- PTAB · Dec 11, 2024 · IPR2024-00907 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review on all challenged claims and all five §103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable over N93, Dua, and Herle.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“(1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. . . . If, after review of [Becton Dickinson] factors (a), (b), and (d), it is determined that the same or substantially the same art or arguments previously were presented to the Office, then factors (c), (e), and (f) relate to whether the petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8, 10 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (Institution Decision) (precedential) (footnote omitted). Consequently, we first turn to an analysis of Becton Dickinson factors (a), (b), and (d) to determine whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office.” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits.” slip op. at 18
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“having “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or equivalent with at least one year of experience in the field of wireless communications,” wherein “[a]dditional education or experience might substitute for the above requirements.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 28). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill in the art at this stage of the proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 19. Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill appears to be consistent with the subject matter of the ’590 patent. This is supported by the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Creusere. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 28. We, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s assessment of a person of ordinary skill for purposes of this Decision. D. Claim Construction” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (in the context of an inter partes review, applying Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,129,590 - PTAB · Nov 20, 2024 · IPR2024-00859 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–9, 13–19, and 28–30 on all petition grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that Pace anticipates claim 1.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). In evaluating the exercise of discretion to deny institution under Section 325(d), we use the following two-part previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, determining whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. Med-El Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 7–8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential).” slip op. at 23
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we conclude that the information demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“C. Legal Standards for Anticipation and Obviousness A patent claim is anticipated if a single prior art reference either expressly or inherently discloses every limitation of the claim. Orion IP, LLC v. Hyundai Motor Am., 605 F.3d 967, 975 (Fed. Cir. 2010). “A single prior art reference may anticipate without disclosing a feature of the claimed invention if such feature is necessarily present, or inherent, in that reference.” Allergan, Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 754 F.3d 952, 958 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).” slip op. at 28
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“skill in the art is “cursory,” “unsubstantiated,” and “so vague as to be effectively meaningless.” Prelim. Resp. 26. According to Patent Owner, the Petition cites no evidence to substantiate the level of skill in the art, and Dr. Riviere’s declaration parrots the language in the Petition. Id. Although Patent Owner disputes the sufficiency of Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art, Patent Owner does not propose a level of ordinary skill in the art of its own. See generally Prelim. Resp. Moreover, Patent Owner fails to present evidence that shows the level of ordinary skill in the art is different from Petitioner’s proposal, or that Petitioner’s proposal is in any way inconsistent with the level of skill reflected in the ’625 patent and the asserted references.8 We find that the ’625 patent and the cited prior art references reflect” slip op. at 30
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,510,625 - PTAB · Nov 20, 2024 · IPR2024-00841 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 5–6, and 8–10 because the petition showed a reasonable likelihood that Gross anticipates at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“In evaluating discretionary denial under § 325(d), the Board follows a two-part framework: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially 1 Amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 103 enacted by the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”) took effect on March 16, 2013. The ’364 patent claims priority to U.S. Provisional Application 60/660,743 filed March 10, 2005. Ex. 1001, code (22). Therefore, we apply the pre-AIA version of § 103. the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential) (“Advanced Bionics”).” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 15. Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art is consistent with the ’364 patent and the asserted prior art except that we set the level to “at least two . . . years of experience.” Otherwise, we agree with and will use Petitioner’s proposed level for this Decision.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningOther
“Although Patent Owner argues that Petitioner interprets certain claim language so as to render it superfluous or non-sensical (Prelim. Resp. 27–28, 30), for reasons explained later in this decision (see § IV.D.2.iv and §IV.D.2.viii, infra), we do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument on the current record. Accordingly, we apply the ordinary and customary meaning to the claim terms without express construction.” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We conclude that the record demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to challenged claims 1–3, 5–6, and 8–10 at least as to anticipation for the following reasons.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,709,364 - PTAB · Nov 20, 2024 · IPR2024-00840 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 1–3, 5, 11–13, 16–20, 24–26, 28, 34–36, and 39–43 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“DexCom, Inc. (“Patent Owner”) timely filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 7 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Based on our review of the record,1 we conclude that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims, and we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“35 U.S.C. § 282(b) “including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). When applying that standard, we interpret the claim language as it would have been understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in light of the specification. Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1279–80 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Thus, we give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by an ordinarily skilled artisan. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Neither party identifies any claim language requiring express interpretation, and we currently discern no such claim language. The parties are free to expressly address the meaning of any claim language during the trial. B. Legal Standards” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“likelihood of proving that Brauker describes the subject matter recited in the preamble of claim 1 and limitation 1a. 10 We do not consider the issue of whether Brauker “expressly state[s]” that its predetermined threshold is non user settable to be dispositive of whether Brauker describes step 1b in an anticipation context. Rather, we seek to determine at trial what Brauker describes to an ordinarily skilled artisan. “An anticipating reference must describe the patented subject matter with sufficient clarity and detail to establish that the subject matter existed in the” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“claim 1 except for the requirement in limitation 1b that the second function determines whether a “predicted glucose value” meets a criterion that is not set by a user. Pet. 60–66. For this aspect of limitation 1b, Petitioner argues that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have found it obvious to incorporate Brauker’s function of determining whether a predicted glucose level meets a threshold into the STS Guide’s second function comparing a glucose level to non user settable criteria. Id. at 62–65. Petitioner argues that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have known the advantages of using a predicted low glucose alarm in addition to a real time low glucose alarm, because a predicted low glucose alarm in advance of potential hypoglycemia helps prevent hypoglycemia by giving the user more time to act, for example, by eating sugar.” Id. at 63 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 146; Ex. 1007, 1149; Ex. 1011, 932). Petitioner also contends that prior art establishes the advantages of using alarms based on both real time and predicted glucose values. Id. at 64 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 11, 15; Ex. 1010, 68). Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been particularly motivated to add a predicted, non user settable low glucose alarm because [an ordinarily skilled artisan] would have known that non user settable criteria tied to hypoglycemia often relate to clinical danger, [Ex. 1013, 725] (“The user should never go below 50 mg / dL at any time without an alarm.”), and that it is particularly beneficial to have an advance warning of a clinical danger. [Ex. 1003 ¶ 147.] Pet. 64 (internal footnote omitted). Petitioner argues that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have reasonably expected to successfully modify the system described in the STS Guide as proposed because the STS Guide and Brauker both relate to alerts to reduce the severity of hypoglycemia and delivering alarms due to low predicted glucose levels was well known before the alleged invention of claim 1. Id. at 65 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 149; Ex. 1005 ¶ 15; Ex. 1010, 68; Ex. 1007, 1150; Ex. 1020; Ex. 1021).” slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 9,119,528 - PTAB · Oct 8, 2024 · IPR2024-00432 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–20 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Comcast would show at least one claim unpatentable over Zhang.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review). slip op. at 12
- Parallel petitionsDenied
“petitions, Petitioner filed a Petition Ranking and Explanation of Material Differences Between Petitions, ranking its three petitions directed to the ’362 patent in accordance with the guidance with respect to parallel petitions in the Board’s November 2019 Consolidated Trial Practice Guide. Paper 3; see Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019, “CTPG”), at 59–60 (available at Available at https://www.uspto.gov/ TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated). In that Paper, Petitioner ranked the instant Petition first. Paper 3, 1.” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA” or “skilled artisan”) “would have had a degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with three-to-four years of experience with digital signal processing and RF tuning systems for satellite and/or cable communications,” and that “[a]dditional education may substitute for professional experience, and significant work experience may substitute for 8 Patent Owner does not present objective evidence of nonobviousness at this stage of the proceeding. See generally Prelim. Resp. formal education.