- Askeladden L.L.C. v. Intercurrency Software LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00377 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 19–36 are unpatentable under § 103 over the listed combinations of Calo, Rude, Sellberg or Szoc, with Davidowitz or Kedia for dependent claims.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We do not need to construe any terms expressly to reach our decision. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). The minor differences between the parties’ proposed constructions of “prevailing exchange rate” do not affect the outcome of this proceeding, as Petitioner has carried its burden of demonstrating unpatentability of the challenged claims by a preponderance of the evidence under Petitioner’s proposed construction or Patent Owner’s proposed construction.” slip op. at 11
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner proposes “that a [person of ordinary skill in the art] for the ’107 Patent in the relevant field in 2007 would have a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a related study and two years of experience with financial trading systems or an equivalent combination of education and experience.” Pet. 29 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 71–74). Patent Owner does not propose an alternative level of skill. See generally PO Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal, reiterated by the proposal of Petitioner’s expert, which comports with the teachings of the ’107 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Additionally, we observe Mr. Reid testifies that “Sellberg also describes benefits of adding currency exchange features to a trading system, such as increasing liquidity in the system.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 182 (citing Ex. 1019 ¶ 12). Mr. Reid further explains that “the skilled person would have known that adding currency exchange to a trading system would be a desired improvement.” Id. After reviewing the record, we determine that Petitioner has set forth a sufficient rationale for combining Sellberg’s teachings with Calo’s system. Sellberg discloses a trading system that utilizes an updated exchange rate that is repeatedly and automatically received from the currency market or the market maker, “and the last received updated exchange rate between the different currency and the specified currency at the time of receiving the order is used as the received current exchange rate.” Ex. 1019 ¶ 24. Mr. Reid has explained, with sufficient reasoning and citation to the record, how and why a POSITA would have added Sellberg’s currency exchange features to Calo’s trading system. Ex. 1002 ¶ 182. Thus, based on our review of the complete record, including the testimony of Mr. Reid, we are persuaded that the combination of Calo, Rude, and Sellberg discloses the disputed limitation for the reasons given by Petitioner.” slip op. at 33
Patent outcomesUS 10,062,107 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,062,107 - Askeladden L.L.C. v. Intercurrency Software LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00376 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–18 are unpatentable under §103 over the stated combinations of Calo, Rude, and other references.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner asserts that for the term “prevailing exchange rate,” as recited in claims 1, 2, 6, 9, and 10, “[t]he term prevailing commonly means ‘current.’” Pet. 28–29. According to Petitioner, this is consistent with the ’107 patent. Id. Petitioner asserts that “[t]he only rates the Specification describes using are a ‘forward’ rate or a ‘spot’ rate – in other words, a selected current exchange rate.” Id. at 29 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 34). Petitioner thus asserts that “‘prevailing exchange rate’ means ‘a selected current exchange rate that is not an FOREX average exchange rate.’” Id. Petitioner further contends that the term “prevailing currency exchange rate,” as recited in claims 2 and 9–11, “is the same as the prevailing exchange rate but limited specifically to currencies.” Id. Patent Owner takes the position that “[f]or purposes of the present IPR, Patent Owner agrees with Petitioner’s proposed definition for both of the terms ‘prevailing exchange rate’ and ‘prevailing currency exchange rate’ in related IPR2024-00375. Namely, ‘a selected current exchange rate.’” PO Resp. 4. For the remaining terms, Patent Owner “submits that they should be given their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the field of electronic trading as of the date of the invention.” Id. at 5. We do not need to construe any terms expressly to reach our decision. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). The minor differences between the parties’ proposed constructions of “prevailing exchange rate” and “prevailing currency exchange rate” do not affect the outcome of this proceeding, as Petitioner has carried its burden of demonstrating unpatentability of the challenged claims by a preponderance of the evidence under Petitioner’s proposed constructions or Patent Owner’s proposed constructions.” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner proposes “that a [person of ordinary skill in the art] for the ’107 Patent in the relevant field in 2007 would have a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a related study and two years of experience with financial trading systems or an equivalent combination of education and experience.” Pet. 30 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 71–74). Patent Owner does not propose an alternative level of skill. See generally PO Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the proposal of Petitioner’s expert, which comports with the teachings of the ’107 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“After review of the arguments and evidence, we conclude that Petitioner has established by a preponderance of evidence that claim 1 would have been obvious over the combination of Calo, Rude, and Sellberg. 2. Claims 2–7, 9–13, and 16–18 For claims 2–7, 9–13, and 16–18, Petitioner relies on the same or similar arguments and evidence discussed above for the combination of Calo, Rude, and Sellberg. See Pet. 45, 66–71. Petitioner further directs us to the claim chart on pages 61 through 77 of the Petition. Id. at 45. Patent Owner relies on the same arguments for claims 2–7, 9–13, and 16–18 that we have discussed for independent claim 1. PO Resp. 10. Based on the reasoning and evidence provided in the Petition (see Pet.” slip op. at 38
