• Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co., Ltd. / Yealink Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. Barco NVNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 5, 2026 · IPR2025-00598 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–31 were not shown unpatentable under either § 103 ground because the asserted combinations did not teach required claim limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “admissions by Patent Owner in litigation, contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a Master of Science (M.S.) degree in electrical engineering or computer science, and five years of work experience in a related field” and that “[a]dditional educational experience could substitute for some of the work experience.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art (Petition, 5) at this time.” PO Resp. 6. On the complete record, we adopt Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it is uncontested and is consistent with the technology described in the ’347 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “In the Preliminary Response, “Patent Owner accept[ed] the Petition’s claim construction.” Prelim. Resp. 6. However, in the Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner argues that “the claims of the ’347 Patent require no construction as they are valid under their plain and ordinary meaning.” PO Resp. 6. Based on the complete record, we do not find it necessary to provide express claim constructions of any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Beel actually discloses the following: [0321] On the peripheral device 32 the video packets are received at the corresponding plug and play port, e.g. the USB port 11, read by the Human Interface Driver (HID) interface handler 13, unpacked to remove HID protocol headers in an unpacker 20 and then transmitted to the communications network by a transmitter 21. The network can be wireless for example WiFi or LiFi network. [0322] Having been routed over a communications network to the base unit 33, the incoming stream is read from the communications interface such as a WiFi access point 22, unpacked in an unpacker 25, decoded in a decoder 26 and then inserted into a suitable composition such as an OpenGL based composition in the compositor 29 for display on a central display device. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 321–322 (emphasis added to portions quoted by Petitioner). Patent Owner notes that “[t]he Petition mistakenly cites to ¶ 322 of Beel but quotes ¶ 321.” PO Resp. 20 n.3. However, it appears that Petitioner has grafted together a portion of paragraph 321 that introduces peripheral device 32 with a portion of paragraph 322, which discusses features of base unit 33. However, this grafting has been done in such a way as to convey (incorrectly) that peripheral device 32, not base unit 33, includes unpacker 25, decoder 26, and compositor 29 that process the first processed video data received by the first peripheral device to generate second video data. Dr. Almeroth’s testimony, which copies Petitioner’s incorrectly altered quotation to paragraph 322 of Beel, is unreliable as to this claim limitation and is entitled to no weight.4 Thus, Petitioner has no expert testimony on which to rely for this claim limitation.” slip op. at 19

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “5 At the oral argument, when challenged on its reliance on paragraph 322, Petitioner argued that paragraph 321 of Beel teaches this limitation. Tr. 22:26–23:24. Petitioner did not make this argument in the Petition and, instead, raised it for the first time during oral argument; thus, it will not be considered. See Dell Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC, 884 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Unless it chose to exercise its waiver authority under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(b), the Board was obligated to dismiss Dell’s untimely argument given that the untimely argument in this case was raised for the first time during oral argument.”). Even if we were to consider this new argument, it would not be persuasive. As Patent Owner observes (PO Resp. 20), any processing performed by peripheral device 32 in paragraph 321 is on data received from the processing device and destined for the base station via the network, rather than data flowing in the direction of the first processed video data of claim 1.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 11,966,347 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,966,347
• Apple Inc. v. Proxense, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 17, 2026 · IPR2025-00562 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Giobbi ’157, Giobbi ’139, and Dua; the Board also finds the claims unpatentable under the Broadcom grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) does not applyDecided for petitioner

    “IPR2024-00783, Ex. 1001, 22:36–49. As the Federal Circuit stated, when a disputed claim limitation does not employ “means for” language, the presumption is that each of the terms conveys sufficiently definite structure or act and, thus, is not subject to § 112 ¶ 6. See Dyfan, 28 F.4th at 1367. Based on the record before us, this presumption that each of the terms is not subject to § 112 ¶ 6 is not overcome.” slip op. at 17

  • Skill levelOther

    “differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, “would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of non-obviousness. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).” slip op. at 25

