• Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC v. Daedalus Prime LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 8, 2025 · IPR2023-01343 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7, 13–15, 17, and 18 were not shown unpatentable because Bose and White, alone or in the asserted combinations, failed to teach claimed workload comparisons or workload monitoring.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “We are persuaded and find for the reasons given that Petitioner fails to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that White teaches or suggests “receiving a bus workload for a communication bus and a first processing element workload for a first processing element based on an integrated circuit reaching a limit.” Patent Owner’s expert Dr. Brogioli testifies that “[t]he workload is a function of the demands imposed by, e.g., applications running on the system, and may or may not be subject to direct control, whereas the conditions under which that workload is processed are controlled directly.” Brogioli Decl. ¶ 66. We agree with Dr. Brogioli and find that White’s frequency and voltage monitoring and adjustments do not result in the power management logic receiving the bus workload as recited in claim element 4[a]. Id. ¶¶ 64–66. We find the testimony of Mr. Wyatt on this issue unconvincing. Wyatt Decl. ¶ 103. In support of his opinion that “monitoring the operating voltages and frequencies of the logic core 120A and common logic bridge 110 is monitoring the workload of those components,” he states: “It was well understood that operating frequency and voltage of a component reflect the activity and use, or workload, of that component.” Id. However, he does not provide any evidentiary support for this statement. We, therefore, give it little weight. See PTAB Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 40 (Nov. 2019)5 (“Opinions expressed without disclosing the underlying facts or data may be given little or no weight.”) (citing Rohm & Haas Co. v. Brotech Corp., 127 F.3d 1089, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).” slip op. at 30

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “response. Paper 9. At the institution stage, therefore, Patent Owner did not dispute Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill in the art or provide its own description. We regarded Petitioner’s description as consistent with the prior art before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Thus, for the purpose of our Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s proposal. Institution Dec. 12–13. In its Response, Patent Owner states that it “uses this definition” in its analysis. PO Resp. 15 (citing Brogioli Decl. ¶ 25). In view of the foregoing, for this Decision, we adopt the description of the person of ordinary skill articulated by Petitioner and used in our Institution Decision. In light of our review of the complete record, we find that this formulation is consistent with the ’494 patent and the prior art of record, and is supported by the testimony of Mr. Wyatt. See Wyatt Decl. ¶ 21.” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionGranted

    “Post-institution, Patent Owner proposes a construction for the term “workload.” PO Resp. 15–16. Patent Owner contends that “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that in the ’494 patent, the term ‘workload’ means ‘an amount of activity over a quantum or period of time.’” Id. at 15. Dr. Brogioli’s testimony supports this construction, as does Mr. Wyatt’s. Brogioli Decl. ¶¶ 36–38; Wyatt Dep. 34:14–36:9. The ’494 patent also supports this construction. Ex. 1001, 8:20–22, 9:60–63. Petitioner does not dispute this proposed construction in its Reply. For the reasons given, we adopt Patent Owner’s construction for “workload.”” slip op. at 15

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Nowhere does Petitioner or its expert point to an explicit disclosure in Bose of making a comparison of the claimed “bus workload and a bus workload threshold.” Instead, Petitioner relies on its expert’s opinion as to what a person of ordinary skill might have known, without any additional supporting evidence. See, e.g., Pet. 26 (“[A person of ordinary skill] would have understood global PMCU compares a workload threshold as exemplified by the predicted power and performance of each power mode and the monitored workload to select and adjust the power mode of a component” (citing Wyatt Decl. ¶¶ 54–55)). This opinion is not supported by the record. The only disclosure of a comparison in Bose that we have been shown is the comparison of PowerTotal to PowerMax in step 303 of Figure 3, which Petitioner does not rely on to meet the “comparison” limitation in the claim. Hearing Tr. 17:16–20. Also without proper support is Petitioner’s assertion that “a [person of ordinary skill] would have understood that in Bose, selecting or adjusting power mode for a component entails comparing a workload threshold, such as predicted power and performance associated with each power mode with real time statistics, such as the monitored workload of a component.” Pet. 26 (citing Wyatt Decl. ¶¶ 55–56). We determine that for the reasons given, Petitioner fails to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimed comparison element 1[g] of claim 1 is taught or suggested by Bose. We find, therefore, that Petitioner has not demonstrated that claim 1 is anticipated by Bose, nor has Petitioner demonstrated that to a person of ordinary skill, claim 1 would have been obvious in light of Bose.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 8,898,494 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,898,494
• Lenovo (United States) Inc. / Motorola Mobility LLC v. Theta IP, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 16, 2024 · IPR2023-00698 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 7–11, 13, and 19–21 were not shown unpatentable because Rauhala does not disclose simultaneous desired and interferer signal-strength determinations, defeating anticipation and the obviousness combination.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The two proposals are materially similar in the education requirement, but differ marginally in professional experience required (three versus five years). See supra. While we were persuaded, on the preliminary record, that both Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposals were consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’202 patent and the prior art of record, on balance, we determined that Petitioner’s proposal was a better reflection of the level of skill in the prior art, and we therefore adopted it for our Institution Decision. See Institution Dec. 12–13. For this Decision, we adopt the description of the person of ordinary skill articulated by Petitioner and used previously in our Institution Decision. In light of our review of the complete record, we find that this formulation is consistent with the ’202 patent, the prior art of record, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker. See Baker I Decl. ¶¶ 28–32. Our Decision would not change, however, if we had applied Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “85:13–16. He admits that “Rauhala doesn’t teach the details of what’s in the detector.” Id. at 91:6–7. He points to no textbook or other independent evidence that would have led a person of ordinary skill to design such a detector. Our Trial Practice Guide cautions against crediting such unsupported testimony: The Board has broad discretion to assign weight to be accorded expert testimony. Yorkey v. Diab, 601 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010). However, the testimony must be based on sufficient facts and data. Fed. R. Evid. 702(b). “Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 35 (Nov. 2019).7 We therefore give Dr, Baker’s unsupported testimony on this issue little weight.” slip op. at 24

