• Unified Patents Inc. v. KCG Technologies LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 10, 2021 · IPR2019-01536 · APJ Kalyan K Deshpande · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–13 are unpatentable as obvious; the revised motion to amend is denied because proposed substitute claims 14–26 are unpatentable as obvious or indefinite.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied

    “We agree with Petitioner. Proposed substitute claim 24 recites “the handheld device” without antecedent basis. This lack of antecedent basis renders proposed substitute claim 24 indefinite, as we noted in our Preliminary Guidance. Pet. Opp. to RMTA 25; Prelim. Guidance 8 (“Proposed substitute claim 24 also recites ‘the handheld device’ and also suffers from the lack of antecedent basis). Despite having the opportunity to correct its error and amend proposed substitute dependent claim 24 when independent claim 14 was amended to remove the recitation of “a handheld device,” Patent Owner did not do so in its Contingent Revised Motion to Amend. RMTA 31. Proposed substitute claim 24 is indefinite because the claim “fails to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 901 (2014); see USPTO Memorandum on the Approach to Indefiniteness Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings (Jan. 6, 2021)13; see MPEP 2173.05(e) (9th ed., Rev. 08.2017, June 2020). This is because “the handheld device” is only recited in proposed substitute claim 24, and the proposed substitute claim fails to inform one skilled in the art the scope of invention related to synchronizing “data on the handheld device” “in the virtual smart phone.” Because proposed substitute claims 25 and 26 depend from proposed substitute claim 24, we similarly agree with Petitioner that claims 25 and 26 also are indefinite for lacking an antecedent basis for the term “handheld device.” Pet. Opp. to RMTA 25. Accordingly, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that proposed substitute claims 24–26 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112 as indefinite.” slip op. at 40

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner

    “Whether to treat a preamble term as a claim limitation is determined on the facts of each case in light of the claim as a whole and the invention described in the patent.” Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Biolitec, Inc., 618 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 329 F.3d 823, 831 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Absent clear reliance on the preamble in the prosecution history, or in situations where it is necessary to provide antecedent basis for the body of the claim, the preamble generally is not limiting.” Symantec Corp. v. Computer Assoc. Int’l, Inc., 522 F.3d 1279, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). When the limitations in the body of the claim rely upon or derive essential structure from the preamble, then the preamble acts as a necessary component of the claimed invention and is limiting. See Eaton Corp. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 323 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003). A claim preamble also is limiting if the preamble is “necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality” to the claim. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 182 F.3d at 1305. We disagree with Patent Owner. Specifically, we do not agree that limitations in the body of the claims require the preamble to serve as an antecedent basis nor do they derive essential structure from the preamble. Rather, all of the elements recited in the body of claim 1 comprise a “virtual smart phone.” That is, we do not discern, and Patent Owner fails to persuasively point us to, any structure imparted by the preamble’s recitation of a “virtual smart phone.” See Pet. Reply 1–2. We similarly do not agree that the without the term “virtual smart phone” there would be no understanding of the “emulating” or “handheld device” limitations. Rather, the recited “software application executing on the processor” limitation provides the structure and meaning for the “emulating” of the “handheld device” features. Furthermore, we agree with the Petitioner that there is no evidence in the record that the prosecution history requires that the preamble is limiting, and the claims were distinguished during prosecution based on the recitation of a “virtual” smart phone. Id. at 2–3. Accordingly, we do not agree with Patent Owner that the preamble is limiting. slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “on the process to . . . emulate features of a handheld device.” Ex. 1001, 12:58–60 (emphasis added). Patent Owner argues that the term “‘emulate’ has a meaning in the art that is common and understood to mean ‘to imitate.’” PO Resp. 18. Patent Owner provides a dictionary definition to support its contention. Ex. 2004 (defining “emulate” as “to imitate in an effort to equal or surpass”). Patent Owner contends the use of “emulate” in claim 1 comports with its commonly understood meaning as “to imitate,” as does the use of the term “emulate” in the written description. Pet. 18–20 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:66–2:3, 2:6–3:5, 12:54–13:2 (claim 1)). Petitioner argues that the term “emulate” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning and does not contest Patent Owner’s construction of the term “emulate” as “to imitate.” Pet. 6–7; Pet. Reply 7. Petitioner, however, contests Patent Owner’s application of that construction to the asserted prior art. Pet. Reply 4–7 (citing Ex. 1034 ¶¶ 24–26). Petitioner specifically argues that Patent Owner implies that “(1) the imitation must be an exact duplicate in display and manner of input . . . or (2) the imitation relates only to the display and touch screen aspects.” Pet. Reply 4–5. In support of its position that Patent Owner’s interpretation of “to imitate” improperly narrows the meaning of “emulate,” Petitioner contends the written description discloses “less than full replication as emulation” and “controlling the handheld device th[r]ough control of a projected image using a variety of control input mechanisms provides emulation.” Pet. Reply 5–6 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:2–5, 3:57–61, 4:63–66, 6:24–42). Petitioner also notes that the dictionary definition Patent Owner proffered indicates that an exact duplication is not required. Pet. Reply 7 (“The complete definition of emulate [as] ‘to imitate in an effort to equal or surpass.’ Ex. 1004, 3”). We conclude that a preponderance of evidence supports the construction of the term “emulate” to mean “to imitate,” without any further restriction such as exact duplication or only display or touch screen aspects. Accordingly, we construe the term “emulate” as “to imitate.”” slip op. at 9

