- PTAB · May 13, 2026 · IPR2025-01444 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment after it disclaimed the entire patent term, entering judgment against claims 1–6.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request entry of adverse judgment against itself at any time during an inter partes review proceeding. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). In addition, “[a]ctions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include: (1) Disclaimer of the involved application or patent; [and] (2) Cancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” Id. Because Patent Owner has explicitly requested adverse judgment against itself pursuant to Rule 42.73(b), and has disclaimed the entire term of the ’584 patent, Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment is granted. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that Patent Owner’s Request for Adverse Judgment is granted; and FURTHER ORDERED that adverse judgment is entered against Patent Owner with respect to claims 1–6 of the ’584 patent.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 7,547,584 - Tableau Software, LLC v. Icharts LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · May 7, 2026 · IPR2024-01387 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–16 are unpatentable under the instituted obviousness grounds, including Becerra, the QlikView Manuals, and combinations with other references.
RulingsFinal written decision- ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part
“why it is trustworthy and how it archives dates by which the webpages were accessible, as this is an information resource on which librarians reasonably rely. See FED. R. EVID. 703. We agree with Petitioner that Dr. Hall-Ellis does have personal knowledge of the facts stated in the remaining testimony (e.g., what she actually downloaded from websites), and that FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 602 is inapplicable to her testimony offered as an expert. See Pet. Opp. 5–6 (citing Ex. 1030 ¶¶ 26, 29–32, 35, 37–39). We find her testimony to be relevant to the issues presented and specifically to whether the QlikView documents were publicly accessible. We also find no danger that the testimony would confuse the issues or mislead the Board or present unfair prejudice to Patent Owner. Accordingly, we deny Patent Owner’s Motion as to the remaining portion of Dr. Hall-Ellis’s declaration.” slip op. at 92
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedGranted
“FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion to Strike portions of Patent Owner’s Reply on its Motion to Exclude (Paper 32) is granted; and” slip op. at 102
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“1. Motivation to Combine Becerra and Couckuyt Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Becerra and Couckuyt because such a person would have recognized that Couckuyt discloses useful techniques of assigning data to Becerra’s charts, including assigning data to each axis. Pet. 34 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 19, 52, Fig. 5; Ex. 1003 ¶ 224). Petitioner contends that Couckuyt discloses associating data from a “spreadsheet document” with a chart, such as a “bar graph.” Id. at 35 (citing Ex. 1006, 6:1–37; Figs. 3a, 3c). below. Petitioner’s annotations to Figure 4 identify “Drop Zones” in red and “Data Fields” in Blue. Id. at 36. Petitioner contends Couckuyt discloses a “drag-and-drop user interface (DDUI) . . . associated with a data source, such as the two-dimensional data source 300,” and Figure 4 illustrates the DDUI permitting “value data fields and the characteristic data fields . . . to be dragged and dropped into drop zones.” Id. at 35–36 (citing Ex. 1006, 7:10–13). Petitioner contends that a “primary benefit of the charting DDUI is that the user can quickly change the data that is being presented in the chart,” and using Couckuyt’s techniques, a user can “quickly change the data” and see the desired effects. Id. at 36 (citing Ex. 1006, 1:18–19; Ex. 1003 ¶ 228). Petitioner contends that when Becerra’s control panel includes multiple charts, Couckuyt’s techniques would allow dragging-anddropping data from a data source to multiple charts, and would simplify the process of assigning data to multiple control panel components. Id. at 36–37 skill in the art would have also had a reasonable expectation of success combining Becerra with Couckuyt because the combination would amount to nothing more than incorporating Couckuyt’s well-known drag-and-drop techniques into Becerra’s system. Id. at 37 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 229–231). Patent Owner responds that Couckuyt focuses on selecting a data icon that corresponds to dragging and dropping data fields, not dragging and dropping data, while Becerra teaches that selecting various data ranges from the spreadsheet is desirable. PO Resp. 36–37 (citing Ex. 1004 7:48–52; Ex. 2001 ¶ 146). According to Patent Owner, a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to merely select data fields that do not limit the selected data in any way. Id. Patent Owner further argues Becerra’s method of binding components to a spreadsheet range and extracting formulas from a spreadsheet teaches away from the multiple chart generation scheme of Couckuyt that uses drag and dropping of data fields. Id. at 37. According to Patent Owner, Couckuyt is directed to the need for a charting DDUI that can generate multiple charts at the same time and such a need does not exist in Becerra which in turn is focused on creating a control panel that is an interactive graphics simulation. Id. (citing Ex. 1004, 1:66–67, 2:5–8; Ex. 1005 ¶ 11; Ex. 2001 ¶ 148). Based on our review of the complete record, we determine that” slip op. at 31
