- PTAB · Jan 15, 2026 · IPR2025-01231 · APJ Mary C Hoffman · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–13 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“petition identifies all real parties in interest. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2). Whether an unnamed party is a real party in interest “is a highly fact-dependent question.” See Applications in Internet Time, LLC v. RPX Corp., 897 F.3d 1336, 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“AIT”); Ventex Co., Ltd. v. Columbia Sportswear N. Am., Inc., IPR2017-00651, Paper 152 at 4–5 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (precedential) (citing Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 13 (2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/tpgnov.pdf (CTPG). “A common consideration is whether the non-party exercised or could have exercised control over a party’s participation in a proceeding.” CTPG at 16. Other considerations include whether the non-party is funding or directing the proceeding; the non-party’s relationship with the petitioner; the non-party’s relationship to the petition itself, including the nature and/or degree of involvement in the filing; and the nature of the entity filing the petition. Id. at 17–18.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a related field and at least two years of experience with lighting technology.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1017 ¶ 35). Petitioner makes additional contentions about what a POSITA would have understood. Id. (“A POSITA would understand that all types of cameras (e.g., analog and digital, photo and video) generally involve the same lighting considerations . . . . [and] that it is important to provide light that evenly illuminates the target subject or object to minimize reflected glare and shadows.”). Patent Owner contends that a POSITA would have at least: (a) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, optical engineering, or a related field; (b) two years of practical experience in designing and developing lighting systems, particularly those integrated with electronic devices such as webcams or computer monitors; and (c) knowledge of user-interface considerations for consumer electronics . . . . Additional experience can substitute for education and vice versa. Prelim. Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 2036 ¶ 48). Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s contentions regarding what a POSITA would have understood. Prelim. Resp. 12–13 (“[O]ne of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that analog and digital cameras have different operating principles and lighting requirements [and] Petitioner’s lack of appreciation for the suitability and unsuitability of different lights for different applications infects and dooms its invalidity analysis.” (citing Ex. 2036 ¶¶ 36–47)). and years of experience required for a POSITA. Pet. 2; Prelim. Resp. 12. For purposes of this Decision, we consider a person of ordinary skill in the art to have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or related field and two years of practical experience in lighting technology, and that additional experience may substitute for education and vice versa, which is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the ’729 patent and prior art of record. See Exs. 1001, 1005–1010, 1012–1015; see also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Patent Owner agrees that the Board need not formally construe any claim terms in order to adjudicate the merits of the Petition and argues Petitioner fails to show unpatentability of any claim under any reasonable construction of the claims. Prelim. Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 2036 ¶ 51). We determine that no express claim construction is necessary to determine whether institution is warranted in this proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only terms in controversy must be construed “and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“claimed subject matter and the prior art are “such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). When a ground in a petition is based on a combination of references, we consider “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” Id. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). We base our obviousness inquiry on factual considerations including (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, (3) the level of skill in the art, and (4) any objective indicia of obviousness or non-obviousness that may be in evidence.14 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18.” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,841,729 - PTAB · Dec 8, 2025 · IPR2025-01064 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–18 on all four §103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Volkswagen would prevail on at least claim 1 over Weese.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“A. Legal Standards — Petitioner’s Burden “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the 1 Amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 103 enacted by the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”) took effect in March 2013. The ’353 patent issued from an application filed in September 2004. See Ex. 1001, code (22). Thus, we apply the pre-AIA version of § 103. grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to the patent owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). B. Legal Standards — Obviousness A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness, if made available in the record, which has not happened here. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).” slip op. at 6