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “We find persuasive Dr. Wolfe’s supporting testimony that a POSITA would have understood the terms “PDK” and “RDC” to have “definite structure.” Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 35–56. In particular, we find persuasive Dr. Wolfe’s testimony that the term “PDK,” for example, “encompasses at least ‘a collection of circuit components that includes an antenna, a transceiver, and a controller and memory for storing information particular to a user.’” Id. ¶ 35. Dr. Wolfe’s testimony is consistent with the Specification of the ’188 patent. See Ex. 1001, 5:42–6:7, 3:48–62. In particular, the Specification of the ’188 patent describes a microchip that stores information in memory and responds through an antenna when probed, which is consistent with Dr. Wolfe’s testimony. Id.; Ex. 1001, 1:30–62.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, “would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of non-obviousness. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 9,049,188 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,049,188
• Amazon.Com, Inc. / Amazon.Com Services LLC et al. v. Soundclear Technologies LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 3, 2026 · IPR2025-00673 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7 are unpatentable as obvious over the combined teachings of the asserted references, including Shin and Aoyama and Shimomura and Iwase.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsOther

    “1 SoundClear also filed a Contingent Motion to Amend that proposed to replace originally challenged claim 5 of the ’675 patent with proposed substitute claim 8. Paper 21. We, however, granted SoundClear’s request to withdraw its Contingent Motion to Amend and, as a result, the Contingent Motion to Amend will no longer be considered in this proceeding. Paper 30.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelOther

    “2. Level of Skill in the Art In determining whether an invention would have been obvious, we” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundMotivation not foundMixed

    “combination because (1) configuring Shin’s processor 120 accordingly “would have been trivial, involving straightforward changes to enhance the processor’s approach to simplifying and abbreviating its output”; and (2) this approach was well-known as evidenced by Ha’s disclosure of replacing “team meeting” and “date” with “schedules” based on the user’s environment.6 Id. at 27–28 (first quoting Ex. 1011 ¶ 97, then quoting Ex. 1011 ¶ 98) (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 102; Ex. 1011, Fig. 7).” slip op. at 33

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “4. Dr. Stern’s Testimony is Reliable In its Patent Owner Response, SoundClear contends that “Dr. Stern’s” slip op. at 125

  Patent outcomesUS 11,244,675 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,244,675
• Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 20, 2026 · IPR2025-00343 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6 and 8–13 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner did not establish a reason to combine Bucknell’s multiplexing techniques with Eckert.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Patent Owner does not expressly dispute Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See generally PO Resp. On this record, Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is not disputed and is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’138 patent and the asserted prior art references. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For purposes of this Decision, we rely on Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “1. a subset of radio bearers Petitioner points out that in IPR2022-01127 the Board “preliminarily determined that a subset of the plurality of radio bearers” means “less than all of the plurality of radio bearers.” Pet 12 (citing Ex. 1019, 18–19). Petitioner explains that, in the present proceeding, it has applied “the prior art in accordance with that construction; however, in view of the asserted grounds, no claim term requires express construction to find the Challenged Claims unpatentable.” Id. (citing Nidec 868 F.3d 1017). Patent Owner neither disputes the prior construction of “a subset of radio bearers,” nor offers additional constructions. See generally PO Resp. To the extent necessary, and in accordance with our prior determination, we construe “a subset of the plurality of radio bearers” to mean “less than all of the plurality of radio bearers.”” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

