- PTAB · Sep 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00101 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all petition challenges because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted
“On August 20, 2024, the Director granted Petitioner’s request and vacated the panel’s decision denying institution. Paper 12, 6. In doing so, the Director determined that Menard is not a real party in interest or a privy of Petitioner under § 315(b) and that § 315(b) does not bar institution. Id. at 5. The Director also determined that § 315(a) “does not apply to the ‘cross-claims’ asserted by Petitioner” and that § 315(a) does not bar institution. Id. Additionally, the Director declined to exercise discretion under § 314(a) to deny institution in view of the Wisconsin case because Petitioner submitted a Sotera stipulation. Id.; see Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation (June 21, 2022)1 at 3, 7–8 (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A)). Further, the Director remanded the case to the panel and instructed the panel “to determine whether the Petition presents a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), and to determine whether to institute inter partes review accordingly.” Paper 12, 5–6. As noted above and explained in the patentability analysis below, we determine that there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. See supra § I; infra §§ III.E–III.H.” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner
“On August 20, 2024, the Director granted Petitioner’s request and vacated the panel’s decision denying institution. Paper 12, 6. In doing so, the Director determined that Menard is not a real party in interest or a privy of Petitioner under § 315(b) and that § 315(b) does not bar institution. Id. at 5. The Director also determined that § 315(a) “does not apply to the ‘cross-claims’ asserted by Petitioner” and that § 315(a) does not bar institution. Id. Additionally, the Director declined to exercise discretion under § 314(a) to deny institution in view of the Wisconsin case because Petitioner submitted a Sotera stipulation. Id.; see Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation (June 21, 2022)1 at 3, 7–8 (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A)).” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“On August 20, 2024, the Director granted Petitioner’s request and vacated the panel’s decision denying institution. Paper 12, 6. In doing so, the Director determined that Menard is not a real party in interest or a privy of Petitioner under § 315(b) and that § 315(b) does not bar institution. Id. at 5. The Director also determined that § 315(a) “does not apply to the ‘cross-claims’ asserted by Petitioner” and that § 315(a) does not bar” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied discretionary otherDecided for petitioner
“On August 20, 2024, the Director granted Petitioner’s request and vacated the panel’s decision denying institution. Paper 12, 6. In doing so, the Director determined that Menard is not a real party in interest or a privy of Petitioner under § 315(b) and that § 315(b) does not bar institution. Id. at 5. The Director also determined that § 315(a) “does not apply to the ‘cross-claims’ asserted by Petitioner” and that § 315(a) does not bar institution. Id. Additionally, the Director declined to exercise discretion under § 314(a) to deny institution in view of the Wisconsin case because Petitioner submitted a Sotera stipulation. Id.; see Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation (June 21, 2022)1 at 3, 7–8 (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A)).” slip op. at 4
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,299,336 - Njoy, LLC / Njoy Holdings, Inc. v. Juul Labs, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Aug 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00567 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that Cho disclosed the claimed reservoir structure required by the challenged claims.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Therefore, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that Cho describes “a liquid reservoir at least partially defined by an interior of the cartridge housing and an exterior of the atomizing chamber” in either of the “separated embodiment” or the “integrated embodiment.” For at least this reason, and based on the current record, Petitioner has failed to establish that claim 43 is anticipated by Cho. 3. Remaining Claims 44, 76, 77, 80, 81, 86, 89, and 93 Petitioner asserts that claims 44, 76, 77, 81, 86, 89, and 93 are anticipated by Cho. Pet. 35–46, 54–64. In addition, Petitioner alleges that the combination of Cho and Nielsen would have rendered obvious claim 80 of the ’114 patent. Pet. 64–70. Each of claims 44, 76, 77, 80, 81, 86, 89, and 93 requires a “liquid reservoir at least partially defined by an interior of the cartridge housing and an exterior of the atomizing chamber,” either by virtue of dependence (claims 76, 77, 80, 81, 86, 89, and 93) or independent recitation (claim 44). Ex. 1001, 11:50–12:9, 19:1–19:63. Because Petitioner has failed to show a reasonable likelihood that Cho teaches a “liquid reservoir at least partially defined by an interior of the cartridge housing and an exterior of the atomizing chamber,” we decline to institute on the remaining claims.” slip op. at 20