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends a person having ordinary skill in the art pertaining to the ’353 patent “would have possessed at least a four-year degree in physics, biophysics, medical physics, or a related field, and two years of experience in developing and/or applying computed tomography methods,” wherein “[a]dditional education and professional experience are interchangeable.” Pet. 1; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 54–55. “Patent Owner utilizes Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 2. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s formulation of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears to be consistent with the ’353 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7
- Expert testimonyOther
“unpatentable as having been obvious over Weese, including supporting testimony from Dr. Peterson. See Pet. 17–22, 26–83; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 138–149, 159–257. Patent Owner opposes. See Prelim. Resp. 1–2, 6–7. We conclude Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertions, as follows.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“(iii) Analysis Based on the present record, we determine Petitioner’s contentions regarding the third step of claim 1 are supported sufficiently by the cited disclosures in Weese and Dr. Peterson’s testimony to justify institution of review. In particular, Weese describes obtaining a plurality of second images of the patient’s internal organs (i.e., PET image I0 in Fig. 1, and PET image I10 in Fig. 3) using a second imaging technique (i.e., PET). See Ex. 1005, Figs. 1, 3, and 6, ¶¶ 47–49, 58–59, 72. In particular, PET image I0 in Figure 1 may be a reconstructed “volume image[]” composed of a plurality of “quasi two-dimensional” “slice images” that, when combined, represent a three-dimensional region inside the patient. Id. ¶¶ 48, 58, 61; see also Pet. 56–57. PET image I10 in Figure 3 may be a similarly reconstructed volume image composed of a plurality of slice images.4 See 4 We do not rely here on Petitioner’s alternative theory that Weese discloses a “plurality” of second images because PET images I0 and I10 are “superposed” images encompassing “several states of motion.” Pet. 58. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 61, 83–84. Patent Owner’s sole opposition to Petitioner’s assertions in this regard are limited to whether Weese “obtain[s]” PET images I0 and I10 as recited in claim 1, which we address below. Also, it appears that PET images I0 and I10 are obtained while also obtaining second movement measurements of the patient’s internal organs using a second sensor system (i.e., motion acquisition unit 12 and motion sensor 15 / S1) which is independent from the PET imaging technique. See Ex. 1005, Figs. 1 and 6, ¶ 65 (“[T]he respiratory motion is determined during the acquisition of the PET projections P1 by means of a respiratory motion sensor provided on the patient and therefrom the frequency function f(r) or, more generally, a state of motion function F1 is derived for the construction of the motion model M2.”). Furthermore, Weese describes how frequency function f(r) is utilized to facilitate image comparison between CT and PET images at common motion states. See id. ¶¶ 31, 49–51, 70–71, 75–77, 79–80, 83; see also Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 214–216 (Dr. Peterson’s supporting testimony). Patent Owner’s sole opposition to Petitioner’s assertions in this regard are limited to whether Weese “obtain[s]” PET images I0 and I10 as recited in claim 1, which we address below. Patent Owner’s two opposing arguments are unavailing, based on the present preliminary record. First, Petitioner relies on reconstructed PET images I0 and I10 as satisfying the “plurality of second images” recited in claim 1, not PET projections P1 from which PET images I0 and I10 are derived. See, e.g., Pet. 56, 58 (“I0 and I10 disclose and render obvious a ‘plurality of second images’ in two ways” — “I0 and I10 may be ‘volume images’ formed using ‘known’ techniques,” and “I0 and I10 are ‘superposed’ PET images encompassing ‘several states of motion,’ which” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,265,353 - PTAB · Dec 3, 2025 · IPR2025-01016 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims 1–13 and all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Jurik anticipates at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). See 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Considering the Petition as well as all supporting evidence, we conclude that the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in its challenge of at least one claim of the ’373 patent as unpatentable. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we hereby institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims of the ’373 patent on the grounds stated in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“[a] person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the assumed effective filing date (March 30, 2023), would have had at least a B.S. degree in mechanical or electrical engineering and would have had at least two years of practical experience designing lighting systems. Alternatively, a POSITA would have at least two years of undergraduate training in a physical science (e.g., engineering or physics) and at least four years of practical experience designing lighting systems. Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 31–32). Patent Owner did not file a Preliminary Response. For the purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s currently uncontested definition except for the term “at least” because it may cause ambiguity resulting in potentially encompassing those with more than ordinary skill in the art. With that qualification, Petitioner’s proposal appears consistent with the problems addressed in the ’373 patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Patent Owner did not file a Preliminary Response. We determine, at this stage of the proceeding, that we need not construe any claim terms to resolve the controversy before us. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). The parties are free to address the construction of any claim term in subsequent authorized briefing during trial. If either party chooses to present claim construction arguments, the arguments should be in a separately delineated portion of the brief labelled accordingly.” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“To establish anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102, each and every element in a claim, arranged as recited in the claim, must be found in a single prior art reference. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Each element of the challenged claim must be found, either expressly or inherently, in the single prior art reference. Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). However, this is not an ipsissimis verbis test, i.e., identity of terminology is not required. See In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990). When evaluating a prior art reference in the context of anticipation, the reference must be “considered together with the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562 (CCPA 1978)).” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,988,373 - PTAB · Aug 25, 2025 · PGR2025-00028 · APJ George R Hoskins · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–20 and all asserted grounds after finding claim 1 more likely than not unpatentable under § 101.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), the Director may not authorize a post-grant review unless the information in the petition, if unrebutted, “would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). For the reasons that follow, we institute a post-grant review as to claims 1–20 of the ’423 patent on all grounds of unpatentability asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“ordinary skill in the art would have had “an educational background of, or practical experience equivalent to, a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately three years of experience with electronic payment systems, vending machine technologies, or distributed network systems,” where “[l]ack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 20–26). Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art in its Preliminary Response. Based on the record presented, including our review of the ’423 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’423 patent and cited 2 Petitioner states that it “takes no position on the proper priority date for the [c]hallenged [c]laims” and “uses the earliest possible priority date claimed, December 18, 2013,” for purposes of its asserted grounds. Pet. 14. prior art, we agree with Petitioner’s definition and apply it for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:42–2:21 (stating that “[t]he present application relates to the field of payment processing systems” and describing the functionality of payment accepting units in the “Background” section).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“B. Claim Interpretation We interpret each challenged claim using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(b). Petitioner states that, “for purposes of [its] Petition, the Board need not construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes, and the claims should be given their ordinary and customary meaning.” Pet. 20. Patent Owner agrees that “[n]o constructions are necessary” to decide the issues disputed by the parties. Prelim. Resp. 2–3. We conclude that no express interpretation of any claim term is necessary to determine whether to institute a post-grant review in this proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe [a particular claim limitation] where the construction is not ‘material to the . . . dispute.’” (citation omitted) (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelNot reached
“For the reasons explained below, we conclude, on the merits and based on the current record, that Petitioner has shown that it is more likely than not that claim 1 is unpatentable as claiming patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See Pet. 77–84. Accordingly, we need not determine at this time whether collateral estoppel applies based on the Board’s decision in PGR2021-00093. The parties, however, should address the issue in their papers during trial, with citations to relevant authority. In particular, the parties are encouraged to address (1) how the collateral estoppel requirement that the issue be “identical to one decided in the first action” applies in the context of an asserted ground under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and (2) the parties’ apparent disagreement as to whether collateral estoppel may be applied in such circumstances on a “limitation-by-limitation basis.” See Pet. 72, 75 (quoting Google LLC v. Hammond Dev. Int’l, Inc., 54 F.4th 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2022)); Prelim. Resp. 20–21; see also Kroy IP Holdings, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., – F.4th –, No. 2023-1359, 2025 WL 2178321, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 1, 2025) (Dyk, J., dissenting) (“In subsequent Board proceedings, it is well established that collateral estoppel applies to claims adjudicated by the Board to be unpatentable and also to ‘related claims that present identical issues of patentability,’ i.e., patentably indistinct claims. . . . ‘It is well established that patent claims need not be identical for collateral estoppel to apply.’” (citing MaxLinear, Inc. v. CF CRESPE LLC, 880 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Google, 54 F.4th at 1381)).” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Mayo · Bilski · Berkheimer · Enfish · Electric PowerPatents in suitUS 11,972,423 - PTAB · Aug 25, 2025 · PGR2025-00027 · APJ George R Hoskins · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR of claims 1–20 on all petitioned grounds, finding claim 1 more likely than not ineligible under § 101.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“A. Legal Standards — Petitioner’s Burden In a post-grant review, “the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (discussing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3), which is identical to 35 U.S.C. § 322(a)(3) in requiring petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”). This 2 Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). burden of persuasion never shifts to the patent owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015).” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends a person having ordinary skill in the art pertaining to the ’920 patent “would have had an educational background of, or practical experience equivalent to, a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately three years of experience with electronic payment systems, vending machine technologies, or distributed network systems.” Pet. 20; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 20–26. Further: “Lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 20; Ex. 1003 ¶ 22. Patent Owner does not oppose Petitioner’s formulation of ordinary skill. See Prelim. Resp. generally. Based on the record presented, including our review of the ’920 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’920 patent and cited prior art, we agree with Petitioner’s definition and apply it for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:42–2:21 (stating “[t]he present application relates to the field of payment processing systems” and describing the functionality of payment accepting units in the “BACKGROUND” section).” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner argues “the Board need not construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes.” Pet. 20. Patent Owner argues: “No constructions are necessary to deny institution because denial is warranted for numerous reasons that do not depend on claim construction.” Prelim. Resp. 3. However, as discussed below, several of Patent Owner’s arguments seeking to distinguish claim 1 from Low rely on underlying claim construction positions. Except as discussed below in connection with those arguments, we determine no explicit construction is needed to resolve the parties’ controversy as to whether institution should be granted here. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 12
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionInstituted
“We determine Petitioner has made a sufficient showing for Step 2A, Prong 1 based on the current record. Petitioner addresses each of limitations [1.2]–[1.14] and explains how they support Petitioner’s contention that the claim, as a whole, is directed to the alleged abstract idea. See Pet. 80–84. For example, Petitioner notes specifically how limitation [1.2], reciting “identifying one or more payment accepting units,” pertains to identifying a merchant, and how limitations [1.6], [1.7], and [1.9] recite user interaction using the mobile device that enables the completion of a purchase. See id. Petitioner thus shows sufficiently how claim 1, by virtue of the limitations reproduced above,5 recites the concept of “identifying a merchant and enabling completion of a purchase from the merchant.” Id. at 80.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Berkheimer · Enfish · Electric PowerPatents in suitUS 11,966,920 - Skechers U.S.A., Inc. v. Nike, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Jun 12, 2025 · IPR2025-00142 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1, 5–9, and 11–17 because Skechers showed a reasonable likelihood that claims 1 and 11 were obvious over Dua, Hong, and/or Choi.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticDenied
“Here, it is undisputed that Skechers was neither a party to the earlier lululemon IPR nor had ever before challenged the claims of the ’484 patent. Instead, in an attempt to demonstrate a significant relationship between Skechers and lululemon that might justify application of the General Plastic framework, Nike’s sole argument is that “Skechers created a relationship with lululemon by openly admitting that it used lululemon’s petition as a roadmap” and that “[t]his admitted roadmapping creates an implicit relationship between Skechers and lululemon.” PO Sur-Reply 2. We reject the notion that “roadmapping” alone creates a significant relationship. As noted in Videndum, a second petitioner’s reliance on a first petitioner’s earlier-filed petition, “even ‘as a menu or road map,’ is not sufficient to create a significant relationship that favors denial under the first General Plastic factor.” Videndum, at *2 (emphasis added); see also Ford, at *2 (rejecting patent owner’s argument that Ford’s use of prior Volkswagen and Dell IPRs “as a roadmap for its Petition” was sufficient to create “an ‘implicit’ relationship”). In other words, absent some evidence of a non-mandated7 collaboration between Skechers and lululemon (such as proof of a licensing or other technology-sharing agreement regarding the accused product), Skechers’ use of arguments and evidence similar to those in the earlier lululemon IPR does not create a significant relationship. Nor does it appear that Nike could reasonably establish such a relationship given that Skechers is a direct competitor of lululemon, was sued on an entirely different product than lululemon, and was not sued until after lululemon had already sought inter partes review of the challenged patent. See Pet. Reply 1–2 (citing Exs. 1065, 1066).” slip op. at 6
