- Lenovo (United States) Inc. / Motorola Mobility LLC v. Theta IP, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 16, 2024 · IPR2023-00698 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 7–11, 13, and 19–21 were not shown unpatentable because Rauhala does not disclose simultaneous desired and interferer signal-strength determinations, defeating anticipation and the obviousness combination.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The two proposals are materially similar in the education requirement, but differ marginally in professional experience required (three versus five years). See supra. While we were persuaded, on the preliminary record, that both Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposals were consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’202 patent and the prior art of record, on balance, we determined that Petitioner’s proposal was a better reflection of the level of skill in the prior art, and we therefore adopted it for our Institution Decision. See Institution Dec. 12–13. For this Decision, we adopt the description of the person of ordinary skill articulated by Petitioner and used previously in our Institution Decision. In light of our review of the complete record, we find that this formulation is consistent with the ’202 patent, the prior art of record, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker. See Baker I Decl. ¶¶ 28–32. Our Decision would not change, however, if we had applied Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“85:13–16. He admits that “Rauhala doesn’t teach the details of what’s in the detector.” Id. at 91:6–7. He points to no textbook or other independent evidence that would have led a person of ordinary skill to design such a detector. Our Trial Practice Guide cautions against crediting such unsupported testimony: The Board has broad discretion to assign weight to be accorded expert testimony. Yorkey v. Diab, 601 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010). However, the testimony must be based on sufficient facts and data. Fed. R. Evid. 702(b). “Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 35 (Nov. 2019).7 We therefore give Dr, Baker’s unsupported testimony on this issue little weight.” slip op. at 24
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We construe claim terms only as relevant to the parties’ contentions and only to the extent necessary to resolve the issues in dispute. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Having considered the positions of the parties, we find that for the purpose of this decision, we do not need to construe these terms to resolve a dispute.” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“requirement.” Pet. Reply 5. We do not agree with Petitioner. We find that the language of the claims supports Patent Owner’s argument that the desired signal and the interferer signal are received together. As discussed infra, claim limitations 7.7 and 7.8 recite determining a signal strength of the interferer signal and determining a signal strength of the desired signal. These determinations must be performed at the same time; otherwise, the determinations of signal strengths would not be of the same wireless signal. See Larson II Decl. ¶ 70; Baker II Decl. ¶¶ 48–49 (explaining that consideration of signal strengths detected at the same time would be “essential”). The specification of the ’202 patent further supports this finding: “When a receiver is actively receiving a desired signal, each block in the signal path has at its input the desired signal as well as noise and possibly interfering signals.” Ex. 1001, 5:22–24; see also Figs. 2A, 2B (showing interferer signals and desired signals together).” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 10,524,202 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,524,202 - Fervo Energy Co. v. Ormat Technologies Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Sep 18, 2024 · IPR2024-00665 · APJ Josiah C Cocks · IPR · Institution
Institution denied because Petitioner failed to show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable under the proposed obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“II. ANALYSIS A. Principles of Law A petition must show how the construed claims are unpatentable under the statutory grounds it identifies. 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4). Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim for a petition to be granted. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining the level of skill in the art, we consider the type of problems encountered in the art, the prior art solutions to those problems, the rapidity with which innovations are made, the sophistication of the technology, and the educational level of active workers in the field. Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus. Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. U.S., 702 F.2d 1005, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Petitioner contends the following assessment in connection with a person of ordinary skill in the art: The Challenged Claims pertain to a method of recovering geothermal heat. However, “[m]any of the techniques are derived from oil and gas industry.” EX1001 at 4:23-24. Accordingly, here, a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) is a person with a Bachelor’s degree, Master’s degree, and/or Ph.D. in Chemical Engineering, Petroleum Engineering, Energy Resource Engineering, or the like, or at least five years of experience engineering, drilling, and constructing wells. Furthermore, a person with less formal education but more experience, or more formal education but less experience, could also have met the relevant standard for a POSITA. Pet. 16–17 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 34–36). Patent Owner does not offer its own assessment of a POSITA. For purpose of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesOther
“own for any claim term. Patent Owner does, however, note that “claim element 9c[13] includes the terms ‘means for,’ which are presumed to invoke 13 The referenced “claim element 9c” reads in-part “Means for producing a water density difference and a pressure difference between said first means-plus-function treatment under Section 112.” Prelim. Resp. 17 (citing Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Power2B Inc., IPR2022-01378, Paper 12 at 11 (PTAB Mar. 15, 2023) (citing Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part))). Patent Owner further submits that “[u]nder Rule 104(b)(3),[14] Petitioner had an obligation to provide a construction of claim element 9c that includes both the claimed function and the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function.” Id. We agree with Patent Owner that the term “means for” when appearing in a claim triggers a rebuttable presumption that treatment under § 112 applies. On the record before us, however, Petitioner has not explained why the noted presumption has been rebutted or does not apply, and has not provided a construction of the pertinent “means for” term in the Petition in contradiction to the requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 104(b)(3).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“While it is certainly the case that “a prior art reference is relevant for all that it teaches to those of ordinary skill in the art,” see In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1264-65 (Fed. Cir. 1992), it is incumbent on a petitioner, in advancing a permissible theory of obviousness, to explain why a skilled artisan would recognize to pick and choose certain aspects of a reference and combine them with other aspects of the reference, particularly so where the reference itself does not suggest such combination. See In re Hedges, 783 F.2d 1038, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“It is impermissible within the framework of section 103 to pick and choose from any one reference only so much of it as will support a given position, to the exclusion of other parts necessary to the full appreciation of what such reference fairly suggests” ) (citation and inner quotes omitted). Here, Petitioner’s oscillation between different embodiments of Rinaldi in an attempt to reach the requirements of claim 1 is not adequately explained, and more closely resembles impermissible hindsight. See Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc. v. The Toro Co., 848 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017). (“[W]e cannot allow hindsight bias to be the thread that stitches together prior art patches into something that is the claimed invention.”). In sum, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its assertion that claim 1 is unpatentable as a part of Petitioner’s proposed Ground 1.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,320,221 - PTAB · Sep 6, 2024 · IPR2024-00430 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–24 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in a petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and Preliminary Response, and accompanying exhibits and evidence, we determine Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim in the inter partes review. Therefore, we grant institution of an inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’690 patent on all challenges in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A POSITA6 would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a similar discipline, and three to four years of experience working in signal processing and/or communication systems/networks. Additional education may substitute for experience, and significant work experience may substitute for formal education. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 115–120). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art, which is consistent with the prior art references asserted by Petitioner. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). For this stage of the proceeding, we agree with and will use Petitioner’s proposed level for this Decision.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Since the parties apply what they contend is the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim terms in their briefs, and have stipulated in the Cox case that the plain and ordinary meaning applies, and Patent Owner argues that the district court’s construction in the Charter case is the plain and ordinary meaning, there is no controversy concerning claim terms that we need to resolve in this Decision. Pet. 6; Prelim. Resp. 10; Ex. 1005, 104–105; Ex. 2001, 2. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). At this stage of the proceeding, therefore, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning to the claim terms consistent with their ordinary and customary meaning under 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). We note, however, that Patent Owner seems to consider the court’s construction in the Charter case to require that the claimed “probe” must be of a type that can be compared with a reference signal. Prelim. Resp. 10. We question whether all of the different types of probes mentioned and claimed in the ’690 patent would require comparison with a reference signal. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 2:7–19. However, this is a matter best resolved, if necessary, on a full record at trial.” slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableUnpatentableMixed
“Prelim. Resp. 23 (citing Ex. 1013, 37) (annotated in red by Patent Owner). IEEE-802.16’s Table 5 shows that the CID is a field of a generic MAC header. Petitioner does not show sufficiently that the CID, located in the header, specifies content payload of a MAC message, as required by limitation 1A. Petitioner alternatively relies on IEEE-802.16’s ranging code index that it contends is another example of data that is in a ranging request parameter and is used for the ranging response payload. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1013, 49–51, 204–213, 576–579, 665–66; Ex. 1002 ¶ 149). Patent Owner asserts that the portions of IEEE-802.16 that Petitioner cites do not disclose that the ranging code index is sent as part of a ranging request message. Prelim. Resp. 25. Although the parts of IEEE-802.16 that Petitioner cites disclose that the ranging code index is sent from the SS to the BS and is included in a ranging response (Ex. 1013, 49–51, 204–213, 576–579, 665–66), the cited parts do not disclose that the SS sends the ranging code index to the BS in a ranging request. Consequently, Petitioner has not established that IEEE- 802.16 anticipates a ranging code index that is a parameter of a ranging request specifying the content payload of the ranging response corresponding to limitation 1A. For the foregoing reasons, on this record, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood to prevail in showing that claim 1 is anticipated by IEEE 802.16.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,284,690 - PTAB · Jul 25, 2024 · IPR2024-00478 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–19 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on anticipation by Rosenberg-I.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“In view of the above, we determine that this factor strongly weighs against the exercise of discretionary denial. 2. Factor 2: proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language at this juncture because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelOther
“would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related field, plus at least two years of industry or graduate level experience with software engineering, haptics programming, and/or human-computer interaction, including experience with user-interfaces and applications involving touchscreens, touchpads, and related technologies.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37–43). Patent Owner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer science (or an equivalent degree), and two years of practical or industry experience in the field of human computer interaction (HCI), including implementation of computer-based systems and software for providing haptic feedback effects to a user,” and adds that a person having ordinary skill in the art “could have qualified . . . with more formal education and less practical or industry experience, or vice versa.” Prelim. Resp. 9 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 32). Although not identical, the parties’ definitions are substantially similar. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we determine that no express finding is necessary, and that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We note, however, that our obviousness analysis in this Decision would not differ if we adopted either Petitioner’s or Patent Owner’s definition. slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,430,042 - PTAB · Jul 24, 2024 · IPR2024-00477 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 1–7 on all asserted grounds because the Petition showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“does not provide any authority supporting its position that failure to provide a Sotera stipulation “neutralizes” or “undercuts” the impact of a stay. We also disagree with Patent Owner’s suggestion that a district court stay can make discretionary denial inappropriate only when coupled with a Sotera stipulation. See Prelim. Resp. 59. Again, Patent Owner does not provide any authority supporting this position. Id. Contrary to Patent Owner’s positions, Fintiv indicates a district court stay “has strongly weighed against exercise of the authority to deny institution” independent of whether a Sotera stipulation—or any other type of stipulation—has been submitted. Fintiv at 6.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Other
“time it was made, 35 U.S.C. § 103 requires us to resolve the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of the invention. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person who is presumed to have known the relevant art at the time of the invention. In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Factors that may be considered in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art include, but are not limited to, the types of problems encountered in the art, the sophistication of the technology, and educational level of active workers in the field. Id. In a given case, one or more factors may predominate. Id.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We do not discern a need to construe explicitly any other claim language at this juncture because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,336,260 - Hunter’S Manufacturing Company, Inc. D/B/A Tenpoint Crossbow Technologies v. Ravin Crossbows, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 9, 2024 · IPR2023-00407 · APJ Robert J Silverman · IPR · Final written decision
