- PTAB · Feb 17, 2022 · IPR2021-01315 · APJ Lynne H Browne · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–19 and all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that the challenged claims are unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“We are not persuaded by Patent Owner that the circumstances here warrant exercise of discretion to deny the Petition. Patent Owner cites to our precedential case General Plastic Co., Ltd. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017). Prelim. Sur-reply 1–2. Patent Owner’s arguments for exercising discretion to deny institution, however, do not correspond to typically considered factors articulated in General Plastic because, as both parties indicate, this is not a case of followon petitions or multiple petitions challenging the ’500 patent. Prelim. Reply 3; Prelim. Sur-reply 1. There has only been a single petition for inter partes review filed against the ’500 patent. Prelim. Reply 3. Patent Owner cites to no other Board decisions with sufficiently similar circumstances where we exercised discretion to deny a Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 314. Patent Owner contends that we should exercise the Director’s discretion to deny institution for a number of reasons, for example, because Petitioner’s challenges to Patent Owner’s patents are allegedly “an attempt to weaponize the IPR process, and impose increased costs and leverage on USWS’s valuable technology in an attempt to overtake this sector of the market.” Prelim. Resp. 15. We have considered all of Patent Owner’s allegations and are not persuaded that exercising discretion is warranted. Patent Owner’s allegations are not supported by sufficient evidence and, to the contrary, it is undisputed that Patent Owner has asserted seven of its patents against Petitioner in district court litigation. Petitioner expresses reasonable concern that Patent Owner may initiate additional district court litigation regarding its as yet unasserted patents. See Prelim. Reply 2.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“Although Broussard was presented to the Office, we find that the first part of the Advanced Bionics framework is not satisfied, because the Petition does not assert Broussard alone. Rather, Broussard is asserted in combination with Kaarstad in every ground set forth in the Petition. Pet. 14. Kaarstand was not presented to the Office during prosecution. Pet. 14. Patent Owner asserts that Kaarstad is cumulative of Seiver and Kristensen; on the record before us, we agree with Petitioner that it is not. Prelim. Resp. 27–30, Prelim. Reply 5. Specifically, we agree with Petitioner that “Kaarstad includes a power distribution network with two switchgear units and a tiebreaker coupled therebetween.” Prelim. Reply 5 (citing Pet. 24–29). We further agree with Petitioner that these elements disclosed in Kaarstad (i.e. two switchgear units and a tiebreaker coupled therebetween) are the same elements that Patent Owner used to overcome the Examiner’s rejection based on Seiver. Prelim. Reply 5; Ex. 1004, 39. In addition, we agree with Petitioner that Kristensen was never relied on by the Examiner during the underlying prosecution, and that Kristensen merely discloses a single switchgear as opposed to the two switchgears and tiebraker required by the claims. Prelim. Reply 5; Ex. 2002, Abst., 7:52. For these reasons, we determine that Kaarstad is not cumulative of Siever or Kristensen. Thus, the first part of the Advanced Bionics framework is not satisfied because the combination of references asserted in the Petition was not presented previously to the Office. Under the circumstances presented here, we determine that exercising discretion to deny the Petition under § 325(d) is unwarranted.” slip op. at 15
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in demonstrating that claims 1–11 and 13–19 of the ’500 patent are obvious over Broussard and Kaarstad.” slip op. at 31
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateOther
“arguments are persuasive. Specifically, we are persuaded that the ’500 patent is not entitled to priority to the November 16, 2012, filing date of the ’085 application because the ’500 patent and the ’085 application do not share any common inventors. See U.S.C. § 120 (“which names an inventor or joint inventor in the previously filed application”); 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(d)(1) (“Each prior-filed application must name the inventor or a joint inventor named in the later-filed application as the inventor or a joint inventor”). The ’500 patent names Jared Oehring and Brandon N. Hinderliter as inventors. Ex. 1001, code (72). The ’085 application names Joel N. Broussard, Jeff McPherson, and Robert Kurtz as inventors. Ex. 1004, code (72). We have reviewed the ’085 application and determine that the ’085 applications fails to include sufficient written description as required by 35 U.S.C. § 120 for the following limitations of independent claims 1 and 14: “at least two switch gear units” (Ex. 1001, 15:44, claim 1; id. at 16:63, claim 14); and “tie breaker electrically coupled between each of the at least two switchgear units” (id. at 15:48–49, claim 1; id. at 16:66– 67). See generally Ex. 1005. Accordingly, on this record, we are persuaded that the effective filing date of the ’500 patent is April 15, 2016.” slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,893,500 - PTAB · Feb 16, 2022 · IPR2021-01238 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–14 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim would be unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute only when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). A decision to institute may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354, 1359–60 (2018). If the PTAB institutes a trial, the PTAB will institute on all challenges raised in the petition. See Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (“CTPG”) 64 (Nov. 2019) (“The Board will not institute on fewer than all claims or all challenges in a petition.”);1 see also AC Techs. S.A. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 912 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“[I]f the Board institutes an IPR, it must . . . address all grounds of unpatentability raised by the petitioner.”).” slip op. at 2
- Other 314aDenied