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art at or before the priority date of the ’955 patent “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, computer engineering, physics, or a related subject, and two to three years of work experience in the field of automotive information systems.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 38–39); Ex. 1034 ¶ 14 (Petitioner’s expert reiterating the same level of ordinary skill in the art). Patent Owner does not propose an ordinary level of skill in the art. We agree with and adopt the level of ordinary skill in the art as articulated by Petitioner.” slip op. at 10

  Patent outcomesUS 9,671,955 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,671,955
• Nautilus Hyosung Inc. v. Diebold Nixdorf, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 14, 2017 · CBM2016-00034 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–24 are unpatentable under § 101; claims 1–3 and 5 are also anticipated by Riach, and specified claims are obvious over combinations of Riach, Graf, Gustin, and Anderson.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

    “For these reasons, we determine that claim 20—its focus and its” slip op. at 37

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptUnpatentable

    “For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that claim 20 is directed to an” slip op. at 52

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “encompasses Riach’s process that copies a portion (but not all) of the original check image data to produce the required modified check image data. Accordingly, we agree that the portion of Riach on which Petitioner relies discloses step (b) of claim 1 that requires, among other limitations, the modified check image data not include at least some visual feature data included in the check image data. Pet. 30 (relying on Ex. 1008, 5:16–30, Figs. 4, 7).” slip op. at 73

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Rather, “it can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does.” Apple, 839 F.3d at 1058 (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 418–19); see also KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (“[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”) (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).” slip op. at 89

  Patent outcomesUS 7,314,163 unpatentable
  § 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Enfish · Electric Power · Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,314,163
• Wombat Security Technologies v. Phishme, Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Jul 20, 2017 · PGR2017-00009 · APJ Jennifer S Bisk · PGR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Wombat’s rehearing request, leaving institution of PGR denied because the petition did not show the patent was eligible for PGR.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “DISCUSSION The applicable standard for granting a request for rehearing is abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). The requirements of a request for rehearing are set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), which provides in relevant part: A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a single request for rehearing without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” slip op. at 3

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “sufficiently shown that the ’038 patent was eligible for post-grant review. Inst. Dec. 8–13. Specifically, we found deficient Petitioner’s contention that the challenged claims were not entitled to the benefit of the filing date of Application No. 13/785,252 (“the ’252 application”) to which the ’038 patent claims priority as a continuation-in-part. Inst. Dec. 8–13. This finding was based on the following deficiencies of the Petition: (1) the Petition did not discuss the relevant disclosure of the application to which the ’038 patent claims priority—Application No. 13/785,282 (“the ’252 application”)—as originally filed, citing instead to the ’940 patent, which issued from the ’252 application; (2) the Petition did not address the Examiner’s statements in the Notice of Allowability that “[t]he present application is being examined under the pre-AIA first to invent provisions”; and (3) Petitioner did not satisfy its burden to show that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have understood the inventor to have possession of “providing feedback to the individual confirming that the identified email was a simulated phishing attack” (“the feedback limitation”). Id. For the third deficiency, we found the feedback limitation supported by at least paragraphs 5 and 18 of the ’252 application, which discuss training individuals who receive simulated phishing attacks such that users are better able to recognize and thwart a real phishing attack. Id. at 11–12.” slip op. at 2

  • BurdenDecided for patent owner

    “being recited expressly in the ’252 application it “satisf[ied] its burden to establish that it was more likely than not that the ’038 patent was not entitled to the filing date of the [’252 application].” Reh’g Req. 3. In Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., however, the Federal Circuit explicitly found that identifying a limitation as not being recited expressly in the specification at issue was not enough to support a finding of lack of written description. 815 F.3d 1331, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The Federal Circuit explained that it was “troubled by the fact that the Board did not cite any evidence other than the fact that the terms were not present in the specification to support its finding,” concluding this placed “undue weight on the absence of the [exact] terms appearing in the specification.” Id. at 1345–46. Petitioner’s burden, therefore, is not established simply by pointing out that the ’252 application does not explicitly state the feedback limitation.” slip op. at 4