Claim 1 is unpatentable as anticipated by Stanziale ’771; the Board did not reach the alternative grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“As an initial matter, the recited expression “mounted to” is broad. The Federal Circuit has explained that words in a claim “will ordinarily be given their full meaning,” without imposing narrowing modifications on the claim language. Johnson Worldwide, 175 F.3d at 989, see also Virginia Panel, 133 F.3d at 865–66. As to whether the “mounted to” connection may be an indirect connection, the parties agree that an indirect connection is permitted — a view that is amply supported by the intrinsic record, as discussed above. With regard to the types of movement that may occur between a “string guide” and a corresponding “limb,” the intrinsic record shows that that various types of movements (including no movement at all) are characterized as “mounted to.” Slight variations of “mounted to,” occurring in the intrinsic record, are helpful in understanding the claim language — particularly because the ’015 patent itself uses such a variant (“mounted . . . on”) to describe the very connection (between a “string guide” and a “limb”) that is elsewhere, and in claim 1, is described as “mounted to.” See Ex. 1001, 5:23–26.” slip op. at 22
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Patent Owner’ sole argument — i.e., that Stanziale ’771 fails to teach the “mounted to” limitation — is based upon its construction of the “mounted to” limitation, which permits the “string guide” to be rotatable relative the corresponding “limb,” but permits no other type of relative motion. See PO Resp. 4, 13–14. As discussed above, we do not accept Patent Owner’s construction of the “mounted to” limitation. In Stanziale ’771, first and second pulleys 145, 146, and interconnecting pivot 147 (all three of which Petitioner maps to claim 1’s “string guide[s]”) are pivotally connected to a number of intermediate members (e.g., lever arms or pushing arms 32, connecting elements 27, and constraining member 29) which are, in turn, pivotally connected to elastic members 10 (which Petitioner maps to claim 1’s “limb[s]”). See Pet. 41–42 (citing Ex. 1012 7:9–17, 8:26–8:13, 11:8–9, 14:18–15:22, 16:24–25, 16:29, 17:2, 17:15–17, 17:24–27, 19:12–30, 20:32–21:16, Figs. 1–7; Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 177–179); see also Ex. 1012 11:3–7, 11:34–12:4, 12:10–17, 16:29–18:3, 18:22–19:30, Figs. 8, 9, 10a, 10b. Therefore, Stanziale ’771, in Petitioner’s mapping, teaches the “string guide[s]” connected indirectly to the “limb[s].” Per the construction of the “mounted to” limitation employed herein (“connected to, either directly or indirectly”), Petitioner establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Stanziale ’771 teaches the “string guide[s]” “mounted to” the “limb[s],” as recited in claim 1 of the ’015 patent. Contrary to Patent Owner’s concerns (see Paper 47, 1), the indirect connection between Stanziale ’771’s “string guide[s]” and “limb[s]” is not “unbounded.” Rather, the connection disclosed by Stanziale ’771 is the type of indirect connection supported by the intrinsic record. See supra § II.B. Patent Owner’s contention that “a POSA would be disinclined to rely on [Stanziale ’771] as a reference for the improved crossbow design disclosed in Claim 1” is not persuasive. See PO Resp. 38 (citing Ex. 2029 ¶ 46). The test for anticipation is whether a prior art reference discloses each and every element recited in the claim, not whether one of ordinary skill in the art would have been inclined to rely on the reference. See Net MoneyIN, Inc., 545 F.3d at 1369.” slip op. at 32
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedMixed
“Motions to exclude evidence are authorized under 35 C.F.R. § 42.64. Rule 42.64(b)(1) states: “Once a trial has been instituted, any objection [to evidence] must be filed within five business days of service of evidence to which the objection is directed.” Further, “[t]he objection must identify the grounds for the objection with sufficient particularity to allow correction in the form of supplemental evidence.” 35 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(1). “A motion to exclude evidence must be filed to preserve any objection.” 35 C.F.R. § 42.64(c).” slip op. at 40
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“In the present proceeding, Petitioner proposed — and Patent Owner does not dispute (see PO Resp. 3) — the following definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art: A hypothetical POSA to which the ’015 Patent pertains would be a technical person who has at least some experience working in the field of archery, reviewing crossbows or engineering related to bows and/or crossbows, and is generally familiar with prior art crossbows. (Ex. 1016 ¶17.) Such a person would likely have at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or, alternatively, would have several years of experience in the field of archery or engineering related to bows and/or crossbows. (Id.) Pet. 28. As discussed above, we adopt Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill for the purposes of this Decision. See supra § II.A. Petitioner alleges various