Patent outcomesUS 10,062,107 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,062,107 - Askeladden L.L.C. v. Intercurrency Software LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 1, 2025 · IPR2024-00375 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–12 are unpatentable under §103 over the listed combinations of Calo, Rude, Sellberg or Szoc, with Davidowitz or Kedia for dependent claims.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“Rule 104(b) provides, in relevant part, that the Petition must contain an “[i]dentification of challenge” and “[p]rovide a statement of the precise relief requested for each claim challenged” that includes: (4) How the construed claim is unpatentable under the statutory grounds identified in paragraph (b)(2) of this section. The petition must specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon; and (5) The exhibit number of the supporting evidence relied upon to support the challenge and the relevance of the evidence to the challenge raised, including identifying specific portions of the evidence that support the challenge. The Board may exclude or give no weight to the evidence where a party has failed to state its relevance or to identify specific portions of the evidence that support the challenge. 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4)–(5) (2023) (emphasis added). Rule 22(a)(2) requires a petition to include “[a] full statement of the reasons for the relief requested, including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence including material facts, and the governing law, rules, and precedent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2) (2023). Based on the complete record, we determine that the Petition satisfies our rules and do not agree with Patent Owner that the Petition is deficient in this regard. For example, with respect to the obviousness challenge based on Calo, Rude, and Sellberg, the Petition provides a discussion on pages 41–43 with accompanying claim charts identifying where the prior art references disclose each limitation of the challenged claims (Pet. 51–75), and further cites to the supporting testimony of Mr. Reid for the motivation to combine the references (see, e.g., Ex. 1002 ¶ 338). Pet. 43, 51–75. In at least this way, we find that the Petition provides sufficient detailed explanation of the evidence and analysis to satisfy our rules.” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner asserts that for the term “prevailing exchange rate,” as recited in claims 1, 4, and 6, “[t]he term prevailing commonly means ‘current.’” Pet. 27. According to Petitioner, this is consistent with the ’863 patent. Id. Petitioner asserts that “[t]he only rates the Specification describes using are a ‘forward’ rate or a ‘spot’ rate – in other words, a selected current exchange rate.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 200). Petitioner thus asserts that “‘prevailing exchange rate’ means ‘a selected current exchange rate.’” Id. Petitioner further contends that the term “prevailing currency exchange rate,” as recited in claims 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8 and 11, “should be given the same meaning as ‘prevailing exchange rate.’” Id. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed constructions. PO Resp. 3 (“For purposes of the present IPR, Patent Owner agrees with Petitioner’s proposed definition of the terms ‘prevailing exchange rate’ and ‘prevailing currency exchange rate’ means ‘a selected current exchange rate.’”). For the remaining terms, Patent Owner “submits that they should be given their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the field of electronic trading as of the date of the invention.” Id. 3–4. We do not need to construe any terms expressly to reach our decision. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner proposes “that a [person of ordinary skill in the art] for the ’863 Patent in the relevant field in 2007 would have a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a related study and two years of experience with financial trading systems or an equivalent combination of education and experience.” Pet. 27–28 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 60–61). Patent Owner does not propose an alternative level of skill. See, generally PO Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the proposal of Petitioner’s expert, which comports with the teachings of the ’863 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Additionally, we observe Mr. Reid testifies that “Sellberg also describes benefits of adding currency exchange features to a trading system, such as increasing liquidity in the system.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 162 (citing Ex. 1019 12). Mr. Reid further explains that “the skilled person would have known that adding currency exchange to a trading system would be a desired improvement.” Id. After reviewing the record, we determine that Petitioner has set forth a sufficient rationale for combining Sellberg’s teachings with Calo and Rude. It is undisputed on the record before us that Sellberg discloses a trading system that utilizes an updated exchange rate that is repeatedly and automatically received from the currency market or the market maker, “and the last received updated exchange rate between the different currency and the specified currency at the time of receiving the order is used as the received current exchange rate.” Ex. 1019 ¶ 24. Moreover, Mr. Reid has explained, with sufficient reasoning and citation to the record, how and why a POSITA would have added Sellberg’s currency exchange features to a trading system. Ex. 1002 ¶ 162. Thus, based on our review of the complete record, including the testimony of Mr. Reid, we are persuaded that the combination of Calo, Rude, and Sellberg discloses this limitation.” slip op. at 36