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“2. Whether QlikView Manuals Qualify as Prior Art Petitioner argues that “the QlikView Manuals describe a well-known system and are printed publications available to the public at least by July 8, 2008.” Pet. 7–9. Petitioner offers ample evidence to demonstrate the QlikView Manuals were publicly accessible by July 8, 2008. See id. (citing Ex. 1008; Ex. 1009; Ex. 1014–1023; Ex. 1003 ¶ 129–140; Ex. 1030;11 Ex. 1068 ¶¶ 4–7; Ex. 1032; Ex. 1033). Petitioner contends in 2008, QlikView was a well-known software product sold by QlikTech International AB (“QlikTech”). Id. at 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 129; Ex. 1030 ¶ 23; Ex. 1068 ¶¶ 4–7). Petitioner asserts that QlikTech announced that QlikView version 8.50 was scheduled for release on June 30, 2008, and QlikTech’s website added the “QlikView 8.50” hyperlink by July 8, 2008. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 129–131; Ex. 1022, 1; Ex. 1068 ¶ 7). Petitioner contends that, as of July 8, 2008, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that they could view the QlikView Manuals in the installation package. Id. (citing Exs. 1014–1017; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 131–132; Ex. 1068 ¶ 7). Petitioner further contends that the QlikView Manuals were also available on QlikTech’s website as of this 11 As discussed below (see infra § IV.A), we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude as to certain portions of Exhibit 1030 and do not give them any weight. However, we deny Patent Owner’s Motion as to the remaining portions of Dr. Hall-Ellis’s testimony as well as Ms. Lofton’s testimony and various other exhibits proffered by Petitioner to show public accessibility of the QlikView manuals as of July 8, 2008. QlikView 8.50 was published on July 8, 2008. Id. at 8–9 (citing Exs. 1008, 1009, 1017, 1059, 1060; Ex. 1030 ¶¶ 29, 37). In its Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner does not contest that the QlikView Manuals were published and publicly available by July 8, 2008. PO Resp. 50 n.2 (noting only that Patent Owner intends to move to exclude evidence Petitioner relies on to establish the publication date for QlikView Manuals); Tr. 45:3–19. We are persuaded that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the QlikView Manuals were publicly available as of July 8, 2008.12” slip op. at 50
Patent outcomesUS 8,271,892 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,271,892 - PTAB · Oct 29, 2025 · IPR2025-00885 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–11 on all petition grounds and granted ADC Solutions Auto LLC’s unopposed motion to join IPR2024-01219 in an understudy role.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We agree with the parties that the Deltran Petition involves the same patent, challenges the same claims, relies on the same expert declaration, and is based on the same grounds and combinations of prior art. Under these circumstances, our reasons for instituting review based on Deltran’s petition apply with equal force to the “substantively identical” Petition filed by ADC Solutions. Id. Accordingly, for the same reasons set forth in the Institution Decision filed in the Deltran IPR, we institute review on all claims and all grounds asserted in the Petition. See generally IPR01219, Paper 8 (Institution Decision in the Deltran IPR).” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“(1) the Motion for Joinder is timely, having been filed “no later than one month of the institution decision” in the Deltran IPR (Motion 6); (2) the Petition here “is substantially identical to the petition in the Deltran IPR” (id.; see also id. at 7 (“there are no substantive changes to the facts, citations, evidence, or arguments relied upon”); (3) “joinder should have no meaningful impact on the Deltran IPR trial schedule because the present Petition presents no new issues or grounds of unpatentability” (id. at 8); (4) “Petitioner explicitly agrees to take an ‘understudy’ role, which will simplify briefing and discovery” in the joined proceeding, “so long as the current lead petitioner in IPR2024-01219 remains an active party (id. at 9; see also id. at 4, 6);2 and (5) joinder will simplify “briefing and discovery” as all issues will be resolved “in a single proceeding” (id. at 9). Patent Owner does not contest any facts alleged by ADC Solutions in its Motion for Joinder. Having considered Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder, we determine that joinder of the instant proceeding with in the Deltran IPR is appropriate. For the reasons in our Decision Instituting Review in Deltran IPR, we find that the Petition in this proceeding also warrants institution of inter partes review and that joinder is appropriate. Accordingly, we grant Petitioner’s 2 We understand the “understudy role” as including Petitioner not making any oral argument or presentation during telephone conferences with the Board.” slip op. at 4
