• Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co., Ltd. / Yealink Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. Barco NVNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 5, 2026 · IPR2025-00598 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–31 were not shown unpatentable under either § 103 ground because the asserted combinations did not teach required claim limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “admissions by Patent Owner in litigation, contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a Master of Science (M.S.) degree in electrical engineering or computer science, and five years of work experience in a related field” and that “[a]dditional educational experience could substitute for some of the work experience.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art (Petition, 5) at this time.” PO Resp. 6. On the complete record, we adopt Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it is uncontested and is consistent with the technology described in the ’347 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “In the Preliminary Response, “Patent Owner accept[ed] the Petition’s claim construction.” Prelim. Resp. 6. However, in the Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner argues that “the claims of the ’347 Patent require no construction as they are valid under their plain and ordinary meaning.” PO Resp. 6. Based on the complete record, we do not find it necessary to provide express claim constructions of any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Beel actually discloses the following: [0321] On the peripheral device 32 the video packets are received at the corresponding plug and play port, e.g. the USB port 11, read by the Human Interface Driver (HID) interface handler 13, unpacked to remove HID protocol headers in an unpacker 20 and then transmitted to the communications network by a transmitter 21. The network can be wireless for example WiFi or LiFi network. [0322] Having been routed over a communications network to the base unit 33, the incoming stream is read from the communications interface such as a WiFi access point 22, unpacked in an unpacker 25, decoded in a decoder 26 and then inserted into a suitable composition such as an OpenGL based composition in the compositor 29 for display on a central display device. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 321–322 (emphasis added to portions quoted by Petitioner). Patent Owner notes that “[t]he Petition mistakenly cites to ¶ 322 of Beel but quotes ¶ 321.” PO Resp. 20 n.3. However, it appears that Petitioner has grafted together a portion of paragraph 321 that introduces peripheral device 32 with a portion of paragraph 322, which discusses features of base unit 33. However, this grafting has been done in such a way as to convey (incorrectly) that peripheral device 32, not base unit 33, includes unpacker 25, decoder 26, and compositor 29 that process the first processed video data received by the first peripheral device to generate second video data. Dr. Almeroth’s testimony, which copies Petitioner’s incorrectly altered quotation to paragraph 322 of Beel, is unreliable as to this claim limitation and is entitled to no weight.4 Thus, Petitioner has no expert testimony on which to rely for this claim limitation.” slip op. at 19

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “5 At the oral argument, when challenged on its reliance on paragraph 322, Petitioner argued that paragraph 321 of Beel teaches this limitation. Tr. 22:26–23:24. Petitioner did not make this argument in the Petition and, instead, raised it for the first time during oral argument; thus, it will not be considered. See Dell Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC, 884 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Unless it chose to exercise its waiver authority under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(b), the Board was obligated to dismiss Dell’s untimely argument given that the untimely argument in this case was raised for the first time during oral argument.”). Even if we were to consider this new argument, it would not be persuasive. As Patent Owner observes (PO Resp. 20), any processing performed by peripheral device 32 in paragraph 321 is on data received from the processing device and destined for the base station via the network, rather than data flowing in the direction of the first processed video data of claim 1.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 11,966,347 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,966,347
• Apple Inc. v. Proxense, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 17, 2026 · IPR2025-00562 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Giobbi ’157, Giobbi ’139, and Dua; the Board also finds the claims unpatentable under the Broadcom grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) does not applyDecided for petitioner

    “IPR2024-00783, Ex. 1001, 22:36–49. As the Federal Circuit stated, when a disputed claim limitation does not employ “means for” language, the presumption is that each of the terms conveys sufficiently definite structure or act and, thus, is not subject to § 112 ¶ 6. See Dyfan, 28 F.4th at 1367. Based on the record before us, this presumption that each of the terms is not subject to § 112 ¶ 6 is not overcome.” slip op. at 17

  • Skill levelOther

    “differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, “would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of non-obviousness. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).” slip op. at 25