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not reached

    “being recited expressly in the ’252 application it “satisf[ied] its burden to establish that it was more likely than not that the ’038 patent was not entitled to the filing date of the [’252 application].” Reh’g Req. 3. In Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., however, the Federal Circuit explicitly found that identifying a limitation as not being recited expressly in the specification at issue was not enough to support a finding of lack of written description. 815 F.3d 1331, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The Federal Circuit explained that it was “troubled by the fact that the Board did not cite any evidence other than the fact that the terms were not present in the specification to support its finding,” concluding this placed “undue weight on the absence of the [exact] terms appearing in the specification.” Id. at 1345–46. Petitioner’s burden, therefore, is not established simply by pointing out that the ’252 application does not explicitly state the feedback limitation.” slip op. at 4

  § 112 disclosure
  Patents in suitUS 9,398,038
• L’Oréal USA, Inc. v. Liqwd, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Jul 19, 2017 · PGR2017-00011 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · PGR · Institution

  The Board denied institution of PGR on claims 1–10 because Petitioner did not show that any claim was more likely than not unpatentable under § 112.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review. 35 U.S.C. § 324(c); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for instituting a post-grant review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), which provides that a post-grant review may not be instituted “unless the Director determines . . . it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.”” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalTerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Moreover, “[a]pplicants can define . . . claim scope during prosecution,” just as they can in a patent specification. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Here, during prosecution of the ’419 patent, the applicant stated that “[t]he term ‘hair coloring agent’ refers to a colorant or pigment that is customarily used in hair care products, which changes the color or tone of the hair it is applied to based on visual inspection.” Ex. 1005, 7. To define specific terms used to describe an invention, the applicant need only set out the definition “with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision,” “so as to give one of ordinary skill in the art notice of the change” in meaning. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). On the present record, the definition of the term “hair coloring agent” set out in the prosecution history of the ’419 patent is sufficiently clear, deliberate, and precise to give a person of ordinary skill in the art notice that the term is used in the ’419 patent in a manner that does not include substances other than “colorant[s] or pigment[s] that [are] customarily used in hair care products,” even if those other substances might be described as “hair coloring agents” outside the context of the ’419 patent. Ex. 1005, 7. Accordingly, we should give effect to that definition. Because Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “wherein the mixture does not contain a hair coloring agent” gives effect to the prosecution history’s definition of “hair coloring agent,” we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction for purposes of the present decision. Thus, on the present record, and for purposes of the present decision, we construe “wherein the mixture does not contain a hair coloring agent” as “wherein the mixture applied to the hair does not have a colorant or pigment that is customarily used in hair care products, which changes the color or tone of the hair it is applied to based on visual inspection.”” slip op. at 6

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Definiteness (Nautilus)Not shown unpatentable

    “to determine the scope of the claims. As discussed above, however, we interpret “wherein the mixture does not contain a hair coloring agent” as “wherein the mixture applied to the hair does not have a colorant or pigment that is customarily used in hair care products, which changes the color or tone of the hair it is applied to based on visual inspection.” We have not been directed to evidence of record that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have considered a bleaching agent to be “a colorant or pigment.” Pet. 7 (describing bleaching as a “process[] that destroy[s] pigment to change hair color,” as opposed to a “process[] that deposit[s] dyes, pigments, or other substances onto the hair to change hair color”); Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 14–15 (contrasting “dyeing,” meaning “processes that alter or change hair color by depositing dyes, pigments, or other substances onto the hair,” with “bleaching,” meaning “the application of an oxidizing agent to hair to destroy the natural or artificial pigment”). Accordingly, on the present record, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has shown that it is more likely than not that claims 1–10 of the ’419 patent are indefinite.” slip op. at 10

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not shown unpatentable

    “wherein the mixture does not contain a hair coloring agent.” Pet. 36–39; Prelim. Resp. 39–40. If “a hair coloring agent” encompasses bleaching agents, then the claims all require a bleaching formulation and simultaneously exclude a bleaching agent, a scope that Petitioner argues is not described in the specification of the ’419 patent. As discussed above, however, we interpret “wherein the mixture does not contain a hair coloring agent” as “wherein the mixture applied to the hair does not have a colorant or pigment that is customarily used in hair care products, which changes the color or tone of the hair it is applied to based on visual inspection.” We have not been directed to evidence of record that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have considered a bleaching agent to be “a colorant or pigment.” Pet. 7 (describing bleaching as a “process[] that destroy[s] pigment to change hair color,” as opposed to a “process[] that deposit[s] dyes, pigments, or other substances onto the hair to change hair color”); Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 14–15 (contrasting “dyeing,” meaning “processes that alter or change hair color by depositing dyes, pigments, or other substances onto the hair,” with “bleaching,” meaning “the application of an oxidizing agent to hair to destroy the natural or artificial pigment”). Accordingly, on the present record, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has shown it is more likely than not that claims 1–10 of the ’419 patent lack written description support. slip op. at 12