“This case is unlike other situations in which the Board has exercised its discretion to deny institution. Instead, Patent Owner asks us to deny institution because Petitioner has filed petitions challenging several of Patent Owner’s patents that are not asserted in district court litigation, arguing that the filing of this many petitions by one petitioner against one patent owner is contrary to the purposes of the AIA. Prelim. Resp. 12–23. Patent Owner’s arguments fail to persuade us to exercise our discretion to deny institution in this case. For each of Patent Owner’s patents, Petitioner has filed only one petition. We do not see this action as being contrary to the purposes of the AIA. See, e.g., Gen. Plastic Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 at 16 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017) (designated precedential) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 48 (2011)) (noting that the AIA is “not to be used as [a] tool[] for harassment or a means to prevent market entry through repeated litigation and administrative attacks on the validity of a patent. Doing so would frustrate the purpose of the section as providing quick and cost effective alternatives to litigation.”). Moreover, it is undisputed that Patent Owner has asserted seven of its patents against Petitioner in district court litigation, and Petitioner expresses reasonable concern that Patent Owner may initiate additional litigation regarding its asyet unasserted patents. See Prelim. Reply 2. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we decline to exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny institution.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“Thus, under § 325(d), the Board uses the following two-part framework: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of [the] first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of [the] challenged claims. Id. at 8.” slip op. at 14
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“In order to claim priority to an early-filed U.S. patent application, the earlier-filed application must disclose the invention claimed in the later-filed application “in the manner provided by section 112(a) (other than the requirement to disclose the best mode)” and the later-filed application must “name[] an inventor or joint inventor in the previously filed application.” 35 U.S.C. § 120. For the reasons discussed below, we agree with Petitioner that, on this preliminary record, the ’882 patent is not entitled to claim priority to the filing date of the ’689 application. Each of the independent claims of the ’882 patent recites a first switch gear positioned between a source of electricity and a transmission line and a second switch gear positioned between the transmission line and an electric motor. Ex. 1001, 8:55–57, 9:19–22. “Switchgear” is “[a] general term covering switching and interrupting devices and their combination with associated control, instrumentation, metering, protective and regulating devices.” Ex. 1029, 7. The ’689 application does not disclose a switch gear. See generally Ex. 1004.2 Nor does the ’689 application disclose any switching or interrupting devices or any transformers. See generally id. Therefore, we agree that, on this preliminary record, the ’689 application does not disclose the invention claimed in the ’882 patent in the manner provided by 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). Additionally, the ’689 application lists Joel N. Broussard, Jeff McPherson, and Robert Kurtz as inventors. Ex. 1004, code (72). The ’882 patent lists Jared Oehring and Brandon Neil Hinderliter as inventors. Ex. 1001, code (72); Ex. 1003, 808. Therefore, we agree that, on this 2 Exhibit 1004 is the publication of the ’689 application. Ex. 1004, code (21). preliminary record, the ’882 patent does not name an inventor or joint inventor of the ’689 application. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons and on this preliminary record, we agree with Petitioner that the ’882 patent is not entitled to claim priority to the filing date of the ’689 application.” slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,526,882 - PTAB · Dec 17, 2021 · PGR2021-00093 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–25 on all petition grounds after finding the § 101 challenge to claim 1 met the institution threshold.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“Fintiv sets forth the factors that we weigh in determining whether to exercise our discretion to deny institution of the post-grant patent review proceeding here under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). See Fintiv, Paper 11, 5–6. These factors are: 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding.” Id. at 6. “[T]he Board takes a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“Because the claims at issue here, in particular claim 1, differ from the March 2015 amended claims of the ’859 patent and the August 2014 amended claims of the ’296 patent (see, e.g., Ex. 1001, 46:59–47:34), we are not persuaded that the cited prosecution history equally applies to the claims here. In particular, we note that claim 1, which we discuss in the analysis below, does not recite a first transceiver corresponding to a short-range communication mode and a second transceiver corresponding to a long-range communication mode, and does not specify whether a first or second transceiver perform certain actions recited in the claim. Id. As Patent Owner points out (Prelim. Resp. 19), claim 1 of the ’614 patent more but claim 1 does not specify whether it is long or short range and merely recites it being used to establish a connection for the exchange of information between a mobile device and a payment accepting unit in some of the claimed steps. Id. Thus, considering Becton, Dickinson factors (a) and (d), we are not persuaded that the same or substantially the same arguments concerning § 101 were previously presented to the Office. Because we determine that the same or substantially the same arguments with respect to § 101 were not previously presented to the Office, we need not address part two of the Advanced Bionics framework with respect to those arguments.” slip op. at 19
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A [person having ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”)] would have had an education background of, or practical experience providing an equivalent to, a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, or a related/equivalent field and at least 3 years of academic or industry experience in electronic payment systems. Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 5–6). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contention in its Preliminary Response. See generally Prelim. Resp. Based on the record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s asserted level of ordinary skill to determine whether it is more likely than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition is unpatentable. This level of skill in the art is consistent with the disclosure of the ’614 patent and the prior art of record. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995).” slip op. at 22