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “We find persuasive Dr. Wolfe’s supporting testimony that a POSITA would have understood the terms “PDK” and “RDC” to have “definite structure.” Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 35–56. In particular, we find persuasive Dr. Wolfe’s testimony that the term “PDK,” for example, “encompasses at least ‘a collection of circuit components that includes an antenna, a transceiver, and a controller and memory for storing information particular to a user.’” Id. ¶ 35. Dr. Wolfe’s testimony is consistent with the Specification of the ’188 patent. See Ex. 1001, 5:42–6:7, 3:48–62. In particular, the Specification of the ’188 patent describes a microchip that stores information in memory and responds through an antenna when probed, which is consistent with Dr. Wolfe’s testimony. Id.; Ex. 1001, 1:30–62.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, “would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of non-obviousness. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 9,049,188 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,049,188
• Microsoft Corporation v. Sterling Computers CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 14, 2026 · IPR2025-00270 · APJ Bach V Hoang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–13, 15, 18, 20, 21, and 27 are unpatentable as obvious over Rohall and Schiavone, with Gomes added for claims 9 and 27.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Our Institution Decision adopted Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Inst. Dec. 9–10. In its Response, Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. See PO Resp. 16 (“Patent Owner and its expert adopt the Board’s definition for purposes of this Response.”). Having considered the record, we continue to adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, as articulated above. We are satisfied that Petitioner’s proposal comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’911 Patent. Accord Inst. Dec. 9–10.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner and determine that the construction of “relational references” does not require the use of a relational model and, further, includes pointers that point to related messages exchanged among users. The intrinsic evidence leads us to this construction. First, the relevant language of claim 1 recites “a message container containing relational references pointing to a plurality of sent submessages stored externally to the message container in the message database.” Ex. 1001, 15:56–59. A relational model is not recited in that language or anywhere else in the claim. See id. at 15:51–16:14. Therefore, the claim does not expressly require a relational model. Furthermore, the claim language supports Petitioner’s interpretation that “relational references” include pointers that point to related messages because the claim states that the “relational references” perform the task of “pointing to a plurality of sent submessages.” Pet. Reply 7. Accordingly, the language of the claim supports a construction that does not require a relational model and at least suggests relational references include pointers.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “No other claim terms need construction for our decision here and we decline unnecessarily doing so. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentableDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Rohall and Schiavone because Schiavone provides reasons to apply its techniques to email systems such as Rohall’s. Schiavone describes a need for “ensuring compliance of e-mail messages with applicable standards and/or laws and/or otherwise determining appropriateness of a message for an intended recipient,” especially because there is “a patchwork of local, federal and international laws.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 6. Schiavone also states that filtering emails, e.g., to remove spam, is beneficial. Id. ¶¶ 1–2. As Schiavone describes problems in email systems, which its rules-based email processing technique addresses, we determine that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Rohall and Schiavone. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 401 (a reference which teaches, suggests, or motivates its combination may “identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the elements”).” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 8,073,911 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,073,911
• Intel Corporation v. Advanced Cluster Systems, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 1, 2026 · IPR2025-00914 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–19 are unpatentable as obvious over Menon, Trefethen, RS6000, and POEref.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “These factors are not exhaustive but are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). There is uncontested evidence in the record before us that reflects the knowledge and We adopt the Petition’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’679 patent, the prior art of record, and the testimony of both experts.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “The Petition relies on the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms consistent with the Phillips standard. Pet. 12–13 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b)). The Petition also addresses the construction of “peer-to-peer architecture” recited in independent claim 1 of the ’679 patent, a limitation we need not construe to resolve the parties’ dispute in this proceeding. Id. at 13; see, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Owner relies on the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms consistent with the Phillips standard without further analysis. Resp. 7.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “RS6000 with Menon, namely because RS6000 provides an overview of the IBM SP2 multiprocessor and Menon teaches the use of “IBM SP2, a modern high performance distributed memory multiprocessor” used in the MultiMATLAB system. Id. at 24–25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 142–145; Ex. 1005, 5–6, 14; Ex. 1007, 1, 11). The Petition also explains why POEref pertains to the field of cluster computing in a parallel operating environment. Id. at 26 (citing Ex.1008, 11 (“PE Software is designed to run on an … RS/6000 network cluster”)); (further citing Ex. 1001, 1:14–15; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 146–149). The Petition contends that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine the teachings of POEref with Menon “because Menon suggests the combination by teaching that MultiMATLAB uses ‘POE, IBM's Parallel Operating Environment.’” Id. at 26–27 (citing Ex. 1005, 6); (further citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 150–153; Ex. 1005, 14; Ex. 1008, 11, 46). We agree with Petitioner’s analysis. We find the Petition’s argument and evidence of a motivation to combine the asserted prior art references in the manner claimed to be compelling, persuasive, consistent with the disclosures in the references, which include internal cross-references to each other, and supported by the expert testimony of Dr. Bajaj.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Patent Owner argues that Menon teaches away from a combination with Trefethen because “Menon expressly states that Trefethen’s first-generation architecture is inadequate for the objectives that motivated the newer design.” Resp. 35–37. The evidence does not support Patent Owner’s position. First, Patent Owner’s teaching away argument is inconsistent with the strong evidence of a motivation to combine Menon and Trefethen discussed above. Second, Patent Owner’s teaching away argument is contrary to the evidence of record for the reasons given in Petitioner’s Reply. Reply 13–15 (e.g., “Menon explicitly cites Trefethen and explains that Menon builds on the teachings of Trefethen.”) (citing Pet. 22; Ex. 1003 ¶ 70; Ex. 1005, 1–3; Ex. 1163 ¶¶ 47–53). We are further persuaded by Dr. Bajaj’s reply testimony: the “MultiMATLAB teachings in Trefethen. In fact, Menon describes enhancing the system of Trefethen. For example, Menon describes a list of “goals” already achieved by MultiMATLAB and then states that the architecture has been “redesigned to achieve two further goals.” One of these two “further goals” is “extensibility,” which Menon achieves by its description of adding “MEX routines” to the system of Trefethen. Far from showing an “incompatibility” between Menon and Trefethen as the POR argues, Menon’s addition of the “MEX routines” to MultiMATLAB shows that such a modification was within the capabilities of a POSITA, because the authors of the Menon paper actually implemented the modification. Ex. 1163 ¶ 49 (citing Ex. 1005, 1–3). Dr. Bajaj’s testimony is unrebutted, credible, and supported by the record. We agree with Dr. Bajaj’s reasoning, which is based on direct quotes in Menon. We further agree with Dr. Bajaj’s conclusion that Menon does not teach away from the combination with Trefethen. Id. ¶¶ 50–52. Menon’s description of building on and enhancing the teachings of Trefethen—the earlier work of the same research group at Cornell—by adding MEX routines to achieve high-performance parallel computing and extensibility for MATLAB, demonstrates a classic motivation for a POSITA to combine the teachings of Menon and Trefethen. RS6000 and POEref are specifically referenced in Menon-Trefethen and add operational details of the parallel operating platform that teach a POSITA how to implement the MultiMATLAB system with a reasonable expectation of success. Such facts are inconsistent with Patent Owner’s teaching away and lack of motivation arguments.” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 12,021,679 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 12,021,679
• Genius Sports Ltd. v. Sportscastr Inc. D/B/A Panda InteractiveAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 27, 2026 · IPR2024-01310 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Remand