  Claim construction§ 112 disclosure
  Patents in suitUS 9,498,419
• Ultratec, Inc. v. Captioncall, L.L.C.Institution denied
  PTAB · Feb 22, 2017 · PGR2016-00037 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · PGR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because the petition did not show that any claim was more likely than not unpatentable under § 101 or § 103.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review of claims 1–23 of U.S. Patent No. 9,197,745 B1 (Ex. 1001, “the ’745 patent” or “the challenged patent”). Paper 1 (“Pet.”). Patent Owner, CaptionCall, L.L.C., filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 9 (“Prelim. Resp.”). We have authority to determine whether to institute a post-grant review. 35 U.S.C. § 324; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for instituting a post-grant review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), which provides that a post-grant review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . demonstrate[s] that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). After considering the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we determine that the information presented in the Petition does not demonstrate it is more likely than not that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Accordingly, we do not institute a post-grant review.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “interpreted according to their broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(b); see Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016) (upholding the use of broadest reasonable construction standard in inter partes review9). Consistent with the broadest reasonable construction standard, claim terms are presumed to have their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire patent disclosure at the time of the invention. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Petitioner proposes constructions for “message” recited in claims 2, 4–8, and 12 and for “module” recited in claims 2–6 and 8. Pet. 9–11. Patent Owner challenges Petitioner’s proposed claim constructions as overly narrow. Prelim. Resp. 8–9. We determine, however, that no claim terms need express construction for this decision.” slip op. at 9

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 not directed to exceptionNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner (Prelim. Resp. 12) that claim 1, as a whole, is directed to an apparatus that facilitates voice communication and captioned text communication using a relay for hearing-impaired users over one or more communications networks and, under specified circumstances— when captioning has been enabled by the hearing-impaired user and the system determines that an attempted connection has failed—automatically reconnects to a captioning communication service. In other words, the claim is directed to a communication device that automatically reconnects to a captioning communication service following an unwanted interruption to the 12 captioning communication service in certain circumstances. See Ex. 1001, 1:13–16 (describing the field of the disclosure as relating to a communication device that automatically reconnects to the captioning communication service “following an unwanted interruption to the captioning communication session”). We determine that claim 1 as a whole is not directed to redialing a telephone as “callers have performed for as long as there have been telephones.” See Pet. 20. Moreover, the claim is directed to an apparatus having communication elements and a processor, and requires two connections and captioning, which, taken as a whole, distinguish claim 1 from a conventional telephone and further supports our determination that the claim merely involves, but is not directed to, the concept of reconnection or redialing. Moreover, looking at the elements individually, claim 1 requires communication elements coupled with a processor configured to able to connect a communication device and connect with a captioning session over two connections. Claim 1 recites a function—“automatically connect with the captioning communication service through a second connection to establish a captioning communication session during the voice communication session responsive to a determination that an attempted connection to the captioning communication service failed during a time in which a caption select option has been enabled by the hearing-impaired user, wherein the attempted automatic connection through the second connection is not made during a time in which the caption select option has been 13 disabled by the hearing-impaired user”—which requires more than “redialing” a telephone. See Prelim. Resp. 11–12. Specifically, the claimed apparatus only performs the “automatically connect” function if three conditions are met: (i) responsive to a determination that an attempted connection to the captioning communication service failed (ii) during a time in which a caption select option has been enabled by the hearing-impaired user, and (iii) “the attempted automatic connection through the second connection is not made during a time in which the caption select option has been disabled by the hearing-impaired user.”” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “excerpts from Parker as purportedly describing aspects of the automatically reconnect limitation. Id. at 40–42. Petitioner does not assert that either the Ultratec User Guide or Parker alone would have conveyed to one of ordinary skill in the art the automatically connect function with the three conditional limitations (id.), nor is such an assertion required under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Petitioner is required under 35 U.S.C. § 103, however, to explain how the combination of the references would have conveyed to one of ordinary skill 25 in the art the recited automatically connect function with its three conditional limitations. Petitioner has not provided such an explanation, much less adequate analysis by Mr. Zatkovich or factual support as to how one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the separate disclosures of the references to teach the automatically connect limitations. Specifically absent from the Petition is any discussion as to how Petitioner’s combination of references would have conveyed to one of ordinary skill in the art the limitations of automatically connecting under the required conditions—the failed attempt limitation, the when-enabled limitation, and the when-not-disabled limitation. Petitioner’s combination relies on Parker’s reconnection function to establish a lost persistent connection, but Parker’s reconnection function does not do so conditionally, much less under the specific conditions required by claim 1. Petitioner does not explain how the combination of Parker’s unconditional reconnection function would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to retry conditionally based on whether the Ultratec User Guide’s caption button was enabling captioning and had not been disabled by the caption telephone user. Furthermore, Petitioner contends that “adding an auto-retry and/or auto-reconnect feature as in Parker to a captioned telephone device as disclosed in [the Ultratec User Guide and Engelke] would amount to simply adding a known technique to a known system, wherein the technique operates in the same way as it was already known to operate and dos not have any unpredictable result.” Pet. 34. As such, Petitioner’s combination 26 expressly relies on Parker’s auto-retry and/or auto-reconnect feature “as in Parker,” which is an unconditional retry in the event of a lost connection. In sum, neither reference by itself describes the automatically reconnect limitation and Petitioner fails to articulate how one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the claimed automatic reconnect in view of the cited disparate disclosures from the references. “[A] patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). Petitioner asserts in a conclusory manner that the combination of a teaching of a button to enable or disable captioning with a teaching of automatic reconnection unrelated to whether captioning is enabled or disabled would have conveyed to one of ordinary skill in the art the automatic reconnection limitation. Petitioner fails to provide adequate explanation or factual support. This flaw of the Petition is particularly problematic when the threshold for institution is “more likely than not,” as here, rather than the threshold of “a reasonable likelihood” required to institute an inter partes review. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), with 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 25