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionInstituted
“Ex. 1001, 46:61–47:34. Based on the current record, we are persuaded that the limitations above recite the concept of identifying a merchant and making a purchase from the merchant. In particular, claim 1 recites steps for identifying payment accepting units (i.e., a merchant) — limitations 1.2– 1.7.1. Claim 1 also recites steps for conducting the purchase —limitations 1.7.2–1.11. Based on the current record, we find that identifying a merchant and making a purchase from the merchant is a commercial interaction, a sales activity. It falls within the enumerated “[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity” grouping of abstract ideas set forth in MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2).” slip op. at 28
Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Mayo · Bilski · Berkheimer · Phillips · NautilusPatents in suitUS 10,891,614 - Kiosoft Technologies, LLC / Techtrex, Inc. v. Payrange Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 16, 2021 · PGR2021-00084 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show that any of claims 1–20 was more likely than not unpatentable on the asserted § 112, § 102, or § 103 grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under section 321, if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.”1 After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, Reply, Sur- reply and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner fails to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition is unpatentable. Accordingly, we do not institute a post-grant review.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments because Petitioner’s proposed construction improperly attempts to read a particular embodiment described in the ’608 patent into the claims. It is not proper to read limitations from the ’608 patent into the claims: Though understanding the claim language may be aided by the explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim limitations that are not a part of the claim. For example, a particular embodiment appearing in the written description may not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the embodiment. SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004). “[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, [the Federal Circuit has] repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. As Mr. Smith points out, the ’608 patent does describe offline- payment operated machine 1500 as an electro-mechanical machine capable of accepting currency (e.g., coins), which is not connected to any networks (e.g., telephone, cellular, or Wi-Fi). Ex. 1005 ¶ 84 (citing Ex. 1002, 39:39– 45). But, the ’608 patent describes offline-payment operated machine 1500 as merely one example of an offline-payment operated machine in some implementations. The ’608 patent states: FIG. 28A illustrates a block diagram of an offline-payment operated machine 1500 in accordance with some implementations. For example, the offline-payment operated machine 1500 (e.g., a form of the machine 120) is an electro-mechanical machine capable of accepting currency (e.g., coins), which is not connected to any networks (e.g., telephone, cellular, or Wi-Fi). For example, the offline-payment operated machine 1500 is a washer or dryer at a laundromat, a parking meter, a car wash payment kiosk, or other offline-payment operated machine that dispenses goods and/or services. Ex. 1002, 39:38–48 (emphases added). The ’608 patent emphasizes that offline-payment operated machine 1500 is merely an example. Id. at 39:52– 56 (“The components of the offline-payment operated machine 1500 in FIG. 28A are examples and one of skill in the art will appreciate that various” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A [person having ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”)], as of the date of the alleged invention, would have had an education background of, or practical experience providing an equivalent to, a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, Information Technology, or a related/equivalent field and at least three years of work experience in electronic payment systems, vending machine technologies, or telecommunication solutions. Pet. 29 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 52). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contention in its Preliminary Response. See generally Prelim. Resp. Based on the record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s asserted level of ordinary skill to determine whether it is more likely than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition is unpatentable. This level of skill in the art is consistent with the disclosure of the ’608 patent and the prior art of record. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995).” slip op. at 7
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateNot shown unpatentable
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), “[t]he specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same . . . .” To satisfy the written description requirement, the disclosure must reasonably convey to skilled artisans that the patentee possessed the claimed invention as of the filing date. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). The requirement under § 112 does not demand that the specification recite the claimed invention verbatim. Id. at 1352 (citations omitted). The “claimed subject matter need not be described in haec verba in the specification in order for that specification to satisfy the description requirement.” In re Smith, 481 F.2d 910, 914 (CCPA 1973). “Original claims are part of the original specification and in many cases will satisfy the written description requirement.” Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA, Inc., 851 F.3d 1275, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2017). We agree with Patent Owner. Petitioner, itself, indicates that the specification of the ’608 patent discloses an interface module counting the electrical pulses generated by a coin receiving switch. The Petition states: “Specifically, the objective inquiry reveals that it is only the ‘first interface module’ that is mentioned as counting one or more electrical pulses generated by the coin receiving switch.” Pet. 32; see also Ex. 1005 ¶ 125 (corresponding testimony of Mr. Smith). In this regard, the ’608 patent states: In FIG. 28A, the first interface module 1522 is configured to sample payment acceptance signals from the microswitch 1502 (e.g., a coin receiving switch) via lead 1532 of the offline-payment operated machine 1500. For example, the payment acceptance signals are indicative of a coin being received by the microswitch 1502 which depress lever 1504. Ex. 1002, 40:35–40. The ’608 patent also describes FIG. 28B as illustrating signals sampled by the first interface module 1522, “[f]or example, the preset sequence of payment acceptance signals indicative of the preset number of coins include pulses (i.e., payment acceptance signals) 1552, 1554, 1556, and 1558.” Id. at 40:50–58; see also id. at 41:59–42:4 (“payment acceptance signals are indicative of a preset number of coins received by the coin receiving switch”); 42:49–55 (describing identifying a count of pulses). The ’608 patent further states: “[T]he terms used for labels (e.g., ‘first,’ ‘second,’ and ‘third’) are meant solely for purposes of designation and not for order or limitation.” Id. at 46:11–14. Claim 19, as originally filed, recited limitation (b), with the coin counting interface module being labeled as the second interface module. Ex. 1003, 283. Given the originally filed claim 19 and the above disclosures of the ’608 patent, Petitioner does not persuade us that the ’608 patent does not reasonably convey to skilled artisans that the patentee did not possess the claimed invention as of the filing date. Petitioner does not show sufficiently that claims 19–20 are more likely than not unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) for lack of written description.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · NautilusPatents in suitUS 10,891,608 - Quantile Technologies Limited v. Trioptima ABAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 1, 2021 · CBM2020-00012 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · CBM · Final written decision
Claims 1–46 are unpatentable under § 101 because they claim abstract financial and mathematical processes without integrating them into a practical application or adding an inventive concept.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“On October 6, 2020, based on the record before us at the time, we instituted a covered business method patent review of all challenged claims on all grounds alleged. Paper 11 (“Institution Decision” or “Dec.”). The claims and ground in this proceeding are indicated in the table below.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“35 U.S.C. § 282(b) “including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(b) (2019). When applying that standard, we interpret the claim language as it would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in light of the specification. In re Suitco Surface, Inc., 603 F.3d 1255, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Thus, we give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning as they would be understood by an ordinarily skilled artisan. See In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“The ordinary and customary meaning ‘is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question.’” (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Patent Owner seeks construction of the terms “linking unit” and “combining unit” from claims 5 and 23, and “converting unit” from claim 6. Pet. 14–18. However, because we determine that even under Patent Owner’s constructions, the claims would be ineligible as discussed below, we discern no terms in need of express interpretation. Accordingly, we apply the legal standards set forth above when reading the claims. B. CBM PATENT REVIEW ELIGIBILITY” slip op. at 15
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable
“Id. at 33:66–34:12 (emphasis added). The combination of the elements italicized above recites the concept of simplifying a trade portfolio through premature termination of certain transactions. The claimed method accomplishes this through collecting information, grouping related information together, and then using mathematical techniques on the information, calculating a total value of the group, and selecting a certain group that meets certain criteria. This is all a mental process, an example of an abstract idea.” slip op. at 23
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptUnpatentable
“Claims 4 and 5 use a generic processor to perform well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, such as receiving and analyzing data and performing mathematical calculations. See Bancorp Servs., L.L.C v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he use of a computer in an otherwise patent-ineligible process for no more than its most basic function--making calculations or computations-- fails to circumvent the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas and mental processes.”). We do not discern any claimed element for accomplishing the claimed solution that is other than what was generically known for performing those conventional functions. See Credit Acceptance, 859 F.3d at 1057 (“[T]he claims do not provide details as to any non-conventional software for enhancing the financing process.”); see Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Our law demands more” than claim language that “provides only a result-oriented solution, with insufficient detail for how a computer accomplishes it.”); Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1354 (explaining that claims are directed to an abstract idea where they do not recite “any particular assertedly inventive technology for performing [conventional] functions”). Despite Patent Owner’s assertions that the claim steps add enough to make the claims patentable, we find the recitation of the steps performed by a generic processor at a high level of generality is insufficient to supply an inventive concept.” slip op. at 40
Patent outcomesUS 8,010,441 unpatentableClaim construction§ 101 eligibilitycites Mayo · Bilski · Enfish · Electric Power · PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,010,441 - Quantile Technologies Limited v. Trioptima ABAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 17, 2021 · CBM2020-00011 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · CBM · Final written decision
Claims 1–22 are unpatentable under § 101; the contingent motion to amend proposing substitute claims 23–28 is denied because those claims are also ineligible.
