- Samsung Display Co., Ltd. v. Pictiva Displays International Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 4, 2026 · IPR2024-01222 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 34–37 and 40–46 are unpatentable as obvious over the Yamazaki-based and Weaver-based grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner bears the burden of production to establish that its claimed invention is entitled to an earlier priority date for this fact-intensive issue. See In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2016). We agree with Petitioner that the email chain does not support Patent Owner’s conception claim because it “does not discuss depositing a planarization layer, as required by both independent claims.” Pet. Reply 3. Patent Owner asserts that the inventor’s discussion of “PML” (polymer multi-layer) encapsulation in the email chain shows their conception of the claimed planarization layer because the ’389 patent describes that PMLs “‘[t]ypically’ include[e] ‘a planarization layer’ that ‘is provided to give a planar surface’ for deposition of an upper layer,” and “‘address ‘any point defects (i.e. pin holes)’ that might appear in the barrier layer’s surface.” PO Resp. 6 (quoting Ex. 1001, 1:31–37, 1:41–44, 1:56–62). We disagree with Patent Owner for two reasons. First, the challenged patent’s specification does not corroborate that the inventors conceived the claimed planarization before the challenged patent’s priority because it did not exist at the time of the email. Whether the inventors, at the time of filing, considered PMLs to typically include a planarization layer as of the claimed priority date does not support the allegation that they conceived of that same planarization layer more than a year earlier. Moreover, the ’389 patent’s teaching that “[t]ypically, for PML structures, a planarization layer 106 is formed” (Ex. 1001, 1:30–31) shows that the inventors recognized PML structures and planarization layers were distinct because only a subset of PML structures formed planarization layers, even if they do so typically. Thus, the inventor’s discussion of a PML layer in the email chain does not evidence their conception of the claimed planarization layer, as Patent Owner contends. Additionally, even if we were to understand the inventors’ mention of PML encapsulation in the emails, together with the discussion of patterning techniques for an organic layer, as discussing a planarization layer, such discussions are evidence of brainstorming ideas, rather than documenting the path taken with the claimed invention. For instance, the inventors use phrases like “don’t know if this will work,” “these are all just ‘undeveloped’ ideas,” and “looking forward to keep this discussion rolling.” Ex. 2006, 1; see also Ex. 1034, 59:22−59:18. As Petitioner argues, and we agree, these are more theoretical and future-development discussions than an exchange of a definite idea. Pet. Reply 2−3 (citing Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986). For these reasons, we agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner has not” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Applicant-admitted prior artDecided for petitioner
“B. Whether Petitioner Relies on Applicant Admitted Prior Art Patent Owner asserts we should “not consider” Yamazaki-based challenges because Petitioner included Applicant Admitted Prior Art (AAPA) in those grounds. See PO Resp. 16 (citing Qualcomm Incorporated v. Apple Inc., 134 F.4th 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2025)) (holding that AAPA may not be part of the basis for an inter partes review). We disagree. As Petitioner notes, it “utilizes the AAPA in the alternative with Ghosh, to show that it was known to manufacture OLED devices in bulk (which [Patent Owner] does not dispute).” Pet. Reply 9. Because “[t]he Petition identifies disclosures in Ghosh that independently demonstrate the same teachings for which the AAPA is cited,” we agree with Petitioner that it does not improperly rely on AAPA for any of its challenges. Id.” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“C. Whether Yamazaki, Weaver, and Palanisamy Are Printed Publications under 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) Patent Owner asserts that Yamazaki, Weaver, and Palanisamy do not qualify as printed publications under 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) because they only qualify as prior art under § 102(e). PO Resp. 17. According to Patent Owner, “[e]ven though the Federal Circuit has held that such references are ‘printed publications’ under 311(b), to preserve arguments on appeal, Patent Owner submits that such an interpretation is inconsistent with the plain statutory language, the precedent, and non-public accessibility of an unpublished patent application.” Id. We disagree with this argument because the Federal Circuit has rejected it, as Patent Owner acknowledges. See Lynk Labs, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 2023-2346, Slip. Op. (Fed. Cir. Jan. 14, 2025).” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“Yamazaki does not involve multiple devices on a substrate” and Ghosh teaches “non-selective deposition of at least the barrier layer.” PO Resp. 31. We disagree with this argument because it attacks Yamazaki and Ghosh individually, rather than the combination of Yamazaki’s selective deposition and Ghosh’s plurality of devices that Petitioner asserts. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). We also disagree with Patent Owner’s criticism that Petitioner fails to explain why skilled artisans would have ignored Ghosh’s non-selective deposition method for barrier layers on multiple devices. PO Resp. 32. This argument attacks a straw man as Petitioner does not propose modifying Ghosh’s method with Yamazaki’s selective deposition. See Pet. 21–23. Rather, Petitioner proposes modifying Yamazaki’s selective deposition method by applying it to Ghosh’s teaching of encapsulating a plurality of OLED devices. Id. Next, Patent Owner asserts that skilled artisans would not have extended Yamazaki’s single-device fabrication/encapsulation method to a plurality of devices on a substrate because doing so would “multiply defects and errors, drop the yield exponentially, and increase the cost.” PO Resp. 34. Patent Owner asserts that precision/defect problems would be particularly acute when using Yamazaki’s inkjet method to print devices’ electro luminescence layers. Id. at 35–36. We disagree. Even if extending Yamazaki’s method to Ghosh’s multiple devices comes at a cost of potential defects, that tradeoff would not undermine Petitioner’s proffered combination given Petitioner’s articulated benefits outline above, including facilitating manufacturing display panels for OLEDs with improved throughput, improved productivity, and reduced manufacturing costs, as compared to fabricating/encapsulating just a single device. See Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another.”). It also does not matter that “inkjet printing yielded devices of half the efficiency than spin coating,” as Patent Owner asserts (PO Resp. 35), because Petitioner does not need to show that Yamazaki’s inkjet printing would be the best option for batch fabrication/encapsulation, only that it would was a suitable one from which the prior art did not teach away. See Par Pharm., Inc. v. TWi Pharms., Inc., 773 F. 3d 1186, 1197–98 (Fed. Cir 2014). That is, Petitioner does not need to show that Yamazaki’s inkjet method was an improvement over other known fabrication/encapsulation methods, so long as it was a known fabrication/encapsulation method and skilled artisans would understand that implementing it for a plurality of devices had known advantages over fabricating/encapsulating a single device, which Petitioner identifies. See Pet. 22. We also agree with Dr. Subramanian that skilled artisans would have a reasonable expectation of success in making the proposed combination given similarities between the references (both are directed to encapsulation of an OLED display device with multiple thin-film layers and at least the first encapsulation is selectively deposited) and because “as the ’389 patent admits, in the prior art it was conventional to use batch fabrication to manufacture OLED display devices with thin-film encapsulation.