  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Enfish · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 9,197,745
• Captioncall, L.L.C. / Sorenson Communications, Inc. v. Ultratec, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 7, 2016 · IPR2015-00637 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–30 are unpatentable as obvious; Patent Owner’s contingent motion to amend is denied for lack of written-description support and indefiniteness.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part

    “admitted that the patented features of voice and revoiced text are responsible for ‘giv[ing] the phone back to folks with hearing loss.’” PO Resp. 48 (emphasis added). Thus, Patent Owner is offering the statement for the truth that voice and re-voiced text gives the phone back to folks with hearing loss. Patent Owner’s argument that Mr. Puzey was discussing the existence of features in his company’s product rather than features in Patent Owner’s product does not change that his statement is offered as proof regarding an alleged long-felt need for the features. Accordingly, his testimony is hearsay. slip op. at 15

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “art is telecommunication systems. Thus, a [POSA] is a person familiar with at least that technology by way of background and/or experience.” CaptionCall, LLC v. Ultratec, Inc., Case IPR2013-00549, Paper 71, 13 (Final Written Decision) (PTAB 2015); see also CaptionCall, LLC v. Ultratec, Inc., Case IPR2013-00780, Paper 35, 9 (Final Written Decision) (PTAB 2015) (reaffirming our finding in IPR2013- 00549). Patent Owner states that it “does not agree” with that definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art, and that, “without waiving the foregoing objection and reserving all rights,” states that it will “appl[y]” our prior definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art “for purposes of this Response.” PO Resp. 3. By not setting forth arguments advocating a particular definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, and by applying our prior definition, Patent Owner has waived arguments for any other definition. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, as expressed by its declarant, Mr. Occhiogrosso. Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 26–27. This person typically has “a bachelor’s degree” slip op. at 35

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “understand a “communication link,” as claimed, to refer to the “communication line” described in the specification. In particular, the link is “intended not only to apply to a traditional land-line . . . but also to all equivalents that offer similar functionality.” Id. at 8:60–63. A link could be “a portion of the bandwidth” of a particular connection, such that a single mode of connection (e.g., IP) could carry out two types of communication (voice and text), with each type corresponding to a different “communication link.” See id. at 8:44–47, 8:63–65. For example, as explained in the ’838 patent, “[e]ach of the telephone lines could be . . . a portion of the bandwidth of an ISDN or DSL service.” Id. at 8:53–65. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s construction of “communication link” as “any communication session, protocol, link, connection, or path distinguishable from [another] communication link[].”” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “3. Combination of References As we discussed above, Petitioner’s combination takes the two-line” slip op. at 43

  Patent outcomesUS 8,908,838 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,908,838
• E-Loan, Inc. v. Imx, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 16, 2016 · CBM2015-00012 · APJ James P Calve · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 7, 8, 26, and 27 are unpatentable under § 101 because they claim the abstract idea of loan processing implemented with generic computers.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “I. BACKGROUND Petitioner E-Loan, Inc. (“E-Loan”) filed a Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”) seeking a covered business method patent review of claims 7, 8, 26, and 27 of U.S. Patent No. 5,995,947 (Ex. 1001, “the ’947 patent”). Patent Owner IMX, Inc. (“IMX”) filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 6 (“Prelim. Resp.”). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 324. Based on these submissions, we instituted trial as to claims 7, 8, 26, and 27 of the ’947 patent. Paper 7 (“Dec. to Inst.”). IMX filed a Response. Paper 11 (“PO Resp.”). E-Loan then filed a Reply. Paper 12 (“Pet. Reply”).” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Constitutional / APA (Arthrex, Oil States, due process)Decided for petitioner

    “unconstitutional. PO Resp. 14–16. IMX argues that issued patents are no longer under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) and may be set aside, annulled, or corrected only by the courts of the United States, not by the USPTO or PTAB. Id. at 14–15. IMX argues that post-grant proceedings to invalidate patents deprive patent owners of due process and invade the province of Article III courts. Id. at 16. IMX’s arguments are not persuasive in view of the recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 2015-1091, 2015 WL 7755665 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 2, 2015), which held that Congress can grant authority to the USPTO to correct or cancel issued patents. MCM Portfolio, 2015 WL 7755665, at *5. Congress has done so by creating inter partes reexamination proceedings, ex parte reexamination proceedings, inter partes review, post-grant review, and covered business method patent review. Id. (citations omitted). As stated with regard to the inter partes review provisions at issue in MCM Portfolio, “Supreme Court precedent demonstrates that these statutes, and particularly the inter partes review provisions, do not violate Article III.” Id.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

