- Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 29, 2026 · IPR2025-00532 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–16 are unpatentable under § 103 over Warren, Warren and Dunn, Calderon and RepRap20208, and Calderon, RepRap20208, and Dunn.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“of ordinary skill in the art would have made the proposed combination in the manner asserted with a reasonable expectation of success. Weighing our underlying factual determinations, a preponderance of the evidence persuades us that claim 7 of the ’381 patent is unpatentable over Calderon, RepRap20208, and Dunn. Arctic Cat, 876 F.3d at 1361.” slip op. at 108
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“involves a case-by-case inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding the reference’s disclosure to members of the public.” In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Whether a document qualifies as a printed publication is a legal conclusion based on underlying factual determinations. Medtronic, Inc. v. Barry, 891 F.3d 1368, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2018). slip op. at 69
Patent outcomesUS 10,556,381 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,556,381 - Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 28, 2026 · IPR2025-00611 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–10, 12, 13, 19, and 20 are unpatentable under § 103 over the stated Douglas–Mark and Hamilton-based grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The parties agree that experience could substitute for a degree, and vice versa. Pet. 3; PO Resp. 10. The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill are substantially similar. For this decision, as in the Institution Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level, which is supported by credible testimonial evidence and is consistent with the problems addressed in the ’774 patent. See Ex. 1001, 1:16–52. Our decision would be the same, however, if we were to adopt Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other
“Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner argues that we need to construe any claim terms explicitly. See Pet. 2–3; PO Resp. 10. However, the parties contest two material claim-construction issues which we address below. To the extent that the parties’ positions depend on interpreting other claim language in a particular way, we discuss the relevant claim language below in the context of the parties’ arguments regarding the prior art.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“We disagree with Patent Owner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that limitation 1.2 must be performed before limitations 1.3 or 1.4. See Ex. 1001, 35:21–24. See Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Unless the steps of a method actually recite an order, the steps are not ordinarily construed to require one.” (citing Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Sony Corp., 181 F.3d 1313, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The evidence suggests that a “target printer” is any printer that is ultimately selected for fabricating the object, and such a printer could send its configuration information either before or after that determination is made in limitation 1.2. This interpretation does not render the word “target” meaningless. At some point, a printer must be determined to be the target printer, which is the one intended to ultimately fabricate the three-dimensional object. But the target printer still exists, and is capable of being queried, before that determination is made. We find the examples in the ’774 patent pertinent to this question. The ’774 patent states that “the target printer may include more than one printer.” Ex. 1001, 18:66–67. In discussing the step of “query target printer for properties 306” (Fig. 3A), the ’774 patent states that “[i]n one aspect, numerous queries are sent to numerous printers, e.g., for use in selecting one or more of the printers as the target printer.” Id. at 19:8–10. Alternatively, “the query is sent to a printer that is not necessarily the target printer as described herein, e.g., when the query or information received from a response to the query is used for the selection of the target printer.” Id. at 19:11–14. Importantly, the second embodiment states that the queried printer “is not necessarily the target printer,” suggesting that the queried printer could be the target printer even before it is determined to be such. Id. at 19:11–12 (emphasis added). Based on the evidence of record, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the “target printer” can be determined after the query recited in limitation 1.3 or the reception of configuration information recited in limitation 1.4. Thus, the evidence does not impose an ordering between limitations 1.2 and 1.3 or between limitations 1.2 and 1.4. The evidence also does not support Patent Owner’s argument that the two reverse-order examples in the ’774 patent are unclaimed embodiments.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We disagree that Petitioner’s arguments are based on impermissible hindsight, because they are based on the disclosures in Douglas and Mark, and Petitioner has articulated a persuasive reason to combine those references without referring to the ’774 patent itself, as we discuss below. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971) (an obvious rationale is not improper hindsight if it “takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure”).” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 11,886,774 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,886,774 - Intel Corporation v. Advanced Cluster Systems, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 1, 2026 · IPR2025-00914 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–19 are unpatentable as obvious over Menon, Trefethen, RS6000, and POEref.