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“In particular, the Board has already performed a detailed analysis of the ’484 patent, including construing the claim terms and applying two of the prior art references—Dua and Hong—that form the primary ground here. As such, the Board is much further along in understanding the challenged claims and the parties’ dispute over their validity than the district court in the parallel litigation. And even if the Final Decision in the lululemon IPR is reversed or remanded on appeal, the Board’s considerable experience with the relevant issues remains. Thus, the fact that the Board has already expended considerable time and resources in deciding the validity of the challenged claims, whereas the district court has not, weighs heavily in favor of institution.10 Indeed, in staying the parallel litigation, the district court expressly recognized the lack of any significant investment by the parties or the court— - “[D]iscovery is still in the early stages.” - “The parties . . . have not yet taken any depositions, any third party discovery, or any expert discovery. . . . Accordingly, this case remains in its early stages.” - “Despite [the parties’] significant work [on claim construction], . . . there is more work ahead of the parties and the Court than behind.”” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Skechers proposes that one skilled in the art would have had “at least a few years of experience in knit materials and knitting methods and machines that can be used in making footwear, or a bachelor’s degree in textile-related sciences, engineering, or industrial product design, or equivalent academic or work experience, including in the footwear industry” or “at least a general understanding of general construction processes and materials used in the manufacturing process of fabric-based articles.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 68). Nike agrees. See Prelim. Resp. 11 (“For purposes of this Preliminary Response, Nike applies Skechers’ definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art (‘POSITA’).” Accordingly, we adopt the level of ordinary skill in the art as proposed by Skechers.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Skechers notes that “[d]uring the parallel litigation, the parties agreed that the term ‘central portion having a domed, three-dimensional structure’ means ‘central portion having a domed, three-dimensional structure formed during the flat-knitting process, and not afterward’” and that “in the lululemon IPR . . . the Board adopted [this] as its construction.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1005, 2; Ex. 1021, 6) (emphasis added). Nike agrees with that construction. See Prelim. Resp. 11–12 (quoting Pet. 11). Thus, consistent with the parties’ agreement and the Board’s construction in the lululemon IPR, we construe the claimed “central portion having a domed, three-dimensional structure” as meaning it is formed during the knitting process, and not afterward.” slip op. at 11
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,730,484 - PTAB · Jun 11, 2025 · IPR2025-00139 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–10 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“d. Overlap of Issues “[I]f the petition includes the same or substantially the same claims, grounds, arguments, and evidence as presented in the parallel proceeding, this fact has favored denial.” Fintiv, Paper 11 at 12. “Conversely, if the petition includes materially different grounds, arguments, and/or evidence than those presented in the district court, this fact has tended to weigh against exercising discretion to deny institution under NHK.” Id. at 12–13. Concerns about the degree of overlap may be mitigated where a petitioner agrees not to pursue in the parallel district court litigation the grounds advanced in the petition. Sand Revolution II, LLC v. Cont’l Intermodal Grp.–Trucking LLC, IPR2019-01393, Paper 24 at 11–12 (PTAB June 16, 2020) (informative). The Board suggested that a broader stipulation such as one stipulating that the petitioner “would not pursue any ground raised or that could have been reasonably raised in an IPR, i.e., any ground that could be raised under §§ 102 or 103 on the basis of prior art patents or printed publications” would better address concerns relating to overlapping issues. Id. at 12 n.5. Here, Petitioner’s stipulation is broader—Petitioner stipulates that, if the Board institutes IPR in this proceeding on the grounds presented in the Petition, Petitioners will not pursue an invalidity defense in the [Texas Litigation] that the patent claims subject to the instituted IPR are invalid based on the grounds that were raised or any grounds Petitioner[] reasonably could have raised in the IPR. Prelim. Reply 3. Petitioner’s stipulation is similar to that provided in Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12, 18–19 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential in relevant part), which was found to obviate much, if not all, of any potential overlap between the issues in the proceeding and the district court proceeding. See Prelim. Sur-reply 3 (acknowledging that “Petitioner[] offered a Sotera stipulation.”) Accordingly, the facts underlying this factor weigh strongly against exercising our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 13
- Other 314aDenied