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “We construe claim terms only as relevant to the parties’ contentions and only to the extent necessary to resolve the issues in dispute. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Having considered the positions of the parties, we find that for the purpose of this decision, we do not need to construe these terms to resolve a dispute.” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “requirement.” Pet. Reply 5. We do not agree with Petitioner. We find that the language of the claims supports Patent Owner’s argument that the desired signal and the interferer signal are received together. As discussed infra, claim limitations 7.7 and 7.8 recite determining a signal strength of the interferer signal and determining a signal strength of the desired signal. These determinations must be performed at the same time; otherwise, the determinations of signal strengths would not be of the same wireless signal. See Larson II Decl. ¶ 70; Baker II Decl. ¶¶ 48–49 (explaining that consideration of signal strengths detected at the same time would be “essential”). The specification of the ’202 patent further supports this finding: “When a receiver is actively receiving a desired signal, each block in the signal path has at its input the desired signal as well as noise and possibly interfering signals.” Ex. 1001, 5:22–24; see also Figs. 2A, 2B (showing interferer signals and desired signals together).” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 10,524,202 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,524,202
• Bright Data Ltd. v. Oxylabs, UabNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 11, 2024 · IPR2023-00187 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 were not proven unpatentable: Athas does not show the same packets are received, modified, and forwarded; neither obviousness combination teaches execution in response to the client’s execution of the second script.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art of the ’457 patent would have had “a Master’s Degree or higher in the field of electrical engineering, computer engineering, or computer science, or as of that time had a Bachelor’s Degree in the same fields and two or more years of experience in Internet Communications.” Pet. 14 (citing Williams Decl. ¶¶ 30–31). For our Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s formulation. Institution Dec. 11. Patent Owner has not provided a description of the ordinarily skilled artisan. However, Dr. Almeroth testifies that although he “do[es] not necessarily agree with every aspect of Dr. Williams’s explanation,” he bases his opinions on Dr. Williams’s description of the person of ordinary skill in the art. Almeroth Decl. ¶ 36. For this Final Written Decision, therefore, we adopt the description of the person of ordinary skill articulated by Petitioner 6 Neither party has presented evidence or arguments regarding objective evidence of non-obviousness. and used previously in our Institution Decision. We find that this formulation is consistent with the ’457 patent, the prior art of record, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Williams. Williams Decl. ¶¶ 30–31.” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “The citations to Dr. Williams’s testimony do not help Petitioner meet its burden of showing that the “same packets” feature is met by a preponderance of the evidence. Pet. Reply 11. The testimony of Dr. Williams cited by Petitioner relates to whether a hypothetical request for a web page forwarded from a conventional proxy to a server would use the same packets as the original request from a client to the proxy. See Ex. 2011, 115:7–21. The testimony does not address the issue raised by limitations 1b–1d, which is whether Athas discloses using the same packets for the receiving, modifying, and forwarding operations performed by the network appliance. In any event, we find Dr. Williams’s testimony on this issue to be equivocal and unconvincing. Several times he avoids answering questions by stating “it depends on how the software is written” or “it depends on the details of the code.” See id. at 117:8–17; 118:10–12.” slip op. at 23

