• Westerngeco LLC v. PGS Geophysical AsRehearing granted
  PTAB · Feb 3, 2017 · IPR2015-00313 · APJ Justin Busch · IPR · Rehearing

  On rehearing, the Board held claim 2 unpatentable as anticipated by Gallagher, modifying the final written decision; no other aspect was modified.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

    “On rehearing, the burden of showing the Decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the Decision. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. For the reasons that follow, Petitioner’s request for rehearing is granted. This decision on rehearing modifies our Final Written Decision only to the extent that we now hold claim 2 of the ’059 patent to be unpatentable as anticipated by Gallagher. Neither party challenges our holdings with respect to any other claims in our Final Written Decision.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Owner, and Petitioner does not contest, that traces “have the same coordinates” when those traces populate the same bin in the “set of bins.” We agree with Petitioner, however, that the disputed limitation is tied to the assignment of coordinates, not to the organizing step, and we are unpersuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments that a trace can only populate a particular bin after “the coordinate-designated set of traces” has been organized.” slip op. at 6

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “interpreted properly (i.e., not tied to the organizing step), Gallagher teaches or suggests the disputed limitation. Req. Reh’g 5–6. We found persuasive Petitioner’s mappings of (1) Gallagher’s assignment of sections and shells in a common reference point bin to the assigning step, (2) the section-shell segments created from that assignment to the recited set of bins, and (3) Gallagher’s decimation process, which in one example leaves one trace per section-shell segment (or bin), to the organizing step. Dec. 14–19; see Pet. 45–48. In Gallagher, it is the combination of the acquisition geometry and the selection of the sections and shells that defines the coordinate-designated set of traces and the bins. Prior to Gallagher’s decimation,” slip op. at 10

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 6,026,059
• Westerngeco, L.L.C. v. PGS Geophysical AsSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 8, 2016 · IPR2015-00310 · APJ Justin Busch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 23, 24, and 30 are unpatentable as anticipated by de Kok; claims 23, 24, 28, and 29 are unpatentable as obvious over Beasley and Edington.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that the “indexed” limitation requires more than merely “selecting” times. Petitioner offers no explanation how Dr. Ikelle’s testimony that “indexed” should be construed broadly to mean “selected,” Ex. 2002, 184:8–11, would be consistent with the rest of the limitation that requires enabling separate identification of events originating from different sources. Patent Owner’s proposed construction, however, is unduly narrow to the extent it requires recording. As explained in the passage cited by Patent Owner, recording the signal and indexing are two separate aspects of the process involved in the ’981 patent. Ex. 1001, 5:62–67 (“A recording is made of the signal . . . that is indexed to a known time reference with respect to time of firing of the first source) (emphases added). The ’981 patent demonstrates that the term “indexed” is used in the “indexed” limitation according to one of its ordinary meanings that one thing is arranged in reference to another. Id.; see also id. at 6:66–7:1 (“[A] time of firing of each source with respect to a time index” is shown in Figure 4.), 8:33–40 (“[W]hen time is indexed with respect to the firing time of source A,” source B events are not coherent between firing sequences.).” slip op. at 7