  On Director remand, the Board determined claims 1–15 unpatentable under § 103, including claims 1–11 over Ellis, Spivey, and Herzog.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “all Challenged Claims unpatentable and denying Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude. Paper 47 (“Original Final Decision”). Subsequently, Patent Owner filed a Request for Director Review and Petitioner filed an authorized Response thereto. Papers 48, 49. On July 29, 2026, the Director granted review, vacated-in-part the Original Final Decision, and remanded the case to the Board. Paper 50. In particular, the Director directed the Board “to consider Patent Owner’s arguments as to the webserver limitation in deciding whether Petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–11 are unpatentable under Petitioner’s Ground 1B.” Id. at 4. We do so in this Final Written Decision on Remand (“Remand Decision”). See infra § III.E (Ground 1B). For completeness, we repeat herein our analysis in the Original Final Decision for all other grounds.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction We construe claims “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). In this context, claim terms “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning” as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13; see CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (There is “a ‘heavy presumption’ that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning.”). “In determining the meaning of the disputed claim limitation, we look principally to the intrinsic evidence of record, examining the claim language itself, the written description, and the prosecution history, if in evidence.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–17). Extrinsic evidence is “less significant than the intrinsic record in determining ‘the legally operative meaning of claim language.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. Petitioner contends that “[t]he claim terms of the ’218 [patent] should be given their plain and ordinary meaning” as understood by the relevant artisan. Pet. 6. Petitioner argues that the relevant artisan “would have understood a ‘socket’ to be a uniquely addressable communication endpoint on a server where first event information is provided to a [viewer client device] VCD.” Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶ 170). Petitioner argues that the relevant artisan also would have understood an “event socket,” in turn, to be “a socket where information about one sporting event is provided to VCDs.” Id. Beyond such proposed plain meanings for “socket” and “event” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “(6) Conclusion as to Objective Indicia of Non- Obviousness For the foregoing reasons, although we have considered Patent Owner’s evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness, we accord it little weight, and find that it does not outweigh Petitioner’s strong countervailing evidence supporting a conclusion of obviousness.” slip op. at 53