RulingsFinal written decision- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable
“Id. at 32:41–33:15 (emphasis added). The combination of the elements italicized above recites the concept of simplifying a trade portfolio through premature termination of certain transactions. The claimed system accomplishes this through collecting information, linking related information together, and then using mathematical techniques on the information to generate a “proposal package” of transactions for “termination and assignment.” This is all a mental process, an example of an abstract idea.” slip op. at 24
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptUnpatentable
“Claim 1 uses a generic processor to perform well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, such as receiving and analyzing data and performing mathematical calculations. See Bancorp Servs., L.L.C v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he use of a computer in an otherwise patent-ineligible process for no more than its most basic function--making calculations or computations-- fails to circumvent the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas and mental processes.”). We do not discern any claimed element for accomplishing the claimed solution that is other than what was generically known for performing those conventional functions. See Credit Acceptance, 859 F.3d at 1057 (“[T]he claims do not provide details as to any non-conventional software for enhancing the financing process.”); see Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Our law demands more” than claim language that “provides only a result-oriented solution, with insufficient detail for how a computer accomplishes it.”); Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1354 (explaining that claims are directed to an abstract idea where they do not recite “any particular assertedly inventive technology for performing [conventional] functions”). Despite Patent Owner’s assertions that the claim steps add enough to make the claims patentable, we find the bare recitation of the steps performed by a generic processor at a high level of generality is insufficient to supply an inventive concept.” slip op. at 39
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied
“The combination of the elements italicized above recites the concept of simplifying a trade portfolio through premature termination of certain transactions. The claimed system accomplishes this through collecting information, linking related information together, and then using mathematical techniques on the information to generate a “proposal package” of transactions for “termination and assignment.” This is all a mental process, an example of an abstract idea. Patent Owner’s efforts to mimic the claim language in McRO does not change the result here. To begin with, the Supreme Court has cautioned against patent eligibility turning on the claim drafter’s art. See Flook, 437 U.S. at 593 (stating that patent eligibility does not turn “on the draftsman’s art”). Thus, merely parroting some language of an eligible claim of a completely different invention does not make the claims for this invention any less abstract. More importantly, the fact that the language is similar does not change the fundamental differences between the claimed invention here and the invention that was claimed in McRO. Proposed substitute claims 26, 27, and 28 are similar to proposed substitute claim 25 and add similar limitations that do not take the claim outside the realm of abstract ideas for Step 1 of the Alice inquiry. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown that the proposed substitute claims” slip op. at 61
- 101 substituteMotion to amend, deniedDenied
“The combination of the elements italicized above recites the concept of simplifying a trade portfolio through premature termination of certain transactions. The claimed system accomplishes this through collecting information, linking related information together, and then using mathematical techniques on the information to generate a “proposal package” of transactions for “termination and assignment.” This is all a mental process, an example of an abstract idea. Patent Owner’s efforts to mimic the claim language in McRO does not change the result here. To begin with, the Supreme Court has cautioned against patent eligibility turning on the claim drafter’s art. See Flook, 437 U.S. at 593 (stating that patent eligibility does not turn “on the draftsman’s art”). Thus, merely parroting some language of an eligible claim of a completely different invention does not make the claims for this invention any less abstract. More importantly, the fact that the language is similar does not change the fundamental differences between the claimed invention here and the invention that was claimed in McRO. Proposed substitute claims 26, 27, and 28 are similar to proposed substitute claim 25 and add similar limitations that do not take the claim outside the realm of abstract ideas for Step 1 of the Alice inquiry. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown that the proposed substitute claims” slip op. at 61
Patent outcomesUS 7,613,649 unpatentable§ 101 eligibilitycites Mayo · Bilski · Enfish · Electric Power · PhillipsPatents in suitUS 7,613,649 - DISH Network Corporation / DISH Network L.L.C. v. Customedia Technologies, L.L.C.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 25, 2018 · CBM2017-00032 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · CBM · Final written decision
Claims 1–4, 6–7, 16–19, 23–24, 26–28, 32–36, and 41 are unpatentable under § 101; the petitioner did not show claims 17, 18, 23, 24, and 28 unpatentable under § 112.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenOther
“Considering each claim limitation, as well as each explicit citation to the specification expressly set forth in the Petition, we are persuaded that Petitioner has met its burden of showing, via analysis and evidence explicitly set forth on pages 6–7 of the Petition, that independent claim 1, as a whole, does not recite a technological feature that is novel or unobvious.” slip op. at 22
- Adverse judgmentOther