    “bears pointing out that the specification of the ’138 patent appears to explain what “a single allocation” means: If there are multiple QoS requirements within a single 3GPP PDP context, a single physical allocation of radio resources may be made to the UE. In this manner, a single PDP context implies a single CCTrCh. This single physical allocation of radio resources provided to a UE is shared amongst a number of services, in proportion to their respective QoS requirements, for example in proportion to the signalled weight values (Stier). Ex. 1001, 9:36–43 (emphasis added). Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Ding, explains that the “abbreviation CCTrCh was understood in the art to refer to a transport channel known as the Coded Composite Transport Channel.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 88. Dr. Ding testifies that Eckert teaches selecting data for uplink within a determined TTI and scheduling the uplink transmission on a transport channel, E-DCH, where scheduling of the E-DCH in a UE is controlled by a base station. Eckert, [0012] (“[A] new dedicated transport channel called Enhanced Dedicated Channel (E-DCH) has been introduced for this purpose. The fundamental characteristics of this new transport channel include . . . scheduling controlled by the base station, also called NodeB in UMTS…” Id. ¶ 90. In addition to Eckert disclosing a single transport channel E-DCH, Petitioner argues that Eckert discloses using a “finite quantum of physical resources” where “[t]he ’138 patent disclosure parallels Eckert, with both the E-DCH and CCTrCH transport channels relating to a UMTS uplink, employing spreading codes in code division multiple access (CDMA), and Reply 6 (citing Ex. 1005, ¶¶ 3, 8, 15, 23; Ex. 1071 ¶¶ 17–20; Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 6, 51). We do not need to specifically interpret this claim phrase because there is no actual dispute as to the meaning of the claim language itself and because, ultimately, the construction of this phrase plays no part in our Decision.” slip op. at 15

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “D. Ground 1: Claims 1–4 and 8–11 – Alleged Obviousness over Eckert in view of Bucknell and Lohr-1 On the complete record now before us, Petitioner has not established a preponderance of evidence that claims 1–4 and 8–11 would have been obvious over Eckert, Bucknell, and Lohr-1. For the reasons explained below we determine that Petitioner has failed to show why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Eckert in view of Bucknell in the manner claimed. We focus our analysis below on claim 1, and more specifically on those limitations for which the combination of Eckert and Bucknell is asserted. 1. Limitations [1.0]–[1.2] and the combination of Eckert and Bucknell The combination of Eckert and Bucknell is essential to each of Petitioner’s asserted grounds in this proceeding. Pet. 13. At the outset, we address this issue because our determination that Petitioner has failed to show why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Eckert and Bucknell is dispositive as to all grounds.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 10,292,138 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,292,138
• Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 18, 2026 · IPR2025-00339 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 22, 23, 28, and 30 are unpatentable over Choi, Labaziewicz, and Yu; claims 1–3, 10–12, 24, 25, 32, and 33 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningOther

    “We decline Patent Owner’s invitation to construe “during a frame” of “independently controlling simultaneous data acquisition with each of the first and second channels during a frame” by importing the extraneous limitations “at some point between the beginning and the end of the exposure interval during which the image sensors capture a single image.” As pointed out by Petitioner, Patent Owner’s proposed construction is unsupported by the language of claim 22 and the ’180 Specification because Specification does not disclose an exposure interval nor suggest “during a frame” is limited to an exposure interval. Patent Owner and its expert Dr. Saber cite only extrinsic evidence (Exs. 2006, 2009) to support its argument that claim 22 should be limited to an “exposure interval during which the image sensors capture a single image.” See PO Resp. 16–17; Ex. 2020 ¶ 64. Similarly, Patent Owner relies only on extrinsic evidence (e.g., Ex. 2011, 1; Ex. 2022, 1; Ex. 2020 ¶ 66) to limit “during” to “at some point between the beginning and the end.” See id. at 18. When considered in the context of claim 22 and the ’180 Patent Specification which do not limit “during a frame” to an exposure interval, we find that we cannot rely on Patent Owner’s citations to extrinsic evidence to yield a reliable construction for “during a frame.” As demonstrated in the analysis below, we need not provide an explicit construction for “during a frame” to resolve the parties’ disputes regarding the merits of the patentability challenges. See Realtime, 912 F.3d at 1375. We apply the ordinary and customary meaning for “during a frame.” To the extent that an explicit identification of the ordinary and customary meaning may aid the understanding of our analysis, consistent with the language of claim 22 and the ’180 Patent Specification, we find that the ordinary and customary meaning for “during a frame” is “during the period of time that data for an image frame is acquired.” See Ex. 1001, code (57), 20:6–24, 25:23–35.” slip op. at 12

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field and 2-3 years of experience in digital imaging systems,” and that “[l]ess experience may be necessary with additional education, and likewise, less education may be necessary with additional work experience.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 16–19). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition. See generally PO Resp. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’180 Patent Specification and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 20

