• Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm IncorporatedSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 24, 2020 · IPR2018-01282 · APJ Daniel N Fishman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 6–10, 12–22, 25–30, 46, 47, and 49–53 are unpatentable over the stated grounds; claims 4, 5, 23, 24, and 48 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We discern no significant distinction between Dr. Allen’s definition of the level of ordinary skill and that of Patent Owner. In view of Patent Owner’s admission that any differences are not material to the issues we decide here, we discern no reason to depart from our definition of the level 5 Patent Owner does not present arguments or evidence of such secondary considerations in its briefs. Therefore, secondary considerations do not enter into our analysis. Inst. 10. Accordingly, we adopt Dr. Allen’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art and determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’865 patent would have had a Bachelor of Science degree in either computer science or electrical engineering, together with at least two years of study in an advanced degree program in artificial intelligence, machine learning, or pattern recognition, or comparable work experience.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Second, we agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s proffered interpretation, requiring a “pattern” to include relationships between two or more such pairs, incorrectly excludes embodiments where a “pattern” may be identified by the value of only a single parameter. We find nothing in the intrinsic evidence that supports Patent Owner’s narrow interpretation. By contrast, Petitioner identifies support in the ’865 patent Specification referring to a “pattern” being represented by “one or more” values of parameters in support of its interpretation that encompasses a single parameter value representing a “pattern.” See Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1001, 6:49–55, 9:63–67). Furthermore, Petitioner points to deposition testimony of Patent Owner’s expert (Dr. Villasenor) as extrinsic evidence to support the contention that a “pattern” encompasses the value of even a single parameter.” slip op. at 15

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “monitoring and detecting steps in the teachings of Louch. Having reviewed the parties’ arguments and supporting evidence in the complete trial record, we are persuaded Louch teaches the monitoring and detecting steps of claim 1 (as well as related recitations of claims 21 and 46). See Ex. 1011, 8:24–26 (“In some implementations, the process 400 can begin when input from one or more sensors on the mobile device are used to determine a current state of the mobile device ( 410).”), 8:33–35 (“the determining can include detecting and determining two or more different states based on inputs from two or more different sensors”), 8:55–57 (“[t]he states can be determined based on sensor inputs, as described in reference to FIGS. 1-4”); see also Ex. 1021 ¶ 119.” slip op. at 31

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues Louch and Nadkarni are in the same field of endeavor, argues both Louch and Nadkarni are pertinent to the problem addressed by the ’865 patent, and articulates reasons for the proposed combination of Louch and Nadkarni. Pet. 41–45. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s reasons for combining the references. Having reviewed Petitioner’s arguments (Pet. 41–45), we are persuaded Petitioner has articulated a reason for combining Louch and Nadkarni based on rational underpinnings.” slip op. at 43

  Patent outcomesUS 8,768,865 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,768,865
• Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm IncorporatedSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 24, 2020 · IPR2018-01281 · APJ Daniel N Fishman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 5, 6, 8–22, 24, 25, 27–30, 46–49, and 51–53 are unpatentable; claims 4 and 23 are not shown unpatentable because Wang does not teach the claimed response between fixing and reduced parameters.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Second, we agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s proffered interpretation, requiring a “pattern” to include relationships between two or more such pairs, incorrectly excludes embodiments where a “pattern” may be identified by the value of only a single parameter. We find nothing in the intrinsic evidence that supports Patent Owner’s narrow interpretation. By contrast, Petitioner identifies support in the ’865 patent Specification referring to a “pattern” being represented by “one or more” values of parameter value representing a “pattern.” See Pet. 11–12 (citing Ex. 1001, 6:49–55, 9:63–67). Furthermore, Petitioner points to deposition testimony of Patent Owner’s expert (Dr. Villasenor) as extrinsic evidence to support the contention that a “pattern” encompasses the value of even a single parameter.” slip op. at 15

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We discern no significant distinction between Dr. Allen’s definition of the level of ordinary skill and that of Patent Owner. In view of Patent Owner’s admission that any differences are not material to the issues we decide here, we discern no reason to depart from our definition of the level 5 Patent Owner does not present arguments or evidence of such secondary considerations in its briefs. Therefore, secondary considerations do not enter into our analysis. Inst. 10. Accordingly, we adopt Dr. Allen’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art and determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’865 patent would have had a Bachelor of Science degree in either computer science or electrical engineering, together with at least two years of study in an advanced degree program in artificial intelligence, machine learning, or pattern recognition, or comparable work experience.” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “illustrated in Wang’s Table 1. In view of these numerous references to the exemplary user states and associated features illustrated in Wang’s Table 1, Patent Owner’s assertion, supported by Dr. Villasenor, that Wang does not use Table 1 to identify states is not credible. Based on Wang’s frequent by Petitioner (Pet. 17, 22–24), we determine that Wang’s implementation uses the states and features illustrated in Table 1 to recognize/identify a pattern as claimed (a particular set of feature values illustrated in Table 1), based on a condition (the corresponding present user state represented in Table 1).” slip op. at 39

