• Alliance Laundry Systems, LLC v. Payrange LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 19, 2026 · PGR2025-00028 · APJ George R Hoskins · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6 and 8–20 are unpatentable under § 102, § 103, or § 101; claim 7 was not shown unpatentable because the asserted grounds did not establish its limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “1. Legal Standards “Anticipation requires that every limitation of the claim in issue be” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundMixed

    “2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Kinetic Concepts, 688 F.3d at 1368). Further, an assertion of obviousness “cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)); accord In re NuVasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (stating that “conclusory statements” amount to an “insufficient articulation[] of motivation to combine”; “instead, the finding must be supported by a ‘reasoned explanation’” (quoting In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002))); In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“To satisfy its burden of proving obviousness, a petitioner cannot employ mere conclusory statements. The petitioner must instead articulate specific reasoning, based on evidence of record, to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”).” slip op. at 36

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionMixed

    “because the “user interface” limitations merely apply the recited abstract idea on a generic mobile device without meaningfully limiting the abstract idea. See 2025 Guidance, at 4–5. For example, these limitations do not reflect an improvement to the functioning of the mobile device (or any other computer device), and instead are “mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on” the mobile device. Id. Indeed, the ’423 patent specification describes only a generic “swipe-to-pay” feature. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 7:13–33, Figs. 8C, 10A–10D. This supports our conclusion here that the claim 11 limitations do not integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application. See MPEP § 2106.04(d)(1) (“[T]he specification should be evaluated to determine if the disclosure provides sufficient details such that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize the claimed invention as providing an improvement,” and “it must describe” slip op. at 108

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptMixed

    “because the “user interface” limitations merely apply the recited abstract idea on a generic mobile device without meaningfully limiting the abstract idea. See 2025 Guidance, at 4–5. For example, these limitations do not reflect an improvement to the functioning of the mobile device (or any other computer device), and instead are “mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on” the mobile device. Id. Indeed, the ’423 patent specification describes only a generic “swipe-to-pay” feature. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 7:13–33, Figs. 8C, 10A–10D. This supports our conclusion here that the claim 11 limitations do not integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application. See MPEP § 2106.04(d)(1) (“[T]he specification should be evaluated to determine if the disclosure provides sufficient details such that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize the claimed invention as providing an improvement,” and “it must describe” slip op. at 108

  Patent outcomesUS 11,972,423 mixed
  § 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Enfish · Electric Power · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,972,423
• Kubota North America Corporation v. Vermeer Manufacturing CompanyAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 30, 2026 · IPR2025-00381 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10 are unpatentable: claims 1–8 and 10 are anticipated by KR996, and claim 9 is obvious over KR996 and Bares.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “2. Independent Claim 1 Petitioner contends that KR996 both anticipates and renders obvious independent claim 1. Pet. 23–46. To support its arguments, Petitioner identifies certain passages in the cited references and explains the significance of each passage with respect to the corresponding claim limitation. Id. Patent Owner argues that KR996 does not disclose a “loader support” and thus fails to disclose limitations requiring “linkage[s]” and an “actuator” attached to the “loader support.” See PO Resp. 37–40; PO Sur-reply 20. In addition, Patent Owner presents evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness. See PO Resp. 51–68; PO Sur-reply 23–27. We address each issue in turn. a. The Loader Support Limitations Claim 1 recites, in relevant part, “[1.3] a loader support having a first side and a second side . . . ; [1.5] a first linkage connected to the first side of the loader support . . . ; [1.6] a second linkage connected to the first side of the loader support . . . ; [1.7] a second actuator for raising the loader, the second actuator being connected to the loader support.” Ex. 1001, 6:56, 6:60–7:1 (collectively, the “loader support limitations”). As to the recitation of “a loader support having a first side and a second side,” Petitioner provides the following annotated version of Figure 9 of KR996: Pet. 30. In the annotated version of Figure 9 of KR996 above, Petitioner added (1) red text and arrows identifying a “loader support,” a “first side of loader support,” and a “second side of loader support” and (2) blue text identifying a “loader.” Id. Petitioner adds that “the loader support includes the portions of the frame of the KR996 vehicle that when in operation, support the attached loader unit 40 having loader arms of the booms 44.” Pet. 29. Petitioner also states that “KR996’s loader support includes the bracket to which the link 45 and boom cylinder 46 attach, as well as the frame protrusion, connected to the bracket, to which the forward link attaches.” Id. (citing Velinsky Pet. Decl. ¶ 72).” slip op. at 32

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “2. Dependent Claim 9 Petitioner contends that KR996, modified based on Bares, satisfies the additional limitations of claim 9. Pet. 60–69. To support its arguments, Petitioner identifies certain passages in the cited references and explains the significance of each passage with respect to the corresponding claim limitation. Id. Petitioner also articulates reasons to combine the relied-upon aspects of KR996 and Bares and explains why there would have been a reasonable expectation of success. Pet. 62–65. Patent Owner argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have had reason to combine KR996 and Bares. See PO Resp. 41–50; PO Sur-reply 22–23. Patent Owner also relies on its prior arguments that KR996 does not disclose the “loader support” limitations in independent claim 1. See PO Resp. 50. In addition, Patent Owner relies on the same evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness discussed above. See PO Resp. 51–68; PO Sur-reply 21–27. We address each issue in turn. a. The Reasons to Combine KR996 and Bares Petitioner presents reasons why one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined KR996 and Bares and why the proposed combination would have had a reasonable expectation of success. See Pet. 62–65; Velinsky Pet. Decl. ¶¶ 157–162. After discussing why KR996 and Bares are analogous art to the claimed invention, Petitioner states that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Bares with KR996 to produce a predictable and beneficial configuration of a tracked vehicle” in that “[t]he simple substitution of Bares’ track assembly for the wheels in the KR996 vehicle would have been predictable with a reasonable expectation of success that both KR996 and Bares relate to similar vehicle types with a similar mainframe having a drive mechanism attached thereto.” Pet. 63 (citing Velinsky Pet. Decl. ¶¶ 158–162). Petitioner asserts that “designing this vehicle type with a drive” slip op. at 64