    “We interpret “can bid on loan applications” in claim 7 and “capable of submitting bids on loan applications” in claim 26 as “can offer to make loans on loan applications that are pending in the database.” This interpretation is consistent with the claims. Claim 1 recites a method for processing loan applications including “maintaining a database of pending loan applications and their statuses at a database server.” Dependent claim 7 recites “said lender can search the database for particular desired types of loans, and can bid on loan applications.” Ex. 1001, 15:26–27 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 10

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

    “E-Loan has established, by a preponderance of evidence, that each of the challenged claims is directed to a fundamental economic or longstanding commercial practice of loan processing. The ’947 patent describes the conventional loan processes as involving large amounts of information that must be collected, compared, evaluated, and disseminated among parties to a transaction so lenders can offer loans at competitive rates. Ex. 1001, 1:9–17. Parties include lenders, borrowers, mortgage brokers, appraisers, regulatory agencies, and mortgage insurance companies. Id. at 1:17–21. Conventional processes required parties to collect nearly all loan application information by hand, transmit it on paper applications, and compare loan information by hand, according to each party’s role of loan evaluation, property appraisal, financial market evaluation, and setting lending rates with rate sheets. Id. at 1:22–27. Thus, parties to a conventional loan transaction monitor loan status and search and modify information in loan applications and loan processes. Claim 1 automates this known method and system of processing loan applications by maintaining a database of pending loan applications and their statuses at a database server where each party to a loan can search and modify that database consistent with their role in the transaction by requests to the server from client devices. Claim 19 recites a system for processing loan applications with a database of pending loan applications including status information and a transaction server for responding to requests of parties to the loan applications to search and modify the database consistent with their roles in the transaction. Whereas conventional loan processing required human beings to collect, compare, evaluate, and disseminate loan applications and loan information by hand, claims 1 and 19 recite the use of a database and transaction server to maintain loan applications so parties can search and modify the loan applications using those computer components instead of using pen and paper to perform these processes.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 5,995,947 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice
  Patents in suitUS 5,995,947
• Global Tel*link Corporation v. Securus Technologies, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 2, 2015 · IPR2014-00825 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 13, 19, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious; the petition did not prove claims 2, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12, and 14–18 unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenDecided for patent owner

    “Applying these principles to the instant case, in an inter partes review, the burden of persuasion is on Petitioner to prove “unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence,” 35 U.S.C. § 316(e), and that burden never shifts to the Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1379. (explaining petitioner “had the burden of persuasion to prove unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence, and this burden never shifted”). Petitioner also has the initial burden of production. Id. Petitioner satisfied its burden of production by arguing in its Petition that Spadaro was prior art under § 102(e) and, in combination with one or more other prior art references, would have rendered claims 1–20 obvious at the time the invention was made under § 103(a). Pet. 4–5, 13–36.” slip op. at 11

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateNot shown unpatentable

    “Even if we were to find that Petitioner’s citation to two pages of its declarant’s testimony, without explanation, does not amount to improper incorporation by reference, the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Leonard J. Forys, Ph.D., is insufficient to show one of ordinary skill in the art was in possession of the subject matter of the claims at issue. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) (“Arguments must not be incorporated by reference from one document into another document.”). First, the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Forys, is conclusory, merely quoting some portions of the ’357 patent without adequately explaining how the quoted portions relate to the subject matter recited by the claims. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Moreover, during cross-examination Dr. Forys explained his analysis, “I just went through the ’167 patent and just picked a few things out that seem to indicate that they are already there. . . . So it was illustrative. It’s not a detailed analysis. It is just suggestive.” Ex. 2006, 48:1–7.” slip op. at 20

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “The ’357 patent does not set forth a special definition for “call application management system.” As confirmed by Dr. Forys (id.), the plain language of the claim specifies the function required to be performed by the call application management system—connecting calls responsive to receiving a request to connect the call. Although Dr. Forys found Patent Owner’s proposed construction to be “reasonable,” Patent Owner’s proposed construction unnecessarily introduces the term “call processing,” which is not recited by the claim itself and on its face seems broader than the recited function of a call application management system—to connect a call. We do not agree with Patent Owner that a call application management system must perform examples of call processing described by the Specification, but not recited in the claim. Limitations from embodiments are not to be imported into the claims. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d at 1184. Furthermore, we find that Patent Owner’s contention— the name “the call application management system of Claim 1 would be understood [by one of ordinary skill in the art] to manage, from start to finish, each call placed or received at the plurality of prisons” (PO Resp. 6)—places too much weight on the term “management” without sufficiently addressing the term “application.” We credit the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, who disagrees that call application management system is 25 required to manage “all call processing, ‘from start to finish.’” Ex. 1020 ¶ 8 (emphasis omitted). Therefore, in light of the plain language of the claim, the Specification of the ’357 patent, and according the testimony of Patent Owner’s declarant and Petitioner’s declarant appropriate weight, we construe “call application management system” to mean a system that performs the enumerated function—“connecting a call to or from the telephone terminals over a telephone carrier network responsive to receiving a request for connecting the call.”” slip op. at 25