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “Owner to show that Labaziewicz is not prior art because the ’180 Patent is entitled to the earliest August 25, 2004, filing date of the ’854 Provisional Application. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1379–1380. For a claim in a later-filed application to be entitled to the filing date of an earlier application, the earlier application must provide written description support for the claimed subject matter. Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 601 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2010). To satisfy the written description requirement, “a prior application itself must describe an invention, and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention as of the filing date sought.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also VasCath v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he applicant must . . . convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention . . . now claimed.” (emphasis omitted)), Ariad Pharm. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“[I]t is the specification itself that must demonstrate possession.”). Patent Owner’s arguments fail to meet this burden of production because, aside from addressing deficiencies of written description support the ’854 Provisional Application provides written description support for all of the limitations of the claimed invention. See PO Resp. 60–64; PO Sur-reply 25–28. Specifically, Patent Owner does not address written description support in the ’854 Provisional Application for “independently controlling simultaneous data acquisition with each of the first and second channels during a frame”––limitation [22.3]––the heart of the parties’ claim construction disputes addressed above in Section II.A. See PO Resp. 60–64; PO Sur-reply 25–27. Accordingly, Patent Owner has not met its burden of production in coming forward with evidence or argument to show possession of the claimed invention in the ’854 Provisional Application. As a result, the burden of production does not shift back to Petitioner, and, therefore, the ’180 Patent is not entitled to the benefit of the August 25, 2004, filing date of the ’854 Provisional Application.” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner does not present arguments that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to modify the teachings of Matsushima to acquire data for images 62A and 62B at the argues that Matsushima renders obvious this limitation. See id. at 21, 23, 30; PO Resp. 33–34 (“[T]he Petition provides no further explanation why Matsushima renders this limitation obvious.”). In the Reply for the first time, Petitioner asserts that “a POSITA would understand that Matsushima’s disclosure, including its multi-channel architecture, synchronous control of channels, and capturing two images that are scaled versions of the same scene, renders obvious simultaneous acquisition during a frame. Pet. Reply 13 (citing Ex. 1069 ¶ 49). We do not consider Petitioner’s belated argument because it exceeds the proper scope of a reply. A reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding patent owner response. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23. As explained in the Trial Practice Guide, “respond” “does not mean proceed in a new direction with a new approach as compared to the positions taken in a prior filing.” Trial Practice Guide at II.I. (December 2025)(citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.23).10 A reply that raises a new issue or belatedly presents evidence may not be considered. See id. For example, a “[p]etitioner may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g. to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability.” Id.” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 7,916,180 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,916,180
• Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co. Ltd. / Yealink Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. Barco N.V.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 28, 2026 · IPR2025-00491 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–18 are unpatentable as obvious over Beel and Dinka, with or without Christison; the Kaplan, Van de Laar, and Christison ground fails for lack of motivation to combine.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art.” PO Resp. 6. On the complete record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, as it is consistent with the ’972 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “Rather than addressing Petitioner’s proposals, Patent Owner states “the claims of the ’972 Patent require no construction as they are valid under their plain and ordinary meaning.” PO Resp. 6. Our decision in this matter does not turn on resolving any particular differences between the parties’ constructions. Therefore, because only those terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy, we determine that no claim term requires express construction in this proceeding and that the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms apply. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019).” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “device. The ’972 patent expressly defines endpoints broadly “as data sources or sinks.” Ex. 1001, 7:64–67. And the ’972 patent admits that Beel’s Figure 11 discloses the same endpoints depicted in the ’972 patent’s own Figure 4. Id. at 4:28–33, 16:44–67. Beel’s Figure 11 and accompanying description disclose a “[m]ass storage device 12,” a “USB audio device 14,” and a “USB HID device 13” on the peripheral device. Ex. 1005, Fig. 11, ¶¶ 320–323. Patent Owner’s own declarant conceded that a mass storage device is “a type of endpoint” (Ex. 1034, 43:19–21), and that “audio devices are endpoints” (id. at 57:5–61:4). We give reduced weight to Patent Owner’s contrary position to the extent it rests on the premise that a reference cannot disclose an endpoint unless it uses the word “endpoint” (Ex. 2030 ¶ 94; Ex. 1034, 43:19–44:16, 72:18–73:12); a premise that is inconsistent with the ’972 patent’s own broad definition and with the ’972 patent’s admission regarding Beel’s Figure 11. As additional support not separately emphasized by the parties in this connection, we note Dr. Almeroth’s technical explanation that, for data to pass from a functional device to a peripheral device, “both the functional device and the peripheral device must have ‘endpoints’”—a data source and a data sink—reasoning consistent with the ’972 patent’s definition. Ex. 1002 ¶ 125.” slip op. at 27