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 30–32). Patent Owner does not address level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Claim Construction We apply the same claim construction standard used in district court actions under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), namely that articulated in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2021). In applying that standard, claim terms generally are given their ordinary and customary meaning as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. “In determining the meaning of the disputed claim limitation, we look principally to the intrinsic evidence of record, examining the claim language itself, the written description, and the prosecution history, if in evidence.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–17). Petitioner states that “[a]ll claim terms herein should be given their” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,210,362 - PTAB · Oct 4, 2024 · IPR2024-00438 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1–76 and all asserted challenges because the Petition showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- Parallel petitionsDenied
“We do not agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s filing of three parallel petitions is grounds to deny all three petitions on that basis alone. See Prelim. Resp. 4–30. As discussed above, Petitioner has complied with our guidance. See CTPG 59–60. For reasons given in our concurrent decisions denying institution in IPR2024-00439 and IPR2024-00440, however, we agree with Patent Owner that plural petitions are not warranted and we deny institution in the concurrently filed decisions for these petitions. Given our decisions to deny institution in IPR2024-00439 and IPR2024-00440, Patent Owner’s arguments on the need for more than one petition are unavailing with regard to the instant Petition. In view of the foregoing, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) in this proceeding.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we institute an inter partes review as to all the challenged claims of the ’206 patent based on all the challenges raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner asserts that “[a]ll claim terms herein should be given their ordinary and customary meaning to a POSITA, as they would be given in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b),” where POSITA stands for “person of ordinary skill in the art.” Pet. 18. Petitioner further notes that “the ’206 patent defines ‘wideband’ as a band that carries multiple channels.” Id. at 18–19 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:36–39). Patent Owner does not respond. At this stage, on the record before us, we determine that no claim term requires express interpretation to resolve any controversy in this proceeding. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“Based on Petitioner’s arguments and evidence, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown sufficiently for purposes of this Decision that Zhang teaches the recited “digitizing” step of element 1C. For example, Zhang teaches that its ADC 220 “converts the down-converted multi-channel analog RF signal to a multi-channel digital RF signal.” Ex. 1013 ¶ 27 (cited by Pet. 22). Zhang explains that “many modifications, variations, alternatives, and equivalents . . . are intended to be within the scope of [its] invention,” and gives the example that “the RF channels need not be contiguous.” Id. ¶ 48 (cited by Pet. 22). We agree with Petitioner that Zhang’s example teaches or suggests that the RF channels may be contiguous. Zhang further describes “demultiplex[ing] the multi-channel digital RF signal into separate digital RF channels C1 to Cn,” which “contain content channels that are selected or used by a subscriber.” Id. ¶ 28 (cited by Pet. 22). Zhang describes filtering the RF channels so that “only the target RF channel passes.” Id. ¶ 32 (cited by Pet. 23). In addition, Zhang describes “select[ing] one or more of the RF channels D1 to Dm from one or more of the digital RF channels C1 to Cn,” where “only the selected channels are later demodulated unlike the systems using RF tuners which demodulate all of the RF channels.” Id. ¶ 28.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,399,206 - PTAB · Oct 1, 2024 · IPR2024-00435 · APJ Lynne H Browne · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–82 on all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Comcast would prevail on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons discussed below, we determine, based on the record before us, that there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioner would prevail in showing at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Furthermore, we deny Patent Owner’s request for us to exercise our discretion to deny institution in this proceeding based on Petitioner’s filing of two additional parallel petitions challenging the same claims. We therefore institute inter partes review on all claims and all grounds. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357 (2018).” slip op. at 2
- Parallel petitionsDenied
“We do not agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s filing of three parallel petitions is grounds to deny all three petitions on that basis alone. See Prelim. Resp. 4–30. As discussed above, Petitioner has complied with our guidance. See CTPG, 59–60. For reasons discussed in our concurrent Decisions Denying Institution in IPR2024-00436 and IPR2024-00437, however, we agree with Patent Owner that plural petitions are not warranted and we deny institution in the concurrently filed Decisions for these petitions. Given our Decisions to Deny Institution in IPR2024-00436 and IPR2024-00437, Patent Owner’s arguments regarding the need for more than one petition are unavailing with regard to the instant Petition.” slip op. at 11