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “probative and cogent evidence in the record” and “may often establish that an invention appearing to have been obvious in light of the prior art was not.” Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Thus, notwithstanding what the teachings of the prior art would have suggested to one skilled in the art, secondary considerations (objective evidence of non-obviousness) may lead to a conclusion that the challenged claims would not have been obvious. In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1471–72 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Our obviousness analysis includes consideration and weighing of Patent Owner’s objective indicia of non-obviousness. In order to accord substantial weight to secondary considerations in an obviousness analysis, “the evidence of secondary considerations must have a ‘nexus’ to the claims, i.e., there must be ‘a legally and factually sufficient connection’ between the evidence and the patented invention.” Henny Penny Corp. v. Frymaster LLC, 938 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); Quanergy Sys., Inc. v. Velodyne Lidar USA, Inc., 24 F.4th 1406, 1417 (Fed. Cir. 2022). Although the patent owner bears the initial burden of proving a nexus (WMS Gaming Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999)), a presumption of nexus may be appropriate if the patent owner shows “the asserted objective evidence is tied to a specific product and that product ‘embodies the claimed features, and is coextensive with them.’” Polaris Indus, Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (emphasis added)); Quanergy, 24 F.4th at 1417. On the other hand, “[w]hen the [product] is not coextensive with the patented invention—for example, if the patented invention is only a component of a commercially successful machine or process,” the patent owner is not entitled to a presumption of nexus. Demaco, 851 F.2d at 1392. A patent owner may establish nexus, either through (1) the use of a rebuttable presumption that arises when certain conditions are met or (2) a direct showing of nexus. In the first, a patent owner may rely on a rebuttable presumption of nexus as follows:” slip op. at 43

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part

    “2. Analysis “The moving party has the burden of proof to establish that it is entitled to the requested relief.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.20. Exhibit 1005 is an English language translation of Korean Patent No. 10-1041996. Exhibit 1006 is an English language translation of Japanese document JP2004-17705A. Exhibit 1014 is an English language translation of Korean Patent No. 10-1023528. A Certification of Translation signed by Takashi Maeshiro of HC Language Solutions, Inc., accompanies each of Exhibits 1005, 1006, and 1014. Ex. 1005 at 28; Ex. 1006 at 16; Ex. 1014 at 16. Each Certification of Translation is worded substantially the same except for the references to the document at issue and the source language being either Korean or Japanese. Exhibit 1005’s Certification of Translation, for example, states: I, Takashi Maeshiro, on behalf of HC Language Solutions, Inc., do solemnly and sincerely declare, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that the attached text represents a translation of Korean Patent No. 10-1041996, that the translation was performed by HC Language Solutions, Inc., and that the translation represents a true, correct, and faithful translation from Korean to English in a form that reflects the intention and meaning of the original text. I hereby declare that all statements made herein of my own knowledge are true and that all statements made on information and belief are believed to be true; and further that these statements were made with the knowledge that willful false statements and the like so made are punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both, under Section 1001 of Title 18 of the United States Code. Ex. 1005 at 28 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 11,465,891 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 11,465,891
• Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. v. California Institute Of TechnologyNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 23, 2026 · IPR2024-01451 · APJ Tawen Chang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–19 were not shown unpatentable: Larson did not establish the claimed detection in a single sample volume, and the asserted obviousness combinations did not cure the deficiencies.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner states that, “[f]or purposes of this IPR proceeding, PO does not contest Petitioner’s description of qualifications for a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA) set forth [above].” PO Resp. 23. In view of the above, and because Petitioner’s uncontested description of one of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable and consistent with the ’921 patent and the cited art, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a POSA for purposes of this Decision, except that we replace the phrase “at least a year of experience in quantitative and/or dPCR and fluorescence-based analyte detection” with “around a year of experience in quantitative and/or dPCR and fluorescence-based analyte detection.” Pet. 9 (emphasis added).13” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We begin with “the context in which a term is used in the asserted claim,” which can be “highly instructive.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. In this case, claim 1 recites that the claimed assay is “capable of unambiguously detecting the presence or absence of each of said at least M analytes, in any combination of presence or absence, in a single sample volume, . . . wherein the analytes are amplified in the single sample 15 In this regard, we note that Petitioner’s claim construction position is not predicated on the collection of droplets being reconstituted into its original, pre-partition form prior to amplification; rather, the droplets remain compartmentalized from each other in the PCR thermal cycling tube. Tr. 65:21–66:9 (Petitioner’s counsel explaining that the droplets do not combine in the PCR thermal cycling tube but, rather, are “suspended in an immiscible fluid and analyzed en masse”). indicates that the first instance of single sample volume, i.e., the single sample volume in which the presence or absence of each M analytes are to be detected, is the antecedent basis for the second instance of “single sample volume,” i.e., the single sample volume in which the analytes are amplified. Thus, as the parties appear to agree, the single sample volume in which amplification takes places must be the same single sample volume in which the presence or absence of analytes are to be detected. We are not persuaded that, when accorded its plain and ordinary meaning, a single sample volume divided into a collection of droplets would be considered the “same” single sample volume prior to its partition.” slip op. at 17