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Owner’s distinctions between what de Kok discloses and what claim 23 recites are inapposite. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments, which Patent Owner does not contest, that de Kok’s firing times for each source are indexed (as we have construed the “indexed” limitation) to the reference time in a way that allows the shot records to be separated into source records. Because de Kok discloses both indexing and enabling separate identification of seismic events originating from each source, de Kok discloses the “indexed” limitation as we have construed it.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “unpersuaded. Petitioner’s challenge relies on Edington for its teaching that time-delays can be used to encode and decode signals. Based on the arguments and evidence presented during trial, we are persuaded by Petitioner that a person having ordinary skill would have used time-aligning signals, as taught by Edington, as a type of decoding without needing to take multiple shots from the same source. Accordingly, a person having ordinary skill would have been able to decode a signal for a given encoding scheme, and we find Patent Owner’s assertion that an ordinarily skilled artisan would “lack[] an effective decoding scheme” unpersuasive.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “Beasley clearly states that “no time shift” results in “no spatial reflection-point smearing.” Ex. 1004, 7:61–62. Both parties agree that some amount of spatial reflection point smearing would result from using Edington’s time delay encoding with Beasley’s seismic surveying system. See Tr. 28:3–8, 38:14–15 (counsel for Patent Owner stating that “frankly, any time you have a time delay at all, there is spatial reflection point smearing”). However, neither party pointed us to evidence explaining the relationship between the amount of delay and the amount of smearing, or how much smearing would be tolerated in marine seismic surveying. One consequence of the lack of evidence on this point is that it is unclear whether Beasley is stating that simultaneous activation versus sequential activation avoids smearing or if simultaneous activation versus near-simultaneous activation avoids smearing. Beasley’s disclosure regarding the benefit of eliminating smearing immediately follows the discussion that distinguishes between sequential and concurrent source activation. Based on the record before us, we find Beasley indicates that simultaneous (or near-simultaneous) activation of sources avoids the smearing that otherwise results when activating the sources sequentially. Ex. 1004, 7:52–63. Furthermore, Patent Owner has not argued, and we do not find, that claim 23 should be construed to exclude any amount of spatial reflection point smearing.10 The parties have pointed to no evidence or argument explaining sufficiently why the level of smearing resulting from Petitioner’s proposed combination of Beasley and Edington would be unacceptable, but the level of smearing resulting from the time delay encoding recited in the ’981 patent would be acceptable. Therefore, to the extent that incorporating Edington’s time delay encoding into Beasley’s system generates reflection point smearing, the evidence does not support a finding that claim 23 excludes any amount of smearing. Based on the record before us, we are not 10 When asked whether the subject matter of the ’981 patent suffered from spatial reflection point smearing because of its use of time delays, counsel for Patent Owner stated “I do think it suffers it to some degree.” Tr. 41:14– 15. persuaded the smearing allegedly introduced by combining Edington’s time delay encoding with Beasley’s system would have led an ordinarily skilled artisan away from that combination.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 6,906,981 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,906,981
• Westerngeco, L.L.C. v. PGS Geophysical AsSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 8, 2016 · IPR2015-00309 · APJ Justin Busch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 6, 7, 10, 11, 16, 17, 21, and 22 are unpatentable; claims 3–5 are not shown unpatentable, and challenges to claims 18–20 are dismissed.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenMixed

    “Decision is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. For the reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1, 2, 6, 7, 10, 11, 16, 17, 21, and 22 are unpatentable, but has failed to do so for claims 3–5 and 12–15. We dismiss the Petition with respect to the challenges asserted against claims 18–20.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “more than merely “selecting” times. Petitioner offers no explanation how Dr. Ikelle’s testimony that “indexed” should be construed broadly to mean “selected,” Ex. 2002, 184:8–11, would be consistent with the rest of the limitation that requires enabling separate identification of events originating from different sources. Patent Owner’s proposed construction, however, is unduly narrow to the extent it requires recording. As explained in the passage cited by Patent Owner, recording the signal and indexing are two separate aspects of the process involved in the ’981 patent. Ex. 1001, 5:62–67 (“A recording is made of the signal . . . that is indexed to a known time reference with respect to time of firing of the first source) (emphases added). The ’981 patent demonstrates that the term “indexed” is used in the “indexed” limitation according to one of its ordinary meanings that one thing is arranged in reference to another. Id.; see also id. at 6:66–7:1 (“[A] time of firing of each source with respect to a time index” is shown in Figure 4.), 8:33–40 (“[W]hen time is indexed with respect to the firing time of source A,” source B events are not coherent between firing sequences.).” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “Although a prior art reference may anticipate when the claim limitations not expressly found in that reference are inherent in it, inherency requires that “the prior art necessarily functions in accordance with, or includes, the claimed limitations, it anticipates.” In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Here, Petitioner’s arguments and evidence fail to persuade us that de Kok disclosure of suppressing random noise inherently includes determining trace to trace coherence. Merely demonstrating a step may be done is not sufficient to show that step is inherently anticipated. Accordingly, based on the arguments and evidence submitted, we find Petitioner has failed to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that de Kok anticipates claims 12 and 17. Similarly, because claims 13–15 ultimately depend from claim 12, we find Petitioner has failed to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that de Kok anticipates claims 13–15.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “The relevant passages cited by both parties demonstrate that Beasley distinguishes between alternating and concurrent firings. See, e.g., Ex. 1004, 7:52–63. Although Herkenhoff states that the concurrent disclosure in Beasley means “exactly concurrently,” Patent Owner has not pointed to any clear disclosure in Beasley itself indicating “concurrently” should be understood as excluding any amount of time delay. Petitioner, however, has pointed to multiple references where Beasley explains that sources may be fired “simultaneously or nearly simultaneously.” Pet. Reply 15 (citing Ex. 1004, 8:46–47); Pet. 47 (quoting Ex. 1004, 1:19–25 (“The present invention, in certain aspects, is directed to seismic survey systems and methods in which two or more seismic sources are fired simultaneously, or significantly close together temporally . . . .”)); see also Ex. 1004, 1:47–51, 8:44–47, 9:5–10, 12:26–29. Moreover, claim 1 of the ’655 patent, which Patent Owner asserts claims the “first embodiment” of the ’981 patent, recites a method including the step of “substantially simultaneously launching a first acoustic wavefield,” from the leading source, “the first wavefield being characterized by a first unique code and launching a second acoustic wavefield” from the trailing source, “the second acoustic wavefield being characterized by a second unique code.” Ex. 2009, 6:46–53. Accordingly, Beasley does not exclude time delay encoding from its disclosed “concurrent” activation embodiments.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 6,906,981 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,906,981
• Westerngeco, L.L.C. v. PGS Geophysical AsSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 8, 2016 · IPR2015-00311 · APJ Justin Busch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 31, 32, and 35–37 are unpatentable as obvious over Beasley and Edington; the Board did not find claims 31–34 and 36–38 anticipated by de Kok or claims 33–34 obvious.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner initially argued for a specific construction of “wavelet time” as “the duration of the source signature.” Pet. 14–15. For purposes of the Decision on Institution, we preliminarily construed wavelet time consistent with Petitioner’s proposed construction. Dec. on Inst. 14–15. Now, with the full record before us, we determine an explicit construction of “wavelet time” is not necessary to resolve this controversy. Petitioner does not clearly set forth a proposed construction for any other term in its Petition. Patent Owner argues for specific constructions of “quasi-randomly” and “randomly.” PO Resp. 15–19. The constructions of “quasi-randomly” and “randomly” are not in dispute, and an explicit construction is not necessary to resolve the controversy; accordingly, we do not provide an explicit construction of “quasi-randomly” or “randomly.” Therefore, we determine there is no need to construe explicitly any term for purposes of this decision.” slip op. at 6

