- Crowdstrike, Inc. v. Webroot Inc.InstitutedPTAB · May 5, 2023 · IPR2023-00126 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–4, 7–8, 10–13, and 16–19 on all presented grounds; Morris-based challenges met the reasonable-likelihood threshold, while Capalik challenges did not.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314, an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition in view of the present record and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We accordingly institute an inter partes review of claims 1–4, 7–8, 10–13, and 16–19 of the ’224 patent on all presented challenges. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1353 (2018) (“The agency cannot curate the claims at issue but must decide them all.”). B.” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“7. Assessment As discussed above, the second, third, fourth, and fifth Fintiv factors weigh against exercising our discretion to deny institution; and the first and sixth factors are neutral. Given the parties’ relatively modest investment thus far in the related litigation and the likelihood that trial will occur in the related litigation several months after we reach a Final Written Decision in this proceeding, we decline to exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny the Petition. B.” slip op. at 16
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“We apply a two-part analysis under § 325(d), first assessing whether the same or substantially the same art or arguments were previously presented to the Office, and if so, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. See Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6, 8 (Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential).” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“We have reviewed the portions of the district court complaint that Patent Owner cites. Although Patent Owner characterizes those passages as “providing evidence” of a long-felt need, they cite only to the ’224 patent itself. See Ex. 2015, 72–82. We do not discern evidence with the kind of specificity for objective indicia of nonobviousness, notably including evidence of a nexus with the merits of the challenged claims, that would cause us to fault Petitioner for failing to address the evidence in its Petition. See Lectrosonics, Inc. v. Zaxcom, Inc., IPR2018-01129, Paper 33, 31–35 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2020). We accordingly decline to deny the Petition on this basis alone. The parties will have an opportunity during the trial to develop Patent Owner’s evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness so that it may be fully considered. D.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,257,224 - Crowdstrike, Inc v. Open Text Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Apr 21, 2023 · IPR2022-01522 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 3, 4, 9, 11, 12, and 17 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the Shukla and Dalcher challenges.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Applying the standard set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which requires demonstration of a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim, we grant the Petition and institute an inter partes review. The Board has not made a final determination regarding the patentability of any claim.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“the related litigation is mid-July 2024. Pet. 65; Prelim. Resp. 7. This is generally consistent with the currently scheduled trial date of August 19, 2024. See Ex. 2007, 18; Prelim. Resp. 7. Although Petitioner contends that the complexity of the related litigation is likely to delay the trial further, the currently scheduled date is already about four months later than the deadline for the Board to issue a final written decision. See Pet. 66. This time difference is already sufficient for this factor to weigh against exercising discretion to deny institution, and we need not speculate whether a further trial delay in the related litigation is likely. We accordingly treat this factor as weighing against exercising our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Petitioner reasons that, based on such a teaching, it would have been obvious for a person of ordinary skill in the art “to configure Shukla’s injected module to execute stack walk processing upon invocation of an API function in the monitored application memory space.” Id. at 24–25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 107). As an example, Petitioner contends that a skilled artisan “would have understood that Dalcher’s stack walk processing would have been advantageously performed as part of the injected module’s ‘post processing of the results returned by the target function,’” as described by Shukla. Id. at 25 (quoting Ex. 1004 ¶ 54; citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 107). Relying on Dr. Lee’s testimony that “[i]t was well-known for over a decade prior to the ’591 Patent that ‘[t]he call stack of a program execution can be a very good information source for intrusion detection,’” Petitioner reasons that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been motivated to apply the teachings of Dalcher to enable Shukla’s injected module to perform Dalcher’s stack walk processing upon invocation of one of Shukla’s targeted API functions to predictably improve the module’s ability to detect and prevent malware intrusions to improve similar monitoring applications in the same way.