“Response (Paper 24, “PO Resp.”) and disclaimed claims 5, 25, 39, and 43 (Ex. 2006). Petitioner filed a Reply to the Patent Owner’s Response (Paper 38, “Pet. Reply”). Patent Owner filed a Sur-Reply (Paper 40, “PO Sur”), and Petitioner filed a Response to the Sur-Reply (Paper 41, “Pet. Sur”).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other
“II. ANALYSIS A. Claim Construction Petitioner and Patent Owner dispute the construction of certain claim terms. Pet. 23–28; PO Resp. 34–46. We apply the constructions of those terms set forth in Paper 49 in this decision.” slip op. at 7
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable
“We agree. The preambles of independent claims 1, 19, and 33 expressly state as much. In particular, the preamble of claims 1 and 33 provide: “A system for providing targeted advertising to a multimedia content end user” (claim 1) or “a plurality of multimedia content end users” (claim 33). Ex. 1003, 46:13–14, 49:59–60. Likewise, claim 19’s preamble refers to “[a] device for providing targeted advertising to an end user.” Id. at 48:20–21. Taking claim 1 as a representative example, the remainder of the claim recites certain tangible components, namely a “storage device” and specifically, an “addressable and reserved storage space”; a “processor”; and “software implemented by” the processor. Id. at 46:13–28. The claim further requires the following functionalities: the processor “reserv[ing]” the storage space; the processor “select[ing] particular advertising data suitable for targeting to at least one end user based upon predefined criteria data”; the storage space “storing digital advertising data” and specifically, the “particular advertising data”; and the “particular advertising data” being “accessible to” the user. Id. Thus, we are persuaded that claim 1, taken as a whole, is focused on the concept of providing targeted advertising to a user. Further, the claims merely invoke computers as a tool to implement the concept of targeted advertising, and are not directed to any improvement in computer functionality. See Pet. 34; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 944–945. The claims recite generic components and functionality. For example, in claim 1, the required components, outlined above—a storage device and specifically, a storage space, a processor, and software— are conventional. The recited functionalities—reserving the storage space for advertising data, selecting advertising data targeted to a user, storing that data, and making that data accessible to the user—are likewise basic and routine. As Petitioner points out, the specification expressly acknowledges that some of the tangible components of the recited system were known. See Pet. 7–8, 33–34, 40–75; Ex. 1008 ¶ 949. For instance, the specification refers to storage device 14 as “any medium known in the art for storing electronic data” and similarly, “any storage device for audio/video information known in the art.” Ex. 1003, 13:22–28, 15:1–5, 24:66–25:7; see id. at [57], 5:3–6, 21:42–22:2. The testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Negus, also persuade us that each recited component and functionality was generic, conventional, and known. Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 945, 949–954; see id. ¶¶ 955–987.” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 9,053,494 unpatentableClaim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 112 disclosurecites Mayo · EnfishPatents in suitUS 9,053,494 - Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · May 8, 2018 · PGR2017-00002 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–19 are unpatentable under § 112(a) for lack of written description; Petitioner did not prove lack of enablement.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenUnpatentable
“Written Description and the ’506 Application The test for written description is an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a POSA. Using this test, the invention must be described in a manner sufficient to demonstrate that the inventor actually invented the claimed invention. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010). “One shows that one is ‘in possession’ of the invention by describing the invention, with all its claimed limitations, not that which makes it obvious.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Written description is a question of fact judged as of the relevant filing date. Falko–Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006). An ipsis verbis disclosure, however, is not necessary to satisfy the written description requirement. Vas–Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The disclosure need only reasonably convey to a POSA that the inventor had possession of the subject matter in question, even if every nuance of the claims is not explicitly described in the specification. Id.; see Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351.” slip op. at 23
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateUnpatentable
“Written Description and the ’506 Application The test for written description is an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a POSA. Using this test, the invention must be described in a manner sufficient to demonstrate that the inventor actually invented the claimed invention. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010). “One shows that one is ‘in possession’ of the invention by describing the invention, with all its claimed limitations, not that which makes it obvious.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Written description is a question of fact judged as of the relevant filing date. Falko–Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006). An ipsis verbis disclosure, however, is not necessary to satisfy the written description requirement. Vas–Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The disclosure need only reasonably convey to a POSA that the inventor had possession of the subject matter in question, even if every nuance of the claims is not explicitly described in the specification. Id.; see Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351.” slip op. at 23
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Enablement (Wands, Amgen full scope)Not enabledNot shown unpatentable