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “engineer with substantial experience in Internet video streaming, Internet communication, and related protocols, including an understanding of relaytype and orchestrator-type webservers, would have considered the subject matter of claim 1 as a whole, including the webserver, to be obvious in light of the combined teachings of Ellis, Spivey, and Herzog. Based on the context discussed above, and for the reasons provided above, we determine that the answer is yes. See Fleming v. Cirrus Design Corp., 28 F.4th 1214, 1222 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“That the proposed combination of [two references]—rather than one of the individual references—discloses the disputed claim limitations does not defeat the Board’s conclusion of obviousness. In this case, it is sufficient that [the relevant artisan] would have been motivated to combine the prior art in a way such that the combination discloses the claim limitations.”).” slip op. at 78

  Patent outcomesUS 11,039,218 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,039,218
• Intel Corporation v. Advanced Cluster Systems, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 26, 2026 · IPR2025-00913 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–30 are unpatentable: claims 1–25, 27–28, and 30 as obvious over Menon, Trefethen, RS6000, and POEref; claims 26 and 29 over those references plus MPIref.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “These factors are not exhaustive but are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). There is uncontested evidence in the record before us that reflects the knowledge and experience of a POSITA. We adopt the Petition’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’034 patent, the prior art of record, and the testimony of both experts.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther

    “processor,” “multi-core” processor, or “singular ‘hardware processor’ that ‘comprises’ (or ‘with’) multiple ‘processing cores’” as Patent Owner contends. Resp. 11–12, 21; see also Ex. 1163 ¶ 22 (“The claim does not recite ‘single chip,’ ‘single package,’ ‘single die,’ or ‘single multi-core microprocessor.’”). Nor do the claims recite a plurality of processing cores “within” a single-chip package or read as “multi-core within a processor” as argued by Patent Owner. Resp. 12–14; Sur-Reply 2; see Reply 6 (citing Ex. 1163 ¶ 23 (“Thus, the phrase ‘with a plurality of processing cores’ identifies the required processing resources associated with the hardware processor; it does not import a packaging limitation.”)). The claims do recite a hardware processor “with” a plurality of processing cores; a critical distinction even Patent Owner reads as open-ended, i.e., as a hardware processor that “comprises” a plurality of processing cores. See Resp. 11 (“the claims require a singular ‘hardware processor’ that ‘comprises’ (or ‘with’) multiple ‘processing cores’”). Consequently, the claim language does not support Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “a . . . hardware processor with a plurality of processing cores” as a single multi-core processor. cores it contains” in reliance on a parsed description in the ’034 patent specification: The specification explains: “Each processor can contain one or more processor cores that are capable of single-threaded execution. Processor cores are generally independent microprocessors, but more than one can be included in a single-chip package.” Id. at 1212 (partially quoting Ex. 1001, 5:11–16); Sur-Reply 2. The quoted description does not support Patent Owner’s contention that the claimed “a . . . hardware processor with a plurality of processing cores” must be limited to a “single multi-core processor” that “locates multiple cores within a ‘single-chip package,’” i.e. limited to a single multi-core microprocessor such as “a Core 2 Duo is one processor package with two cores.” Resp. 12– 13, 21 (citing Ex. 1001, 7:15–25). The description quoted above from column 5, moreover, describes a “processor” that “can contain one or more processor cores” each of which can be an independent microprocessor. Reply 2–3 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:11–16; Ex. 1163 ¶¶ 10–14). As Petitioner emphasizes, the specification distinguishes a “processor” from a “microprocessor” and describes a “processor” that “can be one or more general purpose single-core or multi-core microprocessors,” rather than limiting a “processor” to a single multi-core microprocessor. Reply 3–5 (citing Ex. 1001, 7:14–36, Fig. 1; Ex. 1163 ¶¶ 15–18).” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “art because they pertain to the same “field of cluster computing” as the ’034 patent and “are reasonably pertinent to the problem of the ’034 patent, namely, executing a single program on multiple nodes.” Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:14–15; Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 65–69; Ex. 1005, 2; Ex. 1006, Abstract). The Petition emphasizes that Menon expressly cites and builds on the MultiMATLAB system taught by Trefethen. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 71; Ex. 1005, 1–2). The Petition contends that: combination of prior art elements according to known methods (executing MATLAB code on a multiprocessor system) to yield the predictable result discussed in both papers: the MultiMATLAB system executing MATLAB in parallel to perform mathematical calculations. Id. at 22–23 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 70; Ex. 1005, Abstract; Ex. 1006, 2–7). The Petition further contends that a POSITA would have found it predictable to combine Trefethen with Menon with a reasonable expectation of success “because researchers had a strong desire to parallelize MATLAB.” Id. at 23–24 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 73; Ex. 1005, 2; Ex. 1006, 11–12.)” slip op. at 27