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “First, we agree with Patent Owner that, under the ordinary meaning of the claim language, the endpoint is an endpoint of the peripheral device, and that it must be “a data source or a data sink which is able to store or emit data, of the functional device exposed or made available on the first peripheral device.” Ex. 1001, 23:11–17. The limitation thus identifies a structure—an endpoint, residing on the peripheral device, that is a source or sink and that corresponds to (is “of”) the functional device—through which the communication recited in subsequent element (g) is carried out. By its terms, it imposes no requirement as to the direction in which data flows; it requires only that the endpoint be a data “source” or a data “sink” that is able to “store or emit” data. The operative transmit-and-receive communication “from the functional device to the processing device via the . . . endpoint” is recited in subsequent element (g), which we take up separately below. The disputed question under this limitation is therefore the structural one: whether Beel discloses, on the peripheral device, an endpoint that is “of the functional device.” Because the inquiry is structural and non-directional, we are not persuaded that the audio-out orientation of Beel’s described embodiment, on which Patent Owner relies, is dispositive of this limitation. device. The ’972 patent expressly defines endpoints broadly “as data sources or sinks.” Ex. 1001, 7:64–67. And the ’972 patent admits that Beel’s Figure 11 discloses the same endpoints depicted in the ’972 patent’s own Figure 4. Id. at 4:28–33, 16:44–67. Beel’s Figure 11 and accompanying description disclose a “[m]ass storage device 12,” a “USB audio device 14,” and a “USB HID device 13” on the peripheral device. Ex. 1005, Fig. 11, ¶¶ 320–323. Patent Owner’s own declarant conceded that a mass storage device is “a type of endpoint” (Ex. 1034, 43:19–21), and that “audio devices are endpoints” (id. at 57:5–61:4). We give reduced weight to Patent Owner’s contrary position to the extent it rests on the premise that a reference cannot disclose an endpoint unless it uses the word “endpoint” (Ex. 2030 ¶ 94; Ex. 1034, 43:19–44:16, 72:18–73:12); a premise that is inconsistent with the ’972 patent’s own broad definition and with the ’972 patent’s admission regarding Beel’s Figure 11. As additional support not separately emphasized by the parties in this connection, we note Dr. Almeroth’s technical explanation that, for data to pass from a functional device to a peripheral device, “both the functional device and the peripheral device must have ‘endpoints’”—a data source and a data sink—reasoning consistent with the ’972 patent’s definition. Ex. 1002 ¶ 125. Third, we find that the endpoint Beel discloses is a data source or a data sink that is “able to store or emit data, of the functional device.” We begin with the words of the limitation. The endpoint need only be “able to store or emit data”—language of capability, not a requirement that particular data actually traverse the endpoint in operation, and still less in a particular direction. And the endpoint is defined by the character of the data it handles: it is “a data source or a data sink,” which the ’972 patent instructs An audio endpoint, so understood, is characterized as an audio source or sink; its structure is not tied to any single instance of an audio device. On that understanding, Beel’s disclosure establishes the required capability directly. Beel discloses that “audio data is captured through a virtual sound card interface added as a logical device over the physical interface provided in the peripheral device,” Ex. 1005 ¶ 43, that the peripheral device “acts as a composite device comprising for instance a (virtual) audio speaker device,” id. ¶ 317, and that “audio data is captured at this interface . . . internally in the peripheral device 32” and streamed over the communications network, id. ¶ 319. Beel thus shows the endpoint on the peripheral device actually storing and emitting audio—and, correspondingly, video—data, which is the very type of data produced and consumed by the audio/visual functional devices connected to the base unit, including the microphones, cameras, speakers, and displays. Id. ¶ 120. An endpoint shown to store or emit audio and video data is necessarily one that is “able to store or emit” such data; the capability the limitation requires is thus established by Beel’s disclosure.” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 10,684,972 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,684,972
• Amazon.Com, Inc. / Amazon.Com Services LLC et al. v. Soundclear Technologies LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 27, 2026 · IPR2025-00565 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 are unpatentable because Amazon showed they are anticipated by Shin; the Board did not reach Amazon’s contingent obviousness ground over Shin.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenOther

    “Written Decision under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) as to the patentability of claims 1–5 of the ’337 patent. For the reasons we identify below, we hold that Amazon has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that these claims are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelOther

    “2. Level of Skill in the Art In determining whether an invention would have been obvious, we” slip op. at 18

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “1. Principles of Law To establish anticipation, “all of the elements and limitations of the” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “1. Principles of Law To establish anticipation, “all of the elements and limitations of the” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 11,069,337 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,069,337
• Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 21, 2026 · IPR2025-00339 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 22, 23, 28, 30, and 33 are unpatentable over Choi, Labaziewicz, and Yu under § 103; claims 1–3, 10–12, 24, 25, and 32 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field and 2-3 years of experience in digital imaging systems,” and that “[l]ess experience may be necessary with additional education, and likewise, less education may be necessary with additional work experience.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 16–19). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition. See generally PO Resp. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’180 Patent Specification and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 20

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “Owner to show that Labaziewicz is not prior art because the ’180 Patent is entitled to the earliest August 25, 2004, filing date of the ’854 Provisional Application. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1379–1380. For a claim in a later-filed application to be entitled to the filing date of an earlier application, the earlier application must provide written description support for the claimed subject matter. Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 601 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2010). To satisfy the written description requirement, “a prior application itself must describe an invention, and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention as of the filing date sought.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also VasCath v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he applicant must . . . convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention . . . now claimed.” (emphasis omitted)), Ariad Pharm. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“[I]t is the specification itself that must demonstrate possession.”).” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “We do not agree with Petitioner’s arguments based on retrieval of data from CCD 18A and CCD 18B. Although Matsushima’s CCD drive circuits 20A and 20B are driven synchronously by timing generator 28 (see Ex. 1007 ¶ 27), Matsushima discloses that “accumulated signal charges are retrieved by CCD drive pulses applied by CCD drive circuits 20A and 20B, and are sequentially output from CCD 18A and CCD 18B as voltage signals (analog image signals) corresponding to each signal charge” (see Ex. 1007 ¶ 23) (emphasis added). In other words, regardless of whether CCD drive circuits 20A and 20B are driven synchronously by timing generator 28, Matsushima discloses that voltage signals corresponding to the accumulated 8 Petitioner’s citation erroneously includes ¶¶ 34–36 of Exhibit 1069. CCD 18A and CCD 18B sequentially––not output at the same time or simultaneously.” slip op. at 30

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “argues that Matsushima renders obvious this limitation. See id. at 21, 23, 30; PO Resp. 33–34 (“[T]he Petition provides no further explanation why Matsushima renders this limitation obvious.”). In the Reply for the first time, Petitioner asserts that “a POSITA would understand that Matsushima’s disclosure, including its multi-channel architecture, synchronous control of channels, and capturing two images that are scaled versions of the same scene, renders obvious simultaneous acquisition during a frame. Pet. Reply 13 (citing Ex. 1069 ¶ 49). We do not consider Petitioner’s belated argument because it exceeds the proper scope of a reply. A reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding patent owner response. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23. As explained in the Trial Practice Guide, “respond” “does not mean proceed in a new direction with a new approach as compared to the positions taken in a prior filing.” Trial Practice Guide at II.I. (December 2025)(citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.23).9 A reply that raises a new issue or belatedly presents evidence may not be considered. See id. For example, a “[p]etitioner may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g. to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability.” Id. Petitioner clarifies that the Petition does not argue inherency. See Pet.” slip op. at 33