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), enablement is separate and distinct from the written-description requirement. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1344. “The test of enablement is whether one reasonably skilled in the art could make or use the invention from the disclosures in the patent coupled with information known in the art without undue experimentation.” United States v. Telectronics, Inc., 857 F.2d 778, 785 (Fed. Cir. 1988). “[A] patent specification complies with the statute even if a ‘reasonable’ amount of routine experimentation is required in order to practice a claimed invention.” Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Whether undue experimentation is needed is not a single, simple factual determination, but rather is a conclusion reached by weighing many factual considerations. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). These factors, referred to as the Wands factors, include: (1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breath of the claims. Wands, 858 F.2d at 737. It is Petitioner’s burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the claims of the ’989 patent lack enablement. 35 U.S.C. § 326(e). Petitioner’s evidence and argument does not sufficiently establish that the ’989 patent fails to teach those in the art to make and use the claimed invention without undue experimentation. See PO Resp. 58–66. The Petition does not address the Wands factors sufficiently so as to show that undue experimentation is required to make or use the claimed invention. For example, neither the Petition nor Dr. Pearce sufficiently addresses the state of the prior art or the relative skill of those in the art. See Pet. 64–65; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 145–152; PO Resp. 62. As Patent Owner argues, this is an “omission[] that [is] particularly fatal” to Petitioner’s enablement argument, because Petitioner argues that mechanical expansion and inflation expansion are incompatible and cannot be combined. PO Resp. 62; see Pet. 30–38, 64. Dr. Grundfest, however, testifies that it was well known to combine mechanical and balloon-based expansion in surgical devices. Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 132–136; PO Resp. 56. During cross-examination, Dr. Pearce testified that he “thought about the state-of-the-art in minimally invasive surgery during the 1990s.” Ex. 2003 18:1–14. Dr. Pearce’s testimony is conclusory and does not sufficiently address whether he considered whether it was well known to combine mechanical expansion and inflation expansion in surgical devices. For another example, relying upon the testimony of Dr. Pearce, the Petition asserts that a redesign of the expansion design disclosed in the ’989 patent “would take a substantial amount of time and cost to achieve.” Pet. 65 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 149). Likewise, Dr. Pearce testifies, “[s]uch a redesign would take a substantial amount of time and cost to achieve.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 149. Dr. Pearce, however, does not explain sufficiently why combining mechanical expansion and inflation expansion would require a substantial amount of time and cost. See id. For these reasons, we determine that Petitioner has not met its burden of showing by a preponderance of evidence that claims 1–19 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) for lack of enablement.” slip op. at 33
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Factors that may be considered in determining level of ordinary skill in the art include: (1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of the technology; and (6) educational level of active workers in the field. Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). We are not persuaded that Dr. Pearce’s testimony concerning the level of skill in the art is erroneous to the extent it does not explicitly require experience related to devices used for uterine surgical procedures or surgical devices that employ expandable inflation-based and mechanical-based components. Patent Owner’s argument and Dr. Grundfest’s testimony is inconsistent with the ’989 patent, which does not disclose an ablation device or method of using an ablation device that solves problems unique to endometrial ablation or unique to surgical devices that employ expandable inflation-based and mechanical-based components. The ’989 patent does not limit the art to be “the field of minimally invasive surgical and uterine devices” (Ex. 2005 ¶ 60). The ’989 patent states: “The present invention relates generally to the field of apparatuses and methods for ablating or coagulating the interior surfaces of body organs. Specifically, it relates to an apparatus and method for ablating the interior linings of body organs such as the uterus and gallbladder.” Ex. 1001, 1:20–24; see also id. at 2:36–38 (“The present invention is an apparatus and method of ablation and/or coagulating tissue, such as that of the uterus or other organ”).” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 9,247,989 unpatentable§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 9,247,989 - Tradestation Technologies, Inc. v. Trading Technologies International, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 17, 2017 · CBM2016-00086 · APJ Sally C Medley · CBM · Final written decision
Claims 1–21 are unpatentable under § 101 because they claim an abstract economic practice without an inventive concept.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“I. INTRODUCTION TradeStation Technologies, Inc., (“Petitioner”)1 filed a Petition requesting a covered business method patent review of claims 1–21 of U.S. Patent No. 7,818,247 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’247 patent”) under the transitional program for covered business method patents.2 Paper 2 (“Pet.”). Trading Technologies International, Inc. (“Patent Owner”) did not file a Patent Owner Preliminary Response. Upon consideration of the Petition, we instituted a covered business method patent review of claims 1–21 of the ’247 patent (Paper 8 (“Dec.”)).” slip op. at 2
- BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableUnpatentable
“We have considered Petitioner’s showing and all of Patent Owner’s arguments, and determine, for all of the above reasons, Petitioner has shown sufficiently that claims 1–21 of the ’247 patent are not directed to patent eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we determine that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1–21 of the ’247 patent are patent-ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. IV. ORDER It is: ORDERED that claims 1–21 of the ’247 patent are patent-ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101; and” slip op. at 28
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“B. The Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Notwithstanding the parties’ submissions of the level of ordinary skill in the art, we find that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 15
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable
“we determine that Petitioner has shown4 that claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of receiving market information, color-coding graphical areas based on market information, and then updating the display based on newly received market information to assist a trader to make an order, which is a fundamental economic practice. Claim 1, the sole independent claim, recites in the preamble a method for displaying market information corresponding to a commodity being traded at an electronic exchange. The method steps include receiving market data including a quantity of an order at a first price level, displaying a first and second graphical area corresponding to a first and second price level in an axial direction, color-coding the first and second graphical areas with a first and second color respectively, and updating the first and second graphical area such that the first graphical area is color-coded with the second color and the second graphical area is color-coded with the first color. We agree with Petitioner that claim 1 encompasses the abstract idea of displaying financial information in a manner that makes it easier to understand and facilitate trades on an exchange, steps that can be performed using pen and paper, or even in a trader’s mind. Pet. 31–38 (citing CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, 654 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (unpatentable mental process performed with aid of pen and paper)); Ex.” slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 7,818,247 unpatentable§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Mayo · Enfish · Electric PowerPatents in suitUS 7,818,247 - Ibg LLC / Interactive Brokers LLC et al. v. Trading Technologies International, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 17, 2017 · CBM2016-00087 · APJ Sally C Medley · CBM · Final written decision
Claims 1–24 are unpatentable under § 101, and claims 2 and 15 are also unpatentable under § 112 ¶ 4.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Tradestation Securities, Inc., (“Petitioner”)1 filed a Petition requesting a review of claims 1–24 of U.S. Patent No. 7,412,416 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’416 patent”) under the transitional program for covered business method patents.2 Paper 3 (“Pet.”). Trading Technologies International, Inc. (“Patent Owner”) did not file a Patent Owner Preliminary Response. Upon consideration of the Petition, we instituted a covered business method patent review of claims 1– 24 of the ’416 patent (Paper 11 (“Dec.”)).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“B. The Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Notwithstanding the parties’ submissions of the level of ordinary skill in the art, we find that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 16
- ExcludeDenied
“Kawashima’s deposition (Ex. 1018), and portions of Exhibit 1060 (the cross examination testimony of Mr. Thomas). PO Mot. to Exclude 1. Patent Owner seeks to exclude Exhibits 1015 and 1016 as not relevant under Rules 401 and 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) and because the exhibits have not been authenticated under FRE 901. Id. at 1–4. Patent Owner also seeks to exclude Exhibit 1018 as hearsay, and pages 248, and 263–269 of Exhibit 1060 (the cross examination testimony of Mr. Thomas) as prejudicial and confusing. Id. at 4–13. In rendering our Final Decision, we did not and need not consider Exhibits 1015, 1016, 1018 or pages 248, and 263–269 of Exhibit 1060. We have determined that Petitioner has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the challenged claims are unpatentable, without considering Exhibits 1015, 1016, 1018 or pages 248, and 263–269 of Exhibit 1060. Accordingly, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is dismissed.” slip op. at 32
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable
“Notwithstanding Patent Owner’s arguments, which we address below, we determine that Petitioner has shown3 that claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of displaying a chart with a vertical price axis and a horizontal time axis, displaying indicators representing historical trading data along those axes, placing an order icon at a particular location of a plurality of locations, and generating and sending the order to an electronic trading system to assist a trader to place an order, which is a fundamental economic practice. The preamble of claim 1 recites a method for facilitating trading and displaying information regarding the buying and selling of a good. The method steps of claim 1 include displaying a chart on a graphical user interface having a vertical axis of price values and a horizontal axis of time, placing an order icon for a quantity of a good at a location along the vertical axis of price levels, and generating and sending the order to an electronic trading system. We agree with Petitioner that claim 1 encompasses the abstract idea of the fundamental economic practice of graphing (or displaying) trading data to assist a trader to place an order, steps that can be performed using pen and paper, or even in a trader’s mind. Pet. 22–25” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 7,412,416 unpatentable§ 101 eligibility§ 112 disclosurecites Alice · Mayo · Enfish · Electric PowerPatents in suitUS 7,412,416
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.