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that de Kok’s polarity encoding and decoding process does not disclose the “time aligning” step. As Patent Owner argues, de Kok describes a polarity encoding and decoding system that does not align the “recorded signals with respect to a firing time of the second source in each firing sequence.” Specifically, de Kok explains that it uses activation sequences and polarity to generate signals, from which “source records may be derived” “using a combination of shot record summations, inversions and filtering.” Ex. 1003, 2:51–53; see also id. at 4:55–5:4, 5:55–65. To the extent de Kok discusses time delay encoding, any arguable time alignment applies to the firing of the sources, not the recorded signals. Id. at 5:66–6:2, 6:41–52. Accordingly, Petitioner has not pointed to persuasive evidence that de Kok’s polarity encoding and decoding discloses the “time-aligning” step.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “The relevant passages cited by both parties demonstrate that Beasley distinguishes between alternating and concurrent firings. See, e.g., Ex. 1004, 7:52–63. Although Herkenhoff states that the concurrent disclosure in Beasley means “exactly concurrently,” Patent Owner has not pointed to any clear disclosure in Beasley itself indicating “concurrently” should be understood as excluding any amount of time delay. Petitioner, however, has pointed to multiple references where Beasley explains that sources may be fired “simultaneously or nearly simultaneously.” Pet. Reply 12 (citing Ex. 1004, 8:46–47); Pet. 38 (quoting Ex. 1004, 1:19–25 (“The present invention, in certain aspects, is directed to seismic survey systems and methods in which two or more seismic sources are fired simultaneously, or significantly close together temporally . . . .”)); see also Ex. 1004, 1:47–51, 8:44–47, 9:5–10, 12:26–29. Moreover, claim 1 of the ’655 patent, which Patent Owner asserts claims the “first embodiment” of the ’981 patent, recites a method including the step of “substantially simultaneously launching a first acoustic wavefield,” from the leading source, “the first wavefield being characterized by a first unique code and launching a second acoustic wavefield” from the trailing source, “the second acoustic wavefield being characterized by a second unique code.” Ex. 2009, 6:46–53. Accordingly, Beasley does not exclude time delay encoding from its disclosed “concurrent” activation embodiments. Patent Owner’s argument that time delay encoding results in a plain wavefield rather than an encoded wavefield and, therefore, using time delay encoding would not fall within Beasley’s “any type of coding,” is similarly unpersuasive. Patent Owner fails to address that Beasley distinguishes between “a signal with no encoded feature, individual identifier, tag, discriminating feature, or separate signature” and “signals that can be discriminated from each other due to some identifying characteristic, parameter, signature or feature.” Ex. 1004, 9:67–10:8 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the evidence supports Petitioner’s contention that time delay encoding generates signals with an identifying parameter or characteristic (the timing) that would allow the signals to “be discriminated from each other.” Pet. Reply 11–12. Furthermore, Dr. Lynn acknowledged that “Edington’s time delay source coding is ‘a type of source signature encoding.’” Id. (quoting Ex. 1022, 148:18–23).” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “nonobviousness. PO Resp. 55–60. The factual inquiries for obviousness include secondary considerations based on evaluation and crediting of objective evidence. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). However, to accord substantial weight to objective evidence requires the finding of a nexus between the evidence and the merits of the claimed invention. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995). “Nexus” is a legally and factually sufficient connection between the objective evidence and the claimed invention, such that the objective evidence should be considered in determining nonobviousness. Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The burden of showing that a nexus exists lies with the patent owner. Id.; see In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Patent Owner points to various prior attempts (including Edington, Beasley, and de Kok) to conduct simultaneous shootings in a marine environment and the failings of each of them. Id. at 43–44. Patent Owner also points to various published papers allegedly “investigat[ing] data processing techniques for use with data sets modeled on [the ’981 patent]’s varied time delays” and field trials and studies allegedly using the ’981 patent’s “time-delay acquisition and indexing methods.” Id. at 44–48. Petitioner argues Patent Owner has shown no nexus between Patent Owner’s proffered secondary considerations and the invention of the ’981 patent. Pet. Reply 20–22. Petitioner contends Patent Owner’s focus on the varied time delays of claim 31 is insufficient because time delayed encoding “existed long before the ’981 patent.” Id. We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner has not demonstrated sufficiently a nexus between the secondary considerations and the alleged novelty of claim 31. First, as Petitioner points out, and as borne out by the evidence in this case, time delay encoding for seismic surveying existed prior to the ’981 patent. E.g., Exs. 1006, 1021. Second, the majority of the evidence cited by Patent Owner focuses on the randomness of the time delays, not just the use of time delays generally. Consequently, Patent Owner has not presented persuasive evidence or analysis linking the claims at issue with the alleged “long-felt but unmet need, industry praise, and copying.” See PO Resp. 55.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 6,906,981 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,906,981
• Westerngeco LLC v. PGS Geophysical AsSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 3, 2016 · IPR2015-00313 · APJ Beverly M Bunting · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 4, 10, and 11 are unpatentable: claims 1, 4, and 10 as anticipated by Gallagher, and claim 11 as obvious over Gallagher and Frasier; claims 2, 3, and 5 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Id. at 3:59–65. Additionally, the specification describes how, in this embodiment, “a plurality of the coordinate-designated set of traces have the same coordinates . . . the acquisition geometry resulted in two traces populating each common-inline/common-crossline bin.” Id. at 3:66–4:3. In an alternative embodiment, “there will be a unique set of coordinates per trace (i.e. a single trace per coordinate bin).” Id. at 4:5–7. Thus, based on the specification of the ’059 patent, we credit the testimony of Dr. Lynn that one of skill in the art would understand the “set of bins having a regularized number of traces” into which the coordinate-designated set of traces is organized are “common-offset bins.”4 Ex. 2037 ¶¶ 57–65, 111–113.” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “As discussed supra, we determined that the correct interpretation of the claim term “set of bins” is “a set of common offset bins within a common reference point bin.” Patent Owner’s arguments directed to “posthoc bins” are not persuasive because the claims do not limit the bins to “pre” or “post” hoc bins. Thus, in view of the correct construction of the claim term “set of bins,” we are persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments that Gallagher discloses a “set of bins.” Specifically, Petitioner explains how the section shells group the sources based on their azimuth and offset from the CMP (Reply 10–11), and that the sub-squares represent common offset bins (Id. at 11–12). Additionally, Petitioner argues persuasively that the single-trace bin satisfies the claim limitation “a set of bins” as we have construed this term, because “[e]ach trace within the sub-bins or sections of Gallagher is necessarily common [to itself] with respect to offset and even azimuth.” Reply 13. In considering the record in its entirety, Petitioner has presented persuasive evidence to support a finding that Gallagher describes the “organizing” step recited in independent claim 1.” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that the disclosure in Gallagher teaches away from the recited method. Patent Owner has not shown, nor can we find, that Gallagher criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages the use of a common reflection point instead of a common reference point. A reference teaches away from a claimed invention if it “criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages” modifying the reference to arrive at the claimed invention. In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We will not, however, “read into a reference a teaching away from a process where no such language exists.” DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006).” slip op. at 26

