- Alliance Laundry Systems, LLC v. Payrange LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 19, 2026 · PGR2025-00027 · APJ George R Hoskins · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–6 and 8–20 are unpatentable under § 101; claim 7 was not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Pet.”) pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 321–329 to institute a post-grant review of U.S. Patent No. 11,966,920 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’920 patent”), claims 1–20. We issued an Institution Decision (Paper 12) granting the petitioned review. slip op. at 2
- Skill levelOther
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends a person having ordinary skill in the art pertaining” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“thereby supporting our conclusion that the plain and ordinary meaning of “affordance” in claim 1 refers to an interactive user interface element.” slip op. at 30
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“For the foregoing reasons, we conclude Petitioner’s reliance on Low’s” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 11,966,920 mixedClaim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Berkheimer · Enfish · Electric Power · KSRPatents in suitUS 11,966,920 - Toyota Motor Corp. v. Emerging Automotive LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 21, 2025 · IPR2024-00786 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 10, 11, 13–16 were held unpatentable: claims 10, 11, 13, 15, and 16 as anticipated by Xiao, and claim 14 as obvious over Xiao and Singh.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“arguments, we agree with Patent Owner’s proposed construction that requires the server to conduct a compatibility check. We start with the express claim language. Claim 10 recites: determining, by the server, applicable settings for the selected vehicle, the applicable settings being settings that are preferred to be set as identified from the user profile and are compatible with settings that are settable in the selected vehicle. Ex. 1001, 33:10–14 (emphases added). The express claim language requires that the server determine applicable settings. Those applicable settings, determined by the server, must also be compatible with vehicle settings. As such, the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim language expressly requires that the server make a determination of applicable settings that are defined as being compatible with vehicle settings.” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the invention of the ’268 patent “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or closely related field, with at least two-to-four-years-experience in cloud services for settings customization, or a Master’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or equivalent.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶ 82). Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art. See, generally PO Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal because it is reasonable and consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“However, contrary to Dr. Almeroth’s testimony and Petitioner’s position, Xiao’s server already does not attempt to command vehicles to do things they cannot do. Xiao teaches that server 118 generates commands for command codes that exist and are settable in the vehicle. Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 102– 103. As such, if there is no corresponding automobile setting, then Xiao’s server would not list those command codes for retrieval and would not send a command based on that retrieved command code to control the automobile systems to achieve the operator’s desired settings because that command code is not in the database. Our understanding of Xiao is further supported by Dr. Almeroth’s testimony: By listing them in the table of automobile command code information 606, Xiao shows that there are particular settings compatible with particular automobiles and particular desired settings. Thus, Xiao demonstrates the necessarily present characteristic that certain settings (e.g., commands) are compatible with certain automobiles. Ex. 1009 ¶ 96 (emphases added). We note that Dr. Malek further explains “the nonsensical result achieved by the combination would be that Xiao’s server, at best, in response to the command request issued by the operator, could ‘look up’ a command code to apply a vehicle-specific setting to that automobile 112, only to find that there is ‘none.’” We agree with Dr. Malek that there is a “None” command code in Xiao’s database when Xiao’s database already stores settings that are known to be settable in a specific vehicle per the operator’s preferences. Ex. 2011 ¶ 135. Thus, based on the complete record, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Xiao in combination with Hayashi render claim 10 obvious.” slip op. at 79
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“Anticipation is not an ipsissimis verbis test, but “[a] claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal, 814 F.2d at 631. Petitioner and Dr. Almeroth both acknowledge that Xiao discloses operators on the same account. Pet. 40–41; Ex. 1009 ¶ 170. But Petitioner and Dr. Almeroth do not explain sufficiently how Xiao discloses these operators have sub-user accounts. Petitioner further contends Xiao discloses plurality of accounts. Pet. Reply 18–19 (citing Ex. 1024, 33:1–44:10, 45:22–46:2); Ex. 1010 ¶ 65. Again, Petitioner has not adequately explained how the plurality of accounts includes sub-user accounts because Xiao discloses generally that multiple operators of a vehicle are on the same, single account. Ex. 1010 ¶ 66.” slip op. at 65