“Patent Owner argues that the Petition improperly presents voluminous and excessive grounds challenging the claims of the ’878 patent. Prelim. Resp. 10–14. Patent Owner argues that the twenty distinct grounds set forth in the Petition alone is reason to deny institution. Id. at 11. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s showing regarding the VFD, switchgear, and enclosure recitations of claim 1 require us to “pick-and-choose” which “prior art evidence” is being applied. Id. at 14. We are not persuaded that the Petition sets forth such voluminous or excessive grounds asserting unpatentability that we should deny institution. Although Petitioner does set forth twenty grounds, sixteen of the grounds are directed to a single dependent claim. See Pet. 16–17. And of the four grounds challenging independent claim 1, Petitioner relies primarily on the combined teachings of Morris and Oehring IV to disclose or teach most of the claim recitations, relying on Premset Catalog and Premset Brochure to teach front-aligned, shielded cable connections and on Payne to provide an alternate teaching of using a common support structure. See Pet. 48–51, 70–74. The instant Petition is quite unlike those in the decisions cited by Patent Owner, which dealt with petitions asserting challenges containing multiple instances of “and/or” that resulted in hundreds of challenges or asserting multiple challenges grouped together in an indiscernible claim chart. See Prelim. Resp. 10 (citing Adaptics Ltd. v. Perfect Co., IPR2018-01596, Paper 20 (PTAB Mar. 6, 2019) (informative); Uber Techs., Inc. v. Surgetech LLC, IPR2023-00738, Paper 8 (PTAB Oct. 23, 2023); EnergySouce Mins., LLC v. TerraLithium LLC, IPR2019-01607, Paper 10 (PTAB May 4, 2020)). And although we agree that the Petition is not the epitome of clarity, we are able to interpret Petitioner’s arguments as set forth below. Accordingly, we determine that the circumstances presented weigh against exercising discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny institution of inter partes review based on the number of challenges presented in the Petition.” slip op. at 15
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). A decision to institute may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354, 1359–60 (2018). If the Board institutes a trial, the Board will institute on all challenges raised in the petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting . . . review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the parties’ briefs and evidence of record, we conclude that the information presented shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we institute inter partes review of all challenged claims based on all asserted grounds. slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the effective filing date would have had either “a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Petroleum Engineering or an equivalent field, as well as at least 2 years academic or industry 2 At this stage of the proceeding, the parties have not directed us to any such objective evidence. experience in the oil and gas industry, including well drilling, completion, or production” or “at least four years industry experience in the oil and gas industry including well drilling, completion, or production.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1003 §§ V.A, VII). “Patent Owner applies the same skill level proposed by Petitioner.” Prelim. Resp. 9. We find Petitioner’s uncontested definition to be consistent with the problems and solutions disclosed in the ’878 patent and prior art of record, and adopt it as our own for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579 (approving the determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art by appeal to the references of record).” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,208,878 - PTAB · May 29, 2025 · IPR2025-00091 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–17 on all asserted challenges, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on anticipation by the Renegade Manual.
RulingsInstitution decision- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedInstituted
“cited by Petitioner fall under the definition of “hearsay” set forth in Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). However, based on the present preliminary record, we further determine that the residual exception to hearsay applies here. That is, the Internet forum posts are “supported by sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness . . . considering the totality of circumstances under which [they were] made,” and they are “more probative on the point for which [they are] offered than any other evidence that [Petitioner] can obtain through reasonable efforts.” Fed. R. Evid. 807(a). The sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness include: the number of Internet posts at issue; the consistent specificity concerning the website (www.techauthority.com) where the 2016 model year Jeep Renegade service manual could be obtained, which includes the same product identification code printed on the face of the CD submitted as Exhibit 1013 (“81-370-16028-CD”); and the lack of any apparent connection between the declarants and the parties to this proceeding. As to probity on the point for which the statements are offered, the statements appear to be contemporaneous (that is, made in 2016) efforts to help members of various Jeep Renegade enthusiast forums obtain the service manual for the 2016 model Jeep Renegade. Although there may be other evidence that could establish exactly when the service manual was published, contemporaneous statements by interested persons that the service manual was in fact publicly accessible in 2016 are highly probative on the issue of public accessibility in 2016. Furthermore, given that context, we discern little reason to doubt the accuracy of the statements being made based on the present preliminary record.” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Term construed petitioner construction§112(f) appliesOther