deficiencies in Mr. Teater’s background, education, and knowledge. Paper 39, 4–8. Nevertheless, Mr. Teater satisfies the definition, of a person of ordinary skill in the art, that Petitioner advanced. Specifically, Mr. Teater has reviewed crossbows for 14 years, encompassing the relevant priority date for the ’015 patent, during which time he wrote evaluations of various bows and crossbows, developed and published testing standards for crossbows, and served on the Archery Trade Association’s technical committee for standards and guidelines. Paper 41, 4 (citing Ex. 2029 ¶¶ 3, 4, 7). Accordingly, Mr. Teater satisfies Petitioner’s definition of “a technical person who has at least some experience working in the field of archery, reviewing crossbows or engineering related to bows and/or crossbows, and is generally familiar with prior art crossbows.” Pet. 28. Petitioner emphasizes that Mr. Teater “does not have a degree in mechanical engineering.” Paper 39, 4 (citing Ex. 2034, 1; Ex. 1034, 43:20–44:5). However, no degree of any kind is mandatory for satisfying Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Indeed, Petitioner’s definition states that “[s]uch a person would likely have at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or, alternatively, would have several years of experience in the field of archery or engineering related to bows and/or crossbows.” Pet. 28 (emphasis added). There is no dispute that Mr. Teater meets this standard. Petitioner raises various other issues that form no part of the definition that Petitioner advanced — for example, whether Mr. Teater has taught courses related to crossbows, whether he is named as an inventor on a” slip op. at 36
Patent outcomesUS 9,354,015 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,354,015 - PTAB · May 10, 2024 · IPR2024-00032 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–5, 9, 11, 12, 14–16, 18–22, 25, 27, 29, 31, 32, and 35 on all asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose of determining whether Petitioner meets the threshold for initiating review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Any arguments not raised by Patent Owner in a timely-filed response may be deemed waived. For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We hereby institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–5, 9, 11, 12, 14–16, 18–22, 25, 27, 29, 31, 32, and 35 of the ’494 patent based upon Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“resolution of the PTAB trial allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts.” Fintiv at 6. In view of the circumstances, we do not discern that the § 101 issues addressed in the Federal Circuit appeal would duplicate the anticipation and obviousness issues addressed here. Accordingly, given the limited § 101 issues on appeal, we do not discern there are any concerns about duplication of efforts. Moreover, because of the uncertainty of the timing of any remand to the district court to address any anticipation or obviousness issues, the present circumstances with a pending appeal effectively act as a stay on the assessment of invalidity issues.” slip op. at 15
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“an IDS in the ’494 patent, we agree with Patent Owner that the record shows that Bhattacharya and Spain10 were listed on an IDS during prosecution of the parent ’358 patent, which the ’494 patent Examiner was required to consider. Prelim. Resp. 5 (citing MPEP 609.02). As such, we determine that Bhattacharya and Spain were presented previously to the Office. See Prelim. Resp. 9; Advanced Bionics at 7–8. We also agree with Patent Owner that the addition of Meunier does not substantially impact our § 325(d) analysis because of the Petition’s limited reliance on this reference. For these reasons, we determine that the first prong of Advanced Bionics is met and turn to the second prong.” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“would have at least a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar discipline, and at least two years of experience in the field working with working with navigation and/or geolocation systems. 1003 ¶ 8; Pet. 6, n.2. According to Petitioner, “[s]uperior education could compensate for a deficiency in work experience, and vice-versa.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 8. Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim Resp. 43. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’494 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,786,494 - PTAB · May 10, 2024 · IPR2024-00031 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 15–20, 24, 26, and 27 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on anticipation and obviousness.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“time it was made, 35 U.S.C. § 103 requires us to resolve the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of the invention. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person who is presumed to have known the relevant art at the time of the invention. In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Factors that may be considered in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art include, but are not limited to, the types of problems encountered in the art, the sophistication of the technology, and educational level of active workers in the field. Id. In a given case, one or more factors may predominate. Id.” slip op. at 6