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “as “the number of packets” intercepted in limitation 1a (see PO Resp. 6–7). Petitioner responds that resolving this argument is not necessary. Pet. Reply 1. We find that whether claim 1 requires the packets intercepted by the network appliance in limitation 1a to be the same packets involved in limitations 1b–1d, Petitioner has not persuasively shown that any same number of packets in Athas that are received at proxy platform 101 are then modified and forwarded as required by limitations 1b–1d, for the reasons discussed below. We agree with Patent Owner that the number of packets in limitations 1b-1d are the same, and, therefore, we find that Petitioner’s citations to Athas do not disclose the sequence of operations recited in claim limitations 1b–1d. Petitioner, therefore, does not demonstrate that Athas anticipates the claim. Specifically, we are not persuaded either by Petitioner’s assertions or Dr. Williams’s testimony that in Athas, the same “number of packets” that are received and modified by Athas’s proxy platform 101 are then forwarded to Athas’s proxy client 107, as required by limitations 1b–1d. PO Resp. 6– 7; 15–20; Almeroth Decl. ¶¶ 76–77. Petitioner does not persuasively address this issue the Petition or in its Reply (see Pet. Reply 2–11, asserting, in a footnote, only that “Patent Owner mischaracterizes Dr. Williams’s testimony regarding same versus different packets,” and that “Dr. Williams’s testimony does not support Patent Owner’s arguments.”). Id. at 11 n.4 (citing Ex. 2011, 115:22–117:20, 118:5–12). The citations to Dr. Williams’s testimony do not help Petitioner meet its burden of showing that the “same packets” feature is met by a preponderance of the evidence. Pet. Reply 11. The testimony of Dr. Williams cited by Petitioner relates to whether a hypothetical request for a web page forwarded from a conventional proxy to a server would use the same packets as the original request from a client to the proxy. See Ex. 2011, 115:7–21. The testimony does not address the issue raised by limitations 1b–1d, which is whether Athas discloses using the same packets for the receiving, modifying, and forwarding operations performed by the network appliance. In any event, we find Dr. Williams’s testimony on this issue to be equivocal and unconvincing. Several times he avoids answering questions by stating “it depends on how the software is written” or “it depends on the details of the code.” See id. at 117:8–17; 118:10–12. There is, therefore, no persuasive evidence of record demonstrating that Athas discloses that the same “number of packets” received at proxy platform 101 are, in a modified form, forwarded to proxy client 107. For example, there is no support in the record for a finding that once the content of packets sent from service platform 109 to proxy platform 101 in Athas is extracted and manipulated to replace non-MWL scripts with MWL scripts and the DOM is generated, modified versions of the same received packets are forwarded to provide the web page to proxy client 107, as opposed to completely new packets. We find no sufficient support for this contention in Dr. Williams’s testimony:” slip op. at 23

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “1b-1d are the same, and, therefore, we find that Petitioner’s citations to Athas do not disclose the sequence of operations recited in claim limitations 1b–1d. Petitioner, therefore, does not demonstrate that Athas anticipates the claim. Specifically, we are not persuaded either by Petitioner’s assertions or Dr. Williams’s testimony that in Athas, the same “number of packets” that are received and modified by Athas’s proxy platform 101 are then forwarded to Athas’s proxy client 107, as required by limitations 1b–1d. PO Resp. 6– 7; 15–20; Almeroth Decl. ¶¶ 76–77. Petitioner does not persuasively address this issue the Petition or in its Reply (see Pet. Reply 2–11, asserting, in a footnote, only that “Patent Owner mischaracterizes Dr. Williams’s testimony regarding same versus different packets,” and that “Dr. Williams’s testimony does not support Patent Owner’s arguments.”). Id. at 11 n.4 (citing Ex. 2011, 115:22–117:20, 118:5–12). The citations to Dr. Williams’s testimony do not help Petitioner meet its burden of showing that the “same packets” feature is met by a preponderance of the evidence. Pet. Reply 11. The testimony of Dr. Williams cited by Petitioner relates to whether a hypothetical request for a web page forwarded from a conventional proxy to a server would use the same packets as the original request from a client to the proxy. See Ex. 2011, 115:7–21. The testimony does not address the issue raised by limitations 1b–1d, which is whether Athas discloses using the same packets for the receiving, modifying, and forwarding operations performed by the network appliance. In any event, we find Dr. Williams’s testimony on this issue to be equivocal and unconvincing. Several times he avoids answering questions by stating “it depends on how the software is written” or “it depends on the details of the code.” See id. at 117:8–17; 118:10–12. There is, therefore, no persuasive evidence of record demonstrating that Athas discloses that the same “number of packets” received at proxy platform 101 are, in a modified form, forwarded to proxy client 107. For example, there is no support in the record for a finding that once the content of packets sent from service platform 109 to proxy platform 101 in Athas is extracted and manipulated to replace non-MWL scripts with MWL scripts and the DOM is generated, modified versions of the same received packets are forwarded to provide the web page to proxy client 107, as opposed to completely new packets. We find no sufficient support for this contention in Dr. Williams’s testimony:” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 8,924,457 not shown unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,924,457
• Bright Data Ltd. v. Oxylabs, UabInstitution denied
  PTAB · Apr 3, 2024 · IPR2023-01442 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any challenged claim under either anticipation ground.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to any claim challenged in the Petition. In addition, for the reasons stated on the merits of the Petition, we do not reach the question of whether to exercise our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). We, therefore, deny institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “According to Petitioner, a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art “would have been an individual who, as of July 18, 2002, the filing date of the ’667 Patent, had either: (1) a Bachelor’s Degree or higher in the field of electrical engineering, computer engineering, or computer science and at least one year of related practical experience; or (2) at least four years of practical experience in data management.” Pet. 9 (citing Williams Decl. ¶¶ 30–31). Patent Owner does not provide a description of the person of ordinary skill or dispute Petitioner’s description.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Neither party proposes claim constructions for our consideration. Petitioner “gives the claim terms their plain and ordinary meaning in light of the specification and prosecution history as would have been read by a [person of ordinary skill].” Pet. 9. Patent Owner does not comment on claim construction. We construe claim terms only as relevant to the parties’ contentions and only to the extent necessary to resolve the issues in dispute. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). We do not see the need to construe claim terms to resolve the issues in dispute. E. Description of the Prior Art References” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Other

