- Medtronic, Inc. v. Moskowitz Family LLCInstitutedPTAB · Aug 20, 2026 · IPR2026-00162 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review
The Director granted the petition and instituted inter partes review of claims 8, 9, 13, and 17–21 based on Palmatier.
RulingsDirector review decision- Director reviewOther
“Before JOHN A. SQUIRES, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office. DECISION Granting Institution of Inter Partes Review” slip op. at 1
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“1 US 9,445,919 B2, issued Sept. 20, 2016 (Ex. 1057). 2 At this preliminary stage, Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood that Palmatier anticipates or renders obvious the challenged claims (Pet. 22–66), and Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s showings as to Palmatier.” slip op. at 2
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“1 US 9,445,919 B2, issued Sept. 20, 2016 (Ex. 1057). 2 At this preliminary stage, Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood that Palmatier anticipates or renders obvious the challenged claims (Pet. 22–66), and Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s showings as to Palmatier.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does present some evidence of conception, diligence, and constructive reduction to practice, but Petitioner persuasively disparages that evidence on the preliminary record. For example, Patent Owner relies on April and May 2011 emails exchanged between two or more of the named inventors (Exs. 2027–2031, 2056, 2057, 2059) and a declaration from one of the named inventors, Dr. Nathan Moskowitz (Ex. 2024), to show conception of the claimed subject matter. Prelim. Resp. 8–61. Patent Owner also relies on Dr. Moskowitz’s declaration and emails (Exs. 2045, 2049, 2050) to show reasonably continuous diligence leading up to the filing of a provisional patent application. Id. at 63–66. Petitioner asserts that the documentary evidence does not show conception of the claimed “ridges,” in part, because a key email attachment regarding an embodiment for ridges has not been provided. Pet. Reply 1–4. Petitioner also asserts that Patent Owner’s relies on the declaration testimony from only one named inventor, which is vague and should be the subject of cross-examination. Id. Given these disputes, during trial, the parties are free to develop the record as to the asserted prior conception and diligent reduction to practice of the claimed subject matter, relative to Palmatier’s filing date.” slip op. at 3
§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 12,011,367 - Par Health, Inc. v. Inforlife, S.A.Institution deniedPTAB · Aug 20, 2026 · PGR2026-00036 · APJ John A Squires · PGR · Institution
The Director denied institution because the petition did not show that Biomed was publicly accessible as prior art, so it failed to show any challenged claim was unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“sufficiently that Biomed qualifies as a prior art printed publication. The Board’s precedential decision in Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential), addresses prior-art qualification in the related context of instituting an inter partes review. Hulu states that “the petition must identify, with particularity, evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the reference was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent and therefore that there is a reasonable likelihood that it qualifies as a printed publication.” Id. at 13; see also Jazz Pharm. Inc. v. Amneal Pharm., LLC. 895 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[T]he IPR petitioner . . . had the burden to prove that a particular reference is a printed publication.”). The same guidance applies to post-grant reviews, albeit with the “more likely than not” standard applicable. See 35 U.S.C. § 324(a); Hulu, Paper 29 at 13 n.5. Hulu also states that “there is no presumption in favor of institution or in favor of finding a reference to be a printed publication under [37] § 42.108(c).” Hulu, Paper 29 at 16.” slip op. at 3
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable
“sufficiently that Biomed qualifies as a prior art printed publication. The Board’s precedential decision in Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential), addresses prior-art qualification in the related context of instituting an inter partes review. Hulu states that “the petition must identify, with particularity, evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the reference was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent and therefore that there is a reasonable likelihood that it qualifies as a printed publication.” Id. at 13; see also Jazz Pharm. Inc. v. Amneal Pharm., LLC. 895 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[T]he IPR petitioner . . . had the burden to prove that a particular reference is a printed publication.”). The same guidance applies to post-grant reviews, albeit with the “more likely than not” standard applicable. See 35 U.S.C. § 324(a); Hulu, Paper 29 at 13 n.5. Hulu also states that “there is no presumption in favor of institution or in favor of finding a reference to be a printed publication under [37] § 42.108(c).” Hulu, Paper 29 at 16. In this case, Petitioner merely cites a “date of revision” appearing within Biomed. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1005, 11). Yet, a revision date alone does not establish that Biomed was disseminated or made publicly available. And, although indicia appearing within a reference can sometimes support the printed publication status of the reference, I find the record to be devoid of any such indicia, or other evidence, supporting that Biomed was publicly disseminated or accessible by the June 15, 2021 “date of revision.” See Hulu, Paper 29 at 16–18. Thus, Petitioner fails to show that it is more likely” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNot reached
“sufficiently that Biomed qualifies as a prior art printed publication. The Board’s precedential decision in Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential), addresses prior-art qualification in the related context of instituting an inter partes review. Hulu states that “the petition must identify, with particularity, evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the reference was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent and therefore that there is a reasonable likelihood that it qualifies as a printed publication.” Id. at 13; see also Jazz Pharm. Inc. v. Amneal Pharm., LLC. 895 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[T]he IPR petitioner . . . had the burden to prove that a particular reference is a printed publication.”). The same guidance applies to post-grant reviews, albeit with the “more likely than not” standard applicable. See 35 U.S.C. § 324(a); Hulu, Paper 29 at 13 n.5. Hulu also states that “there is no presumption in favor of institution or in favor of finding a reference to be a printed publication under [37] § 42.108(c).” Hulu, Paper 29 at 16. In this case, Petitioner merely cites a “date of revision” appearing within Biomed. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1005, 11). Yet, a revision date alone does not establish that Biomed was disseminated or made publicly available. And, although indicia appearing within a reference can sometimes support the printed publication status of the reference, I find the record to be devoid of any such indicia, or other evidence, supporting that Biomed was publicly disseminated or accessible by the June 15, 2021 “date of revision.” See Hulu, Paper 29 at 16–18. Thus, Petitioner fails to show that it is more likely” slip op. at 3
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 12,370,153 - Meta Platforms, Inc. v. Sitnet LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jul 2, 2026 · IPR2026-00112 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review
Institution was denied for claims 1–12 because the petition did not show that the cited search results taught the claimed “data feed.”