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “A POSITA would have had an especially strong reason to read these references together because they address the same project, the same MATLAB-based parallel-computing problem, and the same MultiMATLAB command environment. Menon expressly identifies Trefethen’s MultiMATLAB work and then describes a redesigned architecture that preserves the same user-level objective––parallel MATLAB computations—while improving implementation details and extensibility. A POSITA therefore would not view the references as mutually exclusive alternatives. Rather, a POSITA would understand Trefethen as teaching specific MultiMATLAB commands and examples, including Eval, Send, Recv, and the architecture was implemented and improved in a later version. Ex. 1163 ¶¶ 71–72 (emphases added). We find the above reasoning persuasive and adopt it as our own. Petitioner and Dr. Bajaj demonstrate a sound technical motivation for a POSITA—someone having a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or electrical engineering and two years of experience working in the field of cluster computing or parallel processing—to combine Menon and Trefethen: to improve MATLAB’s operational performance and extensibility in a parallel operating environment. Menon builds on Trefethen to improve and extend the parallel processing capabilities of MultiMATLAB: “This system will enable users to access high-performance parallel routines from within the MATLAB environment, to extend the environment with new parallel routines, and to use these routines to develop parallel applications with the MATLAB language.” Ex. 1005 Abstract. Menon is intended to be read in conjunction with Trefethen, as would be expected from two references generated by the same research group at the same university addressed to the same technical subject matter about a year apart. Ex. 1005, 1; Ex. 1006, Ex. 1086 ¶¶ 65, 101, 102. The very first citation in Menon is to Trefethen. Ex. 1005, 2, 16.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 11,570,034 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,570,034
• Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co. Ltd. / Yealink Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. Barco N.V.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 28, 2026 · IPR2025-00491 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–18 are unpatentable as obvious over Beel and Dinka, with or without Christison; the Kaplan, Van de Laar, and Christison ground fails for lack of motivation to combine.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art.” PO Resp. 6. On the complete record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, as it is consistent with the ’972 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “Rather than addressing Petitioner’s proposals, Patent Owner states “the claims of the ’972 Patent require no construction as they are valid under their plain and ordinary meaning.” PO Resp. 6. Our decision in this matter does not turn on resolving any particular differences between the parties’ constructions. Therefore, because only those terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy, we determine that no claim term requires express construction in this proceeding and that the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms apply. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019).” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “device. The ’972 patent expressly defines endpoints broadly “as data sources or sinks.” Ex. 1001, 7:64–67. And the ’972 patent admits that Beel’s Figure 11 discloses the same endpoints depicted in the ’972 patent’s own Figure 4. Id. at 4:28–33, 16:44–67. Beel’s Figure 11 and accompanying description disclose a “[m]ass storage device 12,” a “USB audio device 14,” and a “USB HID device 13” on the peripheral device. Ex. 1005, Fig. 11, ¶¶ 320–323. Patent Owner’s own declarant conceded that a mass storage device is “a type of endpoint” (Ex. 1034, 43:19–21), and that “audio devices are endpoints” (id. at 57:5–61:4). We give reduced weight to Patent Owner’s contrary position to the extent it rests on the premise that a reference cannot disclose an endpoint unless it uses the word “endpoint” (Ex. 2030 ¶ 94; Ex. 1034, 43:19–44:16, 72:18–73:12); a premise that is inconsistent with the ’972 patent’s own broad definition and with the ’972 patent’s admission regarding Beel’s Figure 11. As additional support not separately emphasized by the parties in this connection, we note Dr. Almeroth’s technical explanation that, for data to pass from a functional device to a peripheral device, “both the functional device and the peripheral device must have ‘endpoints’”—a data source and a data sink—reasoning consistent with the ’972 patent’s definition. Ex. 1002 ¶ 125.” slip op. at 27