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 108 (quoting Ex. 1025); Pet. 25. Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s reasoning “because a [person having ordinary skill in the art] would never have been motivated to combine the teachings of two fundamentally different monitoring methods where doing so would serve no purpose.” Prelim. Resp. 37. According to Patent Owner, and supported by Dr. Medvidovic’s testimony, a person of ordinary skill in the art “would understand that Shukla’s system would only be capable of processing ‘the results returned by the target function’ for call frames that have completed execution and are no longer on the call stack.” Id. at 38 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 54; Ex. 2001 ¶ 101). Because “[t]he post-processing step would relate to only these executed and completed calls,” Patent Owner reasons that “there would be no need for gathering information or Dalcher’s stack walk,” and “Dalcher’s stack walk serves no practical purpose when shoehorned into Shukla’s ‘post processing’ step.” Id. (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 101). Patent Owner adds that “[i]mplementation of Dalcher’s stack walk within Shukla’s sandbox would be superfluous because Shukla’s sandbox will ultimately allow execution and apply its own rule set to allow or ‘block potential adverse effects’—regardless of any information returned by the alleged addition of Dalcher’s stack walk.” Id. at 38–39 (quoting Ex. 1004 ¶ 34 (emphasis by Patent Owner), citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 103, 105). Both parties support their respective positions with testimony by the respective experts. The preliminary record before us presents insufficient basis to discount the testimony of either expert, and the record would benefit from cross-examination of those declarants. Mindful of the standard we apply at this stage, we determine that Petitioner makes a sufficient showing with respect to the “executing stack walk processing” limitation.” slip op. at 30
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to effect the combination of teachings that Petitioner proposes because Shukla “teaches away from ‘preventing execution of a payload’ ‘when an alert of suspicious behavior is triggered.’” Prelim. Resp. 48–49. This is so, Patent Owner says, because Shukla’s sandbox, “rather than interfere with the execution of the application, ‘detect[s] and block[s] potential adverse effects resulting from an attack or malware, but does not interfere with the normal execution of the valid application 1 and allows it to function as intended.’” Id. at 49 (quoting Ex. 1004 ¶ 34) (alterations by Patent Owner). But Shukla’s statements do not appear to make criticisms that would rise to the level of a teaching away. See In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (a prior-art reference does not teach away from the claimed subject matter unless the prior-art reference also criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages the solution claimed). Patent Owner will have an opportunity during the trial to revisit and elaborate on this argument. For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Petitioner” slip op. at 36
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,284,591 - Solaredge Technologies Ltd. v. Koolbridge Solar, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 17, 2023 · IPR2022-00013 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–17 are unpatentable under § 103(a), principally over Iwata and Bower, with additional references applied to dependent claims.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, and three years of design experience with power electronics, including experience designing power converters.” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 20–23). Patent Owner neither expressly addresses Petitioner’s proposal nor proffers its own articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art. But Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Foty, states that he “do[es] not dispute the Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” Ex. 2006 ¶ 43. Because we find Petitioner’s proposal reasonable, consistent with the level of skill reflected by the prior art, and supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker, we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyDecided for petitioner