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “With respect to the limitation, “wherein the analytes are amplified in the single sample volume,” Petitioner asserts that “Larson discloses PCR assays that amplify target polynucleotide in a single sample volume, specifically a portion of the reaction mixture that is subsequently partitioned into droplets.” Pet. 31 (emphasis added). There is no dispute that the amplification of the analytes in Larson occurs in the droplets. Larson ¶¶ 6–7 (explaining that “[d]igital PCR (dPCR) is an alternative quantitation method in which dilute sample are divided into many separate reactions” and that “[t]he template is amplified in the droplet for detection”) (emphasis added). Because the claims require that amplification of the analytes be in the same sample volume in which the at least M analytes, in any combination of presence or absence, is unambiguously detected, and because the pre-partition single sample volume is not the same single sample volume as the collection of droplets after partition under our claim construction set forth above, we find Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of evidence, that claims 1–10 and 13–19 are anticipated by Larson.17 Tr. 68:12–69:14 (Petitioner’s counsel” slip op. at 27

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Although we agree with Petitioner that Larson contemplates scenarios in which droplets may contain more than one target molecule and does not require the exclusion of such multiple occupancy droplets in all embodiments, we are nevertheless not persuaded Petitioner has shown, based on a preponderance of evidence, that Larson renders obvious an assay capable of unambiguously detecting, in such multiple occupancy droplets, the presence or absence of each of at least M analytes, in any combination of presence or absence, when M is greater than F and F is at least 2.” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 11,827,921 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,827,921
• Fluidmaster, Inc. v. Danco, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 5, 2026 · IPR2024-00634 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 8–13, 15, 16, and 19–24 are unpatentable over Brown and Ho, with claims 16 and 19 also relying on the Quick Connection Art; the remaining challenged claims were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner proposes that: A [person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”)] in the field to which the ’105 Patent is directed would have had at least a Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical engineering or a related field or, as a substitute, at least two years of work or” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “of “integrally molded with” as “molded together as a single structure.” Paper 21, 15.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Patent Owner responds that: a POSITA would not have been motivated to make the proposed modification, nor does the Petition include any analysis regarding why a POSITA would be motivated to move from a vertical extended portion to a radial extended portion. Indeed, a radial extended portion is directly counter to the stated goals of Brown (e.g., reducing noise caused by turbulence), at least insofar as it introduces another sudden directional change into the fluid flow system. PO Resp. 58–59 (citing Ex. 2013 ¶ 242).” slip op. at 32

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateEntitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner argues that the ’105 patent claims were “fully supported as of the filing date of at least the ’606 Application . . . March 11, 2004” because the ’606 Application discloses regulating water flow and a POSITA would know that appropriate devices for regulating water flow includes nonadjustable waterflow restrictors. PO Resp. 63–65; PO Sur-reply 26–29. Patent Owner’s argument is persuasive. The ’606 Application discloses: [W]hen the toilet fill valve 100 is open and water flows from the water inlet 103 to the water outlets 106 and into a toilet tank, an amount of water is also supplied to the bowl fill valve inlet 113 that flows through the bowl fill valve 109 and out the bowl fill valve outlet 116. By virtue of the manual setting of handle 119 of the bowl fill valve 109, the flow of water through the bowl fill valve 109 is regulated. In this manner, the flow of water is regulated so that enough water flows out of the bowl fill valve 109 to fill a toilet bowl without wasting any water down a drain. seen from the passage above, the ’606 Application discloses regulating an amount of water supplied to a toilet bowl using a valve (i.e., a water flow regulator). Ex. 2013 ¶ 288. Further, the ’606 Application states: The bowl fill valve 109 may be, for example, a ball valve, a gate valve, a globe valve, a plug valve, a diaphragm valve, a butterfly valve, a needle valve, a sliding gate, a quick turn valve, a knife valve or any other appropriate type of valve as can be appreciated by those with ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 42