NonePatents in suitUS 11,667,203 - Duration Media LLC v. Rich Media Club LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 19, 2024 · IPR2023-00953 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–10 were not proven unpatentable under either §103 ground because the evidence did not show the claimed viewability determination.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“We find Patent Owner’s argument persuasive. Indeed, it is unclear how Petitioner’s proposal accounts for the types of problems encountered in the art or prior art solutions to those problems. See Daiichi Sankyo, 501 F.3d at 1256 (identifying these factors, among others, as “a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art”). Nor does Petitioner, in its Reply, address, let alone rebut, Patent Owner’s arguments that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had some experience and/or knowledge in internet advertising. See generally Pet. Reply. Patent Owner proposes that a “person of ordinary skill in the art would have a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a similar major involving computer programming (or at least four years of practical computer programming experience) and at least two years of experience (in or out of college) in the field of internet advertising.” PO Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 2045 ¶54). We agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have some experience in internet advertising, although we fail to see why one year would not be enough to familiarize sufficiently a computer scientist and/or programmer with the types of problems encountered in the art or prior art solutions to those problems. Based on the competing proposals, arguments, and evidence before us, we adopt and apply the following level of skill in assessing Petitioner’s challenges to the patentability of the claims of the ’329 patent: a person that would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or electrical (or similar) engineering with about three years of experience being in the field of internet advertising.” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference not prior artDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner’s resurrected argument is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of § 311(b). Section 311(b) provides: “A petitioner in an inter partes review may request to cancel as unpatentable 1 or more claims of a patent only on a ground that could be raised under section 102 or 103 and only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed cancel the claims of the ’329 patent on the basis of Badros, Harkins, and Krassner. Pet. 11. Petitioner did not base its request, in whole or in part, on the Krassner publication. Id. Krassner clearly is a patent. It issued on August 13, 2019, far too late to be § 102(b) prior art. Even if we assume Krassner is also a “printed publication” withing the meaning of § 311(b), the same date would apply: August 13, 2019. Petitioner has not presented any evidence that the document that is Krassner was published prior to when it issued on August 13, 2019. That another document (the Krassner publication), which published much earlier, may contain the same or similar disclosure is not relevant to when Krassner was patented or published. In sum, Krassner is not prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). b) Whether Krassner is Prior Art Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) Although Krassner is not prior under 35 U.S.C.§ 102(b), we” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner responds that, contrary to Patent Owner’s argument, “Harkins teaches that its invention can be used in web pages.” Pet. Reply 18 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶30). Although Petitioner’s citation is off by one paragraph, Petitioner’s response about what Harkins teaches is correct. See Ex. 1004 ¶29 (“The present invention may be implemented for provision of virtually any type of advertising (e.g., print, radio, television, Internet, billboard, etc.) via any type of advertising medium (e.g., newspaper, magazine, radio broadcast, Web pages, billboards, etc.) without departing from the scope of the present invention.”). We find that Harkins is from the same field based on its express statement that it is applicable to “virtually any type of advertising” and “any type of advertising medium,” including “Web pages.” Ex. 1004 ¶29. Further, even if this were insufficient to place Harkins in the same field as the ’329 patent, we find that Harkins is reasonably pertinent to the particular problems with which the ’329 patent inventors were involved. In sum, we find that Harkins is analogous art to the ’329 patent.” slip op. at 19
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedGranted
“Paper 60 (“PO Mot. To Exclude”), 9–10.6 Patent Owner is correct in this regard and, thus, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude with respect to the testimony in the second Smedley Declaration and the Madansky Declaration opining that Badros teaches the determination limitation. Paper 60, 9–12. Petitioner, in its Opposition to the Motion to Exclude, argues that Patent Owner’s arguments about the “viewability test” were “surprising.” Paper 62, 8. We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument. The “viewability test” is a claim limitation. Petitioner should have anticipated that Patent Owner would argue that limitation. See In re Gardner, 449 F. App’x 914, 916 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“This court has held that when evaluating claims for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103, all the limitations of the claims must be considered and given weight.” (citing Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); Univ. of Strathclyde v. 6 Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude seeks to exclude, in part or in whole, Exhibits 1020–1022, 1025–1030, and 1034–1040, which were submitted with Petitioner’s Reply, of which Exhibits 1026 and 1027 are the declaration by Dr. Madansky and the second declaration by Dr. Smedley, respectively. Mot. To Exclude. The Motion to Exclude also seeks to exclude “Exhibits” 1017 and 1018, which are not filed or of record in this case but which are referenced in the Reply. Id. For example, Exhibit 1017 is the Krassner publication, which Petitioner unsuccessfully