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We are persuaded that Petitioner has not shown that Cho describes a “liquid reservoir [that] is partially defined by the exterior of an atomizing chamber” in either of the “separated embodiment” or the “integrated embodiment.” Pet. 48–50. With respect to the “separated embodiment,” Petitioner identifies the inside of storage container 1201 as the “interior of the cartridge housing” and the outside of air inhalation tube 1313 as the “exterior of the atomizing chamber.” Id. But Annotated Figure 11 does not show air inhalation tube 1313 as part of atomizing chamber 1203. Therefore, the liquid reservoir, i.e., loading portion 1205, is not “at least partially defined by . . . an exterior of the atomizing chamber.”” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“3. Remaining Claims 44, 76, 77, 80, 81, 86, 89, and 93 Petitioner asserts that claims 44, 76, 77, 81, 86, 89, and 93 are anticipated by Cho. Pet. 35–46, 54–64. In addition, Petitioner alleges that the combination of Cho and Nielsen would have rendered obvious claim 80 of the ’114 patent. Pet. 64–70. Each of claims 44, 76, 77, 80, 81, 86, 89, and 93 requires a “liquid reservoir at least partially defined by an interior of the cartridge housing and an exterior of the atomizing chamber,” either by virtue of dependence (claims 76, 77, 80, 81, 86, 89, and 93) or independent recitation (claim 44). Ex. 1001, 11:50–12:9, 19:1–19:63. Because Petitioner has failed to show a reasonable likelihood that Cho teaches a “liquid reservoir at least partially defined by an interior of the cartridge housing and an exterior of the atomizing chamber,” we decline to institute on the remaining claims.” slip op. at 20
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “at the time of the ’114 patent would have had a B.S. in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, or an equivalent degree, and either at least two years of experience designing electro-mechanical consumer products or an advanced degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, or an equivalent field.” Prelim. Resp. 2 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 19). Patent Owner submits that “the arguments in this Response apply regardless of which standard is adopted,” and that “Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. John Collins, was a POSITA at the time of the ’114 patent under either [Petitioner’s or Patent Owner’s] definition.” Id. (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 22). In light of the record before us, and for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’114 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand the ’114 patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips - Motif Foodworks, Inc. v. Impossible Foods, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 12, 2024 · IPR2023-00206 · APJ Donna M Praiss · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–12 and 14–24 are unpatentable as obvious over Giacino, Proulx, and Conrad, with Perret or MacLeod for certain dependent claims; the Board did not reach other grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The District Court’s claim construction for the term “compound” is shown below. Ex. 2016, 8–11. Claim Term District Court Construction The “sulfur compound” limitation must be satisfied by a compound that is present compound10 separately from a protein; “compound” will not be construed as being limited to compounds used as flavor precursors The District Court’s claim construction order cites to U.S. Patent 11,013,250 (the ’250 patent”) as representative of the ’096 patent and other related patents involved in the District Court litigation. See Ex. 2016, 7 (“Claim 1 of the ʼ250 patent claims is generally representative for purposes of the parties’ dispute.”). The District Court determined that plant proteins 10 Ex. 2016, 9, 11 (citing Ex. 1001, 15:26–27).” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“24. Pet. 20–26. Focusing on independent claim 1’s limitation “a compound selected from cysteine, cystine, thiamin, methionine, and mixtures of two or more thereof,” Petitioner asserts Brown’s disclosure of “pea flour” meets this limitation because “pea flour contains cystine, thiamine, and methionine.” Id. at 22–23 (citing Ex. 1012 (Brown) ¶ 364; Ex. 1003 (Tarte) ¶¶ 121–125; Ex. 1050/Ex. 1059 (Jahreis), 39, 41, 86; Ex. 1106, 3, 6–7). Petitioner qualifies that its mapping of “pea flour” to this claim limitation is based on the interpretation of “compound” as “not . . . limited to free compounds.” Id. at 22 n.7. Specifically, Petitioner states that the mapping is based on Brown’s “pea flour, which contains proteins having the claimed sugar and sulfur compounds.” Id. at 12; see Ex. 1003 ¶ 105 (reiterating this statement). Brown states, in pertinent part, “[a] muscle replica comprising pea flour, sunflower oil, and glucose.” Ex. 1012 ¶ 364. Dr. Tarté states in his declaration that a person of ordinary skill “would have understood that pea flour includes cystine, methionine, and thiamine.” Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 121–125. On cross-examination, Dr. Tarté stated that this mapping to the claim is based on an understanding that Brown’s proteins satisfy the sulfur compound limitation. Ex. 2032, 33:19–34:12; 98:11–99.9 (“[I]n as much as . . . Patent Owner considers proteins to satisfy the sulfur compound claim, then . . . the pea protein flour of Brown also satisfies the [sulfur] compound claim.”), 117:9–118:8. Patent Owner asserts that the Petition’s anticipation ground must fail if the claimed compound limitation does not extend to proteins. PO Resp. 13. Because we adopt the District Court’s construction of the claim term “compound,” Petitioner’s contention that Brown anticipates the ’096 patent necessarily fails. See Verdegaal Bros., 814 F.2d at 631 (“A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.”). Petitioner concedes that the viability of this ground depends on construing the term “compound” to include whole proteins, and has failed to present evidence in this proceeding that Brown discloses a sulfur compound that is separate from a protein. Tr. 50:21–52:13 (Petitioner’s counsel conceding that the anticipation ground is not viable under the District Court’s claim construction for “compound”). Thus, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 is unpatentable as anticipated by Brown.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNon analogous artDecided for patent owner