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “These factors are not exhaustive but are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). There is uncontested evidence in the record before us that reflects the knowledge and We adopt the Petition’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’679 patent, the prior art of record, and the testimony of both experts.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The Petition relies on the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms consistent with the Phillips standard. Pet. 12–13 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b)). The Petition also addresses the construction of “peer-to-peer architecture” recited in independent claim 1 of the ’679 patent, a limitation we need not construe to resolve the parties’ dispute in this proceeding. Id. at 13; see, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Owner relies on the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms consistent with the Phillips standard without further analysis. Resp. 7.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“RS6000 with Menon, namely because RS6000 provides an overview of the IBM SP2 multiprocessor and Menon teaches the use of “IBM SP2, a modern high performance distributed memory multiprocessor” used in the MultiMATLAB system. Id. at 24–25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 142–145; Ex. 1005, 5–6, 14; Ex. 1007, 1, 11). The Petition also explains why POEref pertains to the field of cluster computing in a parallel operating environment. Id. at 26 (citing Ex.1008, 11 (“PE Software is designed to run on an … RS/6000 network cluster”)); (further citing Ex. 1001, 1:14–15; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 146–149). The Petition contends that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine the teachings of POEref with Menon “because Menon suggests the combination by teaching that MultiMATLAB uses ‘POE, IBM's Parallel Operating Environment.’” Id. at 26–27 (citing Ex. 1005, 6); (further citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 150–153; Ex. 1005, 14; Ex. 1008, 11, 46). We agree with Petitioner’s analysis. We find the Petition’s argument and evidence of a motivation to combine the asserted prior art references in the manner claimed to be compelling, persuasive, consistent with the disclosures in the references, which include internal cross-references to each other, and supported by the expert testimony of Dr. Bajaj.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Patent Owner argues that Menon teaches away from a combination with Trefethen because “Menon expressly states that Trefethen’s first-generation architecture is inadequate for the objectives that motivated the newer design.” Resp. 35–37. The evidence does not support Patent Owner’s position. First, Patent Owner’s teaching away argument is inconsistent with the strong evidence of a motivation to combine Menon and Trefethen discussed above. Second, Patent Owner’s teaching away argument is contrary to the evidence of record for the reasons given in Petitioner’s Reply. Reply 13–15 (e.g., “Menon explicitly cites Trefethen and explains that Menon builds on the teachings of Trefethen.”) (citing Pet. 22; Ex. 1003 ¶ 70; Ex. 1005, 1–3; Ex. 1163 ¶¶ 47–53). We are further persuaded by Dr. Bajaj’s reply testimony: the “MultiMATLAB teachings in Trefethen. In fact, Menon describes enhancing the system of Trefethen. For example, Menon describes a list of “goals” already achieved by MultiMATLAB and then states that the architecture has been “redesigned to achieve two further goals.” One of these two “further goals” is “extensibility,” which Menon achieves by its description of adding “MEX routines” to the system of Trefethen. Far from showing an “incompatibility” between Menon and Trefethen as the POR argues, Menon’s addition of the “MEX routines” to MultiMATLAB shows that such a modification was within the capabilities of a POSITA, because the authors of the Menon paper actually implemented the modification. Ex. 1163 ¶ 49 (citing Ex. 1005, 1–3). Dr. Bajaj’s testimony is unrebutted, credible, and supported by the record. We agree with Dr. Bajaj’s reasoning, which is based on direct quotes in Menon. We further agree with Dr. Bajaj’s conclusion that Menon does not teach away from the combination with Trefethen. Id. ¶¶ 50–52. Menon’s description of building on and enhancing the teachings of Trefethen—the earlier work of the same research group at Cornell—by adding MEX routines to achieve high-performance parallel computing and extensibility for MATLAB, demonstrates a classic motivation for a POSITA to combine the teachings of Menon and Trefethen. RS6000 and POEref are specifically referenced in Menon-Trefethen and add operational details of the parallel operating platform that teach a POSITA how to implement the MultiMATLAB system with a reasonable expectation of success. Such facts are inconsistent with Patent Owner’s teaching away and lack of motivation arguments.” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 12,021,679 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 12,021,679 - Intel Corporation v. Advanced Cluster Systems, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 26, 2026 · IPR2025-00913 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–30 are unpatentable: claims 1–25, 27–28, and 30 as obvious over Menon, Trefethen, RS6000, and POEref; claims 26 and 29 over those references plus MPIref.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “These factors are not exhaustive but are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). There is uncontested evidence in the record before us that reflects the knowledge and experience of a POSITA. We adopt the Petition’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’034 patent, the prior art of record, and the testimony of both experts.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther
“processor,” “multi-core” processor, or “singular ‘hardware processor’ that ‘comprises’ (or ‘with’) multiple ‘processing cores’” as Patent Owner contends. Resp. 11–12, 21; see also Ex. 1163 ¶ 22 (“The claim does not recite ‘single chip,’ ‘single package,’ ‘single die,’ or ‘single multi-core microprocessor.’”). Nor do the claims recite a plurality of processing cores “within” a single-chip package or read as “multi-core within a processor” as argued by Patent Owner. Resp. 12–14; Sur-Reply 2; see Reply 6 (citing Ex. 1163 ¶ 23 (“Thus, the phrase ‘with a plurality of processing cores’ identifies the required processing resources associated with the hardware processor; it does not import a packaging limitation.”)). The claims do recite a hardware processor “with” a plurality of processing cores; a critical distinction even Patent Owner reads as open-ended, i.e., as a hardware processor that “comprises” a plurality of processing cores. See Resp. 11 (“the claims require a singular ‘hardware processor’ that ‘comprises’ (or ‘with’) multiple ‘processing cores’”). Consequently, the claim language does not support Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “a . . . hardware processor with a plurality of processing cores” as a single multi-core processor. cores it contains” in reliance on a parsed description in the ’034 patent specification: The specification explains: “Each processor can contain one or more processor cores that are capable of single-threaded execution. Processor cores are generally independent microprocessors, but more than one can be included in a single-chip package.” Id. at 1212 (partially quoting Ex. 1001, 5:11–16); Sur-Reply 2. The quoted description does not support Patent Owner’s contention that the claimed “a . . . hardware processor with a plurality of processing cores” must be limited to a “single multi-core processor” that “locates multiple cores within a ‘single-chip package,’” i.e. limited to a single multi-core microprocessor such as “a Core 2 Duo is one processor package with two cores.” Resp. 12– 13, 21 (citing Ex. 1001, 7:15–25). The description quoted above from column 5, moreover, describes a “processor” that “can contain one or more processor cores” each of which can be an independent microprocessor. Reply 2–3 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:11–16; Ex. 1163 ¶¶ 10–14). As Petitioner emphasizes, the specification distinguishes a “processor” from a “microprocessor” and describes a “processor” that “can be one or more general purpose single-core or multi-core microprocessors,” rather than limiting a “processor” to a single multi-core microprocessor. Reply 3–5 (citing Ex. 1001, 7:14–36, Fig. 1; Ex. 1163 ¶¶ 15–18).” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“art because they pertain to the same “field of cluster computing” as the ’034 patent and “are reasonably pertinent to the problem of the ’034 patent, namely, executing a single program on multiple nodes.” Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:14–15; Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 65–69; Ex. 1005, 2; Ex. 1006, Abstract). The Petition emphasizes that Menon expressly cites and builds on the MultiMATLAB system taught by Trefethen. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 71; Ex. 1005, 1–2). The Petition contends that: combination of prior art elements according to known methods (executing MATLAB code on a multiprocessor system) to yield the predictable result discussed in both papers: the MultiMATLAB system executing MATLAB in parallel to perform mathematical calculations. Id. at 22–23 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 70; Ex. 1005, Abstract; Ex. 1006, 2–7). The Petition further contends that a POSITA would have found it predictable to combine Trefethen with Menon with a reasonable expectation of success “because researchers had a strong desire to parallelize MATLAB.” Id. at 23–24 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 73; Ex. 1005, 2; Ex. 1006, 11–12.)” slip op. at 27
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“A POSITA would have had an especially strong reason to read these references together because they address the same project, the same MATLAB-based parallel-computing problem, and the same MultiMATLAB command environment. Menon expressly identifies Trefethen’s MultiMATLAB work and then describes a redesigned architecture that preserves the same user-level objective––parallel MATLAB computations—while improving implementation details and extensibility. A POSITA therefore would not view the references as mutually exclusive alternatives. Rather, a POSITA would understand Trefethen as teaching specific MultiMATLAB commands and examples, including Eval, Send, Recv, and the architecture was implemented and improved in a later version. Ex. 1163 ¶¶ 71–72 (emphases added). We find the above reasoning persuasive and adopt it as our own. Petitioner and Dr. Bajaj demonstrate a sound technical motivation for a POSITA—someone having a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or electrical engineering and two years of experience working in the field of cluster computing or parallel processing—to combine Menon and Trefethen: to improve MATLAB’s operational performance and extensibility in a parallel operating environment. Menon builds on Trefethen to improve and extend the parallel processing capabilities of MultiMATLAB: “This system will enable users to access high-performance parallel routines from within the MATLAB environment, to extend the environment with new parallel routines, and to use these routines to develop parallel applications with the MATLAB language.” Ex. 1005 Abstract. Menon is intended to be read in conjunction with Trefethen, as would be expected from two references generated by the same research group at the same university addressed to the same technical subject matter about a year apart. Ex. 1005, 1; Ex. 1006, Ex. 1086 ¶¶ 65, 101, 102. The very first citation in Menon is to Trefethen. Ex. 1005, 2, 16.” slip op. at 30