RulingsDirector review decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Although Petitioner asserts that the ’463 patent “does not limit the form of a data feed,” Petitioner does not explain what the ordinary and customary meaning of “data feed” was at the time of the claimed invention or otherwise propose an express construction of “data feed.” Pet. 6–7, 23. Nor does Petitioner point to any prosecution history that bears on the meaning of “data feed.” Id.; see 37 C.F.R. § 42.100. Accordingly, Petitioner does not provide sufficient evidence showing that Kraft’s or Wong’s disclosure of search results in response to a user-entered search query teaches a “data feed,” as recited in each challenged claim of the ’463 patent. As such, Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood it would prevail in showing at least one claim is unpatentable, as 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) requires.” slip op. at 4
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“I agree with Patent Owner. Neither Kraft nor Wong uses the term “data feed” or characterizes its listing of Web pages (Kraft) or nodes (Wong) provided in response to a user-provided query as a “data feed.” See Ex. 1005, 5:8–12, 6:52–59, 16:52–59, 18:31–54, 18:61–19:23; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 22, 28, 35. Petitioner points to a disclosure in the ’463 patent of a user requesting a personal information aggregator (PIA) to “receive a data feed.” Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1001, 12:52–64). But Petitioner does not sufficiently explain how this disclosure provides support for broadly construing “browsing a data feed” to encompass a user entering criteria for a search (and not specifically requesting a “data feed”) and receiving a listing of Web pages or nodes in response. See Pet. 23, 58–59; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 102, 201–202; Ex. 1005, 6:57–59 (describing users searching a data store for models that match “user-specified criteria”), 18:41–54 (describing a user submitting a query); Ex. 1007 ¶ 28 (describing “searching and selecting from keyword identifiers or other search terms”). Petitioner’s reliance on a separate disclosure in the ’463 patent of the PIA “searching . . . the network for information about the situation or event” also is not persuasive, because the ’463 patent does not describe that embodiment as involving a data feed or browsing a data feed. See Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1001, 20:46–51) (emphasis omitted); Ex. 1001, 20:46–51.” slip op. at 3
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 12,256,463 - Whoop, Inc. v. Omni Medsci, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · May 6, 2026 · PGR2026-00003 · APJ John A Squires · PGR · Director review
The Director instituted post-grant review of claim 7 of the ’790 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a).