“The analogous-art test requires a showing that a reference is either in the field of endeavor of the challenged patent or is reasonably pertinent to the problem with which the inventor was concerned in order to rely on that reference as a basis for unpatentability. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Patent Owner argues that Petitioner fails to establish Crane as analogous art under this legal framework. PO Resp. 36–40; PO Sur-Reply 1–2. First, Patent Owner asserts Crane is not “from the same field of endeavor” as the ’096 patent. Id. at 37 (citing Ex. 2030 (Qian Decl.) ¶ 86). Based on this record, the ’096 patent is directed to food products while Crane, on the other hand, relates to “methods for producing recombinant functional heme-binding proteins.” Ex. 1001, 1:22–25; Ex. 1014, code (57). As Patent Owner points out, Crane does not even mention food products or any flavor functionality of heme-binding proteins. PO Resp. 37. Petitioner does not address Crane’s field of endeavor in its Petition or Reply. See Pet. 36–50; Pet. Reply 1 (“Petitioner . . . relies on the arguments made in the Petition for Ground 1 and 3A-3D”). We agree with Patent Owner that Crane is not from the same field of endeavor as the ’096 patent. Next, Patent Owner asserts the Petition fails to explain how Crane’s recombinant heme-binding protein is pertinent to the problem addressed by the ’096 patent inventors. According to Patent Owner, the problem solved by the inventors was “to provide meat-like-food products that overcome the limitations of prior-art meat substitutes.” PO Resp. 38. Crane, however, is directed to producing recombinant heme-binding proteins with complete heme incorporation. Ex. 1014 ¶¶ 3–5; Ex. 2030 ¶ 87. Neither Crane nor the Petition addresses how this is relevant to improving meat-associated flavors or aromas in food flavor additives. See generally, Ex. 1014; Pet. 36–50. The Petition asserts that Crane’s recombinant heme-binding protein, if used in place of Conrad’s blood/hemoglobin, which is added to improve taste, “would have produced the proteins with a high degree of purity.” Pet. 47–48. The Petition asserts that the benefit of high purity is greater control over the amount added and consistency in the end product. Id. at 48.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“argument at trial, we do not agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s basis for improving the nutritional content of the food product of Giacino is unsupported by the record. Proulx identifies iron deficiency as “a major nutritional problem, affecting over 2 billion people[.]” Ex. 1019, 1518; Ex. 1003 ¶ 93; see also Pet. Reply 25. Based on the evidence in this record, Giacino’s compositions lack a significant source of iron. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 387, 407. Furthermore, like Proulx, Giacino’s composition is intended to be an additive to food products. Specifically, Giacino’s composition is intended to be added to synthetic meat fibers, that may benefit from a source of iron, by mimicking not only the “meaty flavor” or aroma of meat, but the nutritional profile of conventionally sourced beef as well. Ex. 1003 ¶ 410; Ex. 1015, 7:22–26. This reasoning is supported by Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Tarté. Ex. 1003 ¶ 410. Patent Owner acknowledges the nutritive aspect of the addition is a “bonus” to the flavor impact. PO Sur-Reply 25–26. Proulx explicitly teaches adding leghemoglobin as an additive to food (“food fortificant”), therefore a POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so. Ex. 1019, Abs.; see id. at 1521 (“added with tortillas”). Even if the addition of Proulx’s leghemoglobin were to produce autooxidation and impact Giacino’s meaty flavor, the benefit of Proulx’s leghemoglobin as an additive to a food composition is not disputed and supports the combination. “The fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.” Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine”). Moreover, the evidence of record regarding the asserted negative effect on aroma and flavor due to heme proteins is that this negative impact is merely a possibility. Ex. 2030 ¶ 76 (Dr. Qian states that heme proteins have an “unpredictable effect” and refers to statements made in related patent prosecution that “fortification [with] iron has a potential negative effect on organoleptic quality of maize products, in that soluble forms of iron can cause oxidative rancidity,” quoting Ex. 1148, 2715). Based on the evidence of record, the benefit of adding heme protein taught by Proulx outweighs the potential negative effect that it may have on Giacino’s flavoring additive. Thus, the preponderance of the evidence in this record supports Petitioner’s assertion that a POSITA would have been motivated to nutritionally fortify Giacino’s meat flavoring composition by adding Proulx’s soy leghemoglobin.” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 9,943,096 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,943,096 - PTAB · May 28, 2024 · IPR2024-00085 · APJ Michael L Woods · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7–11, 13, and 15 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a), we have authority to institute an inter partes review if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Preliminary Reply, the Preliminary Sur-reply, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims of the ’659 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the Challenged Claims on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“We disagree with Patent Owner. Our analysis under Fintiv is guided by the USPTO Director’s Memorandum issued on June 21, 2022, titled “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation.”8 The Director’s Memorandum explains that, when a petitioner makes a Sotera-type stipulation, “it mitigates concerns of potentially conflicting decisions and duplicative efforts between the district court and the PTAB” and “[w]ith such a stipulation, if an IPR or PGR is instituted, the grounds the PTAB resolves will differ from those present in 8 https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_discretio nary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf (“Director’s Memorandum”). the parallel district court litigation.” Director’s Memorandum 7 (citing Sotera, IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 at 18–19). Pursuant to the Director’s Memorandum, we “will not discretionarily deny institution of an IPR or PGR in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition.” Id. Because Petitioner provides a Sotera-type stipulation, we do not exercise our discretion to deny institution under Fintiv.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Upon review of the prior art of record and the parties’ arguments, we adopt Patent Owner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision as it appears consistent with the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art). Petitioner’s proposed definition appears overly restrictive, as it requires a graduate degree in a narrow field of engineering or equivalent experience. We find that a bachelor’s degree with the accompanying experience proposed by Patent Owner more closely aligns with the prior art of record and the ’659 patent. We note, however, there is some overlap in the proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art because Patent Owner’s proposal includes “at least” a bachelor’s degree, which would encompass Petitioner’s master’s degree as well. Prelim. Resp. 19. Nonetheless, our determination herein would be the same under either party’s definition.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We disagree with Patent Owner’s claim construction. By using the word “or,” the plain and ordinary meaning of “prone, kneeling, or standing” is that only one must be satisfied to meet the claim. See, e.g., SkinMedica, Inc. v. Histogen Inc., 727 F.3d 1187, 1199 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The disjunctive ‘or’ plainly designates that a series describes alternatives.”). Furthermore, and although claims are read in light of the specification, limitations in a specification are not read into a claim. In re van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Even if the Specification describes embodiments in which the user can begin in a prone position and then transition to a kneeling or standing position, as Patent Owner points out (see Prelim. Resp. 20), the claim does not recite the term “transitioning,” and we do not read the terms “each of” or “substantially flat surface” into this claim limitation. For example, the claim does not recite a “substantially flat” top surface and Patent Owner’s attempt to infer this structure into the claim is not supported under the law. See id. at 29–30. For purposes of this Decision, we agree with Petitioner and construe “prone, kneeling, or standing” in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning as alternatives, and the prior art need only show one to satisfy this aspect of the claim.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 9,586,659 - PTAB · May 28, 2024 · IPR2024-00086 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 5-8, 10-15, 17, 18, 20, and 21 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of success and declining Fintiv denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in an inter partes review). slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“1. “wherein a user can be disposed on the top surface of the flotation device in a prone, kneeling, or standing position” With respect to the claim term “wherein a user can be disposed on the top surface of the flotation device in a prone, kneeling, or standing position,” Patent Owner points to passages of the Specification, arguing that all three positions are possible. Prelim. Resp. 19–21 (citing Ex. 1001, Abstr., 4:13–17, 4:33–40; Ex. 2006 ¶ 18). We do not agree with Patent’s Owner proposed construction because even if the Specification discloses that all three positions are possible, that is not what the plain language of the claim requires. Claim 1 recites “or,” which means that a user can be disposed on the top surface of the flotation device in any one of the three positions. See, e.g., SkinMedica, Inc. v. Histogen Inc., 727 F.3d 1187, 1199 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The disjunctive ‘or’ plainly designates that a series describes alternatives.”). Patent Owner does not identify any definition or disclaimer that would modify this plain meaning. See Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Thus, we agree with Petitioner and apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase “wherein a user can be disposed on the top surface of the flotation device in a prone, kneeling, or standing position,” to construe “prone, kneeling, or standing” as alternatives, and the prior art need only show one to satisfy this aspect of the claim.” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Neither party explains how or why its particular proposal impacts the issues before us in this proceeding. We find that a bachelor’s degree with the accompanying experience proposed by Patent Owner more closely aligns with the prior art of record and the ’044 patent. We note, however, there is some overlap in the proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art because Patent Owner’s proposal includes “at least” a bachelor’s degree, which would encompass Petitioner’s master’s degree as well. Prelim. Resp. 10. Nonetheless, our determination herein would be the same under either party’s definition.” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedInstituted
“As the Board has held in a precedential decision, “at the institution stage, the petition must identify, with particularity, evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the reference was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent and therefore that there is a reasonable likelihood that it qualifies as a printed publication.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential).” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,359,044 - PTAB · Mar 26, 2024 · IPR2023-01424 · APJ Donna M Praiss · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–16 and 18–20, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the asserted grounds, including anticipation by Ueda and obviousness over Plante and Cho.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose of determining whether Petitioner meets the threshold for initiating review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Any argument not raised by Patent Owner in a timely-filed response may be deemed waived. For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at 1 Petitioner identifies itself as the real party in interest. Pet. 1. In addition, Petitioner notes that Spectrum Holdco LLC is its parent company and that Spectrum Holdco LLC and Spectrum Intermediate LLC “have a financial interest in, or could be substantially affected by the outcome of, this proceeding.” Id. 2 Patent Owner identifies itself as the real party in interest and notes that it is a wholly owned subsidiary of OraSure Technologies, Inc. Paper 4, 2. least one claim. We hereby institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–16 and 18–20 of the ’632 patent based upon Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“We decline to exercise our discretion here. As pointed out by Petitioner, the same or substantially the same art or arguments were not previously presented with respect to the ’632 patent. Pet. 123–24. Petitioner challenges the ’632 patent on grounds that were not asserted against the ’646 patent, namely the grounds based on Ueda. Id. at 71–123. In addition, we found Petitioner’s arguments based on Plante sufficiently persuasive and determined that the challenged ’646 patent claims are unpatentable. IPR2022-01347, Paper 43 (Feb. 7, 2024). For these reasons, we do not exercise our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 16
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(POSITA) “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, biomedical engineering, or similar technical degree and at least 3 years of experience in the medical device industry, including experience with containers and valves used in disposable medical devices.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 51–52). Petitioner further asserts that such a person would have collaborated with a team member with training and experience in the biological aspects of the invention and education and experience relating to the collection of biological samples. Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 51– 52). Patent Owner does not offer an alternative definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art at this time. See generally Prelim. Resp. Accordingly, for the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of one of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We determine that it is not necessary for us to construe “biological sample” or “annular valve” at this stage of the proceeding because neither party contends that construing either term is material to deciding whether to institute a trial on the asserted grounds in the Petition. See Nidec Motor Corp. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,536,632 - Daiichi Sankyo, Inc. / Astrazeneca Pharmaceuticals, LP v. Seagen Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 16, 2024 · PGR2021-00030 · APJ Jeffrey N Fredman · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5, 9, and 10 are unpatentable for lack of written description, lack of enablement, indefiniteness, and anticipation by Ogitani.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“respective definitions for the level of ordinary skill in the art. While there seems to be a slight difference in whether the ordinary artisan has ADC design experience obtained after a master’s degree or postdoctoral, neither party provides clear basis to explain how this will impact the analysis. Accordingly, we find the parties’ respective definitions to be equivalent and consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art as reflected by the prior” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION We interpret claim terms using “the same claim construction standard” slip op. at 11
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateUnpatentable
“4. Analysis We note that “[i]t is not sufficient for purposes of the written” slip op. at 23
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Enablement (Wands, Amgen full scope)Not enabledUnpatentable
“4. Analysis The facts here are consistent with the situation in Amgen, which” slip op. at 76