  Patent outcomesUS 7,916,180 mixed
  § 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,916,180
• Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 21, 2026 · IPR2025-00342 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, and 6–11 were not shown unpatentable because the cited combinations did not teach guiding a vehicle to a fixed destination or calculating the claimed optimized path from stored destination data.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Adverse judgmentOther

    “reserves consideration of discretionary issues to the Director. The relief Patent Owner requests is that the panel exercise discretion to terminate these proceedings based on actions taken in related district court proceedings as done in Hulu. Supp. PO Resp. 2. Because the basis for Patent Owner’s requested relief is discretionary, the panel lacks the authority to grant the request. In this regard, the present situation is different from that in Hulu and Sinclair Pharma Limited v. Hydrafacial LLC (IPR2025-00145, Paper 41, Squires, Feb. 12, 2026), cited by Patent Owner. In those cases, the 9 Available at: https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Director_Institution_of _AIA_Trial_Proceedings.pdf (“Director Institution Memo”). Director ordered de-institution, not the panel. The Director has not made such a determination or delegated such authority to the panel in these proceedings. Indeed, as noted above, Patent Owner has already briefed, and the Director has previously ruled on, discretionary denial issues. Paper 10. Accordingly, we decline to vacate our Institution Decision and focus our analysis on the merits of the case as presented by the parties.” slip op. at 8

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We consider the asserted grounds of unpatentability in view of the understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art. In assessing the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “[O]ne or more factors may predominate.” Id. Petitioner asserts that ordinarily skilled artisans “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related subject, and four years of work experience in image processing, automated vehicle control/navigation, or a related field.” Pet. 7. Petitioner’s proposed definition, which Patent Owner does not dispute, appears reasonable and consistent with the asserted prior art and the ’805 patent, and we adopt it here. See generally, PO Resp. Based on this record, and because there is no dispute, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’805 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art, itself, can reflect appropriate level of ordinary skill in art).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Here, in our opinion, Patent Owner has shown that the Specification describes the potential destinations of a vehicle as limited to physically fixed, non-transient objects or features. PO Resp. 18–21. As an initial matter the ’805 patent is titled “Docking Assistant” and explains its purpose for guiding a “vehicle to a stop at a specific location.” Ex. 1001, codes (53), (57), Abstract. We acknowledge that claim 1 does not expressly recite that “at least one potential destination” is a fixed destination or location. See id. at 7:61– 63 (Claim 1 requiring “extracting from the acquired image data positional parameters of at least one potential destination relative to the motor vehicle;”). Yet, in the context of the relatively brief specification, there is no explanation, example, or embodiment which reasonably extends the meaning of “destination” or “potential destination” beyond a fixed location. The ’805 patent describes in the Abstract that [m]any day-to-day driving situations require that an operator of a motor vehicle guide the motor vehicle along a specific course and bring the vehicle to a stop at a specific location, for example in a parking bay or at a loading platform. Id. at code (57) Abstract. The Abstract explains in the next sentence that “[t]o assist a vehicle operator in such situations, a method and a suitable device for implementing this method, include detecting the potential target objects in the image data of an image sensor and identifying the potential target objects as potential destinations in a multi-stage exclusionary method.” Id. (emphasis added). Nowhere in this initial description of the invention, nor anywhere else that Petitioner points to, is there is expansion of the “specific location” or “potential destination” beyond a docking station or parking bay. Of course, the claim is not limited to these examples, as it would be inappropriate to read in such limitations from the Specification. See Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard Inc., 908 F.3d 765, 771 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Acceleration again attempts to import structural limitations into claims lacking those limitations. . . . While the specifications discuss a broadcast channel overlaying a network, the claims at issue are not so limited.”).” slip op. at 14