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “First, we agree with Patent Owner that, under the ordinary meaning of the claim language, the endpoint is an endpoint of the peripheral device, and that it must be “a data source or a data sink which is able to store or emit data, of the functional device exposed or made available on the first peripheral device.” Ex. 1001, 23:11–17. The limitation thus identifies a structure—an endpoint, residing on the peripheral device, that is a source or sink and that corresponds to (is “of”) the functional device—through which the communication recited in subsequent element (g) is carried out. By its terms, it imposes no requirement as to the direction in which data flows; it requires only that the endpoint be a data “source” or a data “sink” that is able to “store or emit” data. The operative transmit-and-receive communication “from the functional device to the processing device via the . . . endpoint” is recited in subsequent element (g), which we take up separately below. The disputed question under this limitation is therefore the structural one: whether Beel discloses, on the peripheral device, an endpoint that is “of the functional device.” Because the inquiry is structural and non-directional, we are not persuaded that the audio-out orientation of Beel’s described embodiment, on which Patent Owner relies, is dispositive of this limitation. device. The ’972 patent expressly defines endpoints broadly “as data sources or sinks.” Ex. 1001, 7:64–67. And the ’972 patent admits that Beel’s Figure 11 discloses the same endpoints depicted in the ’972 patent’s own Figure 4. Id. at 4:28–33, 16:44–67. Beel’s Figure 11 and accompanying description disclose a “[m]ass storage device 12,” a “USB audio device 14,” and a “USB HID device 13” on the peripheral device. Ex. 1005, Fig. 11, ¶¶ 320–323. Patent Owner’s own declarant conceded that a mass storage device is “a type of endpoint” (Ex. 1034, 43:19–21), and that “audio devices are endpoints” (id. at 57:5–61:4). We give reduced weight to Patent Owner’s contrary position to the extent it rests on the premise that a reference cannot disclose an endpoint unless it uses the word “endpoint” (Ex. 2030 ¶ 94; Ex. 1034, 43:19–44:16, 72:18–73:12); a premise that is inconsistent with the ’972 patent’s own broad definition and with the ’972 patent’s admission regarding Beel’s Figure 11. As additional support not separately emphasized by the parties in this connection, we note Dr. Almeroth’s technical explanation that, for data to pass from a functional device to a peripheral device, “both the functional device and the peripheral device must have ‘endpoints’”—a data source and a data sink—reasoning consistent with the ’972 patent’s definition. Ex. 1002 ¶ 125. Third, we find that the endpoint Beel discloses is a data source or a data sink that is “able to store or emit data, of the functional device.” We begin with the words of the limitation. The endpoint need only be “able to store or emit data”—language of capability, not a requirement that particular data actually traverse the endpoint in operation, and still less in a particular direction. And the endpoint is defined by the character of the data it handles: it is “a data source or a data sink,” which the ’972 patent instructs An audio endpoint, so understood, is characterized as an audio source or sink; its structure is not tied to any single instance of an audio device. On that understanding, Beel’s disclosure establishes the required capability directly. Beel discloses that “audio data is captured through a virtual sound card interface added as a logical device over the physical interface provided in the peripheral device,” Ex. 1005 ¶ 43, that the peripheral device “acts as a composite device comprising for instance a (virtual) audio speaker device,” id. ¶ 317, and that “audio data is captured at this interface . . . internally in the peripheral device 32” and streamed over the communications network, id. ¶ 319. Beel thus shows the endpoint on the peripheral device actually storing and emitting audio—and, correspondingly, video—data, which is the very type of data produced and consumed by the audio/visual functional devices connected to the base unit, including the microphones, cameras, speakers, and displays. Id. ¶ 120. An endpoint shown to store or emit audio and video data is necessarily one that is “able to store or emit” such data; the capability the limitation requires is thus established by Beel’s disclosure.” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 10,684,972 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,684,972
• Amazon.Com, Inc. / Amazon.Com Services LLC et al. v. Soundclear Technologies LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 27, 2026 · IPR2025-00565 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 are unpatentable because Amazon showed they are anticipated by Shin; the Board did not reach Amazon’s contingent obviousness ground over Shin.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenOther

    “Written Decision under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) as to the patentability of claims 1–5 of the ’337 patent. For the reasons we identify below, we hold that Amazon has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that these claims are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelOther

    “2. Level of Skill in the Art In determining whether an invention would have been obvious, we” slip op. at 18

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “1. Principles of Law To establish anticipation, “all of the elements and limitations of the” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “1. Principles of Law To establish anticipation, “all of the elements and limitations of the” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 11,069,337 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,069,337
• Cambridge Industries USA, Inc. / Accelight Technologies, Inc. v. Applied Optoelectronics, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 27, 2026 · IPR2025-01570 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Final written decision