Patent outcomesUS 10,776,863 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,776,863 - Askeladden L.L.C. v. Intercurrency Software LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 1, 2025 · IPR2024-00378 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–15 are unpatentable under § 103 over the Calo, Rude, and Sellberg or Szoc combinations, with Davidowitz added for claims 3, 10, 11, and 14.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed constructions. PO Resp. 4 (“For purposes of the present IPR, Patent Owner agrees with Petitioner’s proposed definition of the term[s] ‘prevailing exchange rate’ [and prevailing currency exchange rate] means ‘a selected current exchange rate.’”). For the remaining terms, Patent Owner “submits that they should be given their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the field of electronic trading as of the date of the invention.” Id. We do not need to construe any terms expressly to reach our decision. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner proposes “that a [person of ordinary skill in the art] for the ’930 Patent in the relevant field in 2007 would have a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a related study and two years of experience with financial trading systems or an equivalent combination of education and experience.” Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 73–74). Patent Owner does not propose an alternative level of skill. See, generally PO Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal, reiterated by the proposal of Petitioner’s expert, which comports with the teachings of the ’930 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“After reviewing the record, we determine that Petitioner has set forth a sufficient rationale for combining Sellberg’s teachings with Calo’s system. Sellberg discloses a trading system that utilizes an updated exchange rate that is repeatedly and automatically received from the currency market or the market maker, “and the last received updated exchange rate between the different currency and the specified currency at the time of receiving the order is used as the received current exchange rate.” Ex. 1019 ¶ 24. Mr. Reid has explained, with sufficient reasoning and citation to the record, how and why a POSITA would have added Sellberg’s currency exchange features to Calo’s trading system. Ex. 1002 ¶ 178. Thus, based on our review of the complete record, including the testimony of Mr. Reid, we are persuaded that the combination of Calo, Rude, and Sellberg discloses this limitation for the reasons given by Petitioner.” slip op. at 33
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“transaction immediately after the equity transaction is executed to lock in an exchange rate as close as possible to that previewed.” Id. ¶ 69 (emphasis added). In this way, we find Calo teaches that the exchange rate may be locked in (e.g., a real-time conversion rate that is obtained right before the transaction takes place) and that the currency exchange occurs immediately after the equity transaction to mitigate uncertainty in currency changes in another time. See Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 30, 69.” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 11,449,930 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,449,930 - PTAB · Jun 13, 2025 · IPR2025-00160 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–5, 7, 8, 10–13, 15–18, and 20–31 because ResMed showed a reasonable likelihood of proving at least one challenged claim obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“We are not persuaded by these arguments. We are aware of no regulation, rule, case law, or Office guidance that prohibits a party from filing both an ex parte reexamination and an inter partes review, or deems doing so “an abuse of the patent system” or a due process violation. Prelim. Resp. 7–8. Indeed, the Office has previously permitted parallel reexaminations and inter partes reviews, even when filed by the same party. See, e.g., CBS Interactive et al. v. Helferich Patent Licensing, IPR2013- 00033, Paper 15, 2 (PTAB Nov. 6, 2012) (“four of the five Petitioners [in the inter partes] are also the third-party requesters who filed the request for reexamination”); Arctic Cat, Inc. v. Polaris Indus. Inc., IPR2015-01781, Paper 78, 2 (PTAB Sept. 25, 2018) (denying patent owner’s motion to stay or terminate ex parte reexamination 90/013,999, which was filed by same petitioner in the related inter partes review); Emerson Electric Co. v. Sipco, LLC, IPR2017-00359, Paper 62, 5, 19 (PTAB Mar. 21, 2019) (declining to terminate two ex parte reexaminations filed by a party who previously filed an inter partes review on the same patent). The Office’s April 2019 Notice Regarding Options for Amendments by Patent Owner Through Reissue or Reexamination During a Pending AIA Trial Proceeding provides information as to how the Office may handle parallel reexamination and AIA proceedings involving the same patent. See 84 Fed. Reg. 16,654, 16656–58 (Apr. 22, 2019). The existence of this Notice indicates that there is nothing per se improper about parallel ex parte reexaminations and inter partes reviews. Accordingly, on this record, we are not persuaded to discretionarily deny this Petition based on” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“We find that although the parties engaged in some discovery and briefing in the Ohio case, the bulk of the work remains, including the completion of fact discovery, expert discovery, motion practice, trial preparation, and trial. Additionally, prior to the stay, the district court had not issued orders related to claim construction or the validity of the ’680 patent. Accordingly, the relatively minimal investment in the Ohio case weighs against exercising discretion to deny institution. Fintiv, Paper 11, 10.” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“A patent claim is unpatentable for obviousness if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). In Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966), the Supreme Court set out a framework for assessing obviousness that requires consideration of four factors: (1) the “level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art,” (2) the “scope and content of the prior art,” (3) the “differences between the prior art and the claims at issue,” and (4) “secondary considerations” of nonobviousness such as “commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, determination requires finding a reason to combine accompanied by a reasonable expectation of achieving what is claimed in the challenged patent. See Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “[A]ny need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 419–20. We analyze the asserted grounds of unpatentability in accordance with these principles to determine whether Petitioner has met its burden to establish a reasonable likelihood of success at trial.” slip op. at 20
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“On this record, these arguments are unavailing. “[A] given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate a motivation to combine.” Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Thus, even if Patent Owner is correct that the proposed combination would no longer have the ability to push information directly to physician-side client devices, or would have duplicative storage, this does not necessarily obviate Petitioner’s proffered motivations to combine, which we find sufficient for purposes of institution.” slip op. at 36
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,786,680 - PTAB · Jun 13, 2025 · IPR2025-00158 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–20 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable over Ciulla and Orbach.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Ohio case pending completion of Office proceedings (various inter partes reviews and ex parte reexaminations) concerning the ’512 patent and the other asserted patents. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 5; Prelim. Reply 4. Because “[a] district court stay of the litigation pending resolution of the PTAB trial allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts” 2 Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 11, 2020) (precedential). 3 Petitioner filed the initial complaint in a different court; the case was subsequently transferred to Ohio. See Prelim. Resp. 3.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“After considering all of the arguments and cited evidence of record, we determine that, for purposes of institution, Petitioner sufficiently shows that the combination of Ciulla and Orbach teaches or suggests each limitation of the challenged claims, and that a person of ordinary skill in the with a reasonable expectation of success, for the reasons asserted in the Petition. See, e.g., Pet. 9–64. Accordingly, on this record, Petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on Ground 1. At this early stage, we offer the following observations on Patent Owner’s arguments.” slip op. at 32
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“On this record, these arguments are unavailing. Whether a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the art’s teachings with a reasonable expectation of success in arriving at the claimed subject matter is a fact-intensive inquiry. Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“The presence or absence of a motivation to combine references in an obviousness determination is a pure question of fact”); Par Pharm., Inc. v. TWi Pharm., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The presence or absence of a reasonable expectation of success is also a question of fact.”). Petitioner supports its challenge with evidence-backed reasoning, including the testimony of Dr. Kirkness and Dr. Chatterjee, and Patent Owner’s responsive attorney argument is unavailing at this stage. Patent Owner offers no evidence from either an expert or the cited references to support the underlying premise––namely, absent an express statement by Ciulla that its sensors may send the same output to various devices including a PDA (see Prelim. Resp. 21), a skilled artisan would not” slip op. at 34
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner does not propose construction of any terms. Petitioner states that the Board need not construe any terms, and the “Petition establishes the prior art meets each of the claim limitation[s] under any reasonable construction.” Pet. 9. Patent Owner does not propose construction of any terms. See generally Prelim. Resp. We determine that no express construction of any claim term is necessary to determine whether to institute inter partes review. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). To the extent further discussion of the meaning of any claim term is” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,690,512 - PTAB · Jun 12, 2025 · IPR2025-00159 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims based on both §103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that ResMed would prevail.