  Patent outcomesUS 9,103,105 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,103,105
• Samsung Display Co., Ltd. v. Pictiva Displays International Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 9, 2026 · IPR2024-01095 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 2, 4, 9–12, and 17 are unpatentable under § 103 because the prior-art combinations teach the claimed features and have adequate motivation and reasonable expectation of success.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a Bachelor’s degree in chemistry, physics, or a comparable field of study, and at least three years of research or industrial experience with organic optoelectronic light-emitting devices.” Pet. 10. Further, “[a]n individual with additional education could have less research or industrial experience and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s formulation. See generally PO Resp. We adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed definition because it is consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art. See, e.g., Ex. 1006, code (57); Ex. 1011, code (57).” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “electron-hopping dopant. See In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The prior art’s mere disclosure of more than one alternative does not constitute a teaching away from . . . alternatives because such disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed.”). As Petitioner explains, “Liq acts as an n-dopant in Ma,” which “increases ETL conductivity.” Pet. Reply 10. Patent Owner does not contest that Liq acts as an n-dopant in Ma. See Pet. Reply 30. Thus, Petitioner’s proposed combinations “substitute one known n-dopant for another to further the same goal of improving ETL conductivity.” Pet. Reply 10. Next, Patent Owner faults Petitioner for failing to show that using Ma’s Liq dopant in Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s ETL would result in lower diffusion or higher efficiencies as compared to Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s preferred n-dopants, which included cesium, barium, or lithium fluoride. PO Resp. 31–35; see PO Sur-reply 4–5. We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument because Petitioner does not need to show that Ma’s Liq n-dopant “was an improvement in a categorical sense” over Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s n-dopants, so long as Ma’s n-dopant was known and one skilled in the art would understand that implementing it had advantages. See Intel Corp. v. Pact XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted); In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[O]ur case law does not require that a particular combination must be the preferred, or the most desirable, combination described in the prior art.”). Petitioner does not assert skilled artisans would have used Liq because it was a superior to Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s preferred dopants, but because doping ETLs with Liq had known benefits including lower driving voltage and enhanced power efficiency from enhanced carrier injection increased transport conductivity, as compared to an undoped device. Pet. 37 (citing Ex. 1010, 813). That other potentially suitable or even superior n-dopants were also known does not make Liq nonobvious. Given Liq’s benefits outlined above, Petitioner has articulated sufficient reasoning with rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion that its proffered combination of Ma’s known dopant in Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s device would have been obvious to one skilled in the art. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).” slip op. at 12

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “1. Whether Ma Qualifies as a Prior Art Printed Publication First, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner has not demonstrated that Ma was publicly accessible in August 2008 so as to qualify as prior art. PO 11 As Petitioner notes, the district court adopted a claim construction requiring only “one or more wavelengths” in the infrared-to-UV spectrum. PO Resp. 26 (citing Ex. 2031, 47–48). Resp. 16–24. We addressed this same issue in our Final Written Decision in IPR2024-01094. IPR2024-01094, Paper 42 at 9–13. As we explained there, Ma qualifies as prior art printed publication because the record evidence supports what Ma says on its face—that it was published online on August 29, 2008 by an Elsevier, an established publisher, in Synthetic Metals, which is a reputable journal. Id. For the same reason explained in IPR2024-01094, we agree with Petitioner that Ma qualifies as a prior art printed publication.” slip op. at 10