Patent outcomesUS 9,171,268 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,171,268 - Target Corporation v. Proxicom Wireless, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 8, 2021 · IPR2020-00931 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5, 14–18, 27, 31, 36, 42, 48, 49, and 52–55 are unpatentable over Perttila alone or Perttila and Insolia; claims 37 and 43 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We instituted trial based on all asserted claims and grounds of unpatentability as follows: Claims Challenged 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s) 1–5, 14–18, 27, 31, 36, 37, 42, 43, 102(b)3 Perttila 48, 52, 55 1–5, 14–18, 27, 31, 36, 37, 42, 43, 103(a) Perttila 48, 49, 52, 55 27, 31, 53, 54” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner concedes that the level of skill as defined by Petitioner “is generally sufficient for the Board to evaluate the Petition Grounds.” PO Resp. 9. However, Patent Owner also notes that “Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art does not include any reference to electronic commerce” and contends that “a POSITA should also have 1-2 years of experience designing or implementing systems for electronic commerce including the use of wireless communications.”5 Id. at 10 (citing Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 6–9, 22–24). The level of ordinary skill in the art may be evidenced by the references themselves. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). The level of ordinary skill proposed by Petitioner appears to be consistent with that of the references, and we apply Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill for purposes of this Decision. We note that we would reach the same conclusions herein using Patent Owner’s alternate definition.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Notwithstanding the arguments in its briefing, Petitioner’s counsel acknowledged during the hearing that the claims require the entity or object to have a physical presence. See, e.g., Tr. 8:17–19 (“[T]here’s no debate . . . that physical presence is connoted by the word ‘proximity’ and by ‘located.’”). There is, accordingly, no controversy regarding whether “an entity or object located in proximity to the second device” requires the entity or object to have a physical presence. Moreover, as explained below our decision does not depend on an express construction of this term. We conclude, therefore, that there is no need for us to construe this term. 2. “wireless device” Patent Owner argues that, as recited in the challenged claims, “wireless device” “refer[s] to wireless communication capabilities, not that a wireless device would be precluded from having any external wires whatsoever.” PO Resp. 19. However, Patent Owner concedes that construction of “wireless device” is “not necessary to resolve the dispute here.” Id. Petitioner argues that “‘wireless device’ should be construed to require a device without external wires,” noting that the claims of the ’359 patent recite a “wireless device” rather than a “wireless communication device.” Pet. Reply 5–6. However, Petitioner also concedes that “no construction of this term is necessary.” Id. at 5. No construction of this term is necessary. The parties both agree that no construction is needed, and as explained below our decision does not depend on a construction of this term.” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“As noted above, Petitioner maps Perttila’s disclosure of “electronic coupon information including various offerings” to the recited “list of goods” and notes that the merchant-media device can be located in a store where the advertised goods are sold. Pet. 51–52 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 26, 39); see also Ex. 1003 ¶ 177. However, neither Petitioner nor its declarant identifies adequately any “list of goods” that Perttila’s remote server delivers to the first wireless device. At best, Petitioner and its declarant describe an iterative process whereby a user interacts with a plurality of tags or beacons in a store to receive multiple electronic coupons. Pet. Reply 17–18; Ex. 1003 ¶ 177. However, Petitioner fails to explain adequately how delivering coupons one at a time in an iterative process constitutes delivering a list of goods as part of an electronic commerce transaction. Petitioner also refers to Perttila’s disclosure of delivering a restaurant menu. Pet. 52–53 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 26); see also Ex. 1003 ¶ 177. However, Petitioner and its declarant again fail to explain adequately how sending a restaurant menu constitutes delivering a list of goods as a step in a process for an electronic commerce transaction. Perttila discloses that, in embodiments, the billboard may promote a food product and the user’s interaction with the billboard results in the server sending “a restaurant menu or a recipe involving that particular food or food type.