RulingsInstitution decision- Other 314aDecided for petitioner
“We are not persuaded by these arguments. We are aware of no regulation, rule, case law, or Office guidance that prohibits a party from filing both an ex parte reexamination and an inter partes review, or deems doing so “an abuse of the patent system” or a due process violation. Prelim. Resp. 7–8. Indeed, the Office has previously permitted parallel reexaminations and inter partes reviews, even when filed by the same party. See, e.g., CBS Interactive et al. v. Helferich Patent Licensing, IPR2013- 00033, Paper 15, 2 (PTAB Nov. 6, 2012) (“four of the five Petitioners [in the inter partes] are also the third-party requesters who filed the request for reexamination”); Arctic Cat, Inc. v. Polaris Indus. Inc., IPR2015-01781, Paper 78, 2 (PTAB Sept. 25, 2018) (denying patent owner’s motion to stay or terminate ex parte reexamination 90/013,999, which was filed by same petitioner in the related inter partes review); Emerson Electric Co. v. Sipco, LLC, IPR2017-00359, Paper 62, 5, 19 (PTAB Mar. 21, 2019) (declining to terminate two ex parte reexaminations filed by a party who previously filed an inter partes review on the same patent). The Office’s April 2019 Notice Regarding Options for Amendments by Patent Owner Through Reissue or Reexamination During a Pending AIA Trial Proceeding provides information as to how the Office may handle parallel reexamination and AIA proceedings involving the same patent. See 84 Fed. Reg. 16,654, 16656–58 (Apr. 22, 2019). The existence of this Notice indicates that there is nothing per se improper about parallel ex parte reexaminations and inter partes reviews. Accordingly, on this record, we are not persuaded to discretionarily deny this Petition based on “[f]undamental fairness and due process” due to the pending ex parte reexamination. Prelim. Resp. 6.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“Because “[a] district court stay of the litigation pending resolution of the PTAB trial allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts” (Fintiv, Paper 11, 6), this factor weighs against exercising our discretion to deny institution. 2. Proximity of the Court’s Trial Date to the Board’s Projected Statutory Deadline for a Final Written Decision There is no dispute that no trial date has been set in the Ohio case, and the case is currently stayed. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 7, 15; Prelim. Reply 5. Accordingly, this factor weighs against exercising discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the briefing and cited evidence of record, we institute an inter partes review. The following preliminary findings of fact and conclusions of law are made solely for determining whether to institute review. Any final decision will be based on the full trial record.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made.12 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18. At this stage, the parties agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had: 11 At this stage, Patent Owner does not assert any objective indicia of nonobviousness. See generally Prelim. Resp. 12 For purposes of this Decision, we apply a priority date of November 4, 2005. See supra n.2. at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, computer science, biomedical engineering, or a similar technical field, with at least two years of relevant product design experience working with diagnostic sensor systems and network data systems, such as networked PAP machines. Additional experience could substitute for less education, and additional education could likewise substitute for less experience. Pet. 12–13 (citing Ex. 1003 (Kirkness Decl.) ¶¶ 44–46); Prelim. Resp. 27. Because the proposed level of ordinary skill in the art appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and is undisputed on this record, we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (indicating that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level).” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,375,921 - Crowdstrike, Inc. v. Gosecure, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · May 9, 2025 · IPR2025-00069 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show that the prior art teaches creating a fingerprint at the virtual machine monitor, as claims 1–18 and 21–23 require.