 (i.e., a membrane) is configured to prevent milk from reaching the pump. Id. at 26 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶ 19 (“The elastic diaphragm 7 is used to prevent milk from flowing into the air pump main unit 8.”). Mr. Bauer testifies: The flexible diaphragm [diaphragm 7 in Fang] forms a watertight and airtight seal around its outer edge. In doing so, the diaphragm prevents the passage of milk from reaching the air pump and facilitates generation of negative pressure during operation. Fang also explains that the elastic diaphragm 7 deforms away from the nipple tunnel when a vacuum is created on a pumping chamber, which then creates negative air pressure in the nipple tunnel when a vacuum is created on a pumping chamber.” slip op. at 28

    Patent outcomesUS 11,813,381 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,813,381
  • PTAB · Jun 30, 2026 · IPR2025-00167 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–13, 21, 22, 64, and 65 are unpatentable over the asserted grounds; claims 15, 17, 19, 20, 23–30, 66, and 67 were not shown unpatentable over KR996, JP705, and Beltrami.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

      “B. Analysis “The moving party has the burden of proof to establish that it is” slip op. at 9

    • Skill levelOther

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art We review the grounds of unpatentability in view of the” slip op. at 21

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “lexicographical, we agree with the parties that “mainframe” is not limited to a single weldment. Pet. Init. CC Br. 1; PO Init. CC Br. 1–2. Instead, a single-weldment “mainframe” is merely one disclosed embodiment. See Pet. Init. CC Br. 3 (stating that “by including the term ‘generally’ in a statement, the feature (i.e., single weldment) is expressly identified as merely included in some, but not all embodiments”); PO Init. CC Br. 3 (“This language is merely exemplary, using reference numerals to refer to the embodiment’s features and qualifying ‘single weldment’ as referring ‘generally’ to specific embodiments.”). The Iowa District Court reached the same conclusion. See Ex. 1020 at 4 (holding that “‘mainframe’ will be given its plain and ordinary meaning and does not require a single weldment” (emphasis added)), cited at Pet. Init. CC Br. 2; see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (“Any prior claim construction determination concerning a term of the claim in a civil action, or a proceeding before the International Trade Commission, that is timely made of record in the inter partes review proceeding will be considered.”).” slip op. at 33

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

      “probative and cogent evidence in the record” and “may often establish that an invention appearing to have been obvious in light of the prior art was not.” Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Thus, notwithstanding what the teachings of the prior art would have suggested to one skilled in the art, secondary considerations (objective evidence of non-obviousness) may lead to a conclusion that the challenged claims would not have been obvious. In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1471–72 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Our obviousness analysis includes consideration and weighing of Patent Owner’s objective indicia of non-obviousness.” slip op. at 55

    Patent outcomesUS 9,321,386 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,321,386
  • PTAB · Jun 30, 2026 · IPR2025-00171 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–13 and 28 are unpatentable over KR996; claims 14–16 and 19–27 were not shown unpatentable over Bares and Beltrami.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

      “(“This language is merely exemplary, using reference numerals to refer to the embodiment’s features and qualifying ‘single weldment’ as referring ‘generally’ to specific embodiments.”). The Iowa District Court reached the same conclusion. See Ex. 1020 at 4 (holding that “‘mainframe’ will be given its plain and ordinary meaning and does not require a single weldment” (emphasis added)), cited at Pet. Init. CC Br. 2; see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (“Any prior claim construction determination concerning a term of the claim in a civil action, or a proceeding before the International Trade Commission, that is timely made of record in the inter partes review proceeding will be considered.”). Turning to the prosecution history, neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner has highlighted any specific statements that impact the scope of the term “mainframe.” And from our independent review, we do not discern any such statements. For these reasons, the intrinsic evidence as a whole supports construing “mainframe” as a primary supporting structure.” slip op. at 35

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia no nexusNot shown unpatentable

      “probative and cogent evidence in the record” and “may often establish that an invention appearing to have been obvious in light of the prior art was not.” Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Thus, notwithstanding what the teachings of the prior art would have suggested to one skilled in the art, secondary considerations (objective evidence of non-obviousness) may lead to a conclusion that the challenged claims would not have been obvious. In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1471–72 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Our obviousness analysis includes consideration and weighing of Patent Owner’s objective indicia of non-obviousness.” slip op. at 54

    • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part

      “For these reasons, we are persuaded by Petitioner to exclude, as” slip op. at 28

    Patent outcomesUS 10,202,266 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 10,202,266
  • Fluidmaster, Inc. v. Danco, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
    PTAB · Mar 5, 2026 · IPR2024-00634 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 3, 8–13, 15, 16, and 19–24 are unpatentable over Brown and Ho, with claims 16 and 19 also relying on the Quick Connection Art; the remaining challenged claims were not shown unpatentable.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “Patent Owner proposes that: A [person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”)] in the field to which the ’105 Patent is directed would have had at least a Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical engineering or a related field or, as a substitute, at least two years of work or” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

      “of “integrally molded with” as “molded together as a single structure.” Paper 21, 15.” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “Patent Owner responds that: a POSITA would not have been motivated to make the proposed modification, nor does the Petition include any analysis regarding why a POSITA would be motivated to move from a vertical extended portion to a radial extended portion. Indeed, a radial extended portion is directly counter to the stated goals of Brown (e.g., reducing noise caused by turbulence), at least insofar as it introduces another sudden directional change into the fluid flow system. PO Resp. 58–59 (citing Ex. 2013 ¶ 242).” slip op. at 32

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateEntitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner

      “Patent Owner argues that the ’105 patent claims were “fully supported as of the filing date of at least the ’606 Application . . . March 11, 2004” because the ’606 Application discloses regulating water flow and a POSITA would know that appropriate devices for regulating water flow includes nonadjustable waterflow restrictors. PO Resp. 63–65; PO Sur-reply 26–29. Patent Owner’s argument is persuasive. The ’606 Application discloses: [W]hen the toilet fill valve 100 is open and water flows from the water inlet 103 to the water outlets 106 and into a toilet tank, an amount of water is also supplied to the bowl fill valve inlet 113 that flows through the bowl fill valve 109 and out the bowl fill valve outlet 116. By virtue of the manual setting of handle 119 of the bowl fill valve 109, the flow of water through the bowl fill valve 109 is regulated. In this manner, the flow of water is regulated so that enough water flows out of the bowl fill valve 109 to fill a toilet bowl without wasting any water down a drain. seen from the passage above, the ’606 Application discloses regulating an amount of water supplied to a toilet bowl using a valve (i.e., a water flow regulator). Ex. 2013 ¶ 288. Further, the ’606 Application states: The bowl fill valve 109 may be, for example, a ball valve, a gate valve, a globe valve, a plug valve, a diaphragm valve, a butterfly valve, a needle valve, a sliding gate, a quick turn valve, a knife valve or any other appropriate type of valve as can be appreciated by those with ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 42

    Patent outcomesUS 9,103,105 mixed
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,103,105
  • Fluidmaster, Inc. v. Danco, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
    PTAB · Dec 15, 2025 · IPR2024-00633 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 7–15, 19, and 20 are unpatentable over Brown and Ho; claims 2–6 and 16–18 were not shown unpatentable on the asserted grounds.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “Brown’s adapter tube 23 (i.e., the extended portion) does not extend radially from a longitudinal axis of valve assembly 13 (i.e., the toilet fill valve). Ex. 1021, Fig. 1. Mr. Jobin testifies that a POSITA would not be motivated to move adapter tube 23 from a vertical position to a radial position because “a radial extended portion is directly counter to the stated goals of Brown (e.g., reducing noise caused by turbulence), at least insofar system.” Ex. 2013 ¶ 251; see Ex. 1021, 1:9–62. Patent Owner’s argument is persuasive. Petitioner’s analysis and Dr. Cameron’s testimony is conclusory and does not sufficiently explain why a POSITA would be motivated to make the proposed modification to Brown. For example, Petitioner does not sufficiently explain how such a modification would result in a more compact toilet fill valve system that could be adapted to fit in more toilet tank designs. Further, neither Petitioner nor Dr. Cameron sufficiently address Mr. Jobin’s testimony regarding Brown’s desire for a quieter toilet. See Pet. Reply 23; Ex. 1036 ¶ 84. Petitioner fails to meet its burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 2 is unpatentable over Brown and Ho.” slip op. at 35

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateEntitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner

      “description is an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a POSA. Using this test, the invention must be described in a manner sufficient to demonstrate that the inventor actually invented the claimed invention. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010). “One shows that one is ‘in possession’ of the invention by describing the invention, with all its claimed limitations, not that which makes it obvious.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Written description is a question of fact judged as of the relevant filing date. Falko–Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006). An ipsis verbis disclosure, however, is not necessary to satisfy the written description requirement. Vas–Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The disclosure need only reasonably convey to a POSA that the inventor had possession of the subject matter in question, even if every nuance of the claims is not explicitly described in the specification. Id.; see Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. Patent Owner argues that the ’993 patent claims were “fully supported as of the filing date of at least the ’606 Application . . . March 11, 2004” because the ’606 Application discloses regulating water flow and a POSITA would know that appropriate devices for regulating water flow includes nonadjustable waterflow restrictors. PO Resp. 68; PO Sur-reply 28–30. Patent Owner’s argument is persuasive. The ’606 Application discloses: [W]hen the toilet fill valve 100 is open and water flows from the water inlet 103 to the water outlets 106 and into a toilet tank, an amount of water is also supplied to the bowl fill valve inlet 113 that flows through the bowl fill valve 109 and out the bowl fill valve outlet 116. By virtue of the manual setting of handle 119 valve 109 is regulated. In this manner, the flow of water is regulated so that enough water flows out of the bowl fill valve 109 to fill a toilet bowl without wasting any water down a drain. Ex. 1012, 47, ¶ 8 (emphasis added); see also Ex. 1001, 2:28–39. As can be seen from the passage above, the ’606 Application discloses regulating an amount of water supplied to a toilet bowl using a valve (i.e., a water flow regulator). Ex. 2013 ¶ 288.” slip op. at 48

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference not prior artNot shown unpatentable

      “1. Analysis of Claims 1–18 Schuster is available as prior art if the ’993 patent is only entitled to its January 27, 2014, filing date and not entitled to claim priority to earlier filing dates of the parent applications. On its face, the ’993 patent claims priority to a number of earlier parent applications, including Application No. 12/786,904 (the ’904 Application) filed May 25, 2010, and the Application code 63. Petitioner contends that the ’993 patent is not entitled to claim priority to the filing date of the earlier parent applications, and, thus, Schuster, a parent application of the ’993 patent, is available as prior art.15 Pet. 91–92. Petitioner alleges that the earlier parent applications, specifically Application No. 12/786,904 (the ’904 Application), do not provide written description support for the ’993 patent’s claim term “water flow regulator.” According to Petitioner, “water flow regulator” encompasses both adjustable devices for restricting the flow of water (i.e., valves) and fixed devices for restricting the flow of water (i.e., restrictors). Pet. 15. Petitioner contends that the ’904 Application does not provide support for water flow restrictors and, thus, does not provide support for the broader claim term water flow regulators. Id. at 14–15, 91–92. Petitioner argues that only adjustable water flow devices (i.e., valves) are supported by the ’904 Application. Id. Petitioner, thus, asserts that earliest effective filing date of the ’993 patent’s claims is the filing date of its application, January 27, 2014. Id. at 92. To be entitled to claim the benefit of an earlier filing date under 35 U.S.C. § 120 each application in the priority chain must comply with the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). See Hollmer v. 14 The parties do not dispute that the ’993 patent and the earlier parent applications, including the ’904 Application and the ’606 Application, have the same pertinent portions of their specifications. See PO Resp. 71, n.16; Ex. 1004 ¶ 324. 15 Schuster issued on January 31, 2012, from Application No. 12/786,904, filed on May 25, 2010. Ex. 1029, code (21), (22), (45). Schuster, thus, issued more than one year prior to January 27, 2014.” slip op. at 46

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentable

      “2. Analysis of Claims 19 and 20 Claim 19 depends from claim 14 and additionally recites, “wherein the waterflow regulator comprises an adjustable water flow regulator that is configured to adjust the flow rate of the second portion of the water based at least in part on a setting of the adjustable water flow regulator.” Ex. 1001, 12:16–20. Claim 20 depends from claim 14 and recites the same additional limitation. Id. at 12:21–24. Claims 19 and 20, thus, require the water flow regulator to be an adjustable water flow regulator. Petitioner indicates that the earlier parent applications provide written description support for an adjustable water flow regulator. Pet. 91 (“[T]he ’904 application specification makes it clear that the adjustability of the bowl fill valve is a desirable and essential feature of the invention”); PO Surreply 28. Accordingly, Petitioner fails to meet its burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 19 and 20 are unpatentable over Schuster.” slip op. at 50