Patent outcomesUS 10,808,039 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · NautilusPatents in suitUS 10,808,039 - Resmed, Inc. v. New York UniversityAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 4, 2023 · IPR2022-00989 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 5–11, 13, and 15–30 are unpatentable as obvious over Sullivan995 and Sullivan460; anticipation was not shown, and the other obviousness ground was not reached.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, biomedical engineering, or a similar technical field, with at least two years of relevant product design experience” and “[a]dditional experience could substitute for less education, and additional education could likewise substitute for less experience.” Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 77). Petitioner further states that the “Petition does not turn on this precise definition, and the challenged claims would be unpatentable from the perspective of any reasonable person of ordinary skill in the art at the relevant time.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 78). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 15–16. We find that the ’539 patent and the cited prior art references reflect the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention and that the level of appropriate skill reflected in these references and in the ’539 patent is consistent with the definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“awake state” Claim 24 recites, in part, “to determine whether breathing patterns indicate an asleep state or an awake state.” Ex. 1001, 11:36–12:7; see also id. at 9:49–64 (claim 1 reciting “between an awake state and an asleep state”), 10:42–56 (claim 11 reciting “at least one of an awake state or an asleep state”). In regard to its allegations of obviousness, Petitioner’s arguments suggest an “awake state” ordinarily means when a patient is not asleep. Pet. 36–37, 42. By contrast, with regard to its allegations of anticipation, Petitioner argues that under Patent Owner’s “implied construction of ‘an awake state’ based on [Patent Owner’s] infringement allegations” in district court, “the patient is in an awake state when there is an absence of obstructions or other breathing patterns indicative of sleep.” Id. at 68–70 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1018 ¶¶ 2, 158, 159). Petitioner provides no further support for this “implied construction” purportedly taken from Patent Owner’s district court allegations. Id. Dr. Kirkness, in support of Petitioner, applied the plain meaning of all terms and phrases. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶ 80. In regard to supporting Petitioner’s allegations of anticipation, Dr. Kirkness merely assumed Patent Owner’s purported district court claim construction “position to be true.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 253. In this proceeding Patent Owner does not propose an express meaning for “awake state.” See PO Resp. 29–33. More generally, Patent Owner states that the ’539 patent “teaches how to distinguish between an awake state and an asleep state.” Id. at 8. From the arguments of the Parties, we discern no dispute in this proceeding that a plain and ordinary meaning of an “awake state” is a state in which a patient is not asleep. See Ex. 1001, 3:1–5 (distinguishing between “a wake state” and “a sleep state”), 7:22–24 (describing an embodiment with a processing arrangement that “may determine whether the patient is in a sleep state or a wake state based on the breathing pattern”).8 We apply the plain and ordinary meaning of “awake state” in this proceeding and further determine that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that an awake state means “an absence of obstructions or other breathing patterns indicative of sleep.” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“Next, we turn to the Specification. “While we read claims in view of the specification . . . we do not read limitations from the embodiments in the specification into the claims.” Hill-Rom Servs., 755 F. 3d at 1371 (citation omitted). “We depart from the plain and ordinary meaning of claim terms based on the specification in only two instances: lexicography and disavowal.” Id. In order for a patentee to act as its own lexicographer, the “patentee must ‘clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term other than its plain and ordinary meaning’” and “must ‘clearly express an intent’ to redefine the terms.” Bradium Tech., 923 F. 3d at 1044. In this case, Patent Owner does not argue that it disavowed the full scope of the plain and ordinary meaning of claim 24, nor does Patent Owner argue that it explicitly defined “analyzing the breathing patterns” in the Specification. See, e.g., PO Resp. 29–32. We determine that there is no disavowal nor any explicit lexicographic definition of “analyzing the breathing patterns” in the Specification. Patent Owner instead relies on an “implied lexicography” theory as to why we should construe the phrase as Patent Owner proposes. PO Sur-reply 2, 6–7 (citing, inter alia, AstraZeneca AB v. Mut. Pharm. Co., Inc., 384 F.3d 1333, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). We disagree.” slip op. at 27
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“We disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments—that Petitioner fails to show any motivation to combine and that Sullivan460 is not enabled— merely because Dr. Kirkness indicated in a deposition that he did not know how a preset level is calculated from a sentence in Sullivan460. As Petitioner explains, enablement “is not a requirement to prove invalidity under §103.” Amgen, 314 F.3d at 1357 (under §103, “a reference need not be enabled; it qualifies as a prior art, regardless, for whatever is disclosed therein”). Moreover, we agree with Petitioner that the Challenged Claims do not require any preset level for a flow rate, and a person of ordinary skill “would have understood that a preset level is established from previously-acquired data or data from a previous window of time, such as an average level, for example, as taught in Sullivan995.” Pet. Reply 15 (citing Ex. 2014, 38:2–16; Ex. 1005, 17:3–27, Fig. 12). Patent Owner responds that Petitioner’s assertion is unsupported, and that “Petitioner is obligated to address this challenge, and failed to do so.” PO Sur-reply 18–19 (citing In re