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “The Supreme Court has held that an obviousness evaluation “cannot be confined by a formalistic conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasis on the importance of published articles and the explicit content of issued patents.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 419. Instead, the relevant inquiry here is whether Petitioner has set forth “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cited with approval in KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Patent Owner does not proffer persuasive arguments or evidence that Petitioner’s proposed modification of the system of Gallagher using the teachings of Frasier regarding common reflection point would not have been obvious to one of skill in the art. We have considered Patent Owner’s arguments; however, we are persuaded that Petitioner has provided an articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 6,026,059 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,026,059
• Ericsson Inc. / Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v. Intellectual Ventures I LLC And Intellectual Ventures II LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 17, 2016 · IPR2015-01077 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4–7, 10–16, 18–21, 24–28, and 32 are unpatentable, principally as anticipated or obvious over the ’450 Patent and related combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Transmission Path In our Decision to Institute, we construed the term “transmission path” to have its plain and ordinary meaning as “a communications path in a communications network.” Dec. to Inst. 8. Patent Owner contends that we should not construe this term at all because its plain and ordinary meaning is clear. PO Resp. 6–7. Patent Owner disputes the authority of the IEEE reference we used to establish the plain and ordinary meaning, arguing that Exhibit 1017 is not a standard, but a functional requirements document generated to assist a working group and is subject to change. Id. at 7–8. However, Patent Owner does not propose a “plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. Nor does Patent Owner argue that the scope of the term would be different if we rely on other evidence of the plain and ordinary meaning. Id. Although our Decision to Institute notes that the construction of “transmission path” is not particularly material to the decision, Dec. to Inst. 7–8, it is helpful to establish a baseline definition of the meaning as understood by those of ordinary skill in the art. Patent Owner’s assertion that the definition we applied was used by an IEEE working group supports our determination that our construction in the Decision to Institute applies the plain and ordinary meaning to those of ordinary skill in the art. Accordingly, we adopt the construction of “transmission path” as “a communication path in a communications network.”” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “Time-Slot In this proceeding, neither party proposed a construction for the term “time- slot,” and we did not construe it in our Decision to Institute. However, in related case IPR2015-01471, which concerns a continuation-in-part of the ’557 Patent, it became clear that a construction of the term “slot” was in dispute, and it was discussed extensively at the consolidated oral hearing. In this proceeding, Patent Owner argues that the ’450 Patent does not disclose transmitting payload data on time slots allocated by the network control terminal (NCT), because the NCT in the ’450 Patent assigns only one slot, so that a small aperture terminal (SAT) transmits data beginning on a single slot. PO Resp. 15–19. In IPR2014-01471, we construed “slot” to mean “a duration of time.” Ericsson Inc. and Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, Case 2014- 01471, slip op. at 7 (PTAB, March 17, 2015) (Paper 33, Final Written Decision). We address the implications of this issue in our analysis of Representative Claim A and the ’450 patent.” slip op. at 8