moved to add to the record as supplemental information. See Paper 21, 3 n.1 (expunging the Krassner publication and stating that it “need not -- and indeed may not -- be re-filed under a new exhibit number”). Apart from the portions of Dr. Smedley’s second declaration and Dr. Madansky’s declaration opining that Badros teaches the “determination” limitation, we dismiss the Motion to Exclude as moot. obviousness determination generally requires a finding that “all claimed limitations are disclosed in the prior art’.” (citing PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharms., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Petitioner argues that “[v]iewability tests were well known for well over a decade prior to the ’329 patent’s priority date.” Reply 9. If that were the case, then Petitioner should have made its argument in the Petition. Section 312(a) of Title 35 is titled “Requirements of Petition,” and it specifies that a petition must identify, among other things, “the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim, including . . . (B) affidavits or declarations of supporting evidence and opinions, if the petitioner relies on expert opinions.” 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4)–(5) (“The petition must specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon; and . . . the supporting evidence relied upon to support the challenge.”). Thus, “Petitioner may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g. to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability.” Board’s Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 73 (Nov. 21, 2019).7 Dr. Smedley’s testimony in his second declaration, that “Badros discloses Patent Owner’s ‘viewability test’” (Ex. 1027 ¶11), is clearly evidence to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability. The same is true of Dr. Madansky’s testimony that she agrees with Dr. Smedley in this regard. Ex. 1026 ¶4.” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 11,443,329 not shown unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,443,329 - Meta Platforms, Inc. v. Jawbone Innovations, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 28, 2023 · IPR2023-01130 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–20 were obvious over the asserted combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We agree with Patent Owner that the record does not support Petitioner’s assertion that Brandstein teaches or suggests the independent claim requirement, “wherein the first virtual microphone and the second virtual microphone are distinct virtual directional microphones with substantially similar responses to noise.” Contrary to Petitioner’s interpretation of Brandstein Figure 5.2, that figure does not lead to an inference that the individual microphone responses have similar responses to noise. Prelim. Resp. 12–13. In effect, Petitioner is arguing that knowing that the sum of two numbers is equal to “2” necessarily means that each number is “1”, as opposed, for example, to one number being “2” and the other “0”. Moreover, as discussed above, Brandstein’s description of Figure 5.1 demonstrates that the virtual microphones of Brandstein do not have “substantially similar responses to noise.” Prelim. Resp. 9–11. Likewise, Figure 5. 3 of Brandstein also refutes Petitioner’s assertion the virtual microphone noise responses are substantially similar. Prelim. Resp. 13.8” slip op. at 24
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that the record does not support Petitioner’s assertion that Brandstein teaches or suggests the independent claim requirement, “wherein the first virtual microphone and the second virtual microphone are distinct virtual directional microphones with substantially similar responses to noise.” Contrary to Petitioner’s interpretation of Brandstein Figure 5.2, that figure does not lead to an inference that the individual microphone responses have similar responses to noise. Prelim. Resp. 12–13. In effect, Petitioner is arguing that knowing that the sum of two numbers is equal to “2” necessarily means that each number is “1”, as opposed, for example, to one number being “2” and the other “0”. Moreover, as discussed above, Brandstein’s description of Figure 5.1 demonstrates that the virtual microphones of Brandstein do not have “substantially similar responses to noise.” Prelim. Resp. 9–11. Likewise, Figure 5. 3 of Brandstein also refutes Petitioner’s assertion the virtual microphone noise responses are substantially similar. Prelim. Resp. 13.8” slip op. at 24
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“On June 27, 2023, Petitioner also filed a Motion for Joinder to And Consolidation With Related Inter Partes Review IPR2023-00251, which Patent Owner opposed on July 27, 2023. Papers 2, 7. However, on August 8, 2023, that Proceeding was terminated due to settlement. IPR2023-00251, Paper 15. Accordingly, on September 8, 2023, Petitioner filed an Unopposed Motion To Withdraw Motion For Joinder. Paper 8. We grant that motion.” slip op. at 2
§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,122,357 - PTAB · Dec 21, 2023 · IPR2023-01127 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least claim 11 would have been obvious over Ikeda and Puthuff.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“d. Remaining Limitations Apart from the arguments discussed above, Patent Owner does not present arguments specifically directed to the subject matter recited in the rest of the claim. Even so, Petitioner has the burden to show that the challenged claims are unpatentable. Thus, we have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence submitted in connection with the remaining limitations and find them to be sufficient at this stage and on this record. From the current record, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in demonstrating that at least independent claim 11 would have been obvious over Ikeda and Puthuff. Because Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of success in showing that claim 11 is unpatentable, we institute on all challenges and all claims challenged in the Petition. We have reviewed the rest of the Petition, and the remainder of this Decision provides guidance to the parties.” slip op. at 22