“We have considered Patent Owner’s reiterated argument, and note that the only specific example Patent Owner identifies relates to whether Iwata’s series-connected inverters include transformers. See PO Resp. 9–10. Below, we discuss the propriety of Petitioner’s reliance on Dr. Baker’s testimony within the specific context of that example. See infra § II.E.2.a. More generally, we disagree with Patent Owner’s broader implication that there must be perfect alignment between a petition and a supporting expert declaration because “[m]erely repeating an argument from the Petition in the declaration of a proposed expert does not give that argument enhanced probative value.” Kinetic Techs, Inc. v. Skyworks Solutions, Inc., IPR2014- 00529, Paper 8 at 15 (PTAB Sept. 23, 2014); see also Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15–17 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential) (according “little weight” to declaration testimony that contains a verbatim restatement of a petition’s arguments without additional supporting evidence or reasoning). Indeed, expert discussion of evidence with technical reasoning to support conclusions is a valuable and important part of expert testimony that our regulations expect to be included in a declaration. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); Upjohn Co. v. Mova Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1306, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Lack of factual support for expert opinion to factual determinations, however, may render the testimony of little probative value in a validity determination.”) (quoting Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); Carella v. Starlight Archery & Pro Line Co., 804 F.2d 135, 138 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“Although in some” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends that “[a]ll claim terms herein should be given their ordinary and customary meaning to a [person of ordinary skill in the art], consistent with the prosecution history, as they would be given in a civil action.” Pet. 21 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b)). Patent Owner states that it “does not believe any explicit claim construction is required to resolve the issues presented in the Petition.” PO Resp. 2. We agree with the parties and do not find it necessary expressly to construe any term. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).6” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“We find Petitioner’s reasoning sufficient. In particular, Dr. Baker’s testimony provides rational underpinning for Petitioner’s reasoning to combine the teachings of Iwata and Bower as proposed. Patent Owner disputes limited aspects of Petitioner’s analysis, which we consider below.” slip op. at 30
Patent outcomesUS 10,784,710 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,784,710 - Solaredge Technologies Ltd. v. Koolbridge Solar, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 17, 2023 · IPR2022-00007 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–13 and 20 are unpatentable: claims 1–3 and 8–10 over Tracy, claims 4 and 11 over Tracy and Fujimoto, claims 6 and 20 over Tracy and De, claim 7 over Tracy and Bond, and …
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“IV. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION In the Decision to Institute we declined to treat any of the claim terms as mean-plus-function terms because the terms have an ordinary and customary meaning. Dec. to Inst. 14–15. Neither party has proposed any other claim constructions. We apply the plain and ordinary meaning in this Decision.” slip op. at 7
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther
“Dr. Baker’s testimony is persuasive evidence that Tracy discloses the claimed floating DC power source, as Tracy’s terminals are not permanently connected to the neutral.” slip op. at 24
- Skill levelOther
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner unrealistically reads this definition to mean there can never be a connection to ground or neutral, because Patent Owner ignores the disclosure in the ’822 patent of temporarily connecting one or the other of the floating DC sources to neutral, as discussed above. Id. at 9–10 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:52–60, 4:27–40, 10:44–47, 11:1–7, 11:25–28, 23:47–52; Ex. 1074, Baker Reply Decl. ¶¶ 12–13).” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 8,937,822 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,937,822 - Solaredge Technologies Ltd. v. Koolbridge Solar, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 17, 2023 · IPR2022-00010 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 14–19 are unpatentable under § 103 based on combinations of Suzui, Boniface, and Gilmore, with additional references for claims 16, 17, and 19.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or similar discipline,” and “three years of design experience with power electronics, including experience designing power converters.” Pet. 21–22 (citing Ex. 1402 ¶¶ 20–23). Patent Owner does not propose any definition for a POSITA, and Dr. Foty states that he “does not dispute the Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” See generally PO Resp.; Ex. 2006 ¶ 42. We adopt and apply Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA at the time of the claimed invention because, based on the record, this proposal is consistent with the ’822 patent, the asserted prior art, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“We determine that it is unnecessary to construe any claim term expressly to resolve the disputed issues before us. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). As Petitioner contends that Suzui discloses this limitation (Pet. 42–43), we do not ignore this limitation but address the limitation based on the parties’ explicit arguments with respect to Suzui.