    Patent outcomesUS 9,139,993 mixed
    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,139,993
  • PTAB · Oct 14, 2025 · IPR2025-00554 · APJ Barry L Grossman · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 17–19 and 21–33 on every asserted ground, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 17 is unpatentable over Furrer alone and Furrer with Alvarez.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “After considering the Petition and the evidence of record, based on the analysis in this Decision, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims and on all grounds asserted in the Petition. PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (stating that a decision to institute is “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”).” slip op. at 3

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or a similar field and at least two years of experience designing human breast pump equipment. More education could substitute for experience and vice versa.” Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 30–33). Mr. Bauer’s Declaration testimony states he considered some of the factors listed above. Ex. 1003 ¶ 32. Mr. Bauer testifies that based on his background and experience, in his opinion, the level of ordinary skill is as stated by Petitioner. Id. at 33. For purposes of this Decision, based on the prior art, the sophistication of the disclosed technology in the ’381 patent, and Mr. Bauer’s undisputed testimony, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill.6” slip op. at 15

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner asserts that “[a]ll claim terms should be construed according to the Phillips standard,” and that “no formal claim constructions are necessary for purposes of resolving controversies in this proceeding. Pet. 3. We agree. Given the lack of dispute on this record, we do not perceive the need to construe any claim limitation. Claims must be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 19 F.4th 1325, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. American Science & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe the claim preambles here where the construction is not ‘material to the [obviousness] dispute.’” (citations omitted)).” slip op. at 16

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “Mr. Bauer further testifies: For electric-powered breast pumps, the only two options for providing electricity to the pump was either via a wire plugged into an outlet or via a battery, as would have been well-known to a POSITA. It would have been obvious for a POSITA to utilize a battery as the power source for Furrer’s pump as it was one of the two available options and would have provided known benefits. Ex. 1003 ¶ 93. As to why this a person of ordinary skill would have chosen the option of a battery powered breast pump, Mr. Bauer testifies that: Selection of battery power for Furrer’s pump would have beneficially provided a portable system that was usable during travel. Additionally, such a configuration would have allowed the user to move freely about a room, or be positioned in a location within a room without being tethered to a wall plug, allowing the user to, for example, sit or lay in the most convenient location while using the system without having to worry about being close to an outlet. Such mobility provided by selecting battery power for Furrer’s pump would have particularly aligned with Furrer’s suggestion for a ‘hands-free’ and discrete solution. Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 138, 143, 145 (further discussing the motivation to combine Furrer and Alvarez in the context of Ground 1B). Based on the record before us, without any evidence or argument to the contrary, we determine that Petitioner shows sufficiently for purposes of trial institution that Furrer, alone or in combination with Alvarez, discloses the claimed control unit comprising a battery, and a pump.” slip op. at 23

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,806,454
  • PTAB · Oct 7, 2025 · IPR2025-00598 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–31 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on obviousness over Beel and Dinka and over van de Laar and Kaplan.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we institute an inter partes review of the ’347 patent.” slip op. at 2

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner argues that Dr. Almeroth does not provide a reason why a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Beel and Dinka, and that, instead, he “summarily concludes that Skype’s status as ‘well-known’ somehow would have motivated the combination of Dinka with Beel.” Prelim. Resp. 15–16. We disagree. Dr. Almeroth testifies that Skype, as taught in Dinka, would have been an example of the type of application that would have run on Beel’s system and that applying Dinka’s teachings would have improved Beel’s similar system in the same manner as it improved Dinka’s, with predictable results. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 103, 129. See also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) (“[W]hen a patent ‘simply arranges old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform’ and yields no more than one would expect from such an arrangement, the combination is obvious.” (quoting Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976))). On the current record, including Dr. Almeroth’s testimony, Petitioner’s proposed reasons to combine the teachings of Beel and Dinka have rational underpinning.” slip op. at 21