Patent outcomesUS 11,570,034 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,570,034 - Meta Platforms, Inc. v. Sterling Computers CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 3, 2026 · IPR2025-00430 · APJ Bach V Hoang · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5–9, 13–15, 18, 19, and 22 are unpatentable as obvious over Dumais, Rose, and Rose with Bieganski.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Our Institution Decision adopted Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Inst. Dec. 7–8. In its Response, Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. See PO Resp. 13–14 (“Patent Owner and its expert adopt the Board’s definition for purposes of this Response”). Having considered the record, we continue to adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, as articulated above. We are satisfied that Petitioner’s proposal comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’217 Patent. Accord Inst. Dec. 7–8.” slip op. at 8
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedOther
“We have not considered any of the evidence Patent Owner moves to exclude in reaching our findings and conclusions set for in this Decision. As a result, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude this evidence is dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 55
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference is prior artPriority date, deniedDecided for petitioner
“We determine that Patent Owner has not carried its temporary burden of production to support its contention that the inventors were reasonably diligent throughout the critical period. See Parus Holdings, 70 F.4th at specifically cite the relevant record evidence combined with an explanation of the significance of the produced material in briefs. See id. at 1372 (explaining that “[t]he burden of production cannot be met without some combination of citing the relevant record evidence with specificity and explaining the significance of the produced material in briefs”). Patent Owner states that it “submitted extensive evidence.” PO Sur-reply 14. But simply submitting dozens of exhibits is not enough. As our reviewing court has admonished, the “burden of production cannot be met simply by throwing mountains of evidence at the Board without explanation or identification of the relevant portions of that evidence.” See Parus Holdings, 70 F.4th at 1371. Instead of citing what specific portions of those exhibits are relevant and why, Patent Owner cites entire exhibits and asserts, without analysis or explanation, that they show diligence. See PO Resp. 49– 50 (citing numerous exhibits without pinpoint citations). Patent Owner’s Sur-reply asserts that Patent Owner’s Response was adequate (PO Sur-reply 17), but an examination of the Response shows that it was not. For example, in its Response, Patent Owner states “numerous documents corroborating [the inventors’] testimony that, during the critical period, they were refining the formulas to implement the BlueSpace relevance model” by citing the entirety of so-called “corroborating documentation” spanning Exhibits 2032 through 2074 as well as the entirety of Justin Marston’s Second Supplemental Declaration (Ex. 2030) and Paul Marston’s Declaration (Ex. 2031). See PO Resp. 49. However, there is not a single pinpoint citation to any particular paragraph, page, or entry for any of those exhibits (a number of which approach 100 pages in length) in Patent Owner’s discussion. See id. Even less helpful, the Response does not inventors actually worked on the claimed invention. See id. That is, the Response does not state exactly what in the “corroborating documentation” actually corroborates the inventors’ testimony or itself shows diligence. If anything, the Response points out that the inventors were engaged in other activities: “Justin Marston had numerous other obligations running the company BlueSpace, and Paul Marston was working a full-time position as a lecturer on statistics.” PO Resp. 49; PO Sur-reply 15–16. We do not fault the Marstons for engaging in other activities, but Patent Owner’s discussion of the Marstons’ other activities and mere conclusory assertions of diligence, without more, do not show that the Marstons were reasonably diligent as to the relevant activities during the critical time period. Simply put, Patent Owner’s Response does not adequately explain exactly how or why the evidence supports its argument that the inventors were reasonably diligent throughout the critical period. We decline the invitation to sift through the hundreds of pages spanning dozens of exhibits in search of evidence and reasons supporting Patent Owner’s assertion of diligence.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“combined Rose and Bieganski. Rose and Bieganski are both concerned with recommending content to a user based on other users’ content preferences. Ex. 1006, code (57); Ex. 1007, code (57). Petitioner, supported by Dr. Fox, adequately shows that Bieganski discloses an improved technique for selecting which other users’ preferences are considered in a recommendation. Pet. 71 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 235–236), 75 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 247–248). We agree that improving Rose’s content ranking system using Bieganski’s content recommendation technique sufficiently motivates the combination. See KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. 417 (noting that where “a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious”). Patent Owner’s argument that Bieganski’s approach is not an improvement over Rose because Rose “teach[es] that feedback from all users is valuable” (PO Sur-reply 9–10 (citing Ex. 2029 ¶ 199)) has two faults. First, that argument mischaracterizes Rose. We find no description in Rose which states that feedback from all users is “valuable” such that selecting certain users is not an improvement. Rather, Rose aligns with Bieganski’s selection of relevant users because Rose emphasizes feedback from similar users by adjusting the weight given to feedback from users who are more or less correlated. Ex. 1006, 6:64–7:1, 7:10–34 (“Rjk is the correlation of users i and k, the Vkj is the weight indicating the feedback of user k on document j.”). Second, even if Rose describes an embodiment where feedback from all users is considered, that does not preclude motivating improvement. See PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharms., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1197–98 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (noting it is not necessary to show that a combination is “the best option, only that it be a suitable option”).” slip op. at 47