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 86. As Dr. Subramanian explains, a particular advantage of inkjet printing is that it scales well to larger areas and it was known at the time of the ’389 patent that inkjet could be used to print multiple devices on a glass substrate. Ex. 1032 ¶¶ 2, 27–28. Patent Owner’s argument that “Yamazaki’s methods are far from ready for manufacturing” (PO Resp. 34) goes well beyond what is necessary to show that skilled artisans would have had a reasonable expectation of achieving what is claimed. See Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Given Petitioner’s analysis outlined above, we agree with Petitioner that it would have been obvious to skilled artisans to fabricate and encapsulate multiple OLED devices on a substrate using Yamazaki’s ink-jet methods. slip op. at 15
Patent outcomesUS 6,949,389 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 6,949,389 - Early Warning Services, LLC v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 11, 2026 · IPR2024-01221 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · IPR · Final written decision
Petitioner failed to prove claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 12, 13, 17, 19–21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 29, 30, 34, 39–41, and 43 unpatentable because the cited grounds did not establish the required …
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“image capture device” refers to an imaging-based barcode reader and not a laser-based barcode scanner because we are persuaded that claim language and Specification support that interpretation and also because Patent Owner persuasively shows that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the term as such. Claim 1 recites an “image capture device configured to capture an image.” Ex. 1001, 16:24–25. The plain meaning of the claim term requires that the image be captured, not just scanned. The claim further requires “generating an output based on the information embedded in the image,” requiring that information is retrieved from the captured image. Id. at 16:32–33. A device that does not capture an image is not an “image capture device” under the plain language of the claim. A laser-based barcode scanner employs light reflected from a laser beam to “generate an electrical signal that corresponds to the bars and spaces in the barcode being scanned.” See Ex. 2029 ¶¶ 42–43 (explaining in detail how laser-based barcode self-emitting a laser light across a code to be scanned, with a sensor tuned to capture the reflected light from the laser.”). It simply does not capture an image. slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Based on our review of the complete record, we determine that Petitioner’s stated level of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art. The field of the ’167 patent “relates generally to secure transactions, and more specifically, to methods and devices for providing secure identification, verification, and authorization using a portable secure device.” Ex. 1001, 1:8–11. The ’167 patent seeks “to provide methods and devices that are capable of providing secure transactions in a more efficient manner.” Id. at 3:11–13. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s definition. We note, however, that our patentability analysis would be the same under Patent Owner’s definition.” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that Wang fails to disclose limitation 1[a]. Wang discloses a portable electronic authorization device (PEAD) that can be used as a self-checkout terminal. Ex. 1004 ¶ 115. In this context, Wang discloses By entering the UPC code or barcode using keypad on the PEAD or scanning in the UPC code or barcode using the input device built into the PEAD such as a barcode scanner or OCR reader, the PEAD can generate the receipt with the list of item prices through the wireless network and Internet by querying the item price using the barcode as the index for price lookup table which is Stored in a Server System. Id. (emphasis added). As discussed above (Section III.C.1), we are persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments that the claimed “image capture device” refers to an imaging-based device and not a laser-based barcode scanner. Petitioner does not contend that Wang’s disclosure of the barcode scanner necessarily refers to an imaging-based device, but argues that Wang’s disclosure is sufficient because “both imaging-based barcode scanners and laser-based barcode scanners constitute image capture devices.” Reply 11. In light of our claim construction above, we disagree.” slip op. at 27
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner contends that claims 1, 4, 5, 7, 12, 17, 23, 26, 27, 29, 34, and 43 are unpatentable as obvious over the combination of Wang and Drummond. Pet. 30–43. 1. Drummond Drummond is a patent titled “Automated Banking Machine System and Method,” and “relates to an automated banking machine apparatus and system that are capable of use in a wide area network, and which provides a user with a remote electronic receipt or other record related to a transaction performed at the machine.” Ex. 1008, code (54), ¶ 2. Drummond discloses that its automated banking machine, may “initiate the sending of a non-paper transaction receipt to the customer,” “[t]he receipt may be sent using a wide area network, such as the Internet,” and “[t]he receipt may be an electronic receipt, for example a receipt in the form of an e-mail message.” Id. ¶ 247. 2. Claims 1, 4, 5, 7, 12, 17, 23, 26, 27, 29, 34, and 43 For this obviousness ground, Petitioner relies on the same arguments and evidence as its Ground 1a (anticipation by Wang), discussed above, for the majority of claim limitations. See Pet. 33–43. Importantly, Petitioner relies solely on Wang as teaching independent claim limitations [1a], [23a], and [43b] relating to an image capture device and embedded information. Pet. 36, 41, 43. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above with respect to Ground 1a, Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence, that the subject matter of claims 1, 4, 5, 7, 12, 17, 23, 26, 27, 29, 34, and 43 would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art over the combination of Wang and Drummond.” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 7,314,167 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,314,167 - Samsung Display Co., Ltd. v. Pictiva Displays International Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 9, 2026 · IPR2024-01095 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 2, 4, 9–12, and 17 are unpatentable under § 103 because the prior-art combinations teach the claimed features and have adequate motivation and reasonable expectation of success.