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “illustrated in Wang’s Table 1. In view of these numerous references to the exemplary user states and associated features illustrated in Wang’s Table 1, Patent Owner’s assertion, supported by Dr. Villasenor, that Wang does not use Table 1 to identify states is not credible. Based on Wang’s frequent by Petitioner (Pet. 17, 22–24), we determine that Wang’s implementation uses the states and features illustrated in Table 1 to recognize/identify a pattern as claimed (a particular set of feature values illustrated in Table 1), based on a condition (the corresponding present user state represented in Table 1). It is true that there is no particular algorithm, program code, or data structure that discloses precisely how Table 1 is used. However, the claims do not require any particular data structure, algorithm, or programmed instructions. Claim 1 merely requires that the first pattern be identified “based, at least in part, on said at least one detected condition.” Wang’s frequent reference to the information illustrated in Table 1 and use of that information (feature values) to determine a user state sufficiently teaches the ordinarily skilled artisan the claimed identifying step, as discussed by Dr. Allen. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 105–107. Accordingly, we find that Wang teaches the identifying step because Table 1 illustrates the exemplary states recognized (identified) by EEMSS along with the patterns (State Features) used to identify the states.” slip op. at 39

  Patent outcomesUS 8,768,865 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,768,865
• Intel Corporation v. Qualcomm, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 20, 2020 · IPR2018-01154 · APJ Trevor M Jefferson · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 16 is unpatentable as obvious over Kwak; claims 15, 17–18, and 20 were not shown anticipated by Kwak, and claim 19 was not shown obvious over Kwak and Choi 2010.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Our Institution Decision adopted Petitioner’s proposed level of skill. Dec. on Inst. 11. Patent Owner does not dispute this issue. PO Resp. 11. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art and we find the work experience is commensurate with the level of ordinary skill in the art. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Here, the ’558 patent requires a degree of knowledge that is specific to mobile device architecture as well as transmission and power circuitry for radio frequency devices. See Pet. 36–37; Ex. 1201, Abstract, 1:7–9, 30–31.” slip op. at 7

  • Prior constructionTerm construed petitioner constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “1. “current sense amplifier” (claim 15) Petitioner offers a claim construction for “current sense amplifier” (claim 15) to mean an “amplifier that produces a voltage from a current,” which is based on the ALJ’s construction in the parallel ITC proceeding. Pet. 35–36 (citing Ex. 1223, 11–12). Petitioner argues that the ITC construction is consistent with the ’558 patent specification and the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 35–36 (Ex. 1201, 4:64–66, 5:7–10, 5:18–20). Patent Owner argues that this term does not require construction, but does not contest Petitioner’s contention or our adoption of this construction in the Institution Decision. PO Resp. 10. Based on the full record and for the reasons given by the ALJ in the ITC proceeding (Ex. 1223, 11–12), we adopt the construction of “current sense amplifier” to mean an “amplifier that produces a voltage from a current.”” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “As we discussed in IPR2018-01152 and IPR2018-01153, and incorporate herein (1152 Final Dec. 12–21), the broadest reasonable interpretation is what would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. See Translogic, 504 F.3d at 1257. The ’558 specification and the context of claims 6, 8, and 13 and the related language of claim 19 support that the amplifier must be able to receive both the boosted supply voltage and the first supply voltage (a selective boost) as recited in the claims. PO Resp. 35–38; Ex. 1201, 1:42–50, 5:31–49, 8:55– 62, 8:62–9:17, 9:21–36, 10:19–29, Figs. 3 and 5. In light of these findings, we do not agree with Petitioner’s arguments that the plain language of the claim 19 identifies two alternatives that need not both be present. Pet. Reply 3–4. We credit and find persuasive Patent Owner’s evidence that the ’558 specification, which provides context for the interpretation of an ordinarily skilled artisan, refers to the capability of receiving or operating on both voltages at the source (envelope amplifier). See PO Resp. 35–38.” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “On the full record, Petitioner has not provided sufficient or persuasive argument and evidence that Figure 6 is merely a more detailed implementation of Figure 5 such that a person of ordinary skill in the art would envision them as a single disclosure. Figure 6 specifically discusses a summing circuit operating on input current and offset current that differs from the voltage circuit signals shown in Figure 5. PO Sur-reply 13–14. We also note that feedforward node in Figure 6 differs from that shown in Figure 5. Indeed, Kwak expressly notes the differences and advantages between Figures 4 and 5 (showing summation of voltage signals) and Figure 6, which shows voltage signals converted into current signals before summation, stating that: In CMOS design, although three voltage signals can be added and then integrated as shown in Figs. 4 and 5, the simultaneous summation and integration of the signals at the node Vc, after the conversion of the three voltage signals into current ones, is advantageous, that is, the sensed output current of the linear amplifier, the feedforward current, and the high-frequency current through the ripple filter are added together and integrated at the node with the inverted polarity of the last one Ex. 1211, 2669. Kwak’s disclosure notes differences between the voltage signals of Figures 4 and 5 and the current conversion feedforward teachings shown in Figure 6. See id. On the full record, Petitioner has failed to persuasively establish that “a person of skill in the art, reading the reference, would ‘at once envisage’ the claimed arrangement or combination of elements” of claim 15 based on Kwak’s disclosures. See Microsoft Corp., 878 F.3d at 1068. Petitioner’s parallel citations to Figures 5 and 6 and joint discussion of the current summing and integration of Figure 6 and the voltage summing of Figures 5 (see Pet. 42–49), do not establish that Kwak shows the elements of the claim in an embodiment as arranged in the claims. Microsoft Corp., 878 F.3d at 1068–1069. Petitioner’s arguments and testimony evidence (Ex. 1203 ¶ 96; Pet. 44–45 (citing Ex. 1203 ¶¶ 94–96)) fail to address sufficiently the differences between Kwak’s Figures 5 and 6. For the reasons discussed above, Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Kwak anticipates independent claim 15 or dependent claims 17, 18, and 20.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 8,698,558 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,698,558
• Intel Corporation v. Alacritech, Inc.Rehearing granted
  PTAB · Jan 25, 2018 · IPR2017-01395 · APJ Daniel N Fishman · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board partly granted Intel’s rehearing request to recognize the Stansbury Declaration as a compliant sworn affidavit, but otherwise denied rehearing and left institution denied.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, grantedRehearing, deniedGranted in part