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314, an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition in view of the present record and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review on the grounds set forth in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“We disagree with Petitioner’s arguments. Claim 1 recites “a decoy computer system [that] comprises . . . a virtual machine monitor,” and “at the virtual machine monitor: . . . creating, from the stored activities, a fingerprint.” Ex. 1001, 19:4–22. Thus, the claim’s plain language requires creating a fingerprint at the virtual machine monitor, not just at the decoy system, as Petitioner asserts. When, as here, a claim term has “ordinary, simple English words whose meaning is clear and unquestionable,” we may not redraft those words to mean something different. Chef America, Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 1373–75 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Petitioner offers no explanation how one skilled in the art might read “at the virtual machine monitor” to mean at the decoy system, rather than at the virtual machine monitor. Although the claim’s plain language is decisive, we also disagree with Petitioner’s assertion that the ’697 patent’s specification describes only fingerprint creation outside the virtual machine monitor because, as Patent Owner explains, the specification describes fingerprint generation inside and outside the virtual machine monitor. See Sur-reply 1– 2; see id. at 2 (citing Ex. 1001, 6:65–7:2, 10:13–22). Claim 1’s plain language, however, only covers the latter. Last, Petitioner’s characterization of Patent Owner’s infringement allegations in the related district-court proceedings, even if correct, do not undermine the claim’s plain language.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner does not contest that Capalik’s fingerprint generation occurs outside the components that Petitioner identifies as the claimed virtual machine monitor. Reply 1–3; see Pet. 18–23 (mapping Capalik’s hypervisor kernel 516 to the claimed virtual machine monitor); id. at 30–31 (mapping Capalik’s processing module 508 and signature generation engine 530 to the claimed fingerprint creation); see also Prelim. Resp. 21–23 (explaining Petitioner’s mapping). Instead, Petitioner asserts that the at-issue claim language—“at the virtual machine monitor”—does not require “that each of the subsequently recited steps must be performed by or in the [virtual machine monitor],” but instead only requires “that the fingerprint is generated by the same decoy system that contains the [virtual machine monitor].” Reply 2. Petitioner argues that the intrinsic record supports its position because “[n]owhere in the ’697 Patent is there any teaching or suggestion that a [virtual machine monitor] creates a fingerprint/signature indicative of attack activity,” and instead, “[t]he ’697 Patent teaches that its signature generation engine is separate from the [virtual machine monitor].” Reply 2 (citing Ex. 1001, 8:12–19). In addition, Petitioner asserts that requiring fingerprint creation at the virtual machine monitor “directly” slip op. at 8
- Adverse judgmentOther
“D. Statutory Disclaimer and Remaining Challenged Claims The Petition challenges claims 1–23. Pet. 10. However, because Patent Owner disclaimed claims 19 and 20 (Ex. 2010), the remaining challenged claims are 1–18 and 21–23. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e) (2020) (“No inter partes review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”). Of the remaining challenged claims, only claim 1 is independent. Claim 1 is reproduced below:” slip op. at 4
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,106,697 - Lifecore Fitness, LLC D/B/A Assault Fitness v. Woodway USA, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · May 6, 2025 · IPR2024-00083 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4, 6, 7, 9–13, 15, and 16 are unpatentable as obvious over Socwell, Magid, and Sclater; claim 8 was not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“Prior to institution, Patent Owner argued that we should dismiss the Petition because it identifies the Petitioner as the California Corporation and not the Delaware Corporation. Paper 6, 23–24 (Preliminary Response); Paper 9, 1 (Preliminary Sur-Reply); Paper 12 (Conference Call Transcript); Paper 18 (Request for Director Review). In our Decision on Institution, we found Patent Owner’s argument, as applied to the facts of this proceeding, to be unpersuasive and corrected the caption to correctly reference Petitioner as the California Corporation, essentially replacing the “Inc.” with “LLC” in Petitioner’s name. Paper 13, 14–17; see also Paper 21 (Decision Denying Director Review).” slip op. at 3
- BurdenOther
“We find Dr. Giachetti’s testimony, alone, insufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a POSA, given Tollkien and Sclater, would have been motivated to look to one-way sprag-type clutches to solve the problem of unexpected forward motion of the running belt of a treadmill. Without a reference, like Magid, teaching that it was known to use a one-way clutch mechanism on a treadmill to prevent unexpected forward motion, we are persuaded by Patent Owner that Petitioner’s combination is impermissibly based in hindsight. See PO Resp. 42–47. After considering Petitioner’s evidence and analysis, and taking into account Patent Owner’s arguments and evidence, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 is unpatentable over Tollkien and Sclater.” slip op. at 42