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a Bachelor’s degree in chemistry, physics, or a comparable field of study, and at least three years of research or industrial experience with organic optoelectronic light-emitting devices.” Pet. 10. Further, “[a]n individual with additional education could have less research or industrial experience and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s formulation. See generally PO Resp. We adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed definition because it is consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art. See, e.g., Ex. 1006, code (57); Ex. 1011, code (57).” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“electron-hopping dopant. See In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The prior art’s mere disclosure of more than one alternative does not constitute a teaching away from . . . alternatives because such disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed.”). As Petitioner explains, “Liq acts as an n-dopant in Ma,” which “increases ETL conductivity.” Pet. Reply 10. Patent Owner does not contest that Liq acts as an n-dopant in Ma. See Pet. Reply 30. Thus, Petitioner’s proposed combinations “substitute one known n-dopant for another to further the same goal of improving ETL conductivity.” Pet. Reply 10. Next, Patent Owner faults Petitioner for failing to show that using Ma’s Liq dopant in Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s ETL would result in lower diffusion or higher efficiencies as compared to Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s preferred n-dopants, which included cesium, barium, or lithium fluoride. PO Resp. 31–35; see PO Sur-reply 4–5. We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument because Petitioner does not need to show that Ma’s Liq n-dopant “was an improvement in a categorical sense” over Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s n-dopants, so long as Ma’s n-dopant was known and one skilled in the art would understand that implementing it had advantages. See Intel Corp. v. Pact XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted); In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[O]ur case law does not require that a particular combination must be the preferred, or the most desirable, combination described in the prior art.”). Petitioner does not assert skilled artisans would have used Liq because it was a superior to Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s preferred dopants, but because doping ETLs with Liq had known benefits including lower driving voltage and enhanced power efficiency from enhanced carrier injection increased transport conductivity, as compared to an undoped device. Pet. 37 (citing Ex. 1010, 813). That other potentially suitable or even superior n-dopants were also known does not make Liq nonobvious. Given Liq’s benefits outlined above, Petitioner has articulated sufficient reasoning with rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion that its proffered combination of Ma’s known dopant in Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s device would have been obvious to one skilled in the art. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“1. Whether Ma Qualifies as a Prior Art Printed Publication First, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner has not demonstrated that Ma was publicly accessible in August 2008 so as to qualify as prior art. PO 11 As Petitioner notes, the district court adopted a claim construction requiring only “one or more wavelengths” in the infrared-to-UV spectrum. PO Resp. 26 (citing Ex. 2031, 47–48). Resp. 16–24. We addressed this same issue in our Final Written Decision in IPR2024-01094. IPR2024-01094, Paper 42 at 9–13. As we explained there, Ma qualifies as prior art printed publication because the record evidence supports what Ma says on its face—that it was published online on August 29, 2008 by an Elsevier, an established publisher, in Synthetic Metals, which is a reputable journal. Id. For the same reason explained in IPR2024-01094, we agree with Petitioner that Ma qualifies as a prior art printed publication.” slip op. at 10
Patent outcomesUS 11,828,425 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 11,828,425 - Samsung Display Co., Ltd. v. Pictiva Displays International Ltd.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 22, 2026 · IPR2024-01094 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 6, and 8–14 are unpatentable as obvious over Ma; claims 3 and 4 were not shown unpatentable over Werner.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends: A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) at the time of the alleged invention of the ’223 patent would have had a university degree in chemistry and additional expertise or a second university degree in the field of electrical engineering, particularly optoelectronics, or alternatively a university degree in electrical engineering and additional expertise or a second university degree in the field of chemistry. The person of ordinary skill in the art has spent several years studying the structure and function of organic optoelectronic components, in particular OLEDs, and has detailed knowledge of the chemical structure of light-emitting organic layers and the transport of charge carriers to these layers. In this respect, the person of ordinary skill in the art works at the interface between electrical engineering/physics (charge carrier transport and light emission processes in optoelectronic components) and chemistry, in particular organic chemistry (materials and layer stack combinations suitable). Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 46–47). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contention. See generally Resp. Neither party indicates that the result would change depending on the definition selected. We adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed definition, because it is consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art references. See Ex. 1005, (code 57); Ex. 1007, 8107 (abstracts of the references asserted in the patentability challenges).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, claim terms generally are given their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been understood by the ordinarily skilled artisan at the time of the invention and within the context of the entire patent disclosure. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). We construe claim terms only as relevant to the parties’ contentions and only to the extent necessary to resolve the issues in dispute. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Neither party indicates that an express construction for any claim term is necessary to resolve the disputes at hand. Pet. 15; see generally Resp. On this record, we determine that no claim term requires express construction for purposes of this Decision. In our analysis of the challenges, however, we discuss the meaning of the terms “metal complex” and “central metal atom,” which appear in claim 1 (Ex. 1001, 19:19–20) to the extent necessary to resolve Patent Owner’s contention that Petitioner fails to establish that Ma invalidates claim 1. See Resp. 53, 56–58.” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“Whether Ma qualifies as a “printed publication” involves an inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding the reference’s disclosure to members of the public. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004). A reference is considered “publicly accessible” upon a satisfactory showing that the document has been “disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence[] can locate it.” Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. ITC, 545 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29, 10– 11 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“Based on the information presented, we find Petitioner has the better position. Patent Owner admits that joint vaporization means “two materials vaporize together.” Reply 21 (quoting Resp. 54). As Petitioner argues, “This is what Ma discloses.” Id. We agree with Petitioner that Ma describes a “two-component” electron transport layer having a “thickness with one value.” Id.; see Ex. 1007, 811 (reporting a “co-deposited” application of “BPhen:LiQ” that is “50 nm thick”). Ma’s disclosure, thereby, strongly “indicates that the two components were vaporized together––as opposed to creating a ‘macroscopically homogenous form’” prepared by sequentially vaporizing the individual components as Patent Owner “hypothesizes.” Reply 21 (citing Ex. 1020 ¶¶ 42–44; Ex. 2041 ¶¶ 155–157); see Resp. 54– 55; see also Ex. 1007, 811 (Ma’s description of its device fabrication, appearing in the third paragraph of the experiments section). Petitioner further advances evidence that “[p]reparing a layer that is ‘macroscopically homogeneous’ but potentially microscopically heterogeneous,” as Patent Owner postulates, “would introduce excessive variability and render the data noncomparable and unreliable, thus undermining the experiment’s purpose.” Reply 21 (citing Ex. 1020 ¶ 44); see Resp. 54–55. Patent Owner presents no counterargument or evidence that is persuasive to undercut Petitioner’s reasoning or evidence on that point. See Sur-reply 19–22. Petitioner also argues that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have recognized “that vaporizing materials together would best achieve Ma’s objective of assessing the current density using different Liq doping percentages.” Reply 22 (citing Ex. 1007, 811; Ex. 1020 ¶ 51). Here again, Petitioner’s evidence on point stands uncontested. See Sur-reply 19–22 (declining to contest that point). On this record, therefore, we agree with Petitioner that, as to the relevant disclosure in Ma, “the most natural interpretation of ‘co-deposition’ for forming a layer, particularly when there is nothing to indicate that the materials” are “vaporized sequentially,” is that the materials are co-deposited by joint vaporization. Reply 22 (citing Ex. 1020 ¶ 46–51). We further agree that, “[u]nder a preponderance standard, Ma’s disclosures are sufficient to render joint vaporization at least obvious.” Id. For the above reasons, we determine that Petitioner demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that Ma discloses joint vaporization as required by the challenged claims.” slip op. at 15
Patent outcomesUS 8,558,223 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,558,223 - Samsung Display Co., Ltd. v. Pictiva Displays International Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 22, 2026 · IPR2024-01093 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–16 are unpatentable: claims 1–13 and 15–16 on anticipation and obviousness grounds, and claim 14 on obviousness over Choulis.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the alleged invention of the ’164 patent would have had a Bachelor’s degree in chemistry, physics, or a comparable field of study, and at least three years of research or industrial experience with organic optoelectronic light-emitting devices. An individual with additional education could have less research or industrial experience and vice versa. Pet. 12. Patent Owner repeatedly refers to “a POSITA” without addressing the definition of that term or contesting Petitioner’s proposed definition. See Resp. 1, 2 n.1, 3, 8, 9, 15–21, 23, 26, 29, 32–33, 35, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44–49, 51–57, 61, 62 (bare references to “a POSITA”). Neither party indicates that the ultimate result on patentability would change depending on the definition selected. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition, which is not contested, because it is consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art. See Ex. 1004, (code 57); Ex. 1006, code (57); Ex. 1008, code (57); Ex. 1009, code (57) (abstracts of the references asserted in the patentability challenges).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundTerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“because no information raised during the trial phase of this review changes the calculus: First and foremost, the plain terms of claim 1 include no language from which we reasonably can impose limits on the phrase “matrix material” as urged by Patent Owner. In addition, the specification includes no special definition of that phrase that supports importing Patent Owner’s proposed narrowing limitation into the claim. Furthermore, we are directed to no disclaimer of claim scope during patent prosecution that would support Patent Owner’s twice-rejected argument that the phrase “matrix material” in claim 1 excludes embedded dopants and dispersed agglomerations. And the extrinsic evidence advanced by Patent Owner during this review is ineffective to override the clear interpretation of “matrix material” that is established by the intrinsic evidence. Reply 1–7.10” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“We find that Petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that Choulis anticipates claim 13. We agree with Petitioner, in that regard, that Choulis explicitly teaches “using spin-coating as a method for depositing materials, which involves a simultaneous application process” as required by claim 13. Reply 16 (citing Pet. 40–41; Ex. 1044 ¶ 45).16 We 15 Petitioner raises Djobo as a background reference supporting that Choulis anticipates deposition of PVK by evaporation. Pet. 41. Patent Owner counters that Djobo, to the contrary, shows that Choulis does not teach deposition of PVK by evaporation. Resp. 48. In other words, both parties cite Djobo in connection with the ground based on anticipation by Choulis. Against that backdrop, we determine that Patent Owner waives any argument that Petitioner improperly cites Djobo as a background reference in support of the anticipation challenge, which is based on Choulis alone. Resp. 48 (nowhere asserting that the challenge is deficient on that basis). That waiver arises because no argument, in that regard, is raised in Patent Owner’s Response see Inst. Dec. 34 (“The Board shall deemed waived any issue not raised by Patent Owner in a timely response to the Petition . . . .”). 