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“district-court-type standard, as described in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–14. Although extrinsic evidence, when available, may also be useful when construing claim terms under this standard, extrinsic evidence should be considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence. See id. at 1317–19.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“district-court-type standard, as described in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–14. Although extrinsic evidence, when available, may also be useful when construing claim terms under this standard, extrinsic evidence should be considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence. See id. at 1317–19.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“Fintiv states that “a district court stay of the litigation pending resolution of the PTAB trial allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts.” Fintiv at 6. In view of the circumstances, we do not discern that the § 101 issues addressed in the Federal Circuit appeal would duplicate the anticipation and obviousness issues addressed here. Accordingly, given the limited § 101 issues on appeal, we do not discern there are any concerns about duplication of efforts. Moreover, because of the uncertainty of the timing of any remand from the Federal Circuit to the district court to address any anticipation or obviousness issues, the present circumstances with a pending appeal effectively act as a stay on the assessment of invalidity issues.7” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,400,358 - Bj’S Wholesale Club Holdings, Inc. v. Walmart Apollo, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 11, 2024 · IPR2022-01528 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 15–19 are unpatentable: the Board found claims 15–16 anticipated or obvious and claims 17–19 obvious; it did not reach the Yong-Xavier-Cason ground for claim 17.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We find that the ’435 patent and the cited prior art references reflect the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention and that the level of appropriate skill reflected by those sources is consistent with the definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s asserted level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyDecided for patent owner
“technologies, [and he admits] that his only retail technology experience is limited to MBA case studies from the early 1990s.” Pet. Reply 3 (citing Ex. 1022, 15:20–22, 16:3–7, 17:22–23; Ex. 2010). Based on this, Petitioner advances that we “should afford little weight to Dr. Williams’ testimony.” Id. Patent Owner counters that we should afford full weight to Dr. Williams’s testimony. PO Sur-reply 2. Patent Owner contends that Dr. Williams meets Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Id. According to Patent Owner, “Dr. Williams surpasses the education requirement” and meets the experience requirements. Id. at 3. Addressing Petitioner’s concerns about retail technology experience, Patent Owner asserts that “Dr. Williams testified that his MBA curriculum contained coursework that included study of POS systems, particularly though case studies.” Id. (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 3; Ex. 1022 16:3–7). “This is precisely the ‘more education’ in the [person of ordinary skill in the art] definition that can ‘supplement practical experience,’” Patent Owner argues. Id. (citing Pet. 12). Patent Owner persuades us that Petitioner’s concerns regarding Dr. Williams’s retail technology and knowledge and experience are not a basis for affording less weight to Dr. Williams’s testimony.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“Contrary to Patent Owner’s argument, the ’435 patent’s Specification supports Petitioner’s position. As Petitioner argues, the Specification’s disclosure that “[u]ser identification information may include a username, a password, [or] both a username and password” conveys that “a username, a password, [or] both a username and password” is a short, non-exhaustive list of user identification information according to the ’435 patent. Ex. 1001, 6:2–4 (emphasis added). This comports with the plain meaning of “user identification information,” which seemingly would refer to information that identifies a user. Consistent with this, the claim language does not convey any meaning of “user identification information” other than its plain meaning. See, e.g., id. at 24:7–9. Accordingly, we do not adopt Patent Owner’s suggestion that limitation 16a’s “user identification information” requires a username, a password, or both. PO Resp. 72; PO Sur-reply 30. Instead, we conclude that “user identification information” encompasses information that identifies a user.” slip op. at 16
- BurdenPetitioner expert creditedUnpatentable