  Patent outcomesUS 11,828,425 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 11,828,425
• Samsung Display Co., Ltd. v. Pictiva Displays International Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 22, 2026 · IPR2024-01094 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 6, and 8–14 are unpatentable as obvious over Ma; claims 3 and 4 were not shown unpatentable over Werner.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends: A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) at the time of the alleged invention of the ’223 patent would have had a university degree in chemistry and additional expertise or a second university degree in the field of electrical engineering, particularly optoelectronics, or alternatively a university degree in electrical engineering and additional expertise or a second university degree in the field of chemistry. The person of ordinary skill in the art has spent several years studying the structure and function of organic optoelectronic components, in particular OLEDs, and has detailed knowledge of the chemical structure of light-emitting organic layers and the transport of charge carriers to these layers. In this respect, the person of ordinary skill in the art works at the interface between electrical engineering/physics (charge carrier transport and light emission processes in optoelectronic components) and chemistry, in particular organic chemistry (materials and layer stack combinations suitable). Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 46–47). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contention. See generally Resp. Neither party indicates that the result would change depending on the definition selected. We adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed definition, because it is consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art references. See Ex. 1005, (code 57); Ex. 1007, 8107 (abstracts of the references asserted in the patentability challenges).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, claim terms generally are given their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been understood by the ordinarily skilled artisan at the time of the invention and within the context of the entire patent disclosure. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). We construe claim terms only as relevant to the parties’ contentions and only to the extent necessary to resolve the issues in dispute. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Neither party indicates that an express construction for any claim term is necessary to resolve the disputes at hand. Pet. 15; see generally Resp. On this record, we determine that no claim term requires express construction for purposes of this Decision. In our analysis of the challenges, however, we discuss the meaning of the terms “metal complex” and “central metal atom,” which appear in claim 1 (Ex. 1001, 19:19–20) to the extent necessary to resolve Patent Owner’s contention that Petitioner fails to establish that Ma invalidates claim 1. See Resp. 53, 56–58.” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “Whether Ma qualifies as a “printed publication” involves an inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding the reference’s disclosure to members of the public. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004). A reference is considered “publicly accessible” upon a satisfactory showing that the document has been “disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence[] can locate it.” Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. ITC, 545 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29, 10– 11 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “Based on the information presented, we find Petitioner has the better position. Patent Owner admits that joint vaporization means “two materials vaporize together.” Reply 21 (quoting Resp. 54). As Petitioner argues, “This is what Ma discloses.” Id. We agree with Petitioner that Ma describes a “two-component” electron transport layer having a “thickness with one value.” Id.; see Ex. 1007, 811 (reporting a “co-deposited” application of “BPhen:LiQ” that is “50 nm thick”). Ma’s disclosure, thereby, strongly “indicates that the two components were vaporized together––as opposed to creating a ‘macroscopically homogenous form’” prepared by sequentially vaporizing the individual components as Patent Owner “hypothesizes.” Reply 21 (citing Ex. 1020 ¶¶ 42–44; Ex. 2041 ¶¶ 155–157); see Resp. 54– 55; see also Ex. 1007, 811 (Ma’s description of its device fabrication, appearing in the third paragraph of the experiments section). Petitioner further advances evidence that “[p]reparing a layer that is ‘macroscopically homogeneous’ but potentially microscopically heterogeneous,” as Patent Owner postulates, “would introduce excessive variability and render the data noncomparable and unreliable, thus undermining the experiment’s purpose.” Reply 21 (citing Ex. 1020 ¶ 44); see Resp. 54–55. Patent Owner presents no counterargument or evidence that is persuasive to undercut Petitioner’s reasoning or evidence on that point. See Sur-reply 19–22. Petitioner also argues that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have recognized “that vaporizing materials together would best achieve Ma’s objective of assessing the current density using different Liq doping percentages.” Reply 22 (citing Ex. 1007, 811; Ex. 1020 ¶ 51). Here again, Petitioner’s evidence on point stands uncontested. See Sur-reply 19–22 (declining to contest that point). On this record, therefore, we agree with Petitioner that, as to the relevant disclosure in Ma, “the most natural interpretation of ‘co-deposition’ for forming a layer, particularly when there is nothing to indicate that the materials” are “vaporized sequentially,” is that the materials are co-deposited by joint vaporization. Reply 22 (citing Ex. 1020 ¶ 46–51). We further agree that, “[u]nder a preponderance standard, Ma’s disclosures are sufficient to render joint vaporization at least obvious.” Id. For the above reasons, we determine that Petitioner demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that Ma discloses joint vaporization as required by the challenged claims.” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 8,558,223 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,558,223
• Samsung Display Co., Ltd. v. Pictiva Displays International Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 22, 2026 · IPR2024-01093 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–16 are unpatentable: claims 1–13 and 15–16 on anticipation and obviousness grounds, and claim 14 on obviousness over Choulis.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the alleged invention of the ’164 patent would have had a Bachelor’s degree in chemistry, physics, or a comparable field of study, and at least three years of research or industrial experience with organic optoelectronic light-emitting devices. An individual with additional education could have less research or industrial experience and vice versa. Pet. 12. Patent Owner repeatedly refers to “a POSITA” without addressing the definition of that term or contesting Petitioner’s proposed definition. See Resp. 1, 2 n.1, 3, 8, 9, 15–21, 23, 26, 29, 32–33, 35, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44–49, 51–57, 61, 62 (bare references to “a POSITA”). Neither party indicates that the ultimate result on patentability would change depending on the definition selected. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition, which is not contested, because it is consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art. See Ex. 1004, (code 57); Ex. 1006, code (57); Ex. 1008, code (57); Ex. 1009, code (57) (abstracts of the references asserted in the patentability challenges).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundTerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “because no information raised during the trial phase of this review changes the calculus: First and foremost, the plain terms of claim 1 include no language from which we reasonably can impose limits on the phrase “matrix material” as urged by Patent Owner. In addition, the specification includes no special definition of that phrase that supports importing Patent Owner’s proposed narrowing limitation into the claim. Furthermore, we are directed to no disclaimer of claim scope during patent prosecution that would support Patent Owner’s twice-rejected argument that the phrase “matrix material” in claim 1 excludes embedded dopants and dispersed agglomerations. And the extrinsic evidence advanced by Patent Owner during this review is ineffective to override the clear interpretation of “matrix material” that is established by the intrinsic evidence. Reply 1–7.10” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “We find that Petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that Choulis anticipates claim 13. We agree with Petitioner, in that regard, that Choulis explicitly teaches “using spin-coating as a method for depositing materials, which involves a simultaneous application process” as required by claim 13. Reply 16 (citing Pet. 40–41; Ex. 1044 ¶ 45).16 We 15 Petitioner raises Djobo as a background reference supporting that Choulis anticipates deposition of PVK by evaporation. Pet. 41. Patent Owner counters that Djobo, to the contrary, shows that Choulis does not teach deposition of PVK by evaporation. Resp. 48. In other words, both parties cite Djobo in connection with the ground based on anticipation by Choulis. Against that backdrop, we determine that Patent Owner waives any argument that Petitioner improperly cites Djobo as a background reference in support of the anticipation challenge, which is based on Choulis alone. Resp. 48 (nowhere asserting that the challenge is deficient on that basis). That waiver arises because no argument, in that regard, is raised in Patent Owner’s Response see Inst. Dec. 34 (“The Board shall deemed waived any issue not raised by Patent Owner in a timely response to the Petition . . . .”). 16 Patent Owner’s statement that “spin coating tends to cause phase separation” is not developed adequately on this record and, therefore, is further agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner “has not contested this point.” Resp. 48. “Therefore, there is no genuine dispute regarding the unpatentability of claim 13,” although Patent Owner raises “arguments concerning evaporation, which is a distinct process from spin-coating” relevant to the additional limitations of claim 14. Reply 16. We determine that Petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that Choulis anticipates claim 13. Patent Owner, however, has the better position on whether Choulis anticipates claim 14, which “includes the requirement of applying matrix materials via evaporation coating.” Reply 16. Petitioner seems to abandon that challenge in the Reply by raising arguments that appear, on this record, to bear exclusively on whether the subject matter of claim 14 would have been obvious over Choulis.17 Id. at 16–17. Those arguments are insufficient to counter Patent Owner’s reasons why Choulis does not anticipate the “evaporation coating” limitation of claim 14. Compare id., with Resp. 48. On this record, therefore, we determine that Petitioner does not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Choulis anticipates claim 14. unpersuasive to persuade us “that Choulis does not have three matrix materials.” Sur-reply 15. That argument runs counter to Choulis’s explicit, intrinsic disclosures, which illustrate (Ex. 1004, Fig. 4) and describe (id. ¶ 30) an organic light emitting layer composed of three matrix materials. See Pet. 24–25 (citing Ex. 1004, Fig. 4, ¶ 30); see also Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 85–88 (persuasive declaration testimony of Dr. Holmes, cited at Pet. 24–25). 17 There is some confusion on this point, given that both parties sometimes collapse, into a single argument, whether Choulis anticipates or renders obvious claim 1. Compare Resp. 48, with Reply 16–17.” slip op. at 35