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“Yet Ikeda notes that it is difficult to command the adaptive filter’s learning “depending on the situation in which the noise canceler is located.” See Ex. 1003, 3:40–54 (emphasis added). We emphasize “depending on the situation” here because it indicates that Ikeda does not necessarily criticize all outside sensors, in all situations. See id. Rather, Ikeda’s discussion of outside sensors refers to the sensors that were discussed in the background of the invention and under the specific conditions described in that section. See id. at 1:4–3:54, quoted in Prelim. Resp. 4. For example, in the part quoted by Patent Owner that allegedly teaches away, Ikeda explains that with conventional sensors “a sufficient noise canceling ability and a sufficient distortion correction characteristic are not achievable unless adequate learning sections are indicated to each adaptive filter for the learning purpose.” Id. That is, Ikeda identifies a particular type of sensor: “conventional noise cancelers.” See id. Also, Ikeda’s “Background of the Invention” Section provides specific discussion of a conventional noise canceler, which is shown in Figure 5, reproduced below. See id. at 1:43. In Figure 5, the conventional noise canceler has a main signal microphone 1, a reference signal microphone 2, an adaptive filter 3, a subtracter 4, and an output terminal. Id. at 1:42–46. The conventional noise canceler updates the adaptive filter’s coefficient and learns the acoustic characteristic of noise in sections where the noise signal N(z) is present and the desired signal component S(z) is absent or negligibly small. Id. at 3:32–36. Ikeda teaches using this conventional sensor to detect the absence of a desired signal component. Id. at 3:32–45. In the context of discussing this sensor, Ikeda explains that “it is, in many cases, difficult to command the adaptive filters to perform learning from the outside in accordance with the level of the desired signal and that of the noise signal, depending on the situation in which the noise canceler is located.” Id. at 3:46–50. At this stage and on this record, we preliminarily determine that the cited part of Ikeda refers to the limitations of this conventional sensor—not all outside sensors, generally. according to Petitioner, Ikeda teaches multiple alternative options for detecting the absence of a desired signal component. See Pet. 21–22. For instance, Ikeda proposes using a signal-to-noise power ratio estimator. Id. (citing Ex. 1003, 4:49–56, Fig. 1; Ex. 1002 ¶ 70). Ikeda explains that, with the estimator, the noise canceler “insures rapid convergence and allows a minimum of signal distortion to occur without resorting to a command customarily input from the outside for commanding the learning operation of filters.” Ex. 1003, 9:14–18, cited in Prelim. Resp. 11. At this stage and on this record, we preliminarily determine that Ikeda at most describes an alternative that is desirable in some situations but does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage modifying it to arrive at the claimed invention in a way that would indicate that Ikeda teaches away from the claimed solution. See In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1200–01 (Fed. Cir. 2004).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“specific approach that uses conventional noise cancelers, Petitioner describes the benefits of the multiple options for detecting voicing activity in different situations. For example, Petitioner asserts that “Ikeda discloses the need for accurately determining periods when a desired signal (e.g., voicing activity) is present and periods when a desired signal is absent for an adaptive noise canceler to function optimally.” Pet. 32–33 (citing Ex. 1003, 3:32–54; Ex. 1002 ¶ 91). According to Petitioner, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have looked to other VAD methods, including Puthuff’s. Id. at 33–34. Petitioner argues that Puthuff would have improved voice-activity detection in noisy environments, in particular. Id. (citing Ex. 1004, 3:19–24, 6:6–10). Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 91–93, cited in Pet. 33–34. On this record, Petitioner’s assertions are adequately supported. Pet. 32–34. The cited part of Puthuff, for instance, explains that its system improves “immunity to false triggering due to noisy environments.” Ex. 1004, 3:19–24, 6:6–10. We credit the testimony of Dr. Richard Stern, which is consistent with this teaching. Ex. 1002 ¶ 91. At this stage, the Petition sufficiently explains how Ikeda’s and Puthuff’s systems are similar and how both are concerned with solving the same problem. See Pet. 32–36.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“A. Motion for Joinder Meta Platforms, Inc. filed a Motion for Joinder (Paper 2), requesting joinder as a petitioner in IPR2023-00253. Patent Owner filed an Opposition to the Motion for Joinder. Paper 7. On August 10, 2023, the Board terminated IPR2023-00253 (Paper 14). After that termination, Meta Platforms, Inc. filed a Motion to Withdraw its Motion for Joinder. Paper 8. Because IPR2023-00253 has been terminated, we grant the Motion to Withdraw the Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 2