“determine that we need to construe only “engagement means” and “retaining means.” See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We presently agree with Petitioner’s contention that “engagement means” and “retaining means” are both means-plus-function limitations. See Pet. 37–39. We also agree with Petitioner’s argument that the claimed function of the “engagement means” is “coupling the first member to the second member,” and the corresponding structures of the ’376 patent specification include “fasteners, keys and keyways, male-female couplings, interlocking features, splines, and equivalents thereof.” Id. at 37–38; see Ex. 1002, 8:45–52, 9:46–10:6 (claimed function); id. at 4:40–50, 6:41–44 (corresponding structure). We also agree with Petitioner’s argument that the claimed function of the “retaining means” is “retaining the coupling of the first member and the second member,” and the corresponding structures of the ’376 patent specification include “retaining ring, snap ring, and equivalents thereof.” Pet. 38–39; see Ex. 1002, 8:56–57, 10:10–11 (claimed function); id. at 6:44–47, 7:54–8:25 (corresponding structure). We apply these constructions when comparing claim 1 and Renegade Manual below in Section IV.D.” slip op. at 39
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“if each and every limitation is found either expressly or inherently in a single prior art reference.” WhitServe, LLC v. Computer Packages, Inc., 694 F.3d 10, 21 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Celeritas Techs., Ltd. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). An anticipatory reference must further “disclose those elements ‘arranged as in the claim.’” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). slip op. at 38
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), institution of review requires the information in the record to show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Applying that standard on behalf of the Director (37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a)), we institute the petitioned review.” slip op. at 2
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 11,598,376 - PTAB · May 29, 2025 · IPR2025-00090 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–18 on all petitioned challenges, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on anticipation by Renegade Manual.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), institution of review requires the information in the record to show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Applying that standard on behalf of the Director (37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a)), we institute the petitioned review.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedReference is prior artInstituted
“cited by Petitioner fall under the definition of “hearsay” set forth in Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). However, based on the present preliminary record, we further determine that the residual exception to hearsay applies here. That is, the Internet forum posts are “supported by sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness . . . considering the totality of circumstances under which [they were] made,” and they are “more probative on the point for which [they are] offered than any other evidence that [Petitioner] can obtain through reasonable efforts.” Fed. R. Evid. 807(a). The sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness include: the number of Internet posts at issue; the consistent specificity concerning the website (www.techauthority.com) where the 2016 model year Jeep Renegade service manual could be obtained, which includes the same product identification code printed on the face of the CD submitted as Exhibit 1013 (“81-370-16028-CD”); and the lack of any apparent connection between the declarants and the parties to this proceeding. As to probity on the point for which the statements are offered, the statements appear to be contemporaneous (that is, made in 2016) efforts to help members of various Jeep Renegade enthusiast forums obtain the service manual for the 2016 model Jeep Renegade. Although there may be other evidence that could establish exactly when the service manual was published, contemporaneous statements by interested persons that the service manual was in fact publicly accessible in 2016 are highly probative on the issue of public accessibility in 2016. Furthermore, given that context, we discern little reason to doubt the accuracy of the statements being made based on the present preliminary record.” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“determine that we need to construe only “engagement means” and “retaining means.” See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We presently agree with Petitioner’s contention that “engagement means” and “retaining means” are both means-plus-function limitations. See Pet. 36–38. We also agree with Petitioner’s argument that the claimed function of the “engagement means” is “coupling the first member to the second member,” and the corresponding structures of the ’958 patent specification include “fasteners, keys and keyways, male-female couplings, interlocking features, splines, and equivalents thereof.” Id. at 36, 37; see Ex. 1001, 8:38–45, 10:11‒18 (claimed function); id. at 4:33–43, 6:32–35 (corresponding structure). We also agree with Petitioner’s argument that the claimed function of the “retaining means” is “retaining the coupling of the first member and the second member,” and the corresponding structures of the ’958 patent specification include “retaining ring, snap ring, and equivalents thereof.” Pet. 37, 38; see Ex. 1001, 8:49–50, 10:22‒23 (claimed function); id. at 6:35–38, 7:46–8:18 (corresponding structure). We apply these constructions when comparing claim 1 and Renegade Manual below in Section IV.D.” slip op. at 39