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “On this record, therefore, we determine that Choulis, at minimum, suggests that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have recognized PMMA as a suitable alternative to PVK in Choulis’s Figure 4 embodiment, notwithstanding any differences raised by Patent Owner. Ex. 1004 ¶ 44. Patent Owner’s argument that no disclosure in Choulis suggests that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have found it desirable to use PMMA in place of PVK in Choulis’s devices” misses the mark, where Choulis includes both PMMA and PVK in lists of materials suitable for use as host or matrix materials. Resp. 38; Ex. 1004 ¶ 44. “Our caselaw is clear. It’s not necessary to show that a combination is ‘the best option, only that it is a suitable option.’” Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 800 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Even if Choulis does not expressly disclose substituting PMMA for PVK in the Figure 4 embodiment, “an ordinarily skilled artisan would have found it obvious to make that substitution.” Reply 10 (citing Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 100; Ex. 1044 ¶ 23)). The suggestion for that substitution is set forth unambiguously in Choulis’s listing of both “PVK” and “PMMA” as materials suitable for use as a first “host” material in Choulis’s organic functional layer; that is, “the light emitting layer” that is “described above” in Figure 4. Ex. 1004 ¶ 44. ii. Alternative Reasoning for Replacing PVK with PMMA Patent Owner counterargues that using PPMA in place of PVK would have been understood to “upset the hole and electron balance,” as well as “affect hole-charge recombination,” and “degrade the performance of the resulting OLED system.” Resp. 37. Petitioner responds with evidence that “it would have been a routine task for” an ordinarily skilled artisan “to optimize the composition of each component within the light-emitting layer to achieve the desired charge balance.” Reply 11 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 24). Petitioner’s response brings to light a second reason why an ordinarily” slip op. at 40

  Patent outcomesUS 8,723,164 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,723,164
• Samsung Display Co., Ltd. v. Pictiva Displays International Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 22, 2026 · IPR2024-01095 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 2, 4, 9–12, and 17 are unpatentable under § 103 over the Diekmann- and Suzuki-based combinations with the respective secondary references.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “had a Bachelor’s degree in chemistry, physics, or a comparable field of study, and at least three years of research or industrial experience with organic optoelectronic light-emitting devices.” Pet. 10. Further, “[a]n individual with additional education could have less research or industrial experience and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s formulation. See generally PO Resp. We adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed definition because it is consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art. See, e.g., Ex. 1006, code (57); Ex. 1011, code (57).” slip op. at 7

  • BurdenUnpatentable

    “III. OBVIOUSNESS ANALYSIS Petitioner contends that claims 2, 4, 9–12, and 17 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103. For the reasons explained below, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of evidence that these claims are unpatentable over the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 7

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “Resp. 16–24. We addressed this same issue in our Final Written Decision in IPR2024-01094. IPR2024-01094, Paper 42 at 9–13. As we explained there, Ma qualifies as prior art printed publication because the record evidence supports what Ma says on its face—that it was published online on August 29, 2008 by an Elsevier, an established publisher, in Synthetic Metals, which is a reputable journal. Id. For the same reason explained in IPR2024-01094, we agree with Petitioner that Ma qualifies as a prior art printed publication.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “additional feature in claims 2 and 12, Patent Owner raises a number of challenges to Petitioner’s asserted rationale for combining Ma. See PO Resp. 27–47. First, Patent Owner asserts that skilled artisans would not have used Ma’s Liq dopant in Diekmann/Suzuki because both employ electron-donor dopants that operate differently from Liq’s electron-hopping dopant. Id. at 28–31. We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument because it highlights a difference in the references’ dopants without identifying any incompatibility. Even if Diekmann and Suzuki teach electron-donor type ndopants as Patent Owner asserts, neither precludes or disparages Ma’s electron-hopping dopant. See In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The prior art’s mere disclosure of more than one alternative does not constitute a teaching away from . . . alternatives because such disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed.”). As Petitioner explains, “Liq acts as an n-dopant in Ma,” which “increases ETL conductivity.” Pet. Reply 10. Patent Owner does not contest that Liq acts as an n-dopant in Ma. See Pet. Reply 30. Thus, Petitioner’s proposed combinations “substitute one known n-dopant for another to further the same goal of improving ETL conductivity.” Pet. Reply 10. Next, Patent Owner faults Petitioner for failing to show that using Ma’s Liq dopant in Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s ETL would result in lower diffusion or higher efficiencies as compared to Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s preferred n-dopants, which included cesium, barium, or lithium fluoride. PO Resp. 31–35; see PO Sur-reply 4–5. We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument because Petitioner does not need to show that Ma’s Liq n-dopant “was an improvement in a categorical sense” over Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s n-dopants, so long as Ma’s n-dopant was known and one skilled in the art would understand that implementing it had advantages. See Intel Corp. v. Pact XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted); In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[O]ur case law does not require that a particular combination must be the preferred, or the most desirable, combination described in the prior art.”). Petitioner does not assert skilled artisans would have used Liq because it was a superior to Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s preferred dopants, but because doping ETLs with Liq had known benefits including lower driving voltage and enhanced power efficiency from enhanced carrier injection increased transport conductivity, as compared to an undoped device. Pet. 37 (citing Ex. 1010, 813). That other potentially suitable or even superior n-dopants were also known does not make Liq nonobvious. Given Liq’s benefits outlined above, Petitioner has articulated sufficient reasoning with rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion that its proffered combination of Ma’s known dopant in Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s device would have been obvious to one skilled in the art. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).” slip op. at 11