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Majumder, testifies to the contrary that “[r]ead as an engineer, the ‘805 patent’s present invention is framed around guiding a vehicle to fixed, physical destinations (exemplified by docking stations and similar structures) without fiducials or special markings.” Ex. 2010 ¶ 81. Considering Broggi, Dr. Majumder testifies further that “[a] moving object, such as a preceding car, is not a valid destination under the ‘805 Patent, because it is not a stationary location at which the host vehicle can be guided to stop. To treat such a vehicle as a ‘potential destination’ would lead to collision, not guidance.” Id. ¶ 86. As discussed in our claim construction, given a plain reading of claim 1 in light of the Specification, our understanding of the ’805 patent is consistent with Dr. Majumder’s testimony. We agree that Broggi is directed expressly to the platooning of moving vehicles, and not physically fixed destinations as the proper claim construction requires. Because Broggi does not disclose the use of physically fixed “potential destinations” as required, e.g., in limitations [1.2]–[1.3], and neither Huttenlocher nor Brady are relied upon to overcome this deficiency, Petitioner has not met its burden of persuasion to show by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 would have been obvious over Broggi in view of Huttenlocher and Brady.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 7,336,805 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Markman · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,336,805
• Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00221 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–8 are unpatentable as obvious: claims 1, 2, 5, and 6 over Dateki; claims 3 and 7 over Dateki and Mate; and claims 4 and 8 over Dateki and Chitrapu.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “[w]ould have been someone knowledgeable and familiar with the wireless communications systems that are pertinent to the ’889 patent. That person would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of wireless communication systems or design of similar communication systems. Pet. 18–19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 25). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contention as to the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally, PO Resp. Based on this record, and because there is no dispute, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’889 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art, itself, can reflect appropriate level of ordinary skill in art).” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “do not recite, as Patent Owner interprets it, that the extracted power control information upon which the UE bases its transmission of a signal be “the same” power control information extracted from the control message. PO Resp. 25. Where the claim is clear on its face, we decline to inject “the same” into the construction, that is, words that are not actually in the claim. Yet considering the plain language of claim 1, we mostly agree with Patent Owner’s interpretation, namely that “a transmission power level based on the extracted power control information,” as required in limitation [1.6] includes power control information extracted from “the control message,” in limitation [1.5] having “power control bits for a plurality of UEs” as recited in limitation [1.4]. Ex. 1001, 10:2–19. We understand and interpret the concluding limitation in method-type claim 5 in the same manner as limitation [1.6].” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “do not recite, as Patent Owner interprets it, that the extracted power control information upon which the UE bases its transmission of a signal be “the same” power control information extracted from the control message. PO Resp. 25. Where the claim is clear on its face, we decline to inject “the same” into the construction, that is, words that are not actually in the claim. Yet considering the plain language of claim 1, we mostly agree with Patent Owner’s interpretation, namely that “a transmission power level based on the extracted power control information,” as required in limitation [1.6] includes power control information extracted from “the control message,” in limitation [1.5] having “power control bits for a plurality of UEs” as recited in limitation [1.4]. Ex. 1001, 10:2–19. We understand and interpret the concluding limitation in method-type claim 5 in the same manner as limitation [1.6].” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “where packet transmission is conducted, “the transmission power control information is transmitted via the HS-SCCH as second transmission power control information TPCC at a shorter periodic cycle.” PO Resp. 11 (quoting Ex. 1005, 13:11–13). But in context, after describing transmission of TPCC 1 on F-DPCH, Dateki says “[a]lso, in a case where packet transmission is conducted, the transmission power control information is transmitted via the HS-SCCH as second transmission power control information TPCC at a shorter periodic cycle.” Ex. 1005, 13:8–13 (emphasis added). We find it significant that the word “also” is used by Dateki, here, to describe the relationship of TPCC 1 and TPCC 2 as used together. If the intent was to transmit and use only TPCC 2 on HS-SCCH when data packets are transmitted on HS-PDCH, it would have made more sense to say “alternatively,” and otherwise make clear that only TPCC 2 is transmitted. But they did not. On the other hand, the inventors certainly understood how to explain when TPCC 2 is not transmitted. For example, Dateki makes clear that in certain embodiments TPCC 2 is unnecessary and “transmission power control may be effectively realized without including transmission power control information in the HS-SCCH.” Id. at 14:33–35. The same cannot be said for TPCC 1.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 11,664,889 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,664,889

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.