Morsa, 713 F.3d 104, 110 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). We find Petitioner’s arguments persuasive because they are supported by the asserted references. Sullivan995 discloses that the computing system may “calculate control values of patterns for each patient based on moving average values or such values or patterns will be pre-programmed into the computing system.” Ex. 1005, 17:14–18. According to Sullivan995, when “signals deviate from predetermined values or patterns the computer system generates a signal which is sent to the feedback speed controller on the blower motor.” Id. at 17:19–22. Based on this disclosure, and given that Sullivan460 incorporates Sullivan995 by reference, we agree with Petitioner that Sullivan460’s disclosure of detecting that the flow rate has fallen below a preset level would have informed a person of ordinary skill that this level was predetermined, so that “the controller 100 activates the nCPAP apparatus 90 to supply air to the patient 30 at a pressure which ameliorates or eliminates the upper airway flow limitation.”16 Ex. 1006, 10:17–21.” slip op. at 50
Patent outcomesUS 9,427,539 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,427,539 - Costar Realty Information, Inc. / Duolingo, Inc. v. Clantech, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 21, 2023 · IPR2022-00799 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–17 are unpatentable as obvious: claims 1–9 over Collins and Gautier, with or without Schaefer; claims 1–5 and 11–17 over Collins, Gautier, Schaefer, and Parthasarathy; and claim 10 over Collins, Gautier, Schaefer, and Miller.
RulingsFinal written decision- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“of unpatentability, Patent Owner has the initial burden of production to show that Schaefer is “not prior art because the asserted claims in the [’421 patent] are entitled to the benefit of a filing date (constructive or otherwise) prior to” Schaefer’s filing date. Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1380; see also Parus Holdings, Inc. v. Google LLC, 70 F.4th 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“[W]hen a patent owner attempts to antedate an asserted prior art reference, the patent owner assumes a temporary burden of production.”). To meet that burden, Patent Owner is required to provide “a detailed explanation of the contention that the ’421 patent is entitled to the benefit of a priority date that pre-dates Schaefer.2 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2).” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner
“To disavow claim scope, the specification must contain ‘expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope.’” Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 653 F.3d 1296, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Epistar Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 566 F.3d 1321, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). “In general, statements about the difficulties and failures in the prior art, without more, do not act to disclaim claim scope.” Id. (citing Spine Solutions, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc., 620 F.3d 1305, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (concluding that statement that a prior art two-piece implant was “particularly difficult” to achieve did not disclaim two-piece implants)). Although a disavowal must be clear, it need not be explicit. Techtronic Indus. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 944 F.3d 901, 907 (Fed. Cir. 2019); see also Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc., 675 F.3d 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Disavowal “may be inferred from clear limiting descriptions of the invention in the specification or prosecution history.”). slip op. at 30
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“Under a proper legal standard, a reference will teach away when it suggests that the developments flowing from its disclosure are unlikely to produce the objective of the [patented] invention.” Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 407 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). A reference does not teach away if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage investigation into the invention claimed. In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). slip op. at 35
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“otherwise dispute Petitioner’s evidence that the combined teachings of Collins and Gautier, with or without Schaefer, disclose the limitations of claim 1. See PO Resp. Having considered the complete trial record, and for the reasons set forth in Sections II.D.4–6.a supra, we determine that Petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the combined teachings of Collins and Gautier, with or without Schaefer, account for all of the limitations recited in claim 1. Pet. 16–38; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 115–206. We also determine, for the reasons set forth in the Petition, that Petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Collins, Gautier, and Schaefer as proposed with a reasonable likelihood of success. Pet. 13– 16; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 103–107.” slip op. at 48
Patent outcomesUS 9,886,421 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,886,421 - Wolfspeed, Inc. / Ideal Industries Lighting, LLC D/B/A Cree Lighting v. Cao Lighting, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 28, 2023 · IPR2022-00848 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 21, 22, 25, 26, 28–30, 32–36, 40, 42–44, 47–49, 52, 53, 56–59, 62, 63, 65–68, 71–73, 77, 78, 81, 82, 85, 86, and 88–91 are unpatentable under § 103; claim 41 is not shown …