16 Patent Owner’s statement that “spin coating tends to cause phase separation” is not developed adequately on this record and, therefore, is further agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner “has not contested this point.” Resp. 48. “Therefore, there is no genuine dispute regarding the unpatentability of claim 13,” although Patent Owner raises “arguments concerning evaporation, which is a distinct process from spin-coating” relevant to the additional limitations of claim 14. Reply 16. We determine that Petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that Choulis anticipates claim 13. Patent Owner, however, has the better position on whether Choulis anticipates claim 14, which “includes the requirement of applying matrix materials via evaporation coating.” Reply 16. Petitioner seems to abandon that challenge in the Reply by raising arguments that appear, on this record, to bear exclusively on whether the subject matter of claim 14 would have been obvious over Choulis.17 Id. at 16–17. Those arguments are insufficient to counter Patent Owner’s reasons why Choulis does not anticipate the “evaporation coating” limitation of claim 14. Compare id., with Resp. 48. On this record, therefore, we determine that Petitioner does not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Choulis anticipates claim 14. unpersuasive to persuade us “that Choulis does not have three matrix materials.” Sur-reply 15. That argument runs counter to Choulis’s explicit, intrinsic disclosures, which illustrate (Ex. 1004, Fig. 4) and describe (id. ¶ 30) an organic light emitting layer composed of three matrix materials. See Pet. 24–25 (citing Ex. 1004, Fig. 4, ¶ 30); see also Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 85–88 (persuasive declaration testimony of Dr. Holmes, cited at Pet. 24–25). 17 There is some confusion on this point, given that both parties sometimes collapse, into a single argument, whether Choulis anticipates or renders obvious claim 1. Compare Resp. 48, with Reply 16–17.” slip op. at 35
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“On this record, therefore, we determine that Choulis, at minimum, suggests that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have recognized PMMA as a suitable alternative to PVK in Choulis’s Figure 4 embodiment, notwithstanding any differences raised by Patent Owner. Ex. 1004 ¶ 44. Patent Owner’s argument that no disclosure in Choulis suggests that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have found it desirable to use PMMA in place of PVK in Choulis’s devices” misses the mark, where Choulis includes both PMMA and PVK in lists of materials suitable for use as host or matrix materials. Resp. 38; Ex. 1004 ¶ 44. “Our caselaw is clear. It’s not necessary to show that a combination is ‘the best option, only that it is a suitable option.’” Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 800 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Even if Choulis does not expressly disclose substituting PMMA for PVK in the Figure 4 embodiment, “an ordinarily skilled artisan would have found it obvious to make that substitution.” Reply 10 (citing Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 100; Ex. 1044 ¶ 23)). The suggestion for that substitution is set forth unambiguously in Choulis’s listing of both “PVK” and “PMMA” as materials suitable for use as a first “host” material in Choulis’s organic functional layer; that is, “the light emitting layer” that is “described above” in Figure 4. Ex. 1004 ¶ 44. ii. Alternative Reasoning for Replacing PVK with PMMA Patent Owner counterargues that using PPMA in place of PVK would have been understood to “upset the hole and electron balance,” as well as “affect hole-charge recombination,” and “degrade the performance of the resulting OLED system.” Resp. 37. Petitioner responds with evidence that “it would have been a routine task for” an ordinarily skilled artisan “to optimize the composition of each component within the light-emitting layer to achieve the desired charge balance.” Reply 11 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 24). Petitioner’s response brings to light a second reason why an ordinarily” slip op. at 40
Patent outcomesUS 8,723,164 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,723,164 - Samsung Display Co., Ltd. v. Pictiva Displays International Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 22, 2026 · IPR2024-01095 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 2, 4, 9–12, and 17 are unpatentable under § 103 over the Diekmann- and Suzuki-based combinations with the respective secondary references.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had a Bachelor’s degree in chemistry, physics, or a comparable field of study, and at least three years of research or industrial experience with organic optoelectronic light-emitting devices.” Pet. 10. Further, “[a]n individual with additional education could have less research or industrial experience and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s formulation. See generally PO Resp. We adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed definition because it is consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art. See, e.g., Ex. 1006, code (57); Ex. 1011, code (57).” slip op. at 7
- BurdenUnpatentable
“III. OBVIOUSNESS ANALYSIS Petitioner contends that claims 2, 4, 9–12, and 17 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103. For the reasons explained below, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of evidence that these claims are unpatentable over the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“Resp. 16–24. We addressed this same issue in our Final Written Decision in IPR2024-01094. IPR2024-01094, Paper 42 at 9–13. As we explained there, Ma qualifies as prior art printed publication because the record evidence supports what Ma says on its face—that it was published online on August 29, 2008 by an Elsevier, an established publisher, in Synthetic Metals, which is a reputable journal. Id. For the same reason explained in IPR2024-01094, we agree with Petitioner that Ma qualifies as a prior art printed publication.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“additional feature in claims 2 and 12, Patent Owner raises a number of challenges to Petitioner’s asserted rationale for combining Ma. See PO Resp. 27–47. First, Patent Owner asserts that skilled artisans would not have used Ma’s Liq dopant in Diekmann/Suzuki because both employ electron-donor dopants that operate differently from Liq’s electron-hopping dopant. Id. at 28–31. We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument because it highlights a difference in the references’ dopants without identifying any incompatibility. Even if Diekmann and Suzuki teach electron-donor type ndopants as Patent Owner asserts, neither precludes or disparages Ma’s electron-hopping dopant. See In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The prior art’s mere disclosure of more than one alternative does not constitute a teaching away from . . . alternatives because such disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed.”). As Petitioner explains, “Liq acts as an n-dopant in Ma,” which “increases ETL conductivity.” Pet. Reply 10. Patent Owner does not contest that Liq acts as an n-dopant in Ma. See Pet. Reply 30. Thus, Petitioner’s proposed combinations “substitute one known n-dopant for another to further the same goal of improving ETL conductivity.” Pet. Reply 10. Next, Patent Owner faults Petitioner for failing to show that using Ma’s Liq dopant in Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s ETL would result in lower diffusion or higher efficiencies as compared to Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s preferred n-dopants, which included cesium, barium, or lithium fluoride. PO Resp. 31–35; see PO Sur-reply 4–5. We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument because Petitioner does not need to show that Ma’s Liq n-dopant “was an improvement in a categorical sense” over Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s n-dopants, so long as Ma’s n-dopant was known and one skilled in the art would understand that implementing it had advantages. See Intel Corp. v. Pact XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted); In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[O]ur case law does not require that a particular combination must be the preferred, or the most desirable, combination described in the prior art.”). Petitioner does not assert skilled artisans would have used Liq because it was a superior to Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s preferred dopants, but because doping ETLs with Liq had known benefits including lower driving voltage and enhanced power efficiency from enhanced carrier injection increased transport conductivity, as compared to an undoped device. Pet. 37 (citing Ex. 1010, 813). That other potentially suitable or even superior n-dopants were also known does not make Liq nonobvious. Given Liq’s benefits outlined above, Petitioner has articulated sufficient reasoning with rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion that its proffered combination of Ma’s known dopant in Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s device would have been obvious to one skilled in the art. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).” slip op. at 11