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) “would have had a degree in electrical engineering, or a similar discipline, along with three-to-four years of experience with digital signal processing and RF tuning systems for satellite and/or cable communications,” and that 6 Patent Owner does not present objective evidence of nonobviousness at this stage of the proceeding. See generally Prelim. Resp. “[a]dditional education may substitute for professional experience, and significant work experience may substitute for formal education.” Pet. 15– 16 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 30–32). Patent Owner does not address level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally, Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner states that “[a]ll claim terms herein should be given their ordinary and customary meaning to a POSITA as they would be given in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b).” Pet. 16. Yet, Petitioner proposes claim construction for “wideband” and “digital down converter” / “digital front end.” Id. at 16–19. Patent Owner does not address claim construction. See generally, Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no aspects of the challenged claims require explicit construction. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,381,866 - PTAB · Sep 6, 2024 · IPR2024-00430 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–24 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in a petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and Preliminary Response, and accompanying exhibits and evidence, we determine Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim in the inter partes review. Therefore, we grant institution of an inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’690 patent on all challenges in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A POSITA6 would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a similar discipline, and three to four years of experience working in signal processing and/or communication systems/networks. Additional education may substitute for experience, and significant work experience may substitute for formal education. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 115–120). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art, which is consistent with the prior art references asserted by Petitioner. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). For this stage of the proceeding, we agree with and will use Petitioner’s proposed level for this Decision.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Since the parties apply what they contend is the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim terms in their briefs, and have stipulated in the Cox case that the plain and ordinary meaning applies, and Patent Owner argues that the district court’s construction in the Charter case is the plain and ordinary meaning, there is no controversy concerning claim terms that we need to resolve in this Decision. Pet. 6; Prelim. Resp. 10; Ex. 1005, 104–105; Ex. 2001, 2. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). At this stage of the proceeding, therefore, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning to the claim terms consistent with their ordinary and customary meaning under 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). We note, however, that Patent Owner seems to consider the court’s construction in the Charter case to require that the claimed “probe” must be of a type that can be compared with a reference signal. Prelim. Resp. 10. We question whether all of the different types of probes mentioned and claimed in the ’690 patent would require comparison with a reference signal. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 2:7–19. However, this is a matter best resolved, if necessary, on a full record at trial.” slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableUnpatentableMixed
“Prelim. Resp. 23 (citing Ex. 1013, 37) (annotated in red by Patent Owner). IEEE-802.16’s Table 5 shows that the CID is a field of a generic MAC header. Petitioner does not show sufficiently that the CID, located in the header, specifies content payload of a MAC message, as required by limitation 1A. Petitioner alternatively relies on IEEE-802.16’s ranging code index that it contends is another example of data that is in a ranging request parameter and is used for the ranging response payload. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1013, 49–51, 204–213, 576–579, 665–66; Ex. 1002 ¶ 149). Patent Owner asserts that the portions of IEEE-802.16 that Petitioner cites do not disclose that the ranging code index is sent as part of a ranging request message. Prelim. Resp. 25. Although the parts of IEEE-802.16 that Petitioner cites disclose that the ranging code index is sent from the SS to the BS and is included in a ranging response (Ex. 1013, 49–51, 204–213, 576–579, 665–66), the cited parts do not disclose that the SS sends the ranging code index to the BS in a ranging request. Consequently, Petitioner has not established that IEEE- 802.16 anticipates a ranging code index that is a parameter of a ranging request specifying the content payload of the ranging response corresponding to limitation 1A. For the foregoing reasons, on this record, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood to prevail in showing that claim 1 is anticipated by IEEE 802.16.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,284,690 - PTAB · Jun 10, 2024 · IPR2024-00300 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–38 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing based on the Carr grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may be instituted only if it is determined that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. Considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, for reasons explained below, we conclude that Petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail with respect to at least one of the ’770 patent’s challenged claims. We institute an inter partes review on all challenged claims. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355 (2018).” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference not prior artNot shown unpatentable