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

      “A reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Patent Owner’s argument is unpersuasive at least because Dinka expressly describes using VoIP technology on computer terminals 102. Ex. 1006, 5:45–48 (“A plurality of computer terminals 102 are shown coupled to the Internet 101, each comprising a network interface for communicating over the Internet.”), 6:7–8 (“Each computer terminal 102 is installed with a communication client application 110.”), 6:23–26 (“The communication client applications 110 [of computer terminals 102] and 113 [of television sets 103] are preferably peer-to-peer clients for setting-up and conducting VoIP calls according to peer-to-peer principles as discussed above.”). Thus, Dinka does not lead a skilled artisan in a direction divergent from the path taken in the ’347 patent. Moreover, “[a] reference may be read for all that it teaches, including uses beyond its primary purpose.” In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Thus, even though Dinka expresses a preference for conducting VoIP calls using a television set, a skilled artisan still would have considered Dinka’s teaching of using computers for such calls. See id. at 1334 (“This court has further explained that just because better alternatives exist in the prior art does not mean that an inferior combination is inapt for obviousness purposes.”). Patent Owner’s teaching-away argument is unpersuasive. slip op. at 22

    • Expert testimonyOther

      “a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Beel and Dinka, and that, instead, he “summarily concludes that Skype’s status as ‘well-known’ somehow would have motivated the combination of Dinka with Beel.” Prelim. Resp. 15–16. We disagree. Dr. Almeroth testifies that Skype, as taught in Dinka, would have been an example of the type of application that would have run on Beel’s system and that applying Dinka’s teachings would have improved Beel’s similar system in the same manner as it improved Dinka’s, with predictable results. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 103, 129. See also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) (“[W]hen a patent ‘simply arranges old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform’ and yields no more than one would expect from such an arrangement, the combination is obvious.” (quoting Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976))). On the current record, including Dr. Almeroth’s testimony, Petitioner’s proposed reasons to combine the teachings of Beel and Dinka have rational underpinning.” slip op. at 21

    § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,966,347
  • PTAB · Oct 7, 2025 · IPR2025-00597 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–22 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–22 would have been obvious over Beel and Dinka.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “In sum, on the current record, Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Beel and Dinka. f) Claims 2–22 The parties present their arguments for independent claim 11 along with those for claim 1. Pet. 44–45; Prelim. Resp. 19, 23. Claims 2–10 and 22 depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 1. Claims 12–21 depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 11. Patent Owner does not present separate arguments for claim 11 or the dependent claims. We have analyzed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence for claims 2–22 (Pet. 36–46) and, on the current record, conclude that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that claims 2–22 would have been obvious over Beel and Dinka.” slip op. at 25

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “III. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner, relying on the testimony of Dr. Almeroth and alleged admissions by Patent Owner in litigation, contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a Master of Science (M.S.) degree in electrical engineering or computer science, and five years of work experience in a related field” and that “[a]dditional educational experience could substitute for some of the work experience.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art at this time.” Prelim. Resp. 6. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it is consistent with the technology described in the ’346 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionNo construction neededOther

      “Patent Owner accepts the Petition’s claim construction for the purposes of” the Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 5–6. In light of Patent Owner’s acceptance, and because the proposed constructions are, on this record, consistent with the evidence cited by Petitioner, we, too, accept Petitioner’s proposals for “providing simulations or translations, as required,” and “data transformations,” as recited in claim 1, for purposes of this Decision. Based on the record before us, we do not find it necessary to provide express claim constructions of any other claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). slip op. at 8

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner argues that Dr. Almeroth does not provide a reason why a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Beel and Dinka, and that, instead, he “summarily concludes that Skype’s status as ‘well-known’ somehow would have motivated the combination of Dinka with Beel.” Prelim. Resp. 16. We disagree. Dr. Almeroth testifies that Skype, as taught in Dinka, would have been an example of the type of application that would have run on Beel’s system and that applying Dinka’s teachings would have improved Beel’s similar system in the same manner as it improved Dinka’s, with predictable results. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 117, 132. See also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) (“[W]hen a patent ‘simply arranges old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform’ and yields no more than one would expect from such an arrangement, the combination is obvious.” (quoting Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976))). On the current record, including Dr. Almeroth’s testimony, Petitioner’s proposed reasons to combine the teachings of Beel and Dinka have rational underpinning.” slip op. at 17

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,966,346
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