    “The Federal Circuit addressed the legal standard for anticipation in Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2016): “Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), a prior art reference will anticipate if it ‘disclose[s] each and every element of the claimed invention . . . arranged or combined in the same way as in the claim.’” 815 F.3d at 1341 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted). C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art” slip op. at 7

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 7,020,667
• Bright Data Ltd. v. Oxylabs, UabInstitution denied
  PTAB · Apr 2, 2024 · IPR2023-01441 · APJ Stacey G White · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable over the asserted prior art.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We, therefore, deny institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “persuasive. As both parties note, the phrase in question recites “creating” a second data miner, which requires the generation of a new data miner. Petitioner’s declarant testifies that during prosecution of the ’526 patent prior art references were “expressly distinguished” because the prior art merely “pick[ed] a pre-existing search engine” or fell short because “no new miners [were] created.” Ex. 1008 ¶ 49 (citing Ex. 1002, 83, 34); accord Ex. 2001 ¶ 57 (similar testimony from Patent Owner’s declarant). We agree with the parties that this phrase requires the generation of a new data miner. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s construction falls short because it does not properly address the requirement that the second data miner be created “in response to the customer request.” Patent Owner states, and we agree, that “provid[ing] customized results to the user based on the customized parameters of the user search request” does not address the requirement that the second data miner be created “in response to” a customer request. Prelim. Resp. 9. In support of Patent Owner’s assertions, Patent Owner’s declarant points out that “as described with reference to FIG. 2 of the ’526 Patent, ‘customer requests for information can be received’ at block 66 and then at block 68, [‘]additional low level miners can be written in response, or high level miners, if required and not yet written, can be created.’” Ex. 2001 ¶ 61 (citing Ex. 1001, 8:32–35) (emphasis added). As stated in the ’526 patent a “‘miner’ or ‘data mining element’ is . . . an analysis engine that generates an output, and specifically an output that can include one or more keys representing characteristics of an entity, using a set of rules.” Ex. 1001, 5:63–66. The ’526 patent further notes that “the data miners are modular components that have specific input and output specifications.” Id. at 6:25–26. Further, “[m]iners are specified in terms of the data, usually as indicated by the below-described keys, that must be available when they start, and the data (including other keys) that they will create during successful processing.” Id. at 6:36–40. Thus, our review of the intrinsic record persuades us that creation of a second data miner requires the creation of a new “analysis engine,” and not just the provision of customized parameters to an existing “analysis engine.” Therefore, for the purposes of this decision, we construe the phrase “creating at least a second data miner in response to the customer request for information,” to require (1) the creation of at least one new second data miner, (2) that this creation be done in response to a customer request.” slip op. at 11

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)