  The majority held claims 1–19 not shown unpatentable: Wang did not anticipate claims 1–10, and Wang with Xiong did not render claims 11–19 obvious.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “field of the ’690 Patent would have had at least (1) an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a comparable field of study and (2) at least two years of experience with optical data communications or a comparable field of work.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 22). Petitioner also states that “[i]ndividuals having different educational backgrounds and supplemental experience might still be of ordinary skill in the art if such experience compensates for any deficiencies in education relative to the criteria stated above” and “[i]n some cases, additional education might be an acceptable substitute for some experience, or vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s characterization of the level of skill in the art. See e.g., PO Resp. 9. We adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art as it appears consistent with the disclosures of the ’690 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Patent is self-explanatory and would have been recognized by a [person of ordinary skill in the art] as having plain and ordinary meanings.” Pet. 10. “Petitioner submits that no special constructions are required” because “the claim terms appear understandable in the context of the disclosure provided by the specification of the ’690 Patent.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 58). Patent Owner “agrees that the claim terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning as understood by a [person of ordinary skill in the art].” PO Resp. 10. After reviewing the arguments and evidence before us, we determine that we do not need to expressly construe any claim term to resolve any controversy in the proceeding. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “Also relevant to our analysis is that this is an anticipation ground and Petitioner is required to show that the reference discloses not only the elements of the claimed invention, but also discloses those elements as arranged in the claim. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Although our Institution Decision concluded that Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to its anticipation challenge to independent claim 1 applying Wang (Inst. Dec. 6), at this stage of the proceeding we are required to evaluate Petitioner’s challenges under a higher standard, the preponderance of evidence standard. For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded that Petitioner sufficiently establishes that claim 1 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as anticipated by Wang by a preponderance of the evidence.” slip op. at 13

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Wang discloses that “the isolator 100 is bonded to the substrate by means of an adhesive” in which “[t]he adhesive is not only used to fix the isolator 100 to the substrate, but also fills a gap between the isolator 100 and the substrate to improve the installation accuracy of the isolator 100.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 41 (emphasis added). Petitioner does not explain how filling in a gap between the isolator 100 and a substrate necessarily results in “each of the plurality of optical isolators [being] disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other,” as recited in claim 1. The cited portion in paragraph 43 references Figures 5 and 6, which depict Embodiment 1 of Wang and are reproduced below. Figures 5 and 6 of Wang depict isolators 100, base 311, and baffles 312. Although paragraph 44 of Wang states that “[t]he substrate includes a base 311, and baffles 312 and isolators 100 sequentially disposed on the base 311,” Petitioner does not sufficiently persuade us how Wang’s disclosure “sequentially disposed” isolators necessarily discloses that the isolators are “disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other” as recited in independent claim 1. Ex. 1006 ¶ 44. Although the cited portion in Figure 6 of Wang apparently shows a possibly parallel arrangement of Petitioner cites to Dr. Kirk’s Declaration, but Dr. Kirk does not opine on why cited portions of Wang necessarily disclose or depict the claimed “disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other” requirement. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 73, 74; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 41, 43, Figs. 6, 8, 10. At best, Dr. Kirk testifies that “a POSITA would have understood that Wang anticipates Claim 1.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 75. Also relevant to our analysis is that this is an anticipation ground and Petitioner is required to show that the reference discloses not only the elements of the claimed invention, but also discloses those elements as arranged in the claim. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Although our Institution Decision concluded that Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to its anticipation challenge to independent claim 1 applying Wang (Inst. Dec. 6), at this stage of the proceeding we are required to evaluate Petitioner’s challenges under a higher standard, the preponderance of evidence standard.” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 10,788,690 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,788,690
• Cambridge Industries USA, Inc. / Accelight Technologies, Inc. v. Applied Optoelectronics, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 27, 2026 · IPR2025-00437 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Final written decision