  Patent outcomesUS 11,828,425 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 11,828,425
• Fluidmaster, Inc. v. Danco, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 15, 2025 · IPR2024-00633 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 7–15, 19, and 20 are unpatentable over Brown and Ho; claims 2–6 and 16–18 were not shown unpatentable on the asserted grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Brown’s adapter tube 23 (i.e., the extended portion) does not extend radially from a longitudinal axis of valve assembly 13 (i.e., the toilet fill valve). Ex. 1021, Fig. 1. Mr. Jobin testifies that a POSITA would not be motivated to move adapter tube 23 from a vertical position to a radial position because “a radial extended portion is directly counter to the stated goals of Brown (e.g., reducing noise caused by turbulence), at least insofar system.” Ex. 2013 ¶ 251; see Ex. 1021, 1:9–62. Patent Owner’s argument is persuasive. Petitioner’s analysis and Dr. Cameron’s testimony is conclusory and does not sufficiently explain why a POSITA would be motivated to make the proposed modification to Brown. For example, Petitioner does not sufficiently explain how such a modification would result in a more compact toilet fill valve system that could be adapted to fit in more toilet tank designs. Further, neither Petitioner nor Dr. Cameron sufficiently address Mr. Jobin’s testimony regarding Brown’s desire for a quieter toilet. See Pet. Reply 23; Ex. 1036 ¶ 84. Petitioner fails to meet its burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 2 is unpatentable over Brown and Ho.” slip op. at 35

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateEntitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner

    “description is an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a POSA. Using this test, the invention must be described in a manner sufficient to demonstrate that the inventor actually invented the claimed invention. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010). “One shows that one is ‘in possession’ of the invention by describing the invention, with all its claimed limitations, not that which makes it obvious.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Written description is a question of fact judged as of the relevant filing date. Falko–Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006). An ipsis verbis disclosure, however, is not necessary to satisfy the written description requirement. Vas–Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The disclosure need only reasonably convey to a POSA that the inventor had possession of the subject matter in question, even if every nuance of the claims is not explicitly described in the specification. Id.; see Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. Patent Owner argues that the ’993 patent claims were “fully supported as of the filing date of at least the ’606 Application . . . March 11, 2004” because the ’606 Application discloses regulating water flow and a POSITA would know that appropriate devices for regulating water flow includes nonadjustable waterflow restrictors. PO Resp. 68; PO Sur-reply 28–30. Patent Owner’s argument is persuasive. The ’606 Application discloses: [W]hen the toilet fill valve 100 is open and water flows from the water inlet 103 to the water outlets 106 and into a toilet tank, an amount of water is also supplied to the bowl fill valve inlet 113 that flows through the bowl fill valve 109 and out the bowl fill valve outlet 116. By virtue of the manual setting of handle 119 valve 109 is regulated. In this manner, the flow of water is regulated so that enough water flows out of the bowl fill valve 109 to fill a toilet bowl without wasting any water down a drain. Ex. 1012, 47, ¶ 8 (emphasis added); see also Ex. 1001, 2:28–39. As can be seen from the passage above, the ’606 Application discloses regulating an amount of water supplied to a toilet bowl using a valve (i.e., a water flow regulator). Ex. 2013 ¶ 288.” slip op. at 48

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference not prior artNot shown unpatentable