  • BurdenUnpatentable

    “Claim element A.5 concerns actions taken by the station. As noted above, the elements of Representative Claim A, including element A.5, are common to independent claims 1 and 15. Patent Owner’s argument does not consider other language in claim 1 that provides context for limitation A.5 concerning the central controller that provides the grant to which the station responds. Apparatus claim 1 recites that, upon receiving a reservation request, the central controller responds by “transmitting on said first path a payload data transmission grant to said station for transmitting payload data on said third path on said time-slots allocated by said centralized controller.” Almost identical language appears in method claim 15. Claims 1 and 15 do not limit the form of the grant, nor do claims 1 and 15 limit the time-slots allocated by the central controller. For example, there is no requirement in the claims that the grant authorize a specific number of time-slots or that the time slots be of any particular duration. Claims 1 and 15 recite that, in response to receiving a request on the second path, the centralized controller transmits on the first path a “grant” authorizing payload data transmission on the third path at allocated time-slots. Claims 1 and 15 do not limit the allocated time slots to any particular frame or time. Nor do claims 1 and 15 preclude allocating sufficient time slots for the terminal to transmit its entire message. Given the language of the claims, we conclude that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the ’450 patent discloses the recited features in element A.5, which appears in the challenged claims illustrated by Representative Claim A (independent claims 1, 4, 5, 7, and 10–14, as well as corresponding dependent claims 2–4) and Representative Claim B (independent claims 15, 21, and 25–27, as well as corresponding dependent claims 16–19).” slip op. at 14

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “The Specification of the ’557 Patent describes a cable system implementation and specifically states: (1) that “the implementation of the invention in a cable network was merely illustrative” (Ex. 1001, col. 19, ll. 39–40); (2) that another example is an implementation in a wireless system in which the central controller is a base station and that the communication units are cordless or cellular telephones (id. at col. 19, ll. 41–42); and (3) that when employed in a satellite system the central controller is a satellite and the subscriber stations are earth stations (id. at col. 19, ll. 50–54). As previously discussed, the ’450 patent discloses in Figure 1 NCT 12, which communicates with portable terminals 14 through satellite 11, using two upstream channels and one downstream channel. Ex. 1005, Abstract, Fig.1. Thus, the ’450 patent discloses the NCT in the context of a satellite network. Claims 7 and 21 recite only that the centralized controller is a base station, that the network is a wireless network, that the transmission medium is air, and that the station is a mobile or stationary communication unit. Claims 7 and 21 do not limit a wireless network to a non-satellite network, or, in the case of a satellite network, limit the base station to any particular node. Thus, we conclude that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the ’450 patent anticipates the base station limitation of claims 7 and 21. Petitioner further notes that the question is not whether cellular base stations and satellites have differences, but whether media access controller and contention resolution access principles used in satellite and cellular applications are translatable to each other. Reply 12. To the extent that the base station is considered to be limited to a cellular wireless network as argued by Patent Owner, we note (1) that the Specification of the ’557 patent extends the concept of using two upstream channels and one downstream channel to a wireless network (Ex. 1001, col. 19, ll. 50–57) and (2) that the ’450 patent discloses the two upstream, one downstream channel approach in the context of a satellite network, in which the transmission medium is air and the central controller is the satellite (Ex. 1005, 4:50–57). Thus, we conclude that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence, that this limitation, which recites that the central controller is a mobile or stationary base station in a wireless network in which the transmission medium is air, is obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the ’450 patent.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 5,963,557 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 5,963,557
• Ericsson Inc. / Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 17, 2016 · IPR2014-01471 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–27 are unpatentable: claims 1, 4–6, 9–12, 18, 21–24, and 27 as anticipated; all remaining claims as obvious over the listed combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “of fixed or variable size.” Pet. 8. Patent Owner initially responded that Petitioner’s proposed construction is not supported by the specification and that the term “slot” did not require construction. Prelim. Resp. 9. In our Decision to Institute, we construed “slot” to mean “a duration of time.” Dec. to Inst. 7. In the Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner argues that “slot” should be construed to mean “a predetermined division of the time domain for a channel.” PO Resp. 9– 10. Patent Owner notes that the ’153 Patent discloses that “[e]ach channel illustratively is divided into slots or mini-slots.” Id. at 9 (citing Ex. 1001, col. 8, ll. 60–61). However, the mere division of a channel into slots, does not define a slot. Patent Owner argues that “slot” should be further limited to a predetermined division because in the context of the ’153 Patent, the central controller responds to a reservation request by “assigning specific slots to each station.” Id. at 9–10 (citing Ex. 1001, col. 9, ll. 11–13). However, the assignment of specific slots to each station neither defines a slot nor limits a slot to some predetermined division of the time domain. Indeed, the ’153 Patent states that “the upstream payload channel UPC carries a stream of only payload packets in slots (which may be fixed or variable in size).” Ex. 1001, col. 12, ll. 9–12. Although it is unclear whether the literal text is intended to mean that either the payload packets or the slots vary in size, the text does not restrict the slots to any particular size or preclude adapting the size of the slots to the size of the payload packets.” slip op. at 6