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 26. However, neither Petitioner nor its declarant explain adequately how this constitutes a step in a process for an electronic commerce transaction. Notably, Petitioner and its declarant fail to identify any discussion or suggestion in Perttila of the user interacting with the menu after it has been delivered. Nor do we see any such disclosure in Perttila. Rather, Perttila merely discloses sending a restaurant menu as part of “electronic coupon information”: “In another application, the billboard may be promoting a food product, and the request to the remote server corresponds to a request for receiving electronic coupon information including, for example, a restaurant menu or a recipe involving that particular food or food type.” Id. Moreover, we note that Petitioner does not propose to modify Perttila’s system in some manner such that a user could interact with the delivered menu as part of an electronic commerce transaction. Petitioner also refers to Perttila’s disclosure of delivering a movie ticket. Pet. 52–53 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 44–50); see also Ex. 1003 ¶ 177. However, Petitioner and its declarant again fail to explain adequately how sending an electronic movie ticket constitutes delivering a list of goods as a step in a process for an electronic commerce transaction. Perttila discloses that its system may be used to purchase a movie ticket that is redeemed “at a time much later than the time when the electronic coupon is received.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 44. Perttila discloses purchasing the movie ticket and later using a menu displayed on the user’s mobile phone to activate and validate the ticket at the theater. E.g., id. ¶¶ 46–50. Petitioner fails to explain persuasively how delivering an electronic movie ticket in the manner disclosed by Perttila constitutes delivering a list of goods as a step in a process for an electronic commerce transaction.” slip op. at 38
Patent outcomesUS 8,090,359 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,090,359 - Intel Corporation v. VLSI Technology LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 6, 2020 · IPR2018-01033 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 17 is anticipated by Bednar, and claims 1 and 17 are obvious over Bednar and Gunther; the remaining challenged claims were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“requesting institution of inter partes review of claims 1, 4–6, and 17–19 of U.S. Patent No. 8,004,922 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’922 patent”). VLSI Technology LLC (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response (Paper 12). Applying the standard set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we instituted an inter partes review of all challenged claims. Paper 17 (“Inst. Dec.”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“to the level of ordinary skill in the art was incorrect. Accordingly, because our preliminary finding is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art of record, we maintain and reaffirm that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had “at least (1) an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering (or an equivalent subject), together with three years of post-graduate experience designing power management circuits; or (2) a master’s degree in electrical engineering (or equivalent subject) together with two years of post-graduate experience designing power management circuits.” Inst. Dec. 8–9; see Pet. 36 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 26–27).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“construction of “memory device,” specifically whether it encompasses a latch. Neither party argues that “memory device” is expressly defined in the ’922 patent. Accordingly, the plain and ordinary meaning of the term controls. And, the standard under which we construe the term is the broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification.” slip op. at 45
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“preponderance of the evidence, that (1) claim 17 is anticipated by Bednar, and (2) claims 1 and 17 would have been obvious over the combination of Bednar and Gunther. For the reasons discussed above, Petitioner has not demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) claim 1 is anticipated by Bednar or (2) claims 4–6, 18, and 19 would have been obvious over the combination of Bednar, Gunther, and Willingham. The chart below summarizes our conclusions.” slip op. at 91
Patent outcomesUS 8,004,922 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,004,922 - Symantec Corp. / Blue Coat Systems LLC v. Finjan, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 15, 2017 · IPR2015-01892 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, and 6 are unpatentable over Swimmer under § 103; claims 5, 10, 11, 14, and 15 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“consideration of the Preliminary Response (Paper 7) of Patent Owner, Finjan, Inc., we instituted a trial pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) with respect to claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 10, 11, 14, and 15 and subsequently joined Case IPR2016-00890 with the instant case. Paper 9 (“Decision on Institution” or “Dec. on Inst.”); see also Paper 30 (copy of decision instituting inter partes review in Case IPR2016-00890 and granting motion for joinder; also filed as IPR2016-00890, Paper 8).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“1 Case IPR2016-00890 has been joined with the instant proceeding.” slip op. at 1
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“We determine that the differences in the declarants’ assertions are negligible and that both assessments are consistent with the ’494 patent and the referenced prior art. For the purposes of the analysis below, we adopt Dr. Medvidovic’s assessment.” slip op. at 22