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “In general, we adopt the areas of agreement in the parties’ proposals. Patent Owner’s proposed academic or industry experience of telephony14 systems comports with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record, which relate to telephone communication systems. Petitioner has not explained sufficiently why the broader field of communications systems is a more appropriate area of academic or industry experience than telephony systems. Thus, we generally adopt Patent Owner’s proposed academic or industry experience in telephony systems. Therefore, one of ordinary skill in the art would have a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or an equivalent field, as well as at least three years of academic or industry experience in telephony systems.” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 7,529,357 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,529,357
• Global Tel*link Corporation v. Securus Technologies, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 2, 2015 · IPR2014-00824 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 19, and 20 are unpatentable over Spadaro and Hodge; claim 13 is unpatentable over Spadaro, Hodge, and Cree. Claims 2, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12, and 14–18 were …

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenDecided for patent owner

    “the burden of persuasion is on Petitioner to prove “unpatentability by a preponderance of evidence,” 35 U.S.C. § 316(e), and that burden never shifts to the Patent Owner. See id. (explaining petitioner “had the burden of 11 Dynamic Drinkware issued after the time of the trial hearing and post-hearing briefing. 11 persuasion to prove unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence, and this burden never shifted”). Petitioner also has the initial burden of production. Id. Petitioner satisfied its burden of production by arguing in its Petition that Spadaro was prior art under § 102(e) and, in combination with one or more other prior art references, would have rendered claims 1–20 obvious at the time the invention was made under § 103(a). Pet. 4–5, 19–35.” slip op. at 11

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateNot shown unpatentable

    “production under § 103(c)(1), Petitioner contends it carried its burden of production to show that the ’167 patent (grandparent) sufficiently would have conveyed to one of ordinary skill in the art that the Patent Owner had possession of the claimed subject matter and, therefore, the ’260 patent is entitled to the benefit of the filing date of the ’167 patent. Reply 7. As Petitioner recognizes (Reply 6), a claim in an application is entitled, under 35 U.S.C. § 120, to the benefit of the filing date of an earlier filed application only if the disclosure of the earlier application provides support for the claims in the later application, as required by 35 U.S.C. § 112. 35 U.S.C. § 120; In re Chu, 66 F.3d 292 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Petitioner’s argument consists of a single paragraph identifying claim numbers and locations where the ’167 patent purportedly describes the subject matter of most, but not all, of the claims at issue and a citation to a single paragraph in its declarant’s supplemental declaration supporting Petitioner’s Reply. Reply 7 (listing claims 2, 8, 9, 11, and 14–18, but not listing claims 5 and 12; citing Ex. 1020 ¶ 16).” slip op. at 21

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “The ’260 patent does not set forth a special definition for “call application management system.” As confirmed by Dr. Forys (id.), the plain language of the claim specifies the function required to be performed by the call application management system—connecting calls responsive to 26 receiving a request to connect the call. Although Dr. Forys found Patent Owner’s proposed construction to be “reasonable,” Patent Owner’s proposed construction unnecessarily introduces the term “call processing,” which is not recited by the claim itself and on its face seems broader than the recited function of a call application management system—to connect a call. We do not agree with Patent Owner that a call application management system must perform examples of call processing described by the Specification, but not recited in the claim. Limitations from embodiments are not to be imported into the claims. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d at 1184. Furthermore, we find that Patent Owner’s contention— the name “the call application management system would be understood [by one of ordinary skill in the art] to manage, from start to finish, each call placed or received at the plurality of prisons” (PO Resp. 6)—places too much weight on the term “management” without sufficiently addressing the term “application.” We credit the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, who disagrees that call application management system is required to manage “all call processing, ‘from start to finish.’” Ex. 1020 ¶ 8. Therefore, in light of the plain language of the claim, the Specification of the ’260 patent, and according the testimony of Patent Owner’s declarant and Petitioner’s declarant appropriate weight, we construe “call application management system” to mean a system that performs the enumerated function—“connecting a call to or from the telephone terminals over a telephone carrier network responsive to receiving a request for connecting the call.”” slip op. at 26