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “To establish anticipation, each and every element in a claim, arranged as recited in the claim, must be found in a single prior art reference. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008). “A reference anticipates a claim if it discloses the claimed invention ‘such that a skilled artisan could take its teachings in combination with his own knowledge of the particular art and be in possession of the invention.’” In re Graves, 69 F.3d 1147, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (emphasis omitted) (quoting In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 936 (CCPA 1962)).” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “slots (e.g., 3 or 4) is available ran[d]om access.” Id. (citing Stark Decl. ¶ 194; Ex. 1007, col. 1, ll. 42–48). Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to use such a message to reduce collisions by more precisely identifying the available slots on the reservation channel for requesting slots on the (return) payload channel. Id. The ’398 patent discloses that a known technique for reducing the probability of collisions is dynamic frame based slotted aloha random access and that in this arrangement, an access command is transmitted by a central unit on the downlink indicating that the common control channel on the uplink in the next N slots (e.g., 3 or 4 random slots) is available for access . . . [T]his arrangement has the result that access requests are spread over N frames and are therefore less likely to collide.” slip op. at 28

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “disclose sufficiently selecting different modulation schemes for the upstream control and payload channels to optimize the robustness of the control channel without degrading the robustness of the payload channel, as recited in claim 13, this feature is taught in the ’219 patent. Pet. 44. Petitioner notes, and we agree, that the ’219 patent discloses using quadrature amplitude modulation for the telephony data and binary phase shift keying (BPSK) modulation techniques for the synchronization channel and for IOC control data to provide robustness in the system. Id. at 45. Petitioner cites the Declaration of Dr. Stark to support its contention that one of ordinary skill would have combined these teachings of the ’450 and ’219 patents. We are persuaded by this testimony. Claim 14 recites that the upstream control channel on which the bitstream containing the reservation request is transmitted in step (a) of claim 1 is one of a plurality of upstream control channels. As Petitioner notes, and we agree, the ’219 patent discloses that a plurality of control channels are interspersed among the telephony channels of the second frequency bandwidth. Pet. 45–46 (citing Ex. 1008, col. 5, ll. 49–51; col. 4, ll. 59–66). Petitioner cites testimony of Dr. Stark to support persuasively its contention that the disclosure of at least 3 separate data channels in the ’450 patent would suggest to a person of ordinary skill that two or more control channels could be used in the upstream channel. Id. at 46 (citing Stark Decl. ¶ 201). The three data channels discussed in the ’450 patent are a forward channel outbound from the NCT, a reservation channel inbound from the PT, and a return channel inbound from the PT. Ex. 1005, col. 4, ll. 50–57. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s argument and evidence presented.” slip op. at 31

  Patent outcomesUS 6,370,153 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,370,153
• Under Armour, Inc. v. Adidas AGRehearing denied
  PTAB · Feb 29, 2016 · IPR2015-01532 · APJ Justin Busch · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Under Armour’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of institution on claim 17 for anticipation by Bouve and, alternatively, Kim.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “When rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). “The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision[,]” which party “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner argues it just needs to show “that Kim discloses storing data that falls within the scope of the plain words ‘a length of the route.’” We agree with Petitioner that the plain meaning of “a length of the route” is the appropriate construction because, on this record, we find no reason to give the phrase a special meaning. The Petition, however, did not present persuasive argument that the plain meaning of “a length of the route” encompasses Kim’s total altitude distance.” slip op. at 7

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “users needed to manually estimate route distances between points of interest. Pet. 17–18 (quoting Ex. 1004, 1:28–35). The Petition asserted “Bouve improved upon the prior art system by maintaining route length information in a database.” Id. at 18 (emphasis added). In support of that assertion, the Petition pointed to Bouve’s disclosure that “The processors . . . compute the mileage indication, along the retrieved travel route(s), for each individual item of travel information which is retrieved from the data bases,” and concluded that Bouve computes mileage information along a route and route length between points of interest using route length information stored in a database. Id. (quoting Ex. 1004, 8:18–22 (underlining added). The Petition, however, failed to identify any disclosure in Bouve that “route length information” is maintained in a database. The Petition also argued Bouve discloses recommending a route “based on that stored length of a route” because Bouve allows a user to select the shortest route between two points. Id. at 19.” slip op. at 3