    “When considering a request for rehearing, we review the Decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). The party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the Decision should be modified, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). A request for rehearing is not an opportunity to present new arguments. See id. An abuse of discretion may arise if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000).” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). In the Decision, the Board determined that the record before it was insufficient to show that Stevens21 is a prior art printed publication under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 311(b) with respect to the ’948 patent. Stevens2 is one of the references relied upon in the sole asserted ground of unpatentability in the Petition. Accordingly, the Board concluded that Petitioner did not slip op. at 2

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable

    “Stevens2 was published no later than April 7, 1995 and is prior art under 102(b).” Pet. 45 n.9 (citing Ex. 1063 in support thereof (the “Stansbury Declaration”)). The Petition, per se, provides no other evidence or argument to establish a threshold showing that Stevens2 is a printed publication— publicly accessible by an interested person of ordinary skill in the art before the critical date. slip op. at 3

  • Expert testimonyOther

    “attested that Stevens2 was ‘standard reference book on TCP/IP’ that was ‘widely cited and relied upon,’ ‘well known resources to a [person of ordinary skill in the art]’ (Petition at 15 (citing Ex.1003 at ¶¶21-88, including ¶¶27, 60, and FN3), 45 (citing Ex.1003 at ¶1212), FN9).” Req. 12. Initially we observe the Petition cites these paragraphs of Dr. Horst’s Declaration as part of the “Background Of Technology” discussion rather than as support for public accessibility of Stevens2. See Pet. 15–24. Furthermore, incorporating by reference such a substantial portion of Dr. Horst’s Declaration (paragraphs 21–88) is improper under our rules. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3). Regardless, even if we consider Dr. Horst’s description of well-known background material (including Stevens2) as support for public accessibility of Stevens2, his testimony does not indicate” slip op. at 5

  § 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 8,805,948
• Kingston Technology Company, Inc. v. Spex Technologies, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Aug 17, 2017 · IPR2017-00825 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on all asserted grounds because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on claims 55 or 57.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Our Rules require that a petition for inter partes review identify “[h]ow the construed claim is unpatentable under the statutory grounds identified” and must specify “where each element of [a challenged] claim is 3 Petitioner proposes a definition for a person of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 13; see Ex. 1010 ¶ 20. Patent Owner does not challenge this definition. For purposes of this Decision and to the extent necessary, we adopt Petitioner’s definition. found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4). Moreover, “a challenger who seeks to demonstrate that a means-plus-function limitation was present in the prior art must prove that the corresponding structure—or an equivalent—was present in the prior art.” Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc)).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “2. “security module” and “target module” The terms “security module” and “target module” both are recited in each challenged claim. Petitioner identifies a dispute between itself and Patent Owner in related district court litigation as to whether those terms require only “functional (not necessarily physically distinct) modules.” Pet. 15. Specifically, Petitioner points to a statement in an infringement claim chart that appears to have been attached as an exhibit to Patent Owner’s complaint in the litigation that the accused device “has at least two modules, a security module (e.g., cryptographic functionality) and a target module (e.g., storage functionality).” Id. (citing Ex. 1008, 2). Petitioner states that it “expressly disagrees with Patent Owner’s broad construction of the ‘modules’ language as covering structures that are not physically distinct.” Id. Petitioner contends that the proper construction of “module” “requires a structure that performs as a ‘security’ module and another separate (potentially connected) structure that performs as a ‘target’ (e.g., memory module, second security module, etc.).” Id. at 18.” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner. Petitioner does not sufficiently, persuasively explain how Jones’s disclosure of a memory card that “stores information enabling [a] host computer to automatically identify the particular . . . card as soon as the card and host are connected, and to automatically establish [an] appropriate hardware/software interface” teaches or suggests “receiving a request from the host computing device for information regarding the type of the modular device” and “providing the type of the target module to the host computing device in response to the request,” as recited in claim 55. Indeed, Jones’s statement that the card includes information enabling the host to “automatically” identify the card “as soon as the card and host are connected” suggests not only that receipt of a request is unnecessary, but also that the information is not provided “in response to [a] request.” We also are not persuaded by Petitioner’s alternative argument based on a device driver “directly interrogat[ing] the CIS structures in the attribute memory.” Pet. 20. As Patent Owner points out (Prelim. Resp. 16), Jones describes that as separate from the embodiment relied upon by Petitioner as disclosing all other limitations of claim 55, whereas anticipation requires that all of the limitations be arranged or combined in the same way in the prior art as recited in the claim. Net MoneyIN, 545 F.3d at 1371. Moreover, because Petitioner does not advance any argument that the “CIS structures in the attribute memory” perform the remaining claim steps or explain how the “operably connecting” step of claim 55 would be taught or suggested by Jones “in cases wherein the host computer is not provided with PCMCIA Card Services and Socket Services functions,” we agree with Patent Owner that this alternative argument also fails to establish a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in its obviousness challenge to claim 55 over Jones.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner. Petitioner does not sufficiently, persuasively explain how Jones’s disclosure of a memory card that “stores information enabling [a] host computer to automatically identify the particular . . . card as soon as the card and host are connected, and to automatically establish [an] appropriate hardware/software interface” teaches or suggests “receiving a request from the host computing device for information regarding the type of the modular device” and “providing the type of the target module to the host computing device in response to the request,” as recited in claim 55. Indeed, Jones’s statement that the card includes information enabling the host to “automatically” identify the card “as soon as the card and host are connected” suggests not only that receipt of a request is unnecessary, but also that the information is not provided “in response to [a] request.” We also are not persuaded by Petitioner’s alternative argument based on a device driver “directly interrogat[ing] the CIS structures in the attribute memory.” Pet. 20. As Patent Owner points out (Prelim. Resp. 16), Jones describes that as separate from the embodiment relied upon by Petitioner as disclosing all other limitations of claim 55, whereas anticipation requires that all of the limitations be arranged or combined in the same way in the prior art as recited in the claim. Net MoneyIN, 545 F.3d at 1371. Moreover, because Petitioner does not advance any argument that the “CIS structures in the attribute memory” perform the remaining claim steps or explain how the “operably connecting” step of claim 55 would be taught or suggested by Jones “in cases wherein the host computer is not provided with PCMCIA Card Services and Socket Services functions,” we agree with Patent Owner that this alternative argument also fails to establish a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in its obviousness challenge to claim 55 over Jones.” slip op. at 16