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityReference is prior artPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“As explained in Section III.B.4.a.i, supra, we are persuaded by Dr. Hall-Ellis’s testimony that Swimmer was publicly available at least as early as December 1995 and is, accordingly, prior art at least under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a),6 as well as that Exhibit 1005 represents an authentic 6 As further mentioned in Section II.B, supra, we determined in our Decision on Institution in Case IPR2016-00159 that the ’494 patent is not entitled to any earlier priority date than the November 6, 1997, filing date of the ’388 application, based on the record then before us in that case. See IPR2016- 00159, slip op. at 10–13 (PTAB May 13, 2016) (Paper 8). Because that date is more than one year after December 31, 1995, Swimmer would also be prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) based on the December 1995 publication date. copy of Swimmer and Exhibit 1010 represents an authentic copy of the Virus Bulletin Proceedings within the meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 901. Further, Federal Rule of Evidence 401 provides that evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence” and “the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Both the Federal Circuit and the Board have recognized that there is a “low threshold for relevancy.” See, e.g., OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1407 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Laird Techs., Inc. v. GrafTech Int’l Holdings, Inc., Case IPR2014-00025, slip op. at 44 (PTAB Mar. 25, 2015) (Paper 45). There is no question on this record that Swimmer is relevant to the patentability of the challenged claims in this case. Accordingly, we deny Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude as to Exhibits 1005 and 1010.” slip op. at 62
Patent outcomesUS 8,677,494 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 8,677,494 - Apple Inc. / HTC Corporation et al. v. Memory Integrity, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 21, 2016 · IPR2015-00159 · APJ Kerry Begley · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 8, and 15–25 are unpatentable: Pong anticipates claims 1–3, 8, 15, 16, and 25, and Pong and Smith render claims 17–24 obvious; claim 11 was not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Electronics Co. Ltd., Samsung Electronics America, Inc.,2 and Amazon.com, Inc. (collectively, “Initial Petitioners”) filed a Petition requesting inter partes review of claims 1–3, 8, and 11–25 of U.S. Patent No. 7,296,121 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’121 patent”). Pet. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we determined the Petition showed a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of claims 1–3, 8, 11, and 15–25, and instituted an inter partes review of these claims. Paper 12 (“Inst. Dec.”). We, however, did not institute review of claims 12–14, because we determined the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to these claims. Id. at 23–30.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“Dr. Horst’s testimony that as a result, from the perspective of the presence bit vector, “every processor indicated as storing a copy of the memory line in its cache is storing a valid copy.” Ex. 1014 ¶ A-11; see Pet. 26–27. In other words, as Dr. Horst testifies, “because a write update protocol always updates caches to keep them valid,” “when a cache line is present[,] it is necessarily valid.” Ex. 1025 ¶ 23; see Reply 17–18. Indeed, Dr. Oklobdzija agrees that because the write update protocol “force[s the caches] to update their value for a cache line every time it changes”—as Pong discloses— “every processor that has the cache line will have the line in a valid state.” Ex. 2016 ¶ 90 (emphasis added); Ex. 1003 ¶ 48; see also Tr. 115:1–23 (Patent Owner conceding that in a write update protocol, any cached copies could be “considered . . . to be valid” because they are “kept usable” and “updated”). Accordingly, based on Pong’s disclosures, as well as the explanatory testimony of Dr. Horst in addition to Dr. Oklobdzija, we determine that in the write update protocol, a set bit in Pong’s presence bit vector represents that the corresponding cached copy is present and valid.” slip op. at 44
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable
“2. OBVIOUSNESS OVER PONG AND SMITH We turn to the instituted obviousness ground alleging that claims 17–” slip op. at 73
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied
“addresses Koster—a prior art U.S. patent of record as Exhibit 1009 that was filed on July 13, 2004 and issued on April 13, 2004—Patent Owner’s failure to demonstrate enablement of the proposed substitute claims results in a failure to demonstrate novelty and non-obviousness of the proposed substitute claims over the prior art of record. When arguing how the limitations of the proposed substitute claims distinguish them from the disclosures of the references of record, Patent Owner’s Motion addresses Koster only by asserting that “[a]s to . . . Koster . . . , because, as discussed above, all of the substitute claims find support in the [’]347 Application, . . . Koster . . . is not prior art to any of the proposed substitute claims.” Mot. 22. Because Patent Owner does not persuade us that the proposed substitute claims are enabled by the disclosure in the ’347 Application, we find unpersuasive Patent Owner’s suggestion that the proposed substitute claims are entitled to the filing date of the ’347 Application. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“For a patent to claim priority from the filing date of its provisional application, . . . the specification of the provisional must . . . enable an ordinarily skilled artisan to practice the invention claimed in the non-provisional application.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted); Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The earlier application must contain a written description of the subject matter of the interference count, and must meet the enablement requirement.”); see also Novo Nordisk Pharm., Inc. v. Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp., 424 F.3d 1347, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[If] the 1983 PCT application was . . . not enabled, Novo would not be able to rely upon the application’s priority date to overcome the Brewer patent.”). Accordingly, we also find unpersuasive Patent Owner’s assertion basis for asserting that the proposed substitute claims are patentable over Koster (by itself or in combination with other references of record), we conclude that Patent Owner has not met its burden of demonstrating patentability of the proposed substitute claims over the references of record. See Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (upholding Board’s requirement that patent owner “show patentable distinction [of the substitute claims] over the prior art of record”); Opp. 1–4. Thus, Patent Owner has not met its burden for proposed substitute claims 26–34.” slip op. at 84
Patent outcomesUS 7,296,121 mixed§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 7,296,121 - Commerce Bancshares, Inc. / Compass Bank et al. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 21, 2015 · IPR2014-00801 · APJ Jennifer S Bisk · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 26, 28, and 30–32 are unpatentable as anticipated by Aucsmith; claim 33 was not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“National Bank of Omaha, filed a Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”) requesting an inter partes review of claims 1–33 of U.S. Patent No. 6,715,084 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’084 patent”). On December 1, 2014, we instituted a review (Paper 7, “Decision to Institute” or “Dec.”) based upon Petitioner’s assertion that claims 26, 28, and 30–33 are unpatentable, under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), as anticipated by Aucsmith.1 Dec. 18. Petitioner provides a Declaration from Dr. George Kesidis (Ex. 1003), and Patent Owner provides a Declaration from Dr. David Goldschlag (Ex. 2011). This is a Final Written Decision under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a). Based on the record presented, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 26, 28, and 30–32 are unpatentable. We are not persuaded that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 33 is unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“1. “anomaly” In the Decision to Institute, we construed the term “anomaly” as “a departure from the usual or expected; an abnormality or irregularity.” Dec. 7–8. Specifically, we agreed with Patent Owner’s assertion that this is the plain meaning of the term and is consistent with the specification of the ’084 patent. Id. at 7. For example, the ’084 patent states that “[a]nomaly detection systems look for statistically anomalous behavior . . . [s]tatistical scenarios can be implemented for user, dataset, and program usage to detect ‘exceptional’ use of the system.” Id. at 8 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:54–57). Neither party contests this construction. We discern no reason to deviate from this construction of “anomaly.”” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“evidence that Aucsmith discloses the detecting limitation as required. First, we are persuaded that the indirect detecting method of Aucsmith satisfies the detecting limitation. Aucsmith discloses that “server 104 can also use the possible security problems reported by all of the agents 106(1)–106(N) to help detect intrusion patterns, new intrusion techniques, and other security problems.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 13. As discussed, although we agree that server 104, using this method, is analyzing reports of “possible security problems” created by distributed agents, we are persuaded that this is within the scope of the claim because the reports include data entering the network. For example, Aucsmith discloses that “server 104 receives notice of the anomaly and can examine the anomaly,” and “[i]n individually examining the anomaly [reported by agent 106], the server 104, may, for example, search for particular information in the anomaly such as a network address previously noted as a security problem . . . .” Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 43, 45; see also id. ¶ 44 (“[S]erver 104 may examine the anomaly in conjunction with other information accessible by the server 104, e.g., information included in the collection of security data 118, information sent to the server 104 from other sources, information accessible to the server 104 through the network 108 and/or the corporate server 116, and other similar types of information.”). We are persuaded that Aucsmith discloses server 104 analyzing data entering the network, although this data may also have been analyzed previously by the distributed agents.” slip op. at 16