RulingsDirector review decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“In this proceeding, Petitioner persuasively shows, on the current record, that the ’790 patent is an AIA patent. As Petitioner notes, during prosecution of the ’790 patent, Patent Owner certified that the ’790 patent application “contains, or contained at any time, a claim to a claimed invention that has an effective filing date on or after March 16, 2013.” Ex. 1002, 246; see Pet. 11–12. Patent Owner, therefore, acknowledged that the application was to be examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA. Id. Also, Petitioner shows, for purposes of institution, that the provisional applications to which the ’790 patent claims priority do not provide written description support for a “wearable device adapted to be placed on a wrist or a hand dorsal of a user,” such that the detection system of the wearable device has a “plurality of detectors arranged along an arc,” as recited in claim 2. Pet. 13.1 Although Patent Owner asserts that one of the provisional applications provides written description support via a figure illustrating a mouth guard design and a disclosure that “[t]he non-invasive devices may be part of a series of biosensors applied to the patient,” I do not find this persuasive based on the current record. See Paper 6, 16–17 (citing Ex. 1071, 15–16, 29, 40); Ex. 1071, 7, 29, 40. Even if the mouth guard could be considered to have detectors arranged in an arc, the mouth guard is used to “perform a non-invasive measurement for dental caries” and is not described as “adapted to be placed on a wrist or a hand dorsal of a user,” as claim 2 requires. See Ex. 1071, 7, 29, 18–19, 40.” slip op. at 3
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Decided for petitioner
“record, that the ’790 patent is an AIA patent. As Petitioner notes, during prosecution of the ’790 patent, Patent Owner certified that the ’790 patent application “contains, or contained at any time, a claim to a claimed invention that has an effective filing date on or after March 16, 2013.” Ex. 1002, 246; see Pet. 11–12. Patent Owner, therefore, acknowledged that the application was to be examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA. Id. Also, Petitioner shows, for purposes of institution, that the provisional applications to which the ’790 patent claims priority do not provide written description support for a “wearable device adapted to be placed on a wrist or a hand dorsal of a user,” such that the detection system of the wearable device has a “plurality of detectors arranged along an arc,” as recited in claim 2. Pet. 13.1 Although Patent Owner asserts that one of the provisional applications provides written description support via a figure illustrating a mouth guard design and a disclosure that “[t]he non-invasive devices may be part of a series of biosensors applied to the patient,” I do not find this persuasive based on the current record. See Paper 6, 16–17 (citing Ex. 1071, 15–16, 29, 40); Ex. 1071, 7, 29, 40. Even if the mouth guard could be considered to have detectors arranged in an arc, the mouth guard is used to “perform a non-invasive measurement for dental caries” and is not described as “adapted to be placed on a wrist or a hand dorsal of a user,” as claim 2 requires. See Ex. 1071, 7, 29, 18–19, 40.” slip op. at 3
§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 12,193,790 - Apple Inc. v. Ginko LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Mar 2, 2026 · IPR2025-01388 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review
The Director denied institution because the petition did not sufficiently show that the asserted prior art disclosed the challenged claims’ requirement that a contact request include a permission setting.
RulingsDirector review decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Petitioner’s arguments are not persuasive. Petitioner fails to show that Robertson discloses that the request to become a contact with a potential contact includes a first permission level for the potential contact. In other words, Petitioner does not establish that any of the cited passages in Robertson disclose that the request includes a first permission setting. See Pet. 15–17 (citing Robertson, 7:42–45, 7:55–58, 8:10–17, 8:23–24, Fig. 9). In particular, each passage is silent as to when the permission levels are set. At most, Robertson discloses specifying permissions after contact has been established. See Robertson, 7:50–53. But Petitioner fails to account for the claim requirement that the first permission level is part of the request to establish contact. “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). Furthermore, Petitioner must explain with particularity how the prior art would have rendered the challenged claims unpatentable. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) (“The petition must specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon.”). “The IPR petition, thus, must provide an understandable explanation of the element-by-element specifics of the patentability challenges, including the identification of particular portions of prior art on which the petitioner is relying.” Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 84 F.4th 990, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2023).” slip op. at 3
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner’s arguments are not persuasive. Petitioner fails to show that Robertson discloses that the request to become a contact with a potential contact includes a first permission level for the potential contact. In other words, Petitioner does not establish that any of the cited passages in Robertson disclose that the request includes a first permission setting. See Pet. 15–17 (citing Robertson, 7:42–45, 7:55–58, 8:10–17, 8:23–24, Fig. 9). In particular, each passage is silent as to when the permission levels are set. At most, Robertson discloses specifying permissions after contact has been established. See Robertson, 7:50–53. But Petitioner fails to account for the claim requirement that the first permission level is part of the request to establish contact. “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). Furthermore, Petitioner must explain with particularity how the prior art would have rendered the challenged claims unpatentable. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) (“The petition must specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon.”). “The IPR petition, thus, must provide an understandable explanation of the element-by-element specifics of the patentability challenges, including the identification of particular portions of prior art on which the petitioner is relying.” Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 84 F.4th 990, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2023).” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner’s arguments are not persuasive. Petitioner fails to show that Robertson discloses that the request to become a contact with a potential contact includes a first permission level for the potential contact. In other words, Petitioner does not establish that any of the cited passages in Robertson disclose that the request includes a first permission setting. See Pet. 15–17 (citing Robertson, 7:42–45, 7:55–58, 8:10–17, 8:23–24, Fig. 9). In particular, each passage is silent as to when the permission levels are set. At most, Robertson discloses specifying permissions after contact has been established. See Robertson, 7:50–53. But Petitioner fails to account for the claim requirement that the first permission level is part of the request to establish contact. “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). Furthermore, Petitioner must explain with particularity how the prior art would have rendered the challenged claims unpatentable. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) (“The petition must specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon.”). “The IPR petition, thus, must provide an understandable explanation of the element-by-element specifics of the patentability challenges, including the identification of particular portions of prior art on which the petitioner is relying.” Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 84 F.4th 990, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2023).” slip op. at 3
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 11,025,573
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.