§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,019,091 - Snap Inc. v. You Map Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 31, 2023 · IPR2022-00568 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Feldman and Jackson, or Feldman, Jackson, and Rush; the contingent motion to amend is granted.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related field, plus two years’ work or research experience with location-based content delivery and/or visualization.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19– experience and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp.; Sur-reply. Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Shamos, testifies that he “generally agree[s]” with Petitioner’s proposed articulation, and provides substantially the same expression of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Shamos Decl. ¶¶ 30–31. In this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s proposed definition.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Although Patent Owner appears to argue that applying the preference factors to a general score does not encompass weighting the general score’s components (see, e.g., id. at 10–12; Sur-reply 13–16), this is not reflected in Patent Owner’s proposed construction (PO Resp. 12). Patent Owner’s construction provides no limitation on how the preference factors are applied to a general score. See id. To the extent Patent Owner argues that the phrase “applied to,” as recited in the claim, excludes such component-based weighting, we disagree. Rather, the record better aligns with Petitioner’s argument that “applied to” involves a linear combination of values, which could be the values of the general score’s components. See Pet. 30–31. Petitioner’s position is supported by the plain language of the claim, the ’727 patent’s discussion of weighted aggregation, and Mr. William’s testimony—all of which indicate that weighting the component scores is encompassed by claim 1. As for the plain language, the claim does not define how the factors are “applied to” the general score. Rather, the claim only recites that they are. In the context of the claim, the preference factors are applied to the general score. Patent Owner does not dispute this. PO Resp. 12. Claim 1 further recites that the customized score is based on the application of the preference factors to the general score. Ex. 1001, 23:14–27. We note that the generate the combined ranking, which is then used for the recited selection. Beyond that, the claim does not specify how the two rankings are used or how the combined ranking must be generated. Thus, under the claim’s plain language, the customized score can be used to rank the posts and is based on the general score. Id.” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“adequately supported. We find that Mr. William’s declaration is adequately supported. This is not case where an expert “does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Rather, Mr. Williams adequately supports his testimony about the second preference factor with reasoning based on Jackson’s teachings about how the social-network distance is used to weight the global score. See, e.g., Williams Decl. ¶ 133 (citing Ex. 1006, Fig. 4A, 16:23–25, 58–60). weighting criteria can be used together. Id. ¶¶ 147–149 (citing Ex. 1006, 3:57–44:22, 5:53–58, 9:54–67, 13:17–22, 17:47–67). Mr. Williams’s analysis relies on Jackson’s discussion of using multiple factors to score a post. Ex. 1006, 17:47–55, cited in Williams Decl. ¶ 147; see also Pet. 42–43; Reply 9. Mr. Williams also cites Jackson’s discussion of how social-network distance and geographic distance can be used together. Williams Decl. ¶ 147 (citing Ex. 1006, 3:57–4:22). We agree with Petitioner that Jackson adequately supports this part of Mr. Williams’s analysis. Reply 7–9. Specifically, Jackson discloses that a determination may use social-network distance to “modify the criteria” that it uses to provide posts to users. Ex. 1006, 3:66–4:1, cited in Williams Decl. ¶ 147. Jackson further explains how geographic distance can be used in addition to other criteria: “Transmitting the post to the second computing device may be dependent upon determining that the criteria is met and determining that the posting location is within the threshold distance.” Id. at 4:19–22 (emphasis added), cited in Williams Decl. ¶ 147. This is consistent with Jackson’s teaching that a post may be recommended based on several factors and for several reasons. Id. at 17:47–67, cited in Williams Decl. ¶ 147. Also, Jackson explains how the global score, which Petitioner mapped to the recited “general score,” is used to generate a post’s score: “[A] particular post’s global score . . . is multiplied by, divided by, or summed with a distance between” a user and the post’s author. Id. at 9:54–67, cited in Williams Decl. ¶ 148. Jackson weights a post’s global score against a position of the posts author in a social graph. Id. at 9:25–53. Mr. Williams testifies that it is obvious and conventional to generate the modified scores embodiment. Williams Decl. ¶ 144. This is supported by Jackson. In another example cited by Petitioner, Jackson multiplies a post’s global score by a geographic distance to generate a personal score. Id. at 21:60–22:5, cited in Pet. 37, 39, 43. Thus, Petitioner has shown Jackson teaches or suggests applying two different sets of preference factors to a post’s global score. Pet. 41 (citing Williams Decl. ¶ 144). We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that neither Petitioner nor” slip op. at 31