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part
“Declaration of Robert Giachetti, Ph.D. P.E) under FRE 401–402. Mot. 4 (citing FRE 401–402 in the heading). Patent Owner’s Motion, however, includes no substantive arguments directed to whether Giachetti Declaration is relevant admissible evidence or irrelevant inadmissible evidence. Mot. 4– 7. In its Reply, Patent Owner states: “While the Motion to Exclude does not expressly detail Exhibit 1036’s lack of relevance under FRE 401–402, the irrelevance is plain. Petitioner’s provision of new arguments in Reply, which is not allowed, renders such arguments irrelevant.” PO Reply to Mot., 1, n.1. Patent Owners argument is unpersuasive because it is a mere assertion without adequate explanation. The party moving to exclude evidence bears the burden of proving that it is entitled to the relief requested—namely, that the material sought to be excluded is inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.20(c), 42.62(a). Patent Owner’s mere assertion does not meet Patent Owner’s burden to show that Exhibit 1036 is irrelevant inadmissible evidence.” slip op. at 52
- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner
“8 Patent Owner argues that we should not consider Petitioner’s Reply and Exhibits 1036 and 1051 because the Reply and Exhibits relate to new arguments which should have been made in the Petition. PO Sur-Reply 4–5. We do not agree. Petitioner may rely upon Exhibits 1036 and 1051 to response to arguments raised in the Patent Owner’s Response. See PO Resp. (a ); Axonics, Inc. v. Medtronics, Inc., 75 F.4th 1374, 1380–1382 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“we have continued to recognize that a petitioner is entitled under the APA to respond to new claim construction arguments made by a patent owner.”)” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 11,465,005 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,465,005 - Crowdstrike, Inc. v. Gosecure, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · May 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00067 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution for claims 1–23 because the cited art did not teach or suggest creating the claimed fingerprint at the virtual machine monitor.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“Given the deficiencies outlined above, Petitioner has not shown that the prior art teaches or suggests creating a fingerprint at the virtual machine monitor as the challenged claims require. Thus, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. III. CONCLUSION After considering the evidence and arguments presented in the current record, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least one of the challenged claims of the ’697 patent is unpatentable. We therefore do not institute trial on any challenged claims or grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“We disagree with Petitioner’s arguments. Claim 1 recites “a decoy computer system [that] comprises . . . a virtual machine monitor,” and “at the virtual machine monitor: . . . creating, from the stored activities, a fingerprint.” Ex. 1001, 19:4–22. Thus, the claim’s plain language requires creating a fingerprint at the virtual machine monitor, not just at the decoy system, as Petitioner asserts. When, as here, a claim term has “ordinary, simple English words whose meaning is clear and unquestionable,” we may not redraft those words to mean something different. Chef America, Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 1373–75 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Petitioner offers no explanation how one skilled in the art might read “at the virtual machine monitor” to mean at the decoy system, rather than at the virtual machine monitor. Although the claim’s plain language is decisive, we also disagree with Petitioner’s assertion that the ’697 patent’s specification because, as Patent Owner explains, the specification describes fingerprint generation inside and outside the virtual machine monitor. Sur-reply 1–2; see id. at 2 (citing Ex. 1001, 6:65–7:2, 10:13–22). Claim 1’s plain language, however, only covers the latter. Sur-reply 1–2; see id. at 2 (citing Ex. 1001, 6:65–7:2, 10:13–22). Last, Petitioner’s characterization of Patent Owner’s infringement allegations in the related district-court proceedings, even if correct, do not undermine the claim’s plain language.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Given the deficiencies outlined above, Petitioner has not shown that the prior art teaches or suggests creating a fingerprint at the virtual machine monitor as the challenged claims require. Thus, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,106,697
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.