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that the claimed detector must look for “a specific unusual current with specific characteristics, i.e., ‘with said common mode waveform at said characteristic frequency.’” PO Resp. 15. In particular, claim 14 recites “creating” a common-mode AC probe signal waveform “from said DC to AC converter at a characteristic repetition frequency that is in phase on both said DC positive and negative input conductors,” and the claimed detector is adapted to “detect with said” common mode waveform at said characteristic repetition frequency. See Ex. 1401, 43:21–37 (emphasis added). That is, contrary to Patent Owner’s contention that the claimed detector “must look for” the unusual current with the common mode waveform, claim 14 recites that the common mode wave form is created from the DC to AC converter at the characteristic frequency, and the detector then detects the unusual current with said created common mode waveform at the characteristic frequency. Id. As pointed out by Petitioner during oral argument, “the existence of a common [mode] waveform in Suzui is not in dispute.” Tr. 9:23–24. We find persuasive Petitioner’s reliance on Suzui to disclose “creating a common mode AC probe signal waveform from a DC to AC converter at a characteristic repetition frequency” as recited in claim 14. Pet. 37. As Dr. Baker testified, “[f]rom the DC input voltage output by solar battery 1, Suzui’s inverter generates an output AC waveform—specifically a 60 Hz, sine-shaped alternating current” which “corresponds to the claimed ‘AC output having an output waveform with an output repetition frequency,” which is then “received by Suzui’s single-phase three-wire commercial power system 3.” See Ex. 1402 ¶ 192 (citing Ex. 1406, 3:26–30, 4:60–65, 5:15–24, 5:32–40, 5:51–67, 7:43–52, Fig. 2). Further, we are also persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that Suzui and Gilmore teach “detecting an imbalance current generated by the common-mode voltage.” Pet. Reply 17 (citing Pet. 37–42; Ex. 1474 45–46). In particular, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s contention, supported by Dr. Baker’s declaration, that Suzui’s current detector 10 “detects an imbalance between the currents flowing in the positive and negative DC conductors (zero-phase current) of the inverter (the claimed ‘a detector adapted to detect an unusual current’),” which “is generated by the 120 Hz AC voltage to ground (the claimed ‘with said common mode waveform at said characteristic repetition frequency’).” Pet. 37; see also Ex. 1402 ¶ 205. That is, we are persuaded by Dr. Baker’s testimony that, “because Suzui’s current detector 10 detects an imbalance in the zero-phase current of the DC circuit of the inverter,” a POSITA would understand Suzui to disclose “a detector adapted to detect an unusual current,” wherein “because this ‘unusual current’ is generated by the AC voltage to ground that has a frequency of 120 Hz,” the POSITA would also understand Suzui to disclose the claimed “with said common mode waveform at said characteristic repetition frequency.” Ex. 1402 ¶ 205 (citing Ex. 1406, 5:47–51, 7:46–61, Fig. 2).” slip op. at 29
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“10. Instead, we are persuaded by Dr. Baker’s testimony that Suzui’s solar battery 1 “is formed as a solar battery string by connecting a plurality of solar battery modules 1M1 to 1Mx in series such that an appropriate voltage can be output as the input voltage to the system interconnection inverter 2.” Ex. 1402 ¶ 186 (citing Ex. 1406, 4:66–5:2). We find persuasive Dr. Baker’s testimony that Suzui’s solar battery modules 1M1 to 1Mx are “arranged in an array,” wherein a POSITA “would understand that they are composed of photovoltaic cells.” Id. at ¶ 187 (citing Ex. 1406, 4:59–5:6, Figs. 2, 8).” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 8,937,822 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,937,822 - PTAB · Apr 12, 2023 · IPR2022-01428 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 1–34 on all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“the PTAB will not deny institution of an IPR or PGR under Fintiv (i) when a petition presents compelling evidence of unpatentability; (ii) when a request for denial under Fintiv is based on a parallel ITC proceeding; or (iii) where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute review. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims on all grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“For the reasons explained below in section II.E.3.a, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing under the district court’s construction and also under that construction as interpreted by Patent Owner. Because the constructions advocated by Patent Owner do not impact the decision whether to institute, we need not resolve this claim construction issue at this time. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). 2. “Chip Select Signals,” ”Chip Select Conduits” Claims 6, 11–14, 16–19, and 29–34 recite “chip select signals” or “chip select conduits.” Patent Owner argues that the district court construed the term “chip select signals” and associated “chip select conduits” to “exclude[] situations in which a chip select signal could enable multiple array dies at once” and contends that we should adopt this construction. Prelim. Resp. 23–24 (citing Ex. 2004, 33–34). For the reasons explained below in section II.E.6, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a and, therefore, we need not further address this claim construction at this time.” slip op. at 11