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,003,135
• Smart Microwave Sensors GmbH v. Wavetronix LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 17, 2017 · IPR2016-00488 · APJ Daniel N Fishman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 9, 10, 12, 13, 22, 23, and 25 are unpatentable, including as anticipated by Boles or Farmer and obvious over combinations including Boles, Farmer, Herman, and others.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedGranted

    “1. Exhibits 1002, 1008, 1009, and 1012 Patent Owner argues the date printed on each of Exhibits 1002, 1008, 1009, and 1012, is inadmissible hearsay under FRE 801 and 802 as out of court statement offered to prove that truth of the matter asserted—that each document was a printed publication as of the date printed on that document (i.e., that it was sufficiently publicly accessible). Paper 45, 2–3 (citing Standard Innovation Corp. v. Lelo, Inc., Case IPR2014-00148, Paper 41 (PTAB April 23, 2015)). As discussed supra, we agree with Patent Owner that the dates printed on these Exhibits are hearsay with no applicable exception. Thus, we grant Patent Owner’s motion requesting that we exclude the copyright notice date from each of Exhibits 1008, 1009, and 1012, and exclude the date of the EuMC conference on Exhibit 1002. However, we note that the documents per se are not excluded from the record as hearsay—only the date imprinted on each as proof of the printed publication status of each document. The underlying documents of these Exhibits are offered not to prove the publication dates thereof but, instead, are statements offered to demonstrate the knowledge of persons of ordinary skill in the art. Petitioner may rely on other evidence to establish the date of public accessibility of each of these documents, the analysis of which we have set forth supra. See Section II.B.1–4.” slip op. at 54

  • Skill levelNot reached
  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “data about multiple vehicles on a particular section of roadway (PO Resp. 7– 8), Petitioner counters by identifying references in the field of traffic engineering that use mobile sensors (i.e., not at a fixed location) for acquiring “traffic data.” Pet. Reply 2 (citing Ex. 1031 ¶¶ 6, 22, 181–183). Referring to pages 7–13 of Exhibit 1031 (Texas Highway Operations Manual discussing “Vehicle-based Equipment”), Patent Owner’s expert testified, on cross-examination, as follows: Q In view of the paragraph, would it be accurate to note that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the equipment located in a vehicle can be used to measure the speed of the traffic stream? A It says that a vehicle-mounted radar unit can be used to measure the timing speed of other vehicles in the traffic stream. It does not say it is used to measure the traffic stream. Q I said measure the speed of the traffic. A Yes. This says it is measuring the speed of vehicles in the traffic stream. Q So one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the equipment located in a vehicle can be used to measure the speed of vehicles in a traffic stream? A That is how it’s worded, the speed of other vehicles in the traffic stream. Ex. 1036, 98:21–99:13. In light of that testimony, we determine that Patent Owner’s expert testimony in support of their assertion is not credible.” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Id. at 49:19–50:10. Given, at best, significant ambiguity as to whether the Specification and other evidence requires that “traffic data” must refer to “all or substantially all vehicles,” we are persuaded that such a requirement would not be proper under a broadest reasonable construction. Regarding Patent Owner’s assertion that “traffic data” is limited to data about multiple vehicles on a particular section of roadway (PO Resp. 7– 8), Petitioner counters by identifying references in the field of traffic engineering that use mobile sensors (i.e., not at a fixed location) for acquiring “traffic data.” Pet. Reply 2 (citing Ex. 1031 ¶¶ 6, 22, 181–183). Referring to pages 7–13 of Exhibit 1031 (Texas Highway Operations Manual discussing “Vehicle-based Equipment”), Patent Owner’s expert testified, on cross-examination, as follows: Q In view of the paragraph, would it be accurate to note that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the equipment located in a vehicle can be used to measure the speed of the traffic stream? A It says that a vehicle-mounted radar unit can be used to measure the timing speed of other vehicles in the traffic stream. It does not say it is used to measure the traffic stream. Q I said measure the speed of the traffic. A Yes. This says it is measuring the speed of vehicles in the traffic stream. Q So one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the equipment located in a vehicle can be used to measure the speed of vehicles in a traffic stream? A That is how it’s worded, the speed of other vehicles in the traffic stream.” slip op. at 14