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 8,652,009
• Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. National Graphics, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 27, 2016 · IPR2014-01162 · APJ Michael P Tierney · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–46 are unpatentable: claims 1, 2, 23, 24, and 27–29 as anticipated by Quadracci ’995; the remaining claims as obvious over the stated combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “in the lenticular art “is one who has several years of work experience in the lenticular industry.” Ex. 1013 ¶ 11. Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Garcia, testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have five or more years of experience in the lenticular lens industry or have an understanding of optical engineering including first and higher order geometric and physical optics principles. Ex. 2001 ¶ 13. The parties’ definitions of one of ordinary skill in the art are substantially the same and neither party states how any difference in the parties’ articulated levels of skill impacts the proceeding. For purpose of this decision, we hold that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record, such that one of skill in the art would have had years of experience in the lenticular lens industry or had an understanding of optical engineering, including higher order geometric and physical optics principles. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther

    “Patent Owner does not dispute the proposed constructions, except to state that, consistent with Petitioner’s definition of focal length, one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that focal length in the ’467 refers to the “effective focal length” of the lens. PO Resp. 3–4. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed claim constructions as they are consistent with the Patent Owner’s use of the terms in the ’467 patent Specification. For example, the term gauge thickness is defined in the ’467 patent with reference to g2 of Fig. 1A and states that the thickness is measured from the outermost edge of the curved surface of the lens to the flat back surface of the lens. Ex. 1001, 2:27–33.” slip op. at 7

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “describe . . . each and every claim limitation and enable one of skill in the art to practice an embodiment of the claimed invention without undue experimentation.” Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Corp., 651 F.3d 1318, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).” slip op. at 8

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPetitioner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “Based on the evidence of record, we credit the ray tracing testimony of Mr. Raymond and are persuaded that the lenticular lens disclosure of Quadracci ’995 is enabling. Specifically, Dr. Garcia acknowledges that focal length formulas other than those recited in the ’467 patent were known in the art and Mr. Raymond demonstrates that, consistent with the teachings of Quadracci ’995, one of ordinary skill in the art could make the described lenses. c. Mr. Raymond’s Gauge Thickness and Focal Length Calculations Patent Owner states that Mr. Raymond’s thickness calculation in his first declaration is either wrong, or it uses an unacceptable index of refraction. Mr. Raymond, in his first declaration, testifies that using the general lens formulas described in the ’467 patent, he arrived at a gauge thickness of 3.4 mils. Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 26–28. Mr. Raymond, however, does not disclose the index of refraction that he used to determine the gauge thickness. Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight. 37 C.F.R. 42.65(a). As Mr. Raymond failed to disclose the index of refraction used in his calculations and provide support for his selected refraction index, we do not credit Mr. Raymond’s gauge thickness calculation in his first declaration with respect to Quadracci ’995. As discussed below, however, Mr.” slip op. at 14

  Patent outcomesUS 6,424,467 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 6,424,467
• NVIDIA Corp. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.Institution denied
  PTAB · Dec 9, 2015 · IPR2015-01316 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show that VESA P&D and VESA Flat Panel were publicly accessible printed publications, so claims 6–10 could not rely on them.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated, under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of claims 6–10 of the ’724 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of any claim.” slip op. at 2

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable

    “We find Patent Owner’s arguments persuasive. Petitioner does not explain adequately whether or how the VESA documents were made “sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art.” Lister, 583 F.3d at 1311. Instead, Petitioner merely asserts that “VESA is a well-known standards setting organization that promulgates standards relating to video in electronics.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 58); id. at 22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 75). As such, we determine that Petitioner has not made a sufficient showing that the VESA documents are printed publications under § 102(b). See Lister, 583 F.3d at 1317 (burden is on the proponent to show the purported reference was publicly available). Therefore, based on the record before us, we conclude Petitioner has not made a sufficient showing that either VESA P&D or VESA Flat Panel may be relied upon as prior art with respect to claims 6–10 of the ’724 patent.” slip op. at 6

  § 102 anticipationcites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 6,804,724

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.