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “The parties propose similar levels of ordinary skill in the art and do not directly challenge the other’s proposal. We consider the level of ordinary skill in the art to be reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579; In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). The prior art references, like the ’260 patent, relate to telephone communication systems. See Ex. 1001, 1:60–62 (indicating the technical field relates to inmate management and call processing); Ex. 1004, 1:7–9 (indicating the field of the invention relates to the processing of voice telephone calls); Ex. 1005, 1:7–9 (indicating the field of the invention relates to telephone communication systems). In general, we adopt the areas of agreement in the parties’ proposals. Patent Owner’s proposed academic or industry experience of telephony15 systems comports with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record, which relate to telephone communication systems. Petitioner has not explained sufficiently why the broader field of communications systems is a more appropriate area of academic or industry 15 MCGRAW-HILL DICTIONARY OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL TERMS 2112 (6th ed. 2003) (defining telephony as “[t]he transmission of speech to a distant point by means of electric signals”) (Ex. 3001). 30 experience than telephony systems. Thus, we generally adopt Patent Owner’s proposed academic or industry experience in telephony systems. Therefore, one of ordinary skill in the art would have a Bachelor of” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 8,340,260 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,340,260
• The United States Postal Service (Usps) / The United States Of America, As Represented By The Postmaster General v. Return Mail, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 15, 2015 · CBM2014-00116 · APJ Kevin F Turner · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 39–44 are unpatentable under § 101 because they claim the abstract idea of relaying mailing address data without significantly more; anticipation by 1997 ACS was not shown.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “II. ANALYSIS A. Claim Construction We construe all terms, whether or not expressly discussed here, using the broadest reasonable construction in light of the ’548 Patent specification. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.300(b); see also In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 93 F.3d 1268, 1278–80 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Congress implicitly approved the broadest reasonable interpretation standard in enacting the AIA,” and “the standard was properly adopted by PTO regulation.”). During the pre-trial stage of this proceeding, the parties submitted their constructions for specific claim terms and we adopted constructions consistent with the constructions adopted by the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (Ex. 1011). Dec. 8–10. Return Mail does not dispute the constructions adopted. PO Resp. 16–27. Upon review of the parties’ explanations and supporting evidence before us, we discern no reason to modify our claim constructions set forth in the Decision on Institution with respect to these claim terms. Dec. 8–10. For convenience, our claim constructions are reproduced in the table below:” slip op. at 6

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionIneligibleUnpatentable

    “USPS has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 39, as a whole, is directed to the processing of returned mail items, involving decoding information, obtaining an updated address, and electronically transmitting that updated address to a transferee. USPS has shown that the steps are directed to the abstract idea of relaying mailing address data, with the inclusion of an electrical transmission step. Regarding whether claim 39 includes limitations that amount to significantly more than the abstract idea of relaying mailing address data, per our claim construction, USPS has shown that the “decoding” step is “deciphering information into useable form,” but that does not necessarily bring it out of the realm of processes performed in the past by human beings. In fact, all of the claimed steps could be performed in the human mind, with the exception of the transmitting step. Additionally, USPS has shown that what the data might be deemed to represent to the human mind — e.g., “information indicating whether the sender wants a corrected address to be provided for the intended recipient” — does not substantially affect the underlying structure or function of the claim or any machine on which it is carried out. Consistent with USPS’s position, the ’548 Patent disclosure does not describe any particular hardware to perform the steps recited in claim 39, but refers merely in broad terms to generic computer hardware and software.” slip op. at 14

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptIneligibleUnpatentable

    “significantly more than the abstract idea of relaying mailing address data, per our claim construction, USPS has shown that the “decoding” step is “deciphering information into useable form,” but that does not necessarily bring it out of the realm of processes performed in the past by human beings. In fact, all of the claimed steps could be performed in the human mind, with the exception of the transmitting step. Additionally, USPS has shown that what the data might be deemed to represent to the human mind — e.g., “information indicating whether the sender wants a corrected address to be provided for the intended recipient” — does not substantially affect the underlying structure or function of the claim or any machine on which it is carried out. Consistent with USPS’s position, the ’548 Patent disclosure does not describe any particular hardware to perform the steps recited in claim 39, but refers merely in broad terms to generic computer hardware and software.” slip op. at 14

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “deciding between the proffered constructions of “[d]ecipher information into useable form” and “[c]onvert information into useable form,” the court concluded that “using the terms ‘decipher’ and ‘deciphered’ more closely follow the customary meaning of the terms and reflects the claim language. This is because decoding must operate on encoded data,” which is recognized in the term “decipher” but not in “convert.” Ex. 1011, 22–23. USPS contends that “the carrier converts into intelligible form the participant code and endorsement thereby performing the claimed ‘decoding.’” Pet. 45. However, we find no support within 1997 ACS that the carrier decodes or deciphers the participant code or endorsement because the carrier (a person) is merely reading those indicators. The indicator “ADRESS SERVICE REQUESTED” is merely read and there is no disclosure that the carrier decodes the participant code or the keyline. We disagree with Dr. Lubenow that the plain-English endorsements “meet the plain and ordinary meaning of the term ‘code.’” Ex. 1028 ¶ 18. As such, we are not persuaded that the carrier in 1997 ACS acts to decode encoded data on the returned mail items.” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 6,826,548 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipationcites Alice · Mayo
  Patents in suitUS 6,826,548

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.