  Patent outcomesUS 6,693,557 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 6,693,557
• Amazon.Com, Inc. / Amazon.Com, LLC et al. v. Zitovault, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 11, 2017 · IPR2016-01025 · APJ Daniel N Fishman · IPR · Final written decision

  Petitioner did not prove claims 1, 3, 5–8, and 10 unpatentable because the cited references did not adequately account for the claims’ session limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “We are persuaded that our preliminary interpretation of “session” in our Decision on Institution is, at least in some respect, overly broad. Independent claims 1, 6, 7, and 10 each refer to “sessions” in plural, and independent claim 7 refers to “simultaneous” sessions. Thus, the term “session” must be understood, at least, in such a manner as to allow multiple sessions to be distinguished from one another. Although independent claim 5 does not recite “sessions” in plural, the same term should be construed consistently across all claims. Accordingly, we conclude that there must be sufficient delineation within a proper construction of “session” that separates a “session” between one client and one server and a different “session” when one of the client and server are replaced, and that separates multiple sessions from each other even between the same pair of client and server. During Oral Hearing there were extensive discussions regarding proper construction of “session.” See Tr. 7:9–22:18, 43:11–65:15, 74:21–76:13. At Oral Hearing, counsel for Petitioner agreed that “session” should be understood as communications having a recognizable beginning and a recognizable end. Id. at 10:13–16 (“Of course a session has a beginning and an end. I think that is axiomatic in a session. I think that is how Dr. Rubin defined it in his declaration”); see also id. at 12:21–13:5, Ex. 1005 ¶ 41. Patent Owner also agreed that if the construction of session is made to include a recognizable beginning and a recognizable end, that would be a proper construction for the term:” slip op. at 12

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has failed to identify what constitutes a “session” in Feinberg in accordance with a proper construction of “session.” That proper construction of “session” is set forth above and has been agreed to by the parties. Tr. 10:13–16, 53:13–54:10. We state it again here: “a set of transmitters and receivers, and the data streams that flow between them wherein each data stream flowing between the transmitters and receivers has a recognizable beginning of the data stream transmission and a recognizable end of the data stream transmission.” Petitioner identifies Feinberg’s disclosure of forwarding (shunting) received requests from the primary server to secondary servers (for purposes of load balancing) teaches the recited “communication between the main server and agent server enlists additional agent servers to support incremental secure sessions in response to maintaining performance at a desired level.” Pet. 21–23 (emphasis added). The analysis is excessively generic for the claim recitation of “incremental secure sessions.” It is uncertain what Petitioner regards as a session in Feinberg much less how it begins and how it ends. It is unexplained by Petitioner whether a request in Feinberg begins a session, or something else in Feinberg begins a session. We decline to speculate in that regard. It is Petitioner who bears the burden of proof, and who must account for all the limitations in a claim. In that regard, we note further that it is insufficient for Petitioner to present only dots that may be connected in some unspecified manner to yield the claimed invention. Instead, Petitioner must make a sufficient connection through the dots to demonstrate a full accounting of the claimed invention.” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “that the system supports “incremental secure sessions.” The Petition relies on Feinberg for disclosing such sessions, presenting the same arguments as those it presents for claim 6. See Pet. 33–34. Patent Owner argues Feinberg fails to disclose sessions for the same reasons as those that Patent Owner presented with respect to claim 6. See PO Resp. 36–37. Petitioner’s Reply asserts essentially the same arguments for claim 1 as it does for claim 6 regarding “incremental secure sessions.” Pet. Reply 17. Petitioner does not rely on Bhaskaran to alleviate the above-identified deficiency in the analysis of Feinberg with respect to claim 6. The standard for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is what would have been taught or suggested to the ordinarily skilled artisan with based on the references. The key to supporting any prima facie conclusion of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is the clear articulation of the reason(s) why the claimed invention would have been obvious and, the Court has noted that, the analysis supporting an obviousness assertion should be made explicit. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)). A “legal determinations of obviousness, as with such determinations generally, should be based on evidence rather than on mere speculation or conjecture.” Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2006). As discussed supra, Petitioner failed to account adequately for the recited “sessions.” Therefore, Petitioner has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that independent claims 1, 6, and 10 would have been obvious over Feinberg and Bhaskaran and, for the same reasons, has failed to establish claim 3, dependent from claim 1, would have been obvious over Feinberg and Bhaskaran.” slip op. at 24