Patent outcomesUS 7,716,217 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 7,716,217 - Valve Corporation v. Immersion CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 23, 2026 · IPR2024-00582 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–6, 14–16, and 19 are unpatentable based on anticipation by or obviousness over Pratt, and obviousness over Pratt–Ku, Ku, or Ku–Jiang.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The parties agree that formal education could substitute for practical experience, and vice versa. Pet. 6, PO Resp. 18. The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill appear to be substantially similar, supported by testimonial evidence, and consistent with the asserted prior art and the types of problems and solutions identified in the ’738 patent. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:6–61. Although we discern no difference in the outcome of this decision from choosing one over the other, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill for this decision. The outcome of our decision would be the same under Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We find insufficient support in the specification or prosecution history to narrow the term “haptic effect” to only one that has not been modified or combined with another haptic effect. The ’738 patent still refers to combined or modified haptic effects as a “haptic effect.” Ex. 1001, 11:35–38 (“a haptic effect may further be modified or combined with another haptic effect” and “the haptic effect can include one or more haptic effects”). We also find no support for importing into the construction of “haptic effect” the ’738 patent’s example in which a haptic effect can be “based on the proximity signal and the touch sensor signal.” That is already an explicit claim limitation. Id. at 14:19–20 (“generate a haptic output signal based at least in part on the first [proximity] and second [touch] sensor signals”). Including that limitation as part of the construction of “haptic effect” would render the limitation superfluous. See Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1237 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The Board was correct to not include in its construction of ‘menu’ features of menus that are expressly recited in the claims . . . . Construing a claim term to include features of that term already recited in the claims would make those expressly recited features redundant.”). We also disagree with Patent Owner that the ’738 patent’s references to haptic effects modified or combined with other haptic effects are unclaimed embodiments. The ’738 patent discloses that a proximity-based haptic effect may be combined with a touch-based haptic effect, such as when “a particular haptic effect associated with a particular control on a user interface element [is] further . . . modified or combined with another haptic effect based on the proximity sensor signal,” or when “the haptic effect [to be output by the processor] . . . include[s] a haptic effect meant to confirm ‘pushing’ on a virtual button.” Ex. 1001, 11:32–40. These examples are consistent with the claim language and we find no credible evidence in the record that these embodiments are intended to be excluded from the claimed invention. Thus, we agree with Petitioner that it would be incorrect to construe the term “haptic effect” to include the extraneous limitations Patent Owner proposes. We also agree with Petitioner that a person of ordinary skill in the art reading the ’738 patent disclosure would have understood that a combined or modified haptic effect is still a haptic effect.” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“To show anticipation under § 102, a petitioner must locate every element in a claim, arranged as recited in the claim, in a single prior art reference. See Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The limitations may be present in the reference “either explicitly or inherently.” In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In making this determination, we consider the reference “together with the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562 (CCPA 1978)).” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“We find Petitioner’s arguments persuasive and disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary. Ku discloses summing two overlapping vibration signals, one “based at least in part on” data from a proximity sensor and another “based at least in part on” data from a touch sensor. Ex. 1008, Fig. 12 (items 705, 710, and 715). The summed signal 715 is the basis for generating what the user would perceive as a single haptic effect. See Ex. 1004 ¶ 210–212. This meets limitation 1F. We agree with Petitioner’s argument as to why there would have been a motivation to modify Pratt to include Ku’s teachings. Petitioner’s argument is not merely that Pratt was ready for improvement; Petitioner persuasively argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to add Ku’s method for confirming that the user has touched the intended icon to Pratt’s system. Both Pratt and Ku already disclose using both proximity and touch data in generating a haptic effect, and based on the evidence of record, we are of the view that combining the two teachings would not have been uniquely challenging or otherwise beyond the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Leapfrog presents no evidence that the inclusion of a reader in [electronic children's toys] was uniquely challenging or difficult to one of ordinary skill in the art.” (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 419–420))” slip op. at 32