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed skill level at this time. See Prelim. Resp. 20 (“For purposes of this preliminary response only, Patent Owner applies the skill level proposed by Petitioner.”). To the extent necessary, and for purposes of this Decision, we accept the uncontested assessment offered by Petitioner, with the exception of the qualifier “at least,” which introduces vagueness as to the amount of experience.” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,787,060 - PTAB · Apr 12, 2023 · IPR2022-01427 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 over all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the asserted obviousness challenges.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“the PTAB will not deny institution of an IPR or PGR under Fintiv (i) when a petition presents compelling evidence of unpatentability; (ii) when a request for denial under Fintiv is based on a parallel ITC proceeding; or (iii) where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition. Interim Procedure 9. Here, Petitioner has filed such a stipulation, which provides the following: Samsung stipulates that, if the Patent Trial and Appeal Board institutes an IPR proceeding for U.S. Patent No. 9,318,160 on the grounds presented in Samsung’s petition in IPR2022-01427, Samsung will not pursue an invalidity defense in the Eastern District of Texas action (C.A. No. 21-463-JRG) that the patent claims subject to the instituted IPR are invalid based on grounds that were raised or reasonably could have been raised in the IPR. Ex. 1051. Thus, in light of Petitioner’s stipulation, we do not exercise discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Pet. 23. Patent Owner argues that we should apply the district court’s constructions for “array die” and “chip select signals.” Prelim. Resp. 21–25. We provide a preliminary analysis of each of these terms below. The parties may address these and any other claim construction issues during the trial, and our final decision including any claim constructions will be based on the full record developed during the trial. 1. “Array Die” The district court construed “array die” as “array die that is different from a DRAM circuit” based on an argument during prosecution of the ’060 DRAM circuits 206A–D in U.S. Patent Application Publication 2008/0025137 A1 (Ex. 1011 (“Rajan137”)). Ex. 2004, 31–32 (citing January 13, 2014 Amendment at 10); see Ex. 1002 (’060 prosecution history), 465 (January 13, 2014 Amendment at 10) (“Rajan does not disclose ‘a plurality of stacked array dies.’ Rajan merely stacks DRAM circuits 206A–D, which are different from array dies.”). Patent Owner argues that we should adopt the district court’s construction so that there is a “consistent construction” between the two proceedings. Prelim. Resp. 23–24. Patent Owner, however, qualifies its position by arguing that “the statements it made during prosecution were specific to Rajan137’s DRAM circuits 206A–D and this should be made clear to the jury through the order instead of having the expert explain it at trial.” Prelim. Resp. 24 n.4 (citing Ex. 2005 (Patent Owner’s objections to the district court claim construction order), 1–2); see Ex. 2005, 2 (“[T]he Court should make clear that the claimed array die is one that is ‘different from Rajan’s DRAM circuits 206A–D.’”). Although Patent Owner appears to walk this qualification back by arguing in its Sur-reply that it withdrew its objections to the district court claim construction (Sur-reply 1–2 (citing Exs. 2010, 2011)), Patent Owner’s position here still appears to be that the term “array die” is one that is different from DRAM circuits 206A–D of Rajan137. For example, in disputing Petitioner’s unpatentability contentions, Patent Owner argues that “the Petition contains no analysis on how or why Kim’s or Riho’s memory dies are different from Rajan137’s DRAM circuits.” Prelim. Resp. 26–27; see also Prelim. Resp. 27 (“Missing from the Petition is any analysis on why the referenced DRAM dies in Grounds 1 and 2 differ from Rajan137’s” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had an advanced degree in electrical or computer engineering, or a related field, and two years working or studying in the field of design or development of memory systems, or a bachelor’s degree in such engineering disciplines and at least three years working in the field.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 60). Petitioner also asserts that “[a]dditional training can substitute for educational or research experience, and vice versa,” and Petitioner identifies particular technology with which a person of ordinary skill in the art would 7 At this stage, Patent Owner does not present any objective evidence of nonobviousness (i.e., secondary considerations) as to any of the challenged claims. Council) industry standards and DRAM (dynamic random access memory) and SDRAM (synchronous DRAM) memory modules. Pet. 5. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed skill level at this time. See Prelim. Resp. 21 (“For purposes of this preliminary response only, Patent Owner applies the skill level proposed by Petitioner.”). To the extent necessary, and for purposes of this Decision, we accept the uncontested assessment offered by Petitioner with the exception of the qualifier “at least,” which introduces vagueness as to the amount of experience.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Pet. 98–99 (citing Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 40, 45–46; Ex. 1030, 135–36; Ex. 1038, 68; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 589–606). Petitioner argues that Riho teaches that varying impedances between TSVs that result from, for example, manufacturing processes and chip placement, should be taken into account. Pet. 99–100 (citing Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 55–56, 61); see Ex. 1016 ¶ 61 (discussing that the chip located closest to the control chip has “smaller penetrating through resistance” than a chip farther from the control chip). Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill “would have been motivated by Riho2 to account for these variations by selectively activating one or more drivers . . . to achieve the optimal driving strength for each ‘data conduit,’ thus saving power.” Pet. 100 (citing Ex. 1018 ¶¶ 96–97, Fig. 7A; Ex. 1017, 1:22–24, 5:11–14, Fig. 5; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 598–603); see also Pet. 100–01 (asserting that “[o]ther contemporaneous references confirm that adjusting the driver strength to account for the position of a die in stack was well known at the time” (citing Ex. 1039, code (57), 7:46–49, Fig. 6)). 3. Patent Owner’s Arguments and Our Preliminary Analysis Patent Owner makes two arguments against Petitioner’s challenge to” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSRPatents in suitUS 9,318,160 - Unified Patents, LLC v. Robocast, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jan 20, 2023 · IPR2022-01125 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable over Henley or Shoham and Richardson.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“establish anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102, each and every element in a claim, arranged as recited in the claim, must be found in a single prior art reference. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001). While the elements must be arranged in the same way as is recited in the claim, “the reference need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis test.” In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832–33 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Identity of terminology between the anticipatory prior art reference and the claim is not required. Prior art references must be “considered together with the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994).” slip op. at 10
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019); see Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Certain terms recited in the challenged claims were construed during prior litigation of the ’451 patent, i.e., the parent of the challenged ’932 patent. Ex. 1011 (claim construction order in cases involving Microsoft and Apple); Ex. 2009, 5 (clarification of certain claim constructions on summary judgment). Patent Owner advocates that we adopt such prior constructions in this proceeding, and Petitioner “does not dispute” such constructions. Pet. 10–13; Prelim. Resp. 6–8. We have reviewed the court’s claim-construction order, and adopt its construction of the following terms for purposes of this Decision. First, we construe “node,” which is recited in multiple claims, as “an identifier of a resource that includes an address to the resource and the duration for which the resource’s content is to be presented by default.” See Ex. 1011, 16–17; Pet. 12; Prelim. Resp. 7. Second, we construe “show structure of nodes,” which is recited in challenged independent claims 1 and 22, as well as in challenged dependent claim 4, as “a structure that is arranged for the display of content by specifying one or more paths through a plurality of nodes. The show structure of nodes specifies the duration of any display,” but there is no durational requirement separate from the construction of “node.” See Ex. 1011, 2–13; Pet. 11–12; Prelim. Resp. 7. Third, we construe “interactively variable duration information,” which is recited in challenged independent claim 1, as well as challenged dependent claims 2 and 26, as “a parameter specifying how long a content is to be displayed by default before a subsequent content is displayed, where the viewer of the content can change the parameter.” Ex. 1011, 22–23; Pet. 13; Prelim. Resp. 7.” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related subject and two or more years of experience working with computer networks and the accessing and presentation of networked resources to users in the 1996 timeframe.