  The majority held claims 1–19 not unpatentable: Wang did not establish anticipation of claims 1–10, and Wang with Xiong did not establish obviousness of claims 11–19.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “Wang discloses that “the isolator 100 is bonded to the substrate by means of an adhesive” in which “[t]he adhesive is not only used to fix the isolator 100 to the substrate, but also fills a gap between the isolator 100 and the substrate to improve the installation accuracy of the isolator 100.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 41 (emphasis added). Petitioner does not explain how filling in a gap between the isolator 100 and a substrate necessarily results in “each of the plurality of optical isolators [being] disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other,” as recited in claim 1. The cited portion in paragraph 43 references Figures 5 and 6, which depict Embodiment 1 of Wang and are reproduced below. Figures 5 and 6 of Wang depict isolators 100, base 311, and baffles 312. Although paragraph 44 of Wang states that “[t]he substrate includes a base 311, and baffles 312 and isolators 100 sequentially disposed on the base 311,” Petitioner does not sufficiently persuade us how Wang’s disclosure “sequentially disposed” isolators necessarily discloses that the isolators are “disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other” as recited in independent claim 1. Ex. 1006 ¶ 44. Although the cited portion in Figure 6 of Wang apparently shows a possibly parallel arrangement of Petitioner cites to Dr. Kirk’s Declaration, but Dr. Kirk does not opine on why cited portions of Wang necessarily disclose or depict the claimed “disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other” requirement. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 73, 74; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 41, 43, Figs. 6, 8, 10. At best, Dr. Kirk testifies that “a POSITA would have understood that Wang anticipates Claim 1.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 75. Also relevant to our analysis is that this is an anticipation ground and Petitioner is required to show that the reference discloses not only the elements of the claimed invention, but also discloses those elements as arranged in the claim. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Although our Institution Decision concluded that Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to its anticipation challenge to independent claim 1 applying Wang (Inst. Dec. 6), at this stage of the proceeding we are required to evaluate Petitioner’s challenges under a higher standard, the preponderance of evidence standard.” slip op. at 12

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Wang discloses that “the isolator 100 is bonded to the substrate by means of an adhesive” in which “[t]he adhesive is not only used to fix the isolator 100 to the substrate, but also fills a gap between the isolator 100 and the substrate to improve the installation accuracy of the isolator 100.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 41 (emphasis added). Petitioner does not explain how filling in a gap between the isolator 100 and a substrate necessarily results in “each of the plurality of optical isolators [being] disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other,” as recited in claim 1. The cited portion in paragraph 43 references Figures 5 and 6, which depict Embodiment 1 of Wang and are reproduced below. Figures 5 and 6 of Wang depict isolators 100, base 311, and baffles 312. Although paragraph 44 of Wang states that “[t]he substrate includes a base 311, and baffles 312 and isolators 100 sequentially disposed on the base 311,” Petitioner does not sufficiently persuade us how Wang’s disclosure “sequentially disposed” isolators necessarily discloses that the isolators are “disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other” as recited in independent claim 1. Ex. 1006 ¶ 44. Although the cited portion in Figure 6 of Wang apparently shows a possibly parallel arrangement of Petitioner cites to Dr. Kirk’s Declaration, but Dr. Kirk does not opine on why cited portions of Wang necessarily disclose or depict the claimed “disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other” requirement. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 73, 74; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 41, 43, Figs. 6, 8, 10. At best, Dr. Kirk testifies that “a POSITA would have understood that Wang anticipates Claim 1.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 75. Also relevant to our analysis is that this is an anticipation ground and Petitioner is required to show that the reference discloses not only the elements of the claimed invention, but also discloses those elements as arranged in the claim. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Although our Institution Decision concluded that Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to its anticipation challenge to independent claim 1 applying Wang (Inst. Dec. 6), at this stage of the proceeding we are required to evaluate Petitioner’s challenges under a higher standard, the preponderance of evidence standard. For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded that Petitioner” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “challenge set forth in the Petition by citing the background of the ’690 patent and Dr. Willner’s deposition testimony and characterizing the same as “admissions” of Patent Owner in Petitioner’s Reply, such “evidence” did not form the basis of Appellant’s original position set forth in the Petition.6 Petitioner’s arguments that all of the components recited in claim 11 “were known in the prior art” or that Dr. Willner admitted the same are unpersuasive at least because the Petition did not set forth this position. Contrary to Petitioner’s arguments during the oral hearing, the Petition does not present challenges based on “Applicant Admitted Prior Art.” See generally Pet.” slip op. at 23

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “field of the ’690 Patent would have had at least (1) an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a comparable field of study and (2) at least two years of experience with optical data communications or a comparable field of work.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 22). Petitioner also states that “[i]ndividuals having different educational backgrounds and supplemental experience might still be of ordinary skill in the art if such experience compensates for any deficiencies in education relative to the criteria stated above” and “[i]n some cases, additional education might be an acceptable substitute for some experience, or vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s characterization of the level of skill in the art. See e.g., PO Resp. 9