Patent outcomesUS 11,175,738 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,175,738 - Reed Semiconductor Corp. v. Monolithic Power Systems, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 22, 2026 · IPR2024-01158 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5, 7–15, 17, and 18 are unpatentable: claims 1–4, 9–14, 17, and 18 as anticipated by Tateishi, and claims 5, 7, 8, and 15 as obvious over Tateishi.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We discern no material difference between the parties’ definitions. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. We note, however, that were we to adopt Patent Owner’s assessment, the outcome of this Decision would be the same.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine that Patent Owner has not offered persuasive evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art reading the claims in light of the Specification would understand the plain and ordinary meaning of “control signal” to be as narrow as Patent Owner proposes. We do not construe the claims such that the “control signal” must be the exclusively controlling factor of a component, as Patent Owner urges. Petitioner’s position, on the other hand, is consistent with the evidence of record. We construe “control signal” as having its plain and ordinary meaning, namely a signal configured to control a circuit component. D. The Asserted Anticipation of Claims 1–4, 9–14, 17, and 18 by Tateishi” slip op. at 24
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We determine that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Tateishi discloses the “control signal” recited in limitations 1B2 and 1D of independent claim 1.” slip op. at 37
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“based on the Tateishi application publication (Ex. 1007), that the Tateishi Patent (Ex. 1005) also anticipates claims 1–4, 9–14, 17, and 18. See Pet. 23–24 (“The Tateishi Patent is also prior art under (pre-AIA) §102(e)”; identifying Ground 1 as anticipation “under §102 by Tateishi and/or the Tateishi Patent”). However, we are unable to locate in the Petition or Petitioner’s Reply a discussion of or citation to the Tateishi Patent other than under the Petitioner’s heading “Identification of Challenge and Relief Requested” on pages 23 and 24 of the Petition. Cf. id. at i–x (Table of Contents identifying a section of the Petition discussing the Tateishi (Application) anticipation ground but not a section discussing a Tateishi Patent anticipation ground). Although the issued patent may be substantively identical to the published application, Petitioner does not assert that, and we decline to compare the documents to determine whether that is the case. In light of Petitioner’s silence on the alternative ground, Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the Tateishi Patent anticipates 1–4, 9–14, 17, and 18.” slip op. at 47
Patent outcomesUS 9,041,377 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,041,377 - PTAB · Nov 19, 2025 · IPR2025-00915 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–30 on both asserted § 103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“to determine whether or not to institute an inter partes review. Paper 12, 2–3. We, thus, have authority, acting on the designation of the Director, to determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). See 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and all supporting evidence, we conclude that the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in its challenge of at least one claim of the ’621 patent as unpatentable. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we hereby institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims of the ’621 patent on the grounds stated in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner, supported by Dr. Bajaj’s testimony (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 24–27) submits that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been someone knowledgeable of and familiar with computer cluster systems and cluster computing techniques” in June 2006. Pet. 12. According to Petitioner, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or an equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of cluster computing or parallel processing and would be knowledgeable regarding high-level scientific computing languages. Additional work experience can substitute for specific educational background, and vice versa. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 24–27). Patent Owner does not address Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed level of ordinary skill in the art because it appears consistent with the problems address in the ’621 patent and the cited prior art. C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner “submit[s] that no claim term requires express construction.” Pet. 12–13. Patent Owner does not address claim construction in the Preliminary Response. We determine, at this stage of the proceeding, that we need not construe any claim terms to resolve the controversy before us. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“6. Printed Publication Status of Petitioner’s Asserted Prior Art The Federal Circuit instructs that “[t]o qualify as a printed publication, a reference ‘must have been sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art.’” Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing In re Cronyn, 890 F. 3d 1158, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). “A reference will be considered publicly accessible if it was ‘disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” Id. (citing Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F. 3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). Further, the question of whether a document qualifies as a “printed publication” for the purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 102 “involves a case-by-case inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding the reference’s disclosure to a member of the public.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Barry, 891 F.3d 1368, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). At this stage of the proceeding, Petitioner “must identify, with particularity, evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the reference was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent and therefore that there is a reasonable likelihood that it qualifies as a printed publication.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018- 01039, Paper 29, 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). The reasonable likelihood standard “is lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in in a final written decision.” Id.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,563,621 - PTAB · Nov 12, 2025 · IPR2025-00914 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–19 because the petition showed a reasonable likelihood that Menon combined with Trefethen, RS6000, and POEref rendered them obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Under § 314, the Board may not institute review on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 371 (2018). If the Board institutes a review, it will institute “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we conclude the Petition demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim in the ’679 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–19 of the ’679 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “These factors are not exhaustive but are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). There is uncontested evidence in the record before us that reflects the knowledge and experience of a POSITA. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the Petition’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the description in the ’679 patent, the prior art of record, and the testimony of Dr. Bajaj.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“The Petition first asserts that Menon and Trefethen are analogous prior art because they pertain to the same “field of cluster computing” as the ’679 patent and “are reasonably pertinent to the problem of the ’679 patent, namely, executing a single program on multiple nodes.” Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:14–15; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 129–133; Ex. 1005, 2; Ex. 1006, Abstract). The Petition points out that Menon expressly cites and builds on the MultiMATLAB system taught by Trefethen. Id. (citing Ex. 1005, 1–2); see also Ex. 1003 ¶ 70 (“Menon builds on the teaching of Trefethen”). The Petition also contends that: Accordingly, Menon and Trefethen together represent a combination of prior art elements according to known methods (executing MATLAB code on a multiprocessor system) to yield the predictable result discussed in both papers: the MultiMATLAB system executing MATLAB in parallel to perform mathematical calculations. Pet. 23–24 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 134; Ex. 1005, Abstract; Ex. 1006, 2–7). The Petition further contends that a POSITA would have found it predictable to combine Trefethen with Menon with a reasonable expectation of success “because researchers had a strong desire to parallelize MATLAB.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 137; Ex. 1005, 2; Ex. 1006, 11–12).” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“RS6000, and POEref in the manner claimed in the ’679 patent with a reasonable expectation of success, which we find sufficient on the present record.” slip op. at 17
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 12,021,679 - PTAB · Nov 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00916 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). See 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”).1 Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“publication, a reference ‘must have been sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art.” Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Cronyn, 890 F. 3d 1158, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). “A reference will be considered publicly accessible if it was ‘disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.’” Id. (quoting Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F. 3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). Further, the question of whether a document qualifies as a “printed publication” for the purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 102 “involves a case-by-case inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding the reference’s disclosure to a member of the” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Menon, Trefethen, RS6000, and MPIref with a reasonable expectation of success. Id. at 23–28. Petitioner also maps the prior art to the limitations of claim 1. Id. at 27–67. Patent Owner does not address motivation to combine or the mapping. See generally Prelim. Resp.” slip op. at 26
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) in June 2006 would have been someone knowledgeable of and familiar with computer cluster systems and cluster computing techniques available at the time. Such a POSITA would have a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or an equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of cluster computing or parallel processing and would be knowledgeable regarding high-level scientific computing languages. Additional work experience can substitute for specific educational background, and vice versa.” slip op. at 9
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,811,582
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.