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “Initially, we note Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude fails to identify the portions of Dr. Rubin’s Declaration that allegedly fail to be based upon sufficient facts or data, that allegedly are the product of unreliable principles and methods, or that allegedly fail to reliably apply sound principles and methods to the facts of the case. There is no requirement for an exact or perfect match between the expert’s experience and the field of the patent. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 594 F.3d 1360, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Thus, Patent Owner fails to meet its burden with respect to this Motion to Exclude. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). Furthermore, regarding the objections under FRE 702, we note that under 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a), “[e]xpert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” Consequently, this objection more properly goes to the weight to be given Dr. Rubin’s testimony, and not to its admissibility. In any event, Patent Owner’s argument, that Petitioner did not explain the evidentiary weight or standard that was applied by Dr. Rubin, is misplaced. We note that Dr. Rubin is an expert witness, not a fact finder or a tribunal making fact findings. Dr. Rubin need only provide his opinion and, preferably, also provide the underlying reasoning, inclusive of data and facts, in support of his opinion. For the above reasons, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is denied.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 6,484,257 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 6,484,257
• Amazon.Com, Inc. / Amazon.Com, LLC et al. v. Zitovault, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 11, 2017 · IPR2016-00021 · APJ Daniel N Fishman · IPR · Final written decision

  Petitioner did not prove claims 1, 3, 5–8, and 10 unpatentable: the asserted grounds did not adequately identify sessions with recognizable beginnings and ends.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “We are persuaded that our preliminary interpretation of “session” in our Decision on Institution is, at least in some respect, overly broad. Independent claims 1, 6, 7, and 10 each refer to “sessions” in plural, and independent claim 7 refers to “simultaneous” sessions. Thus, the term “session” must be understood, at least, in such a manner as to allow multiple sessions to be distinguished from one another. Although independent claim 5 does not recite “sessions” in plural, the same term should be construed consistently across all claims. Accordingly, we conclude that there must be sufficient delineation within a proper construction of “session” that separates a “session” between one client and one server and a different “session” when one of the client and server are replaced, and that separates multiple sessions from each other even between the same pair of client and server. During Oral Hearing there were extensive discussions regarding proper construction of “session.” See Tr. 7:9–22:18, 43:11–65:15, 74:21–76:13. At Oral Hearing, counsel for Petitioner agreed that “session” should be understood as communications having a recognizable beginning and a recognizable end. Id. at 10:13–16 (“Of course a session has a beginning and an end. I think that is axiomatic in a session. I think that is how Dr. Rubin defined it in his declaration”); see also id. at 12:21–13:5, Ex. 1005 ¶ 41. Patent Owner also agreed that if the construction of session is made to include a recognizable beginning and a recognizable end, that would be a proper construction for the term:” slip op. at 12

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has failed to identify what constitutes a “session” in Feinberg in accordance with a proper construction of “session.” That proper construction of “session” is set forth above and has been agreed to by the parties. Tr. 10:13–16, 53:13–54:10. We state it again here: “a set of transmitters and receivers, and the data streams that flow between them wherein each data stream flowing between the transmitters and receivers has a recognizable beginning of the data stream transmission and a recognizable end of the data stream transmission.” Petitioner identifies Feinberg’s disclosure of forwarding (shunting) received requests from the primary server to secondary servers (for purposes of load balancing) teaches the recited “communication between the main server and agent server enlists additional agent servers to support incremental secure sessions in response to maintaining performance at a desired level.” Pet. 21–23 (emphasis added). The analysis is excessively generic for the claim recitation of “incremental secure sessions.” It is uncertain what Petitioner regards as a session in Feinberg much less how it begins and how it ends. It is unexplained by Petitioner whether a request in Feinberg begins a session, or something else in Feinberg begins a session. We decline to speculate in that regard. It is Petitioner who bears the burden of proof, and who must account for all the limitations in a claim. In that regard, we note further that it is insufficient for Petitioner to present only dots that may be connected in some unspecified manner to yield the claimed invention. Instead, Petitioner must make a sufficient connection through the dots to demonstrate a full accounting of the claimed invention. Petitioner had ample notice of the possibility of a narrower interpretation of “session.” See PO Resp. 7–11, 23–24. Indeed, Petitioner responded to that possibility by referring to its own expert’s testimony that the beginning and end of a session may be signified in a variety of forms. Pet. Reply 2. See Genzyme Therapeutic Prod. Ltd. P’ship v. Biomarin Pharm. Inc., 825 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The critical question for compliance with the APA and due process is whether [the parties] received ‘adequate notice of the issues that would be considered, and ultimately resolved, at [the] hearing’”) (internal citation omitted). Nevertheless, Petitioner’s Reply still does not specifically identify a “session” within Feinberg that accounts for what constitutes a session in Feinberg, including when it begins and ends. Claim 10 recites, in pertinent part, “sharing spare CPU cycles of the computer network for encrypting and decrypting communication to provide N simultaneous secure session[s] among said network of computers.” Petitioner’s analysis with respect to the recitation of “N simultaneous secure session[s]” is deficient for the same reasons we discussed above with respect to the recitation of “incremental secure sessions” in claim 6. For the above reasons, we are not persuaded Petitioner has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 6 and 10 are anticipated by Feinberg.” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “that the system supports “incremental secure sessions.” The Petition relies on Feinberg for disclosing such sessions, presenting the same arguments as those it presents for claim 6. See Pet. 33–34. Patent Owner argues Feinberg fails to disclose sessions for the same reasons as those that Patent Owner presented with respect to claim 6. See PO Resp. 36–37. Petitioner’s Reply asserts essentially the same arguments for claim 1 as it does for claim 6 regarding “incremental secure sessions.” Pet. Reply 17. Petitioner does not rely on Bhaskaran to alleviate the above-identified deficiency in the analysis of Feinberg with respect to claim 6. The standard for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is what would have been taught or suggested to the ordinarily skilled artisan with based on the references. The key to supporting any prima facie conclusion of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is the clear articulation of the reason(s) why the claimed invention would have been obvious and, the Court has noted that, the analysis supporting an obviousness assertion should be made explicit. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)). A “legal determinations of obviousness, as with such determinations generally, should be based on evidence rather than on mere speculation or conjecture.” Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2006). As discussed supra, Petitioner failed to account adequately for the recited “sessions.” Therefore, Petitioner has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that independent claims 1, 6, and 10 would have been obvious over Feinberg and Bhaskaran and, for the same reasons, has failed to establish claim 3, dependent from claim 1, would have been obvious over Feinberg and Bhaskaran.” slip op. at 24