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“if each and every limitation is found either expressly or inherently in a single prior art reference.” WhitServe, LLC v. Computer Packages, Inc., 694 F.3d 10, 21 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Celeritas Techs., Ltd. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). An anticipatory reference must further “disclose those elements ‘arranged as in the claim.’” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). slip op. at 38
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 11,434,958 - PTAB · Apr 29, 2025 · IPR2025-00031 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–19 on all petitioned challenges, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim based on Norris anticipation.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“Considering the Fintiv factors (summarized above) as a whole, we find that trial in the District Court will not begin any earlier than February 2, 2026, and the trial date is very likely to be set back by at least a few weeks due to the delayed Markman process to fall around the same time as the Board’s late April 2026 statutory deadline, so the Fintiv analysis turns on other factors. See Fintiv, at 9. Further, the evidence presented here indicates the parties and the Court have not yet made a significant investment in the District Court Litigation, and Petitioner’s Sotera stipulation mitigates concerns of duplicative efforts and potentially conflicting decisions. Overall, we determine that efficiency and integrity of the patent system are best served by not exercising discretion to deny institution based on the District Court Litigation.” slip op. at 17
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“(iii) Conclusion as to Claim 1 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the record shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to challenging claim 1 as anticipated by Norris.” slip op. at 33
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“to the ’435 patent “would have either (1) a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical, Electrical, or Petroleum Engineering or an equivalent field, and at least 2 years of academic or industry experience in the oil and gas industry, including well drilling, completion, or production, or (2) at least four years of oil and gas industry experience including well drilling, completion, or production.” Pet. 7; Ex. 1003 ¶ 51. “Patent Owner applies the same skill level proposed by Petitioner.” Prelim. Resp. 15 (citing Pet. 7). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the level of ordinary skill in the art as articulated by Petitioner because, based on the current record, it is not disputed, and it appears to be consistent with the ’435 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 21
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“First, we accept (for purposes of this Decision) Patent Owner’s construction of the claim term “acceptable threshold” as referring to a limit, wherein, when the limit is reached, something happens or changes. See Prelim. Resp. 18 (citing Exs. 2002, 2003, and 2004). We find, however, that this is how Norris’s control system operates, based on the present preliminary record. That is, Norris’s application controller 401 monitors the pressure within pressure-side manifold 250b as measured by pressure sensor 185, and compares that measured pressure with a desired pressure. See Ex. 1004, Figs. 2, 3A, and 3B, ¶¶ 22, 29–31, 35–37. Then, “upon variation from the desired settings,” Norris’s control system increases or decreases the operation of pumps 270 to “restore the desired pressure.” Id. at Fig. 2, ¶ 37 (emphasis added). Regardless of whether the desired pressure setting is applied as a single pressure value, or as a range having minimum and maximum pressure values, determining that the measured pressure varies from the desired pressure setting is applying a limit which, when it is reached, changes the operation of pumps 270. Second, based on the present preliminary record, we reject Patent Owner’s additional claim construction position that the claim term “acceptable” requires that the limit must be an “operational limit” representing a potential failure condition that results in shutting down one or more pumps 270. See Prelim. Resp. 19–22 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:65–6:9, 6:56–59, 7:63–66, 8:16–17, 8:25–28, 10:4–11, 11:11–18). It is true that the ’435 patent specification describes such an operational limit as one example of an “acceptable threshold.” See Ex. 1001, 5:65–6:6, 6:56–59, 7:63–66, 8:16–17, 8:25–28, 10:4–11, 11:11–18. However, the ’435 patent specification also describes another example of an “acceptable threshold” as “automatically adjusting” rather than turning off a pump (id. at 10:4–11), and indicates the control system may “adjust” the pumps and other system components “so that each is performing its job most efficiently.” Id. at 5:51–6:9 (emphasis added), 7:41–54, 8:1–9; see also id. at 6:40–61 (“Operating efficiencies for each individual component and the system 40 may be greatly improved,” for example “[p]ump efficiencies may be monitored . . . to optimize boost and rate . . . to deliver a consistent job.”). Patent Owner’s claim construction that would limit the scope of the claim term “acceptable threshold” to require applying an operational pump limit, to the exclusion of applying limits that simply optimize efficient pump operation, is contradicted by this intrinsic evidence. Indeed, claim 10 depends from independent claim 7 (which contains the same “acceptable threshold” limitation as claim 1), to further limit the scope of the claimed invention to “determining that the one or more parameters are indicative of a potential failure condition.” Id. at 12:63–64 (claim 7), 13:23–25 (claim 10) (emphasis added). Claim differentiation therefore suggests that the independent claims are broader than that.” slip op. at 31
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,655,435
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.