    “As to the first argument, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that Jacobsen’s site ranking is created in response to a user request. Jacobsen’s site ranking feature “analyzes the Internet (i.e., the sites found) to determine the degree to which sites have been found interesting by others in the desired context/profession.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 67. A word score is saved for each word on each page (i.e., except for stop words, as discussed above). When a user enters a query, the inventive SSSE determines a set of (relevant) pages that contain the query terms. For each page, the word scores are summed for the words of the query to compute a site ranking for that page. The site rankings for the pages are then used in determining how to display the search results to the user. Id. ¶ 69. Based on our review of Jacobsen’s disclosures, we are persuaded that the query is an input to the site ranking feature. As described in the ’526 specification, a “‘miner’' or ‘data mining element’ is . . . an analysis engine that generates an output, and specifically an output that can include one or more keys representing characteristics of an entity, using a set of rules.” Ex. 1001, 5:63–66 (emphasis added). Site ranking in Jacobsen is performed after a user query, but on the record before us, Petitioner has not shown that the analysis engine used to rank the sites is not created “in response to” the user query. See also Pet. 14 n. 7 (stating that Jacobsen discloses “the use of a pre-existing template to search the results of a first data miner”). In addition, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that the site ranking feature in Jacobsen would disclose a data miner as recited in the claims. The ’526 patent describes prior art systems that “generat[ed] an inverted index of words that occur on Web pages.” Ex. 1001, 1:22–23. User queries were provided with output based on that index and the results “returned are usually ranked by relevance using e.g., link information or key word frequency of occurrence.” Id. at 1:29–31. Petitioner’s declarant describes these disclosures are applicant admitted prior art. Ex. 1008 ¶ 52. The ’526 patent criticizes this prior method as inefficient because, despite the ranking “finding particular types of information typically entails a great deal of mundane sifting through query results by a person” and this process is “labor-intensive and mundane,” ranking “can consume an excessive’ amount of time.” Ex. 1001, 1:31–35, 1:42–43, 2:5–6. In contrast, the ’526 patent’s system purportedly “integrates the knowledge of many experts to sift through a large corpus of data to respond to what might be relatively complex requests for information.” Id. at 3:9–11. Its data miners are analysis engines that operate based on expert rules. Id. at code (57), 5:63– 66. Petitioner’s allegations have not persuaded us that Jacobsen’s site ranking feature overcomes the problems of the prior art ranking system. Accordingly, based on the record before us, we determine that” slip op. at 25

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success

    “E. Alleged Obviousness of Claims 2 and 35 Over Jacobsen, and Over Jacobsen and Jaramillo, and Alleged Obviousness of Claims 6–9, 11, 16, 17, 39–42, 44, 49, and 50 Over Jacobsen and Hegli Petitioner asserts that dependent claims 2 and 35 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Jacobsen, and as obvious over Jacobsen and Jaramillo. Pet. 4, 32–38. Petitioner also asserts that dependent claims 6–9, 11, 16, 17, 39–42, 44, 49, and 50 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Jacobsen and Hegli. Pet. 4, 38–50. Petitioner’s assertions here rely on the same disclosures from Jacobsen regarding the above discussed independent claims and do not remedy the above noted deficiency. As such, on the record before us, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s Jacobsen-based challenges to claims 2, 6–9, 11, 16, 17, 35, 39–42, 44, 49, and 50. F. Alleged Anticipation of Claims 1, 6, 9, 11, 13, 19, 20, 34, 39, 42, 44, 46,” slip op. at 27

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,010,526
• Netskope, Inc. v. Fortinet, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Sep 11, 2023 · IPR2023-00457 · APJ James P Calve · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Netskope did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–9 were unpatentable on any of its four §103 grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, we determine that the information presented does not show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We therefore deny institution of an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “The parties substantially agree on the level of ordinary skill in the art and differ mainly in the level of experience required for different levels of education. We consider Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill to be slightly more consistent with the ’968 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our obviousness analysis below. We note, however, that our decision would be the same under either party’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “B. Claim Interpretation We interpret claims “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claims in a civil action [held] under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, we construe a claim “in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Id. We construe the claims only to the extent necessary to determine whether to institute inter partes review. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The parties agree that no claim constructions are needed. Pet. 21; Prelim. Resp. 15. Having considered the record, we determine that no express claim construction is necessary to reach our decision.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “3. Motivation to Combine Petitioner contends that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Jordan and FortiGate because FortiGate analyzes content in real-time and downloads new or updated virus definitions to identify suspicious network traffic, and this capability would improve Jordan’s complementary system, which generates and updates rules for malware detection. Pet. 25.” slip op. at 12

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 9,231,968
• Bright Data Ltd. v. Oxylabs, UabInstituted
  PTAB · Jul 18, 2023 · IPR2023-00186 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · IPR · Institution

  Instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all asserted grounds; the Board found a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one claim and compelling merits for Scoda anticipation of claim 1.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