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “Initially, we note Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude fails to identify the portions of Dr. Rubin’s Declaration that allegedly fail to be based upon sufficient facts or data, that allegedly are the product of unreliable principles and methods, or that allegedly fail to reliably apply sound principles and methods to the facts of the case. There is no requirement for an exact or perfect match between the expert’s experience and the field of the patent. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 594 F.3d 1360, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Thus, Patent Owner fails to meet its burden with respect to this Motion to Exclude. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). Furthermore, regarding the objections under FRE 702, we note that under 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a), “[e]xpert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” Consequently, this objection more properly goes to the weight to be given Dr. Rubin’s testimony, and not to its admissibility. In any event, Patent Owner’s argument, that Petitioner did not explain the evidentiary weight or standard that was applied by Dr. Rubin, is misplaced. We note that Dr. Rubin is an expert witness, not a fact finder or a tribunal making fact findings. Dr. Rubin need only provide his opinion and, preferably, also provide the underlying reasoning, inclusive of data and facts, in support of his opinion. For the above reasons, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is denied.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 6,484,257 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 6,484,257
• Karl Storz Endoscopy-America, Inc. v. Novadaq Technologies, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 8, 2017 · IPR2015-01847 · APJ Daniel N Fishman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–17 are unpatentable: all are obvious over Yabe; claims 10, 12, and 14 are also anticipated by Krauter.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “1. Level of Ordinary Skill Mr. Gunday testified, In my opinion, a person having ordinary skill in the relevant art at the time of the alleged invention is a person with a Bachelor of Science degree in Physics, Computer Engineering, Computer Science, or other similar degree, and two ([2]) to three (3) years of work experience relating to medical endoscopic imaging. Such a person would have had an understanding of, or experience in, designing, implementing, and using endoscopic imaging systems, including light sources and endoscopic video and image processing. Ex. 1011 ¶ 76. Mr. Jaggi agrees with Mr. Gunday’s opinion in this regard, adding only that degrees in “Electrical engineering or Engineering Physics” would each qualify as Mr. Gunday’s “other similar degree.” Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 53–54. We agree with and adopt the view of the parties regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 22

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Initially, we note bodily incorporation of the features of the embodiments is not the test of obviousness; rather, the test lies in what is taught or suggested to the ordinarily skilled artisan by the proposed combination of embodiments of Yabe. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Furthermore, “the [obviousness] analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. “If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability.” Id. at 417. Yabe discloses multiple embodiments and expressly discloses interchangeability of rotary (“surface-sequential-type”) filters as disclosed in Yabe’s second embodiment (Figure 2) and mosaic (“built-in”) filters as disclosed in Yabe’s first and third embodiments (Figures 1a and 10). Ex. 1007, 18:17–21. Yabe’s express disclosures outweigh the unsupported assertions of Patent Owner’s expert regarding the complexity of constructing the proposed combination of embodiments. “Combining two embodiments disclosed adjacent to each other in a prior art patent does not require a leap of inventiveness.” Boston Sci. Scimed, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 554 F.3d 982, 991 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Therefore, we are persuaded, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have had reason to combine the embodiments of Yabe, as proposed by Petitioner, “because it would serve the same purpose as the existing rotary filter/CCD arrangement and lead to predictable results.” See Pet. 20; see also KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.” slip op. at 28