“Here, however, the February 18, 2022 filing date of Krupa (Ex. 1003, code (22)) is indisputably after the priority date for the claims recited in the ’770 patent, which Petitioner concedes is at least May 17, 2021 (Pet. 4, 14, filing date of the Krupa Provisional to qualify Krupa as prior art. See Pet. 4; 35 U.S.C. § 102(d)(2). Under subsection 102(d)(2), to qualify as prior art, a reference patent or published patent application is considered effectively filed as of the filing date of its provisional application only to the extent that the provisional “describes the subject matter” relied on in the reference patent document. 35 U.S.C. § 102(d)(2). We cannot presume that the Krupa Provisional describes the subject matter in Krupa that the Petition relies on, however. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1380 (“[B]ecause the PTO does not examine priority claims unless necessary, the Board has no basis to presume that a reference patent is necessarily entitled to the filing date of its provisional application.”). The burden to make this showing falls squarely on Petitioner. But Petitioner does not explain how the Krupa Provisional supports the relevant subject matter relied on in Krupa. In fact, Petitioner did not introduce the Krupa Provisional into the record, so it would not be possible to do so.9” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“But Patent Owner’s arguments do little to undermine the rational underpinning of Petitioner’s reasoning for combining Carr and Beuterbaugh because they improperly focus on what Carr and Beuterbaugh disclose individually, rather what they disclose in combination; and they appear to improperly rely on the bodily incorporation of Beuterbaugh’s pulsing method into Carr. Petitioner contends the motivation for combining Beuterbaugh and Carr in the manner claimed comes from the fact that valve sequencing generally (rather than Beuterbaugh’s specific pulsing method for “overlap of fluid flows to each well [to] be controlled to optimize the downhole pressure waves and minimize the surface impacts.” Pet. 63, 66 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 24; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 496–512). Patent Owner does not dispute, at this preliminary stage, that Beuterbaugh suggests valve sequencing was a known technique that can enhance well operations; nor does Patent Owner dispute that Carr discloses a control system that can control the sequence of opening and closing valves in response to determining that the fluid communicated via the manifold has satisfied one or more conditions. Thus, after considering what Carr and Beuterbaugh teach as a whole, we are persuaded at this stage that Petitioner’s reasoning for combining those reference in the manner claimed has a rational underpinning, which is supported sufficiently by the cited evidence of record.” slip op. at 27
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“claims in a civil action before the courts under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), the terms in the challenged claims carry their ordinary and customary meaning, as understood by an ordinarily skilled artisan in the field of art at the time of the invention, in view of the patent’s specification and prosecution history. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Here, both parties contend that the challenged claims in this proceeding do not need to be construed further. Pet. 12; Prelim. Resp. 25. This is so, according to the parties, because a resolution in this proceeding does not hinge on a dispute about how the parties are interpretating any particular claim term or phrase. Id. Furthermore, neither Id. And we need only construe terms that are in controversy and only to the extent needed to resolve the controversy. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019); U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding claim construction is for “resolution of disputed meanings”). Therefore, at this stage of the proceeding, the ordinary and customary meaning of each of the challenged claim terms and phrases, viewed in the proper context of the intrinsic record, applies without any further construction.” slip op. at 6
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,560,770 - Abbott Diabetes Care Inc v. Dexcom, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 1, 2023 · IPR2022-00909 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4, 19, and 23 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 5 and 12 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner
“including a “predictive glucose value,” nowhere do we find the written description or drawings to have delineated such a second function expressly as “the present invention.” See, generally, Ex. 1001; see also Evolusion Concepts, Inc. v. HOC Events, Inc., 22 F.4th 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“We have repeatedly held that ‘it is not enough that the only embodiments, or all of the embodiments, contain a particular limitation to limit claims beyond their plain meaning.’”) (citation omitted). And, regardless of the exact wording, the concern we have is that without a persuasive, express, indication in the specification that the “second function” is specifically limited to “predicting glucose values,” it is a disfavored path to read limitations into the claims. Though understanding the claim language may be aided by the explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import limitations into a claim that are not expressly part of may not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the embodiment. SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The facts and written description here appear to fall more squarely into the category of cases where it is not enough to simply point to embodiments in the specification including the unrecited claim limitation. See Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. Ag, 318 F.3d 1081, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Even in cases where a “present invention” statement is provided, the Federal Circuit has explained that ‘[w]hile clear language characterizing ‘the present invention’ may limit the ordinary meaning of claim terms, . . . such language must be read in context of the entire specification and the prosecution history.”) (citation omitted); see also In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Absent claim language carrying a narrow meaning, the PTO should only limit the claim based on the specification or prosecution history when those sources expressly disclaim the broader definition.”).” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“is any disagreement about the meaning of “a second function” apart from the argument by Patent Owner that the second function should be understood to include “a predictive glucose value.” We are not apprised of any reason for Petitioner to provide an express construction for “second function” in this case. The plain and ordinary reading of limitation 1b is a method step of “evaluating sensor data using a second function to determine whether a parameter indicative of glucose value meets one or more non user settable second criteria.” Ex. 1001, 48:39–41. As far as “second function” goes, the claim language is clear on its face that the second function “determine[s] whether a parameter indicative of glucose value meets one or more non user settable second criteria.” Id. Patent Owner has not offered any construction, nor apart from criticizing Petitioner, indicated in any manner that the “second function” as recited in claims 1 and 19 requires a construction. Our understanding of “second function” is consistent with the specification of the ’215 patent. A plain reading of the specification reveals that the first criteria relates to the claimed “first function,” and the “second criteria” relates to the claimed “second function.” See, e.g., Ex. 1001 3:44–49 (The ’215 Patent describing “a processor configured to: evaluate sensor data using a first function to determine whether a real time glucose value meets one or more first criteria; evaluate sensor data using a second function to determine whether a predicted glucose value meets one or more second criteria.”). The specification description is therefore mostly consistent with the recitations in claim 1 with respect to the first and second functions and relative first and second criteria. Compare id., with Ex. 1001, 48:36–41.” slip op. at 35
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“second function.” PO Resp. 19. However, neither did Patent Owner provide an express construction. See generally id. is any disagreement about the meaning of “a second function” apart from the argument by Patent Owner that the second function should be understood to include “a predictive glucose value.” We are not apprised of any reason for Petitioner to provide an express construction for “second function” in this case. The plain and ordinary reading of limitation 1b is a method step of “evaluating sensor data using a second function to determine whether a parameter indicative of glucose value meets one or more non user settable second criteria.” Ex. 1001, 48:39–41. As far as “second function” goes, the claim language is clear on its face that the second function “determine[s] whether a parameter indicative of glucose value meets one or more non user settable second criteria.” Id. Patent Owner has not offered any construction, nor apart from criticizing Petitioner, indicated in any manner that the “second function” as recited in claims 1 and 19 requires a construction. Our understanding of “second function” is consistent with the specification of the ’215 patent. A plain reading of the specification reveals that the first criteria relates to the claimed “first function,” and the “second criteria” relates to the claimed “second function.” See, e.g., Ex. 1001 3:44–49 (The ’215 Patent describing “a processor configured to: evaluate sensor data using a first function to determine whether a real time glucose value meets one or more first criteria; evaluate sensor data using a second function to determine whether a predicted glucose value meets one or more second criteria.”). The specification description is therefore mostly consistent with the recitations in claim 1 with respect to the first and second functions and relative first and second criteria. Compare id., with Ex. 1001, 48:36–41. slip op. at 34
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In our Institution Decision we determined, in accordance with Petitioner’s proposal, that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’215 patent [w]ould have had a Bachelor’s degree in biomedical engineering, mathematics, statistics, or computer science (or a related or equivalent field), and two or more years of experience researching, developing, designing and/or evaluating (or supervising the same) medical devices for measuring analyte levels, e.g., analyte sensors, including at least some experience in researching, developing, designing and/or evaluating (or supervising the same) methods, systems, or algorithms for providing indicators (e.g., alerts, alarms or other indicators) of analyte levels to users, or equivalent experience. A person with less or different education but more relevant practical experience, or vice versa, may also meet this standard. Inst. Dec. 8; Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 24–26). Patent Owner states that “DexCom does not challenge Petitioner’s POSA definition (Petition, 9-10) because the Petition fails even if it is adopted.” PO Resp. 9 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 20–23). ordinary skill in the art, and because Petitioner’s assessment is consistent with the ’215 patent and the asserted prior art, we continue to rely on Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11
Patent outcomesUS 10,702,215 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,702,215
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.