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner does not provide sufficient evidence that Aucsmith discloses “adjusting anomaly detection sensitivity and alarm thresholds” sufficient to show anticipation. Dr. Kesidis’s testimony just repeats the language from Aucsmith quoted above and concludes that “Aucsmith discloses each and every limitation of claim 33.” Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 178–81. Dr. Kesidis, however, does not explain why a person of ordinary skill would understand “modifying security procedures” to disclose “adjusts anomaly detection sensitivity and alarm thresholds.” Id. Dr. Goldschlag, on the other hand, states that “[o]ne of ordinary skill in the art would not have understood this term to disclose adjusting either anomaly detection sensitivity or alarm thresholds.” Ex. 2011 ¶ 62 (emphasis added). Thus, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 33 is anticipated by Aucsmith.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 6,715,084 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 6,715,084 - CB Distributors, Inc. / Dr Distributors, LLC v. Fontem Holdings 1 B.V.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 24, 2014 · IPR2013-00387 · APJ Jacqueline Wright Bonilla · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–10, 12, 15–26, and 33–38 are unpatentable: claims 1, 2, 5–8, 10, 33, 35, 37, and 38 as anticipated by Liu; the specified remaining claims as obvious over Hon ’494 and Liu.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“filed a Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”) to institute an inter partes review of claims 1–12, 15–26, and 33–41 of U.S. Patent No. 8,156,944 B2 (Ex. 1001) (“the ’944 patent”). The previous Patent Owner, Ruyan Investment (Holdings) Limited,1 did not file a preliminary response. We determined that the information presented in the Petition demonstrated that there was a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in challenging claims 1–12, 15–26, and 33–38, but not claims 39–41, of the ’944 patent, as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102 or § 103, or both. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we instituted this proceeding on December 30, 2013, to review whether claims 1–12, 15–26, and 33–38 are unpatentable on the following grounds. Reference(s) Basis Claims Challenged Liu (Ex. 1019)2 § 102 1, 2, 5–8, 10, 33, 35, 37, and 38 Hon ’494 (Exs. 1008/1009)3 § 103 1–4, 8–12, 15–26, 33, 34, 36, and 38” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We decline, however, to read limitations that are not recited into the claims. While we read claims in view of the Specification, we do not read limitations from embodiments in the Specification into the claims. Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir 2014) (citing Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Our reviewing court “has expressly rejected the contention that if a patent describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent must be construed as being limited to that embodiment.” Hill-Rom Servs., 755 F.3d at 1371–72 (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim, 358 F.3d at 906).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“At least one dictionary definition provided by Patent Owner mirrors the dictionary definition cited in our Decision to Institute. Dec. to Inst. 11 (citing Random House Webster’s College Dictionary 1051 (1995) (defining “porous” as “permeable by water, air, etc.” or “full of pores”)). Exhibit B attached to Mr. Sheehan’s Declaration provides several definitions for “porous” as presented in the Free Online Dictionary (http://www.thefreedictionary.com/porous). That dictionary defines “porous” to mean, among other definitions, “having pores,” “[a]dmitting the passage of gas or liquid through pores or interstices,” or “permeable to water, air, or other fluids.” Ex. 2001, Ex. B. The other dictionary cited by Mr. Sheehan provides definitions for “porous” that include “containing minute interstices through which water, air, etc., may pass.” Id. at Ex. C (providing an on-line Oxford English Dictionary). While both dictionaries define “porous” to include the definition of “full of pores,” both dictionaries also include less limiting definitions. Id. at Exs. B, C. We do not agree with Patent Owner or Mr. Sheehan that the broadest reasonable construction of “porous” is limited to “full of pores or interstices into which liquid or gas is absorbed or defused.” PO Resp. 26; Ex. 2001 ¶ 29. Rather, as discussed in our Decision to Institute, we interpret “porous,” consistent with its ordinary meaning and how it is used the Specification, to refer to a component that includes pores and is permeable to liquid, i.e., admits passage of air or liquid through pores or interstices. Dec. to Inst. 11. A component that includes such pores has the ability to “absorb” liquid in the pores, consistent with disclosures in the Specification, regardless of whether the porous component has a few pores or is full of pores, such as in the case of a foam. Ex. 1001, 6:30–34; 7:3–7.” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“narrowly as Patent Owner suggests. Rather, we consider whether Liu describes (i) an atomizing chamber that runs through, i.e., inside and along the length of, the atomizer and its electric heating rod, such that (ii) atomization occurs along (i.e., runs through), the length of the chamber. Petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that Figure 2 of Liu depicts (i) an atomizing chamber inside heater housing 24 that runs through, i.e., inside and along the length of, heater housing 24 and its electric heating rod (i.e., rod and heater wire 26). Pet. 18–20, 24, 28 (citing Ex. 1019, Figs. 2, 5, 6:18–22, 7:16–19, 9:19–20). Petitioner also establishes that Liu describes (ii) atomization occurring along the length of the chamber inside heater housing 24. Contrary to Patent Owner’s assertion, it does not matter to our analysis that the upstream end of heater housing 24 in Liu is not “unblocked,” and it does not matter whether apertures 28 are “small.” Rather, we consider whether apertures in heater housing 24 in Liu allow liquid to come into the chamber such that atomization occurs along the length of the chamber, as required by claims 1 and 10.” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 8,156,944 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,156,944
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.