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

    “We are disinclined to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction of this phrase, as recited in claim 1, to require mathematical manipulation. Claim 1 recites “calculates” in a self-defining manner, specifically reciting calculating the image signals “by minimizing the contribution from signals produced by the image sensor in response to red illumination light.” Thus, claim 1 is clear on its face that the calculation to be performed is by minimizing the contribution from red light. Therefore, our analysis shifts to determining the meaning of “minimizing” as recited in claim 1. The ’151 patent discloses a variety of embodiments for “minimizing” the contribution of red light.5 For example, in support of the Patent Owner’s 5 Additionally we observe that “minimizing” appears only once in the ’151 patent—in claim 1 (and, thereby, also in its dependent claims 2–9). construction, the ’151 patent does disclose exemplary embodiments that minimize red light contribution utilizing mathematical manipulations including, for example, CMYG filter computations that are “considered to be well known to those of ordinary skill in the art” (Ex. 1001, 4:66–7:59) and averaging blue and green signals to “compute” a cyan signal (id. at 4:21–24). The ’151 patent, however, also specifically recites, Because the passbands of the red mosaic filters do not significantly overlap with the pass bands of the other filters for a short wavelength imaging mode, the contribution of the image signals due to red illumination light can be reduced or largely eliminated by not assigning the image signals produced by image sensor pixels that are sensitive to red light to their corresponding display pixels. Id. at 4:5–12 (emphasis added). The ’151 patent further states “a short wave-length image (or the color components of such an image) can be computed from a subset of image sensor signals (i.e. excluding the signal data from red light).” Id. at 8:29–32 (emphasis added). Thus, the ’151 patent also encompasses the contribution of red light in the image being” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Although the ’151 patent does not address “analog” or “digital” in reference to “memory,” we agree with Patent Owner, based primarily on the cross-examination testimony of Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Gunday, that the ordinarily skilled artisan at the time of the ’151 patent filing would have understood “memory,” in the context of the ’151 patent, to be referring to digital memory rather than analog buffers. The signals stored in Krauter’s analog buffers are transitory, analog signals propagating from circuits that calculate a value, through the analog buffer, to an analog input of a display monitor. We are persuaded that an ordinarily skilled artisan would not have considered such analog buffers to be a memory in the context of the ’151 patent. Thus, we determine “memory,” as recited in claim 1, means any digital memory capable of storing image signals that minimize the contribution of red light.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 7,420,151 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,420,151
• Microsoft Corporation v. Corel Software, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jan 4, 2017 · IPR2016-01300 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on claims 1–3 because the Petition did not show that QuarkXPress or IRIS was a prior art printed publication.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedDecided for patent owner

    “date of a reference disregards Petitioner’s burden to show that the reference was publicly accessible by a particular date. Indeed, a copyright notice may be evidence of the date of a reference. See, e.g., FLIR Systems, Inc., slip op. at 18–19 (stating that “[o]n the record before us, we are persuaded that the Copyright notice prima facie establishes a prior art date of 2002”). The copyright notice, alone, however, sheds virtually no light on whether the document was publicly accessible as of that date, therefore additional 6 We note that Petitioner sought authorization to file a reply brief to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response to further address whether either QuarkXPress or IRIS is prior art. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c) (providing that a petitioner may be authorized to file a reply to the preliminary response upon a showing of good cause). During a teleconference between counsel for the parties and the Board on October 27, 2016, Petitioner explained that it not only sought to file an additional brief, but also to submit additional evidence in the form of declarations. Petitioner’s request was denied for lack of “good cause.” That Petitioner may have determined from Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response that the information Petitioner provided with the Petition failed to provide a threshold showing that either QuarkXPress or IRIS is a prior art printed publication did not support a finding of “good cause” in this case, much less justify submitting additional evidence not included with the Petition, which Patent Owner was deprived of addressing in its Preliminary Response. As noted above, an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition” shows a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Petitioner did not identify any persuasive basis to provide additional declaration evidence outside of the Petition prior to institution of inter partes review to show a fundamental element of Petitioner’s contentions -- that the references asserted by Petitioner are prior art as printed publications. evidence is typically necessary to support a showing of public accessibility. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Cruise Control Techs. LLC, Case IPR2014- 00291, slip op. at 9–10 (PTAB June 29, 2015) (Paper 44) (discussing evidence of public accessibility that supported a finding that a reference was a prior art printed publication). Rather than evidence public accessibility, the copyright notice appears in QuarkXPress along with an express limitation on the use and dissemination of QuarkXPress, stating “[t]his manual may not, in whole or in part, be copied, photocopied, reproduced, translated, or converted to any electronic or machine readable form without prior written consent of Quark, Inc.” Ex. 1007, 4. Thus, the evidence suggests that if it was distributed at all, it was only in a restricted and limited fashion to persons who acquired the underlying QuarkXPress software product. Accordingly, we look to whether Petitioner has provided other evidence or argument to support its contention that QuarkXPress was publicly accessible.” slip op. at 10

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “III. CONCLUSION The only grounds of unpatentability asserted by Petitioner against the ’309 patent in the Petition rely upon QuarkXPress or IRIS, and, as discussed above, Petitioner has not presented sufficient persuasive information in the Petition and accompanying evidence to make a threshold showing that either QuarkXPress or IRIS is a prior art printed publication. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the information presented in the Petition and accompanying evidence does not establish a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any challenged claim of the ’309 patent. IV. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that the Petition is denied and no inter partes review is instituted.” slip op. at 15

  § 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 6,731,309

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.