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“We agree with Petitioner that Jackson adequately supports this part of Mr. Williams’s analysis. Reply 7–9. Specifically, Jackson discloses that a determination may use social-network distance to “modify the criteria” that it uses to provide posts to users. Ex. 1006, 3:66–4:1, cited in Williams Decl. ¶ 147. Jackson further explains how geographic distance can be used in addition to other criteria: “Transmitting the post to the second computing device may be dependent upon determining that the criteria is met and determining that the posting location is within the threshold distance.” Id. at 4:19–22 (emphasis added), cited in Williams Decl. ¶ 147. This is consistent with Jackson’s teaching that a post may be recommended based on several factors and for several reasons. Id. at 17:47–67, cited in Williams Decl. ¶ 147. Also, Jackson explains how the global score, which Petitioner mapped to the recited “general score,” is used to generate a post’s score: “[A] particular post’s global score . . . is multiplied by, divided by, or summed with a distance between” a user and the post’s author. Id. at 9:54–67, cited in Williams Decl. ¶ 148. Jackson weights a post’s global score against a position of the posts author in a social graph. Id. at 9:25–53. Mr. Williams testifies that it is obvious and conventional to generate the modified scores embodiment. Williams Decl. ¶ 144. This is supported by Jackson. In another example cited by Petitioner, Jackson multiplies a post’s global score by a geographic distance to generate a personal score. Id. at 21:60–22:5, cited in Pet. 37, 39, 43. Thus, Petitioner has shown Jackson teaches or suggests applying two different sets of preference factors to a post’s global score. Pet. 41 (citing Williams Decl. ¶ 144).” slip op. at 32
Patent outcomesUS 10,616,727 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,616,727 - PTAB · Jul 19, 2023 · IPR2023-00559 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims and grounds, and granted Amazon’s motion to join IPR2022-01060 subject to participation restrictions.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The patentability challenges in the Google IPR met the “reasonable likelihood” standard of § 314(a). Google Inst. 38.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Under the present circumstances, we agree with Petitioner that joinder is appropriate and will not unduly impact the ongoing trial in IPR2022- 01060. Still, we impose the following restrictions to ensure minimal impact on the trial schedule, cost, discovery, and potential briefing: (1) Google LLC alone is responsible for all petitioner filings in the joined proceeding until such time that it is no longer an entity in the joined proceeding; (2) Amazon.com, Inc. is bound by all Google LLC’s filings in the joined proceeding, except for (a) filings regarding termination or settlement and (b) filings where Amazon.com, Inc. receives permission to file an independent paper; and (3) Amazon.com, Inc. must obtain prior Board authorization to file any paper or to take any action on its own in the joined proceeding while Google LLC remains as a non-terminated petitioner in the joined proceeding. This arrangement promotes the just and efficient administration of the ongoing trial in IPR2022-01060 and protects the interests of Patent Owner and of Google LLC as the original petitioner in IPR2022-01060. Thus, Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder is granted with the restrictions discussed above.” slip op. at 7
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“for Joinder. Even so, as the moving party, Petitioner has the burden of proof to show that it is entitled to the requested relief. 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.20(c), 42.122(b) (2023).” slip op. at 6
NonePatents in suitUS 8,503,691 - PTAB · Jul 19, 2023 · IPR2023-00561 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 23–28 and 41–46 on all petition grounds and granted Amazon’s motion to join IPR2022-01061, subject to participation restrictions.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The patentability challenges in the Google IPR met the “reasonable likelihood” standard of § 314(a). Google Inst. 38.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Under the present circumstances, we agree with Petitioner that joinder is appropriate and will not unduly impact the ongoing trial in IPR2022- 01061. Still, we impose the following restrictions to ensure minimal impact on the trial schedule, cost, discovery, and potential briefing: (1) Google LLC alone is responsible for all petitioner filings in the joined proceeding until such time that it is no longer an entity in the joined proceeding; (2) Amazon.com, Inc. is bound by all Google LLC’s filings in the joined proceeding, except for (a) filings regarding termination or settlement and (b) filings where Amazon.com, Inc. receives permission to file an independent paper; and (3) Amazon.com, Inc. must obtain prior Board authorization to file any paper or to take any action on its own in the joined proceeding while Google LLC remains as a non-terminated petitioner in the joined proceeding. This arrangement promotes the just and efficient administration of the ongoing trial in IPR2022-01061 and protects the interests of Patent Owner and of Google LLC as the original petitioner in IPR2022-01061. Thus, Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder is granted with the restrictions discussed above.” slip op. at 7