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1012 ¶ 51). Petitioner adds that “[t]his description is approximate, and a higher level of education or specific skill might make up for less experience and vice-versa.” Id. Patent Owner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have the equivalent of a four-year degree from an accredited institution (usually denoted as a B.S. degree) in computer science, computer engineering or the equivalent, and experience with, or exposure to, topics in computer networking, multimedia, and web systems. A person of ordinary skill in the art would also have approximately 3-5 years of professional experience with these topics.” Prelim. Resp. 6. In addition, Patent Owner say that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, while significant experience in the field might substitute for formal education.” Id. (citing Ex. 2005 ¶ 28). Both parties support their proposals with testimony by their respective experts. See Ex. 1012 ¶ 51; Ex. 2005 ¶ 28. Although the proposals differ in certain respects, they do not differ in ways that affect our decision to deny institution of the proceeding. Both proposals include baccalaureate degrees and experience in generally related fields, with both parties indicating that additional education or experience could compensate for some lack in the other. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal, which we find consistent with the level of skill reflected by the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“distinction. See Ex. 2005 ¶ 30 (“Henley discloses a ‘video optimized stream server system 10,’ also referred to as ‘media streamer,’ for use by broadcasters to deliver content to end users, or viewers.”). In particular, Dr. Almeroth observes that, in Figure 1 of Henley, reproduced above, system controller 64 is illustrated graphically as connected to multiple user controls 65, but is shown connected only to a single display 66. Id. ¶ 31. This structure, in combination with Henley’s description of the drawing, leads Dr. Almeroth to conclude that user control 65 “corresponds to a ‘set top box[]’” for an end user, and that system controller 64 corresponds to a separate “‘user interface’ for the operator.” Id. Specifically, Dr. Almeroth points to Henley’s description of system controller 64 as “respond[ing] to inputs from user control set top boxes 65 to cause commands to be generated that enable media streamer 10 to access a requested video presentation.” Id.; Ex. 1013, 8:30–32 (emphasis added). Dr. Almeroth also notes Henley’s explanation that “[s]ystem controller 64 is further provided with a user interface and display facility 66 which enables a user to input commands, such as by hard or soft buttons, and other data to enable an identification of video presentations, the scheduling of video presentations, and control over the playing of a video presentation.” Ex. 2005 ¶ 31; Ex. 1013, 8:33–38. These disclosures by Henley support Dr. Almeroth’s conclusion that “[t]his ‘user interface and display facility 66’ is for an operator—not an end user.” See Ex. 2005 ¶ 31. Dr. Almeroth provides additional reasoning to support this conclusion. For example, Henley explains that “[s]ystem controller 64 responds to inputs from user control set top boxes 65 to cause commands to be generated that enable media streamer 10 to access a requested video presentation.” Ex. 1013, 8:30–32. In light of this, because an end user would interact with the set-top box shown as user control 65, Dr. Almeroth reasons that “it would make no sense” for display 66 to be for the end user. Ex. 2005 ¶ 32. We agree with this reasoning. In addition, Dr. Almeroth observes that Henley describes two types of interfaces for media streamer 10, a command line interface and a graphical user interface. Id. ¶ 33 (citing Ex. 1013, 18:47–50). Because the command line interface can be used for “batch” functionality, Dr. Almeroth reasons, and we agree, that the command line interface is for broadcast operators, rather than for end users. Id. With respect to the graphical user interface shown in Figure 8, reproduced above, Dr. Almeroth further reasons that a person of skill in the art would understand that it relates to operator controls, rather than end-user controls, because Henley specifically describes it as showing keys “used to operate the media streamer.” Id. ¶ 34; Ex. 1013, 4:5– 6. In other words, according to Dr. Almeroth, “[t]he graphical user interface corresponds to the command line interface.” Ex. 2005 ¶ 34. Dr. Almeroth’s reasoning is compelling. Notably, Figure 8 shows “Batch” button 130 and “Import/Export” button 132 to “move video data into and out of the media streamer.” See Ex. 1013, 19:20–22, 19:30–31. As Dr. Almeroth testifies, these are not functions that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand to be available for end users, but are appropriate for broadcast operators: “None of these commands are consistent with those that would be available to an end user of, e.g., a set top box or pay-per-view system.” Ex. 2005 ¶ 35. In light of this compelling testimony, we agree with Patent Owner and find that “Henley . . . does not describe . . . the end user’s interface or controls.” See Prelim. Resp. 22.” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,965,932 - Google LLC v. Parus Holdings, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 13, 2022 · IPR2022-01020 · APJ James J Mayberry · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2021) (permitting the Board to institute trial on behalf of the Director). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the present record, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“the prior art and the claimed invention. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have had a Bachelor’s Degree in electrical engineering, computer science or a related field, and at least two years of experience with voice interfaces and information processing.” Pet. 8. Petitioner adds that “[m]ore education could substitute for less experience, and vice versa.” Id. Petitioner bases these contentions on declaration testimony from Mr. Lipoff. Id. (referencing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 40, 85).” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that the three independent claims include language that indicates that each claim encompasses a set-up stage and a retrieval stage. When construing a claim, we start with the language of the claims themselves. See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“[T]he context in which a term is used in the [claim at issue] can be highly instructive.”). Claim 1 expressly recites that steps (a) through (h) are completed before step (i) and subsequent steps. Ex. 1001, 14:12–15; see Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Unless the steps of a method [claim] actually recite an order, the steps are not ordinarily construed to require one.” (citation omitted)). For claim 16, its preamble recites “[a] method for allowing a phone user to set up and subsequently retrieve information in an audio format from a pre-defined portion of a pre-selected web [site].” Id. at 16:13–15; accord id. at 16:17–62 (affirmatively reciting “pre-defined portion of said pre-selected web site” in multiple steps in the body of the claim); see also Pet. 13 (“Furthermore, a [person having ordinary skill in the art] would have understood that Claim 16’s preamble is similar to element 1(i) of Claim 1.”); Prelim. Resp. 22–23; cf. Function Media, LLC v. Google, Inc., 708 F.3d 1310, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (concluding that a claim that recites “processing” an “electronic advertisement” necessarily indicates that “the creation of the ad must happen before the processing begins”).” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“2. Other claim terms Except as provided above, we determine that we need not expressly construe any other claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). To the extent that the scope of any particular claim term requires discussion, however, we provide it in our assessment of the challenges, which we turn to next.” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,516,190 - Apple Inc. v. Parus Holdings, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 6, 2022 · IPR2022-00950 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1–4 unpatentable over the asserted obviousness combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Applying the standard set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which requires demonstration of a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim, we deny the Petition and do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of retrieving information in response to a voice command.” Pet. 10. Petitioner adds that “[l]ack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Id. Dr. Yarowsky supports this articulation, and Patent Owner does not propose any different articulation. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 14. Because we find Petitioner’s proposal reasonable, consistent with the level of skill reflected by the prior art, and supported by the testimony of Dr. Yarowsky, we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). We also note that, although the specific language of Petitioner’s proposal differs somewhat from the expressions of the level of ordinary skill that we adopted in the related proceedings to determine whether to institute review, they are substantially equivalent. See Microsoft, IPR2022-00137, Paper 9 at 9–10; Google, IPR2022-00279, Paper 7 at 10–11.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019); see Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “Petitioner submits that for the purposes of this proceeding, the terms of the challenged claims should be given their plain and ordinary meaning, and no terms require specific construction,” nor does Patent Owner propose any express construction of any claim term. See Pet. 10. On the record before us, we do not find it necessary to construe any term for purposes of this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“2. Combination of Brown and Shuster Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s reasoning for combining Brown and Shuster (together with Myers) as “based solely on hindsight.” Prelim. Resp. 64 (citing ATD Corp. v. Lydall, Inc., 159 F.3d 534, 546 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). We agree with this assessment because, as Patent Owner observes, “Brown discloses a web-based [interactive voice response] system with no inherent search capability and [that is] used to navigate Internet sites,” while Shuster “discloses a system for searching a wide area network and then displaying optimized search results such that users can find information easily and quickly.” Id. at 61 (emphases omitted). This difference, between navigation and searching, is meaningful, as Patent Owner illustrates with what it calls “a more realistic scenario.” See id. at 62.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,721,705
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.