    “Office (“USPTO”) issued a Memorandum7 titled Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation (“Memo”), which states, among other things, that “to benefit the patent system and the public good, the PTAB will not rely on the Fintiv factors to discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petition presents compelling evidence of unpatentability.” Memo 2. “Compelling, meritorious challenges are those in which the evidence, if unrebutted in trial, would plainly lead to a conclusion that one or more claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 4. “This clarification strikes a balance among the competing concerns of avoiding potentially conflicting outcomes, avoiding overburdening patent owners, and strengthening the patent system by eliminating patents that are not robust and reliable.” Id. at 5. For the reasons that follow, although we find that Fintiv factors 1–5 weigh in favor of denying institution in this case, we determine that the Petition presents compelling merits as to the challenged claims, and thus, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny the Petition.” slip op. at 10

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “institute an inter partes review if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). After considering the parties’ briefing and the evidence of record, we conclude the information presented shows there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’162 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to the challenged claims on the grounds of unpatentability asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “the invention of the ’091 patent would have had master’s degree or higher in the field of electrical engineering, computer engineering, or computer science, or would have had a bachelor’s degree in the same fields and two or more years of experience in internet communications. Pet. 15–16 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 30–31). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition for a person of ordinary skill in the art. See Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the level of ordinary skill as articulated by Petitioner because, based on the current record, this proposal appears to be consistent with the ’091 patent and the prior art of record and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Williams.” slip op. at 17

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “recited in the Petition, does cite throughout to the asserted art and provides support for its assertions that the art discloses the claim language. We, therefore, determine Dr. Williams’s declaration is not without evidentiary support. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.63 (“Evidence consists of affidavits, declarations, transcripts of deposition, documents, and things.”). At this stage, we give weight to Dr. Williams’s testimony, which is the only testimony we have before us in this proceeding relating to the asserted art and how the art discloses the claim limitations. In contrast to the situation presented here, neither the petition nor the declarant in Xerox provided sufficient evidence to support the asserted positions; rather, the petition merely cited to the declaration which merely repeated the unsupported, conclusory assertions set forth in the petition. See Xerox Corp., IPR2022-00624, Paper 12 at 5 (stating the cited declaration testimony is conclusory and unsupported and adds little to the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support); 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight”). That is not the case here. As noted above, however, the ultimate weight of Dr. Williams’ testimony will be determined in light of the full record adduced during trial.” slip op. at 28

  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,516,091
• Code200, Uab / Teso LT, Uab et al. v. Bright Data Ltd.Rehearing granted
  PTAB · Oct 19, 2022 · IPR2022-00862 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Rehearing

  On Director remand, the Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1, 2, 6–11, 13, and 15–24 on all petitioned grounds and granted joinder with IPR2021-01493.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

    “Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office vacating our previous decision denying institution, remanding for further proceedings, and ordering us to reconsider joinder after reconsidering the decision denying institution. Paper 18 (“Remand Dec.”).” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

    “We consider the Director’s Memorandum, which directs that “the PTAB will not rely on the Fintiv factors to discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petition presents compelling evidence of unpatentability.” Memorandum 2. The Memorandum explains that “where the PTAB determines that the information presented at the institution stage presents a compelling unpatentability challenge, that determination alone demonstrates that the PTAB should not discretionarily deny institution under Fintiv.” Id. at 4–5 (emphasis added). The Memorandum further explains that “[c]ompelling, meritorious challenges are those in which the evidence, if unrebutted in trial, would plainly lead to a conclusion that one or more claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 4. On the current record, we determine that Petitioner’s invalidity grounds present compelling unpatentability challenges. See infra Sections IV, D–I. In particular, in our view at this stage of the proceeding, the Petition presents compelling evidence that three prior art references, including Border, which was not before the jury in the Teso litigation, anticipate many of the claims of the ’510 patent. We determine that instituting inter partes review under these circumstances “strikes a balance among the competing concerns of avoiding potentially conflicting outcomes, avoiding overburdening patent owners, and strengthening the patent system by eliminating patents that are not robust and reliable.” Memorandum 5. Accordingly, based upon our consideration of the evidence and arguments presented in the Petition, and pursuant to the directive in the Memorandum concerning compelling, meritorious challenges, we decline to exercise our discretion under § 314(a) to deny institution of inter partes review as Patent Owner requests.” slip op. at 13