“Weighing all of the parties’ arguments and evidence, we find Petitioner has shown that Fletchall discloses performing all of limitations 15h–15j’s actions by the same server, specifically payment server 130. For example, Petitioner persuades us that Fletchall discloses payment server 130 performing the actions of limitations 15h and 15i: “retrieving . . . payment information to complete the transaction” and “completing . . . the transaction based on the payment information.” Ex. 1001, 23:43–24:2; Pet. 24–26 (citing Ex. 1008, 4:35–49, 11:3–12, 12:42–45, 13:9–14, 13:45–47; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 199–204, 206–208, 210; Ex. 1001, 10:59–11:3, Fig. 2B). Petitioner’s evidence also shows that Fletchall discloses limitation 15j’s “transmitting . . . a confirmation receipt to the mobile phone in response to completion of payment for the transaction” by payment server 130 on its own. Ex. 1001, 24:3–5; Pet. 26–27 (citing Ex. 1008, 9:26–32, 11:57–61; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 213–214). For example, Petitioner cites Fletchall’s disclosure of at least one embodiment in which “the electronic receipt is generated by the payment server (130) and provided to the transaction module (106b) of the mobile POS application (106).” Ex. 1008, 9:26–29; Pet. 27. Thus, Petitioner demonstrates that Fletchall discloses performing all of limitations 15h–15j by payment server 130. This showing is not diminished by Patent Owner’s observation that the Petition mentions Fletchall’s product database 121 when discussing limitation 15j. PO Sur-reply 27 n.12 (citing Pet. 26–27). In the passages Petitioner cites, Fletchall contains multiple, alternative disclosures about creating and sending a receipt. Ex. 1008, 9:26–32, 11:57–61; Pet. 27. For example, Fletchall contains (1) a disclosure that a receipt can be generated and transmitted by payment server 130 on its own (Ex. 1008, 9:26–29) and (2) an alternate disclosure that “[t]he electronic receipt may be generated by the product database (121) in cooperation with the payment server (130) and provided to the transaction module 106(b) of the mobile POS application (106)” (id. at 9:29–32). As Dr. Shamos notes, Fletchall also discloses that “[t]he electronic receipt may be generated by the payment server.” Ex. 1008, 11:19–20; Ex. 1002 ¶ 213. Immediately following this disclosure, Fletchall describes handling the electronic receipt by payment server 130 and product database 121 working in cooperation as an alternative to handling the electronic receipt by payment server 130 on its own: The electronic receipt may be generated by the payment server, by the product database in cooperation with the payment server and/or by a mobile application installed on the mobile device directly. Once generated, the electronic receipt may be sent to the mobile device to be stored in a memory or in a storage device of the mobile device. Ex. 1008, 11:19–25 (emphasis added). Petitioner’s reliance on Fletchall’s disclosure of handling the electronic receipt by payment server 130 on its own supports Petitioner’s case, regardless of Fletchall’s alternate disclosure of handling the electronic receipt by payment server 130 in cooperation with product database 121.” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 10,803,435 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,803,435 - Bj’S Wholesale Club Holdings, Inc. v. Walmart Apollo, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 10, 2024 · IPR2022-01564 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–14 are unpatentable as anticipated by Keith; the Board did not reach the alternative obviousness ground over Hanson and Keith.
RulingsFinal written decision- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“claims of the later-filed application must be supported by the written description in the parent ‘in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention as of the filing date sought.’” Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 601 F.3d 1333, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). “[T]he hallmark of written description is disclosure,” and the test “is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date” of that application. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citing Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562–63 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). “[T]he test requires an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. But, “[i]t is not sufficient for purposes of the written description requirement of [35 U.S.C.] § 112 that the disclosure, when combined with the knowledge in the art, would lead one to speculate as to modifications that the inventor might have envisioned, but failed to disclose.” Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1572.” slip op. at 33
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros. Inc., v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Moreover, “[b]ecause the hallmark of anticipation is prior invention, the prior art reference—in order to anticipate under 35 U.S.C. § 102—must not only disclose all elements of the claim within the four corners of the document, but must also disclose those elements ‘arranged as in the claim.’” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Whether a reference anticipates is assessed from the perspective of an ordinarily skilled artisan. See Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“‘[T]he dispositive question regarding anticipation [i]s whether one skilled in the art would reasonably understand or infer from the [prior art reference’s] teaching’ that every claim element was disclosed in that single reference.”). slip op. at 13
- BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableDecided for petitioner
“preponderance of the evidence that the claims are unpatentable. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d) (2022). “In an IPR, the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (2012) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to the patent owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review).” slip op. at 12
Patent outcomesUS 10,803,435 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,803,435
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.