    “1. Analysis of Claims 1–18 Schuster is available as prior art if the ’993 patent is only entitled to its January 27, 2014, filing date and not entitled to claim priority to earlier filing dates of the parent applications. On its face, the ’993 patent claims priority to a number of earlier parent applications, including Application No. 12/786,904 (the ’904 Application) filed May 25, 2010, and the Application code 63. Petitioner contends that the ’993 patent is not entitled to claim priority to the filing date of the earlier parent applications, and, thus, Schuster, a parent application of the ’993 patent, is available as prior art.15 Pet. 91–92. Petitioner alleges that the earlier parent applications, specifically Application No. 12/786,904 (the ’904 Application), do not provide written description support for the ’993 patent’s claim term “water flow regulator.” According to Petitioner, “water flow regulator” encompasses both adjustable devices for restricting the flow of water (i.e., valves) and fixed devices for restricting the flow of water (i.e., restrictors). Pet. 15. Petitioner contends that the ’904 Application does not provide support for water flow restrictors and, thus, does not provide support for the broader claim term water flow regulators. Id. at 14–15, 91–92. Petitioner argues that only adjustable water flow devices (i.e., valves) are supported by the ’904 Application. Id. Petitioner, thus, asserts that earliest effective filing date of the ’993 patent’s claims is the filing date of its application, January 27, 2014. Id. at 92. To be entitled to claim the benefit of an earlier filing date under 35 U.S.C. § 120 each application in the priority chain must comply with the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). See Hollmer v. 14 The parties do not dispute that the ’993 patent and the earlier parent applications, including the ’904 Application and the ’606 Application, have the same pertinent portions of their specifications. See PO Resp. 71, n.16; Ex. 1004 ¶ 324. 15 Schuster issued on January 31, 2012, from Application No. 12/786,904, filed on May 25, 2010. Ex. 1029, code (21), (22), (45). Schuster, thus, issued more than one year prior to January 27, 2014.” slip op. at 46

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentable

    “2. Analysis of Claims 19 and 20 Claim 19 depends from claim 14 and additionally recites, “wherein the waterflow regulator comprises an adjustable water flow regulator that is configured to adjust the flow rate of the second portion of the water based at least in part on a setting of the adjustable water flow regulator.” Ex. 1001, 12:16–20. Claim 20 depends from claim 14 and recites the same additional limitation. Id. at 12:21–24. Claims 19 and 20, thus, require the water flow regulator to be an adjustable water flow regulator. Petitioner indicates that the earlier parent applications provide written description support for an adjustable water flow regulator. Pet. 91 (“[T]he ’904 application specification makes it clear that the adjustability of the bowl fill valve is a desirable and essential feature of the invention”); PO Surreply 28. Accordingly, Petitioner fails to meet its burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 19 and 20 are unpatentable over Schuster.” slip op. at 50

  Patent outcomesUS 9,139,993 mixed
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,139,993
• Advancell Pty Ltd. v. Sciencons As And Artbio, Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Nov 6, 2025 · PGR2025-00040 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · PGR · Institution

  The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–9, 11–33, and 35–38 on all petition grounds, finding it more likely than not that Hassfjell-Hoff anticipates at least claim 1.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), a post-grant review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . demonstrate[s] that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Post-grant review is available for patents that issue from applications that at one point contained at least one claim with an effective filing date on or after March 16, 2013. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), §§ 3(n)(1), 6(f)(2)(A). After considering the briefing and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has shown that the ’437 patent is eligible for post-grant review and that it is more likely than not that at least one challenged claim of the ’437 patent is unpatentable under § 324(a). Accordingly, we institute a post-grant review of all challenged claims of the ’437 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther

    “Here, Patentee Sciencons AS filed a statutory disclaimer of claims 10 and 34 of the ’437 patent. Ex. 2001; Prelim. Resp. 43. Based on our review of Exhibit 2001 and the Office’s public records, we find that the disclaimer of claims 10 and 34 complies with the above-listed requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a). Accordingly, we treat claims 10 and 34 as having never been part of the ’437 patent. See Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“This court has interpreted the term ‘considered as part of the original patent’ in [35 U.S.C.] § 253 to mean that the patent is treated as though the disclaimed claims never existed.”). Because post-grant review cannot be instituted based on disclaimed claims, claims 10 and 34 are outside the scope of this proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.207(e) (“No post-grant review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”); General Elec. Co. v. United Techs. Corp., IPR2017-00491, Paper 9 (PTAB July 6, 2017) (precedential) (denying institution in view of a statutory disclaimer of all the challenged claims). Thus, we confine our analysis in this Decision to claims 1–9, 11–33, and 35– 38, the remaining challenged claims that have not been disclaimed.” slip op. at 6

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityGranted

    “Sciencons AS also states that ARTBIO, Inc. is responsible for defending the ’437 patent in this proceeding and requests that ARTBIO, Inc. be included in the caption for this proceeding.2 Paper 4, 1. ARTBIO, Inc. has signed powers of attorney appointing the same practitioners that were appointed by Sciencons AS to transact all business associated with the instant post-grant review review of the ’437 patent. See Paper 3. To date, no objection has been raised to Patent Owner’s request. Given Sciencons AS’s representation that ARTBIO, Inc. is currently the exclusive licensee of the ’437 patent and is responsible for defending the ’437 patent, we grant Sciencons AS’s unopposed request that ARTBIO, Inc. be included in the caption. For convenience we refer to Sciencons AS and the purported exclusive licensee ARTBIO, Inc. collectively as “Patent Owner.” As stated supra, to the extent any party disputes ARTBIO, Inc.’s right to participate in this proceeding or to be included in the caption, the party shall request authorization to brief the issue within 10 business days of this Decision.” slip op. at 3

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “nuclear chemistry, radiochemistry, or materials science, or a comparable field of study, plus approximately two to three years of professional experience with radioisotope generators, radiopharmaceutical chemistry, nuclear medicine, or other relevant industry experience” and that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 33; Ex. 1019 ¶ 27). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition nor provide a proposed definition of its own. See generally Prelim. Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed proposed definition of a POSITA.” slip op. at 10

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 12,249,437

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.