Patent outcomesUS 11,828,425 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 11,828,425 - Luxottica Of America Inc. v. E-Vision Optics, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 23, 2025 · IPR2024-01030 · APJ Richard H Marschall · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20, 22–31, and 33–37 are unpatentable; claims 21 and 32 were not shown unpatentable, principally because the proposed combinations failed to establish motivation to combine or the required airtight seal.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“We find that the proposals from the parties substantially overlap, such that it remains unclear whether any substantive difference exists. Notably, neither party argues that the minor differences in the proposals lead to a different outcome on any issues in this proceeding. Based on our review of the proposals, we apply Patent Owner’s proposal because it is consistent with the problems and solutions disclosed in the ’483 patent and prior art of record. See, e.g., GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579 (approving the determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art by appeal to the references of record). The outcome of the issues addressed in this Decision would not change if we applied Petitioner’s proposal.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“hermetically sealed” module does not encompass waterproof modules that are not airtight. First, as Petitioner admits, as a general matter, “[s]omething that is hermetically sealed is sealed so as to be airtight.” Pet. 28 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 103; Ex. 1010, 269); PO Sur-reply 16. Petitioner later tries to argue that the specification puts a different spin on this meaning, but still acknowledges that “[o]utside the context of the ’483 patent, a hermetic seal is sometimes equated with an airtight seal.” See Pet. Post-hearing 2–3 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 103; Ex. 1010, 269). Based on our review of the record, the “ordinary meaning” of “hermetically sealed” means “airtight,” and, as noted above, “airtight” is not the same thing as “waterproof.” Second, the claims support Patent Owner’s position by including dependent claims that separately claim a “hermetically sealed” module (claims 13 and 32) and a “waterproof” module (claims 15 and 34), strongly suggesting that the terms have a different scope to avoid rendering some claims redundant. See Ex. 1001, 11: 65–66, 12:3–4, 12:52–53, 12:55–56. Petitioner argues in its Post-hearing brief that claims requiring waterproof modules are “a narrower species” of hermetic seal, but fails to explain how hermetic, airtight, and waterproof seals would not fall within the scope of both claims using its approach. Pet. Post-hearing Reply 2. Petitioner’s earlier argument in its Reply also seems to cut against this position by asserting that the specification “treats hermitically sealing as conventional and equivalent to waterproofing,” with different dependent claims directed to two allegedly “equivalent” terms making little sense. Pet. Reply 14 (emphasis added). The most natural reading of the claim language suggests that “hermetically sealed” means airtight, and does not encompass modules that are waterproof but not airtight. Third, while the specification does not define “hermetically sealed” and uses “waterproof” and “hermetically sealed” in similar contexts, it does not suggest that “hermetically sealed” does not require an airtight seal consistent with its ordinary meaning. See Pet. Reply 14–15 (citing Ex. 1001, 6:47–53, 9:15–18, 10:47–50). Instead, the specification states that hermetic seals prevent water from contacting electronics, which remains consistent with Patent Owner’s position because airtight hermetic seals are also waterproof. See Ex. 1001, 6:47–53, 9:15–18. The specification also states that “[t]he module preferably houses any of the aforementioned electrical components in a substantially water-proof and wear resistant/moisture resistant environment and is preferably hermetically sealed.” Id. at 10:47–50 (emphasis added). This passage supports Patent Owner’s position by suggesting that the preferable “hermetically sealed” module goes beyond mere water resistance. See PO Sur-reply 16–17. slip op. at 16
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“2. Petitioner’s Anticipation Arguments and Evidence Petitioner argues that Howell-596 discloses every limitation of claims 1, 9, 10, 14, 15, and 18, and points to specific portions of Howell-596 and expert testimony to support its arguments. See Pet. 10–20 (citing Ex. 1002; Ex. 1003). We have reviewed the evidence and arguments of record and find that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the limitations in claims 1, 9, 10, 14, 15, and 18 are disclosed by Howell-596 for the reasons set forth in the Petition, which we adopt as our own. See id.11 Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Howell-596 anticipates claims 1, 9, 10, 14, 15, and 18.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Based on these undisputed points and the parties’ arguments, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner fails to establish that a POSITA would have been motivated to locate Howell-596’s module housing 1700, which contains its UV detection system 1500, behind a user’s ear. Petitioner never squarely addresses the fact that placing Howell-596’s UV detection system behind a user’s ear would negatively impact its performance. Pet. 31–33; Pet. Reply 17–22. As a result, even if we accept Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to the various advantages when placing electronics behind a user’s ear, it fails to establish a motivation to combine that requires placing Howell-596’s module housing 1700, and therefore its UV detection system, behind a user’s ear. Petitioner never acknowledges the readily apparent disadvantages of placing a UV detection system behind the ear, where it may not work at all. See Pet. 31–33. Nor does Petitioner argue that, in its combination, adjustments would be made to ensure accurate operation of Howell-596’s UV detection system. See id. Similarly, Petitioner notes that both Howell-596 and Howell-833 disclose UV sensors behind the ear of a user, but those teachings do not establish that placing Howell-596’s module behind the ear would ensure proper operation of its UV detection system housed within that module. See Pet. Reply 17–22. Instead, even though Howell-596 discloses a sensor behind the ear of a user, it maintains the UV detection system in a module toward the front of the temple, away from the ear. See id. at 18–19; PO Surreply 21–22; Ex. 1003 ¶ 205 (describing UV detection system 2102), Fig. 21 (showing UV detection system 2102 toward the front of the temple). Moreover, Petitioner’s reliance on the sensor placed behind the ear of the user in Howell-596 lacks weight because that sensor merely indicates that the device “is being worn by a user,” which serves a very different purpose than Howell-596’s UV detection system, which seeks to monitor a user’s exposure to UV radiation, a central purpose of Howell-596’s eyewear. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 205, code (57). Howell-833 also employs a UV sensor behind the ear, but Petitioner does not establish that it operates any differently than the “being worn” sensor in Howell-596, and therefore does not establish that Howell-596’s UV detection system would still work for its intended purposes in Petitioner’s proposed combination. See Pet. Reply 19–20.” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 8,708,483 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 8,708,483 - Apple Inc. v. Apex Beam Technologies LLCInstitutedPTAB · Nov 14, 2025 · IPR2025-00907 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 and all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable over the three 3GPP references.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“inter partes review unless the information in the petition and preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). For the reasons that follow, we institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–20 of the ’944 patent on all grounds of unpatentability asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner argues that at the time of the ’944 patent (November 2019),2 a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a similar field, along with two years of experience designing or developing wireless networks, including long-term evolution LTE/4G or 5G new radio (NR) cellular technology,” where “[a]dditional years of experience could substitute for an advanced-level degree (and vice versa).” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 39–44). Patent Owner “utilizes Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art” for its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 8. Based on the record presented, including our review of the ’944 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’944 patent and cited prior art, we agree with Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art and apply it for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Interpretation We interpret each challenged claim using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Petitioner argues that “no claim terms need be construed.” Pet. 8. Patent Owner does not propose interpretations of any claim terms in its Preliminary Response. We conclude that no express interpretation of any claim term is necessary to determine whether to institute an inter partes review in this proceeding, but encourage the parties to address various claim interpretation issues identified below during trial. See infra Section II.D.5; Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe [a particular claim limitation] where the construction is not ‘material to the . . . dispute.’” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedInstituted
“Patent Owner responds that Petitioner fails to show that the 3GPP-38.213-CR “document sent to [the] 3GPP email list on November 3 was available to non-3GPP members by November 5, 2019” (the alleged critical date for the ’944 patent). Prelim. Resp. 3 (emphasis omitted); see Pet. 10. According to Patent Owner, the listserv archive of emails cited by Mr. Rodermund “only shows that the November 3, 2019 email is available now—not that it was uploaded within a day of when the original email was sent”—and Mr. Rodermund provides only his uncorroborated opinion that uploads were “automatic” and “immediate.” Prelim. Resp. 5–6 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 43–63, 72–80). Patent Owner also contends that the November 2, 2019, metadata only relates to creation of 3GPP-38.213-CR and does not support Petitioner’s contention that the email was immediately uploaded. Id. at 6. Finally, Patent Owner argues that whether the subject matter of 3GPP-38.213-CR was discussed at the 3GPP meeting in October 2019 is “irrelevant,” given the date of the metadata, and has no bearing on whether the document itself was later publicly accessible. Id. at 6–7. Assessing the evidence of record collectively, however, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that 3GPP-38.213-CR was publicly accessible from the ETSI email archive before November 5, 2019. Given his many years of experience with ETSI, in particular his responsibilities pertaining to management of documents like change requests, and as the “list owner” “responsible for managing and administrating” several email exploder lists, Mr. Rodermund appears to be well-qualified to testify to the matters in his declaration. See Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 7, 10–15, 47. He explains in detail how, based on his experience, emails sent” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,139,944 - PTAB · Oct 9, 2025 · IPR2025-00847 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1–11 because Petitioners showed a reasonable likelihood of proving at least one challenged claim unpatentable across the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose of determining whether Petitioners meet the threshold for initiating review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Any arguments not raised by Patent Owner in a timely-filed response may be deemed waived. For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We hereby institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–11 of the ’847 patent based upon Petitioners’ asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would have had a master’s degree in electrical engineering, physics, chemistry, materials science, or a related field and three years of work experience in semiconductor manufacturing, such as, for example, in integrated circuit device (or transistor) design and/or manufacturing,” and “[a]dditional relevant education could substitute for professional experience, and significant work experience or training could substitute for formal education.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 38). Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’847 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner does not propose any claim constructions, except to explain that the claim 7 limitation “the spacer further comprises an offset spacer, positioned between the gate and the spacer,” is “satisfied if one layer (an ‘offset spacer’) of the claimed ‘spacer’ lies between another layer of the ‘spacer’ and the gate.” Pet. 11. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s assertions or offer any claim constructions. See generally Prelim. Resp. Because resolution of Petitioner’s proposed construction is unnecessary to our analyses for purposes of this decision, we do not address the proposal here. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We do not discern a need to construe any other claim language at this juncture because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“a. Claim 1 Petitioner contends that claim 1 is anticipated by Lan or, alternatively, obvious in view of Lan. Pet. 18–26. Petitioner explains how Lan teaches or suggests each recitation of claim 1, and Petitioner’s position is supported by adequate evidence for institution. Id. (citing, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 100–125). Petitioner, for example, persuasively compares the structure of Figure 12 of Lan to each limitation of claim 1. Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contentions except to argue that Lan (and the Petition’s other asserted references) “Do Not Mention, Describe, or Concern ‘Raised Epitaxial Layers.’” Prelim. Resp. 22–24. Patent Owner does not persuasively undermine Petitioner’s position.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,745,847 - Shenzhen Xinzexing E-Commerce Co., Ltd. v. Shenzhen Carku Technology Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 24, 2025 · IPR2024-00222 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 6–23, and 25–33 are unpatentable, including as anticipated by Chen and as obvious over the Chen and Inskeep combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“have at least a Bachelor’s Degree in Electrical Engineering and at least two years of experience in the field of electrical engineering and specifically power supply management such as battery charging system design.” PO Resp. 31. Petitioner presents a similar formulation. Pet. 10. Although we do not discern any meaningful distinction between the parties’ formulations, we adopt Patent Owner’s description of a person of ordinary skill as it is consistent with the prior art and challenged patent’s specification. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill).” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“a first current through one or more output ports of the at least one output port in a first operating mode,” and “is configured to output a second current capable of starting a vehicle engine through the pair of output terminals in a second operating mode.” Ex. 1001, 8:25–34. Claim 21 has similar first and second operating-mode limitations. Id. at 9:40–46. Patent Owner proposes that “[t]he proper construction for ‘first operating mode’ is ‘an operating mode of the portable backup charger wherein the battery pack is configured to output a first current through one or more output ports of the at least one output port, and outputting a second current capable of starting a vehicle engine through the pair of output terminals is inhibited.’” PO Resp. 25. Similarly, Patent Owner argues “[t]he proper construction for ‘second operating mode’ is ‘an operating mode of the portable backup charger wherein the battery pack is configured to output a second current capable of starting a vehicle engine through the pair of output terminals, and outputting a first current through one or more output ports of the at least one output port is inhibited.’” Id. at 27. Patent Owner asserts that claim differentiation supports its construction because dependent claim 3 recites “a third operating mode for outputting the first current and the second current simultaneously,” and “if the battery pack could output the first current and the second current simultaneously in the first operating mode, then there would be no difference between the claimed first operating mode and the claimed third operating mode.” Id. at 26. We disagree with Patent Owner’s constructions because, as Petitioner explains, they wrongly import current-inhibiting limitations beyond the plain language in the claim. Pet. Reply 1. Nothing in the at-issue language addresses inhibiting current. In addition, the claimed first and third operating modes are still distinct without importing additional limitations because outputting just the first current is sufficient for the first operating mode, but not for the third. In other words, whereas the third operating mode requires simultaneity, the first and second merely permit it. Thus, claim differentiation does not support Patent Owner’s construction. Last, although Patent Owner asserts that its construction “is consistent with the specification,” nothing in the cited passages describes inhibiting current. Prelim. Resp. 26 (citing Ex. 1001, 4:30–33, 5:30–33, 5:58–62). Instead, the specification characterizes the modes solely by what the portable charger “can output,” not what is inhibited. Ex. 1001, 4:30–33, 5:30–33, 5:58–62. Thus, we decline to read the first and second operating modes to require the current-inhibiting features that Patent Owner asserts.” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Patent Owner argues the two current paths are not different because Chen’s Figure 1 shows they overlap between the lithium battery and the output control circuit and “only diverge when making the connection to the output control circuit.” PO Resp. 32. We disagree. First, Patent Owner’s argument is based on a claim construction for “different” current paths that we do not adopt for the reasons above. In addition, we agree with Petitioner that Chen shows the claimed different current paths even under Patent Owner’s construction. Pet. Reply 8–12. Specifically, as Petitioner explains, a skilled artisan would recognize that Chen’s physical circuits are depicted in Figures 4–7, rather than in Chen’s Figure 1, which is merely a “block diagram of the principle of present invention.” Id. at 9; Ex. 1006 ¶ 15. Unlike Figure 1, Chen’s Figures 5, 6, and 7 show current paths between the battery and USB outputs, and between the battery and DC multi-gear output, that do not overlap with the high current path shown in Chen’s Figure 4. Pet. 9–12. Based on Petitioner’s analysis and for the reasons above, we agree with Petitioner that Chen teaches the claimed “pair of output terminals coupled to the battery pack and having a current path to the battery pack different from that of the at least one output port to the battery pack.”” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“Patent Owner asserts one skilled in the art would not have added White’s fuse to Chen because doing so was “unnecessary” given Chen’s built-in relay K1 that already provides protection. PO Resp. 42–43. We disagree because, as Petitioner notes, “the Petition cited ample evidence that both layers of over current prevention provide improved safety and protection to the battery.” Pet. Reply 17 (citing Pet. 31–33); see also, e.g., Pet. 31 (describing “advantageously reduc[ing] the likelihood of damage”), id. at 32 (describing “the additional benefit of a safety fuse along a jumper cable to promptly cut off current in the event of a short circuit” and “more simplified maintenance and repair”). Given Petitioner’s unrebutted rationale, Petitioner has articulated sufficient reasoning with rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion that adding White’s fuse and polarity-protection connector to Chen’s power-supply system would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). Other than the arguments addressed above, Patent Owner does not additionally challenge Petitioner’s obviousness showing based on Chen and White. We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence and, based on that analysis, we find Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1, 2, 6–9, 11–14, 16–22, 25–28, and 30–33 would have been obvious over Chen and White.” slip op. at 15
Patent outcomesUS 9,643,506 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 9,643,506
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