RulingsFinal written decision- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“declaration addresses the Patent Owner Response and is relevant to the issues at hand. We start with an important observation: claim 18 (the only independent claim at issue) is an apparatus claim; the claim is directed to a “semiconductor light source.” Ex. 1001, 9:52, EPRC 1:32. One requirement of this apparatus is that it comprise “a semiconductor chip” (id. at 9:66) where “said semiconductor chip is a light emitting diode (LED) chip EPRC, 1:34–36. As we explain when addressing claim construction, infra, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction (Resp. 14) of “said semiconductor chip is a light emitting diode (LED) chip configured to output light at greater than about 40 milliwatts” as referring to “a semiconductor LED chip capable of emitting light greater than about 40 milliwatts.” See Section III.D, infra (emphasis added). Because of these recitations, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that the prior art teaches or suggests a semiconductor LED chip “capable of emitting light greater than about 40 milliwatts.” As explained herein, we determine that in the Petition, Petitioner met this burden by establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the Krames reference teaches an LED chip that has this capability. Pet. 53 (quoting Ex. 1008, 10). Notably, claim 18 does not require actual operation of anything at greater than 40 milliwatts because claim 21 is not a method claim. Petitioner never had a burden of establishing a method of running the Krames reference’s LED at this power output within a semiconductor light source.” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that the challenged claims relate to light fixtures, LED packaging, and LED chip layer structure and that the ’770 patent claims reflect “a hybrid of the light bulb art and semiconductor art.” Resp. 16. The prior art of record, for example, Begemann, likewise reflects “a hybrid of the light bulb art and semiconductor art.” Id. (quoting Pet. 28). Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Lebby, agreed that a person having ordinary skill in 28:16. While Petitioner’s proposed description of a person having ordinary skill in the art could, in some instances, be sufficient to qualify a person as having ordinary skill, Patent Owner’s proposal is a more complete and accurate description of the level of skill commensurate with the scope of the challenged ’770 patent claims. Patent Owner’s description appears consistent with the prior art and patent specification before us and is supported by witness testimony. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill). For the purpose of this Decision, we adopt Patent Owner’s description. We further note that the outcome of our decision would be the same under either party’s asserted skill level.” slip op. at 15
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedTerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Delaware held, with respect to related U.S. Patent 6,465,961, construed “a light emitting diode (LED) chip configured to output light at greater than about 40 milliwatts” as “at least one LED chip is capable of emitting light greater than about 40 milliwatts.” Resp. 14 (citing Ex. 1024, 15–18). Petitioner responds that the phrase “needs no construction” and that Petitioner’s grounds meet this construction. Reply 1. We note that the language of claim 18 does not precisely match the language the District Court considered, it is substantively the same. The record supports a construction very similar to the construction the District Court adopts, and we reference the District Court’s reasoning. Ex. 1024, 15– 18. We, thus, construe claim 18’s recitation that “said semiconductor chip is a light emitting diode (LED) chip configured to output light at greater than about 40 milliwatts” as referring to “a semiconductor LED chip that is capable of emitting light greater than about 40 milliwatts.” It is unnecessary to construe any other claim terms in this Decision because none of the parties’ disputes turn on the meaning of other terms. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017).” slip op. at 17
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedReference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“The facts above are evidence of the Krames reference’s publication as of June 29, 2000, because the facts tend to make the Krames reference’s publication as of June 29, 2000, more probable than it would be without the evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 401(a) (defining evidence as relevant “if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence”). The evidence is sufficient to support publication. Meanwhile, no evidence of record suggests that Krames was not a printed publication as of June 29, 2000. Thus, a preponderance of the evidence supports Krames’s prior art status. Patent Owner argues that Ms. Watters “never establishes a firm date when Krames was purportedly available to the relevant public.” Resp. 21. Patent Owner bases this argument by taking a tortured reading of Ms. Watters’s statement that “[m]embers of the interested public could locate a copy of [the Proceedings] on or after June 29, 2000, the date it was catalogued.” Id. (quoting Ex. 1020, 3); see also Sur-Reply 12–13. The best understanding of Ms. Watters’s statement, in view of the context of Ms. Watters explaining the library’s cataloguing process, is that a member of the interested public had two options: the person could choose to locate the Proceedings on June 29, 2000, or the person could choose to locate the Proceedings after June 29, 2000. Thus, the statement supports public availability as of June 29, 2000.” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 6,634,770 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 6,634,770
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.