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “PTAB will not rely on the Fintiv factors to discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petition presents compelling evidence of unpatentability.” Memorandum 2. The Memorandum explains that “where the PTAB determines that the information presented at the institution stage presents a compelling unpatentability challenge, that determination alone demonstrates that the PTAB should not discretionarily deny institution under Fintiv.” Id. at 4–5 (emphasis added). The Memorandum further explains that “[c]ompelling, meritorious challenges are those in which the evidence, if unrebutted in trial, would plainly lead to a conclusion that one or more claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 4. On the current record, we determine that Petitioner’s invalidity grounds present compelling unpatentability challenges. See infra Sections IV, D–I. In particular, in our view at this stage of the proceeding, the Petition presents compelling evidence that three prior art references, including Border, which was not before the jury in the Teso litigation, anticipate many of the claims of the ’510 patent. We determine that instituting inter partes review under these circumstances “strikes a balance among the competing concerns of avoiding potentially conflicting outcomes, avoiding overburdening patent owners, and strengthening the patent system by eliminating patents that are not robust and reliable.” Memorandum 5. Accordingly, based upon our consideration of the evidence and arguments presented in the Petition, and pursuant to the directive in the Memorandum concerning compelling, meritorious challenges, we decline to exercise our discretion under § 314(a) to deny institution of inter partes review as Patent Owner requests.” slip op. at 13

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

    “As discussed above, we determine that the merits of this action present a compelling unpatentability challenge. Absent joinder, a one-year bar would apply to Petitioner, and, again, the merits presented in this challenge would not be reached by the Board in a final written decision. Under these specific circumstances, we determine joinder is appropriate in the interests of justice. Because NetNut has been dismissed from the 1493 IPR, there are no longer issues of cooperation and duplication that would have to be addressed between petitioners. Additionally, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 316(11), maintaining the previously-set trial schedule in the 1493 IPR is not necessary when joinder is granted. See also 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(c). Thus, the schedule will be adjusted in accordance with a Revised Scheduling Order, entered concurrently with this Decision.” slip op. at 37

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,484,510
• Hulu, LLC v. Sito Mobile R&D IP, LLC And Sito Mobile, Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 4, 2022 · IPR2021-00265 · APJ Joni Y Chang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 15–19, 21, 24, and 27 are unpatentable as obvious over Eyal and Wiser; claims 15, 16, 19, 21, and 27 are also unpatentable over Madison and Wiser.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “The Specification sets forth the following definition: “[a] reservation is a feature that enables the streaming system 102 to reserve system resources, such as switches, processors, or media, either now or in the future, to ensure a quality media experience.” Ex. 1001, 11:59−62 (emphasis added). The Federal Circuit has recognized that “the specification may reveal a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess,” and “[i]n such cases, the inventor’s lexicography governs.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (citing CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Therefore, consistent with the definition in the Specification, we construe “reservation” as “a feature that enables the streaming system . . . to reserve system resources, such as switches, processors, or media, either now or in the future, to ensure a quality media experience.” Ex. 1001, 11:59−62. We agree with Patent Owner that the construction of the term “reservation” does 7 not require “a set of instructions uniquely identifying the communication device.” As to “reservation identification,” we adopt Patent Owner’s construction, construing the term “reservation identification” as “identification of a reservation” because this construction is consistent with the term’s plain and ordinary meaning, without requiring the identification to be unique.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “is a feature that enables the streaming system 102 to reserve system resources, such as switches, processors, or media, either now or in the future, to ensure a quality media experience.” Ex. 1001, 11:59−62 (emphasis added). The Federal Circuit has recognized that “the specification may reveal a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess,” and “[i]n such cases, the inventor’s lexicography governs.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (citing CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Therefore, consistent with the definition in the Specification, we construe “reservation” as “a feature that enables the streaming system . . . to reserve system resources, such as switches, processors, or media, either now or in the future, to ensure a quality media experience.” Ex. 1001, 11:59−62. We agree with Patent Owner that the construction of the term “reservation” does 7 not require “a set of instructions uniquely identifying the communication device.” As to “reservation identification,” we adopt Patent Owner’s construction, construing the term “reservation identification” as “identification of a reservation” because this construction is consistent with the term’s plain and ordinary meaning, without requiring the identification to be unique.” slip op. at 7

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Here, Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art of the ’360 patent would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical or computer engineering, or equivalent.” Pet. 16. And, such an artisan also would have had “at least two years of experience in distributed systems, multimedia streaming, and various HTTP-related technologies, or an equivalent amount of relevant work or research experience,” citing to the Declaration of Henry Houh, Ph.D., for support. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 59−61). Patent Owner’s declarant, Mr. Michael Adams, provides similar assessment, but also testifies that such an artisan, alternatively, would have had “at least five years of work experience and training in the design and development of distributed network systems and/or multimedia streaming.” Ex. 2012 ¶ 28. Neither party points out any meaningful difference between the parties’ assessments. We apply Patent Owner’s assessment on the level of ordinary skill in the art. However, our analysis would be the same under either party’s description.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableUnpatentable

    “added). Dr. Houh testifies that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have used Wiser’s voucher ID in Eyal’s play-list because delivery servers may have a “limited number of active streams of data being delivered at any one time,” so that generating and tracking reservations by the content server using voucher IDs is necessary. Ex. 1003 ¶ 144 (citing Ex. 1006, 14:65−15:1). We agree with and credit Dr. Houh’s testimony, and we find that such an artisan of ordinary skill would have understood that, in Eyal in combination with Wiser, the voucher ID provided in the play-list is uniquely associated with the client device and a viewing session of the media. Ex. 1003 ¶ 151 (citing Ex. 1006, 8:30−33, 15:23−28). We do not agree with Patent Owner’s assertion that “Wiser teaches away from video.” PO Resp. 33 (citing Ex. 2012 ¶ 174). “A reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Here, nothing in Wiser would discourage a relevant artisan from applying its teachings to video media, as Patent Owner alleges. Patent Owner’s argument of teaching away is based on speculation. As discussed above, Wiser’s disclosure is not limited to audio media. Ex. 1006, 1:5−8, 1:23−26, 3:8−10; Ex. 1083, 145:20−147:21. The “mere disclosure of alternative designs does not teach away.” In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Moreover, KSR instructs us that “if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize 20 that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. As Dr. Houh testifies, “[s]ervers’ limited streaming capacity was a common media delivery problem, and well-known solutions existed before the ’360 Patent, including generating a reservation to ensure resource availability for streaming media to the user.” Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 106, 167 (citing Ex. 1019, 263 (Discussion on Resource Reservation Protocols (RSVP) in the book entitled “Communication and Computing for Distributed Multimedia Systems”); Ex. 1023 (RSVP Specification); Ex. 1024, 194 (Discussion on the Reservation Protocol in the book entitled “Multimedia Servers”)).” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 9,591,360 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,591,360
• Hulu, LLC v. Sito Mobile R&D IP, LLC And Sito Mobile, Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 4, 2022 · IPR2021-00206 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 10, 11, 14, 34, 35, 37, 39, 43, and 47–50 are unpatentable as obvious over the stated prior-art combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “U.S. Patent No. 8,825,887 (“the ’887 patent”). The claims of that patent include the same term referring to “at least one portion,” and the ’887 patent shares its written description with the ’636 patent. In our Final Written Decision in CBM2020-00028 (Paper 33, 9−13), we found that the plain and ordinary meaning of this term encompasses one or more portions of the “requested media,” as well as the entirety of the “requested media.” CBM2020-00028, Paper 33 at 10–11. We declined to adopt Patent Owner’s implicit claim construction because it improperly imports extraneous limitations into the claims and excludes a preferred embodiment. Id. at 11–” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “as “a file containing one or more media references and other information used by a communication device to obtain media.” PO Resp. 14–17. Patent Owner contends that “a play script is not itself limited to being a list.” Id. at 15. Patent Owner argues that a script “is a file, which can be processed by a computer to obtain media” because the claims recite that the play script contains “instructions.” Id. Patent Owner also cites the district court’s adoption of this construction. Id. at 13–14. Whether or not a playlist is a file is not a meaningful distinction for the purposes of this Final Written Decision. As Petitioner notes, all of the “play scripts” identified by Petitioner in the prior art are files. Reply 6. We agree with Petitioner that we need not determine which party’s construction applies for purposes of our analysis. Nidec, 868 F.3d at 1017.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “reservation. Patent Owner now proposes the following construction: “arrangement regarding reserved resources of a streaming system.” PO Resp. 17. Patent Owner cites the specification and Mr. Adam’s testimony 13 for support. Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 10:33−37; Adams Decl. ¶ 110). Mr. Adam relies on the ’636 patent specification, which states that “[a] reservation is a feature that enables the streaming system 102 to reserve system resources, such as switches, processors, or media, either now or in the future, to ensure a quality media experience.” Ex. 1001, 10:33–37. Further, “[t]he reservation uniquely identifies the viewer 118 or 120 and the customized play script.” Id. at 10:27–28, 10:34–37. The Federal Circuit has recognized that “the specification may reveal a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess,” and “[i]n such cases, the inventor’s lexicography governs.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (citing CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Based on the description in the specification, we construe “reservation” as “a feature that enables the streaming system 102 to reserve system resources, such as switches, processors, or media, either now or in the future, to ensure a quality media experience.” Ex. 1001, 10:33–37.” slip op. at 13

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Neither party points out any meaningful difference between the parties’ assessments. We therefore apply Patent Owner’s more detailed assessment on the level of ordinary skill in the art. This proposal is consistent with the ’636 patent, the prior art of record, and is supported by 16 the testimony of Mr. Adams. Adams Decl. ¶¶ 27–29. However, our analysis would be the same under either party’s description.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 9,135,636 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,135,636

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.