NonePatents in suitUS 8,503,691 - PTAB · May 15, 2023 · IPR2023-00284 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–20 on two §103 grounds and granted Amazon.com, Inc.’s motion to join IPR2022-01059, subject to participation limits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The patentability challenges in the Google IPR met the “reasonable likelihood” standard of § 314(a). IPR2022-01059, Paper 12, 53.” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Denied
“We do not agree with Patent Owner that the discretionary General Plastic factors either (1) apply to the present case or (2) weigh in favor of exercising discretion to the deny the petition and joinder motion. First, the General Plastic factors do not apply here because, unlike the Uniloc case, the instant petition is Petitioner’s first petition, it is timely filed before the 1- year bar date, and it is merely a “me too” petition that presents identical grounds and arguments as in the Google IPR. It is not a follow-on petition that takes advantage of information learned from prior challenges. See LG Elecs., Inc. v. Gesture Tech. Partners, LLC, IPR2022- 00092, Paper 8 at 5 (PTAB May 9, 2022) (declining to apply the General Plastic factors to a “standard ‘me too’ petition with a motion for joinder” because “none of the unique facts in Apple v. Uniloc [were] present”); Cent. Sec. Grp. – Nationwide, Inc. v. Ubiquitous Connectivity, LP, IPR2019-01609, Paper 11 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 26, 2020) (General Plastic factors are not particularly relevant where a different petitioner files a “me-too” petition and a timely motion to join). Patent Owner’s citation to and reliance on Uniloc case is misplaced because the case is distinguishable. In Uniloc, the petition was the petitioner’s second challenge to the patent and that second challenge came after denial of a first petition and after the statutory deadline had passed. Apple Inc. v. Uniloc 2017 LLC, IPR2020-00854, Paper 9 at 5 (PTAB Oct. 28, 2020). Thus, we find that the General Plastic factors do not apply. Second, even if we were to consider the General Plastic factors, we find that they weigh against exercising discretion to the deny the petition and joinder motion. Petitioner has not filed any petition previously challenging the validity of the ’080 patent and, according to Petitioner, “shares no significant relationship with prior petitioners.” Reply 5 (citing Pet. 8). This weighs against exercising our discretion to deny. Patent Owner’s arguments that factors 2, 4, and 5 weigh in favor of exercising our discretion to deny are also unavailing. Opp. 4. Factors 2, 4, and 5 are designed “to assess and weigh whether a petitioner should have or could have raised the new challenges earlier.” Google LLC v. Express Mobile, Inc., IPR2022-00597, Paper 17 at 8–9 (PTAB Aug. 19, 2022). As Petitioner contends in it Reply, it is “not raising new challenges but merely presents the same challenges that previously resulted in institution, and Petitioner acted within the time frame set forth under our Rules.” Reply 4. We agree with Petitioner. Regardless of whether Petitioner “had” Patent Owner’s preliminary response in the Google IPR at the time Petitioner filed this petition, Petitioner did not use the preliminary response as a roadmap to draft its petition. See Reply 5. Instead, as Petitioner notes, it filed a substantively identical petition. See id. (citing Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc., IPR2022-01151, Paper 12 at 48–51 (PTAB Jan. 4, 2023) (“factor (3) does not favor discretionary denial” when “Petitioner presents substantively identical challenges . . . based on the same prior art and the same unpatentability theories”)). Accordingly, we find these factors weigh against exercising our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Under the present circumstances, we agree with Petitioner that joinder is appropriate and will not unduly impact the ongoing trial in IPR2022- 01059. Nonetheless, we lay out the following restrictions in order to ensure minimal impact on the trial schedule, cost, discovery, and potential briefing. Specifically, we limit Petitioner Amazon.com, Inc.’s participation in the joined proceeding, such that (1) Google LLC alone is responsible for all petitioner filings in the joined proceeding until such time that it is no longer an entity in the joined proceeding, and (2) Amazon.com, Inc.is bound by all filings by Google LLC in the joined proceeding, except for (a) filings regarding termination or settlement and (b) filings where Amazon.com, Inc. receives permission to file an independent paper. Amazon.com, Inc. must obtain prior Board authorization to file any paper or to take any action on its own in the joined proceeding, so long as Google LLC remains as a non-terminated petitioner in the joined proceeding. This arrangement promotes the just and efficient administration of the ongoing trial in IPR2022-01059 and protects the interests of Google LLC as original petitioner in IPR2022- 01059, and of Patent Owner. For the foregoing reasons, and with the limitations discussed above, Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder is granted. III. ORDER Accordingly, it is: ORDERED that inter partes review is hereby instituted as to claims 1–20 of the ’080 patent on the following asserted grounds: (1) Claims 1–3, 5–9, 11–14, 16–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Ikeda, McCowan, and Kanamori; (2) Claims 4, 10, 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Ikeda, McCowan, Kanamori, and Yang; FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder with IPR2022-01059 is granted, and Amazon.com, Inc. is joined as a petitioner in that case pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.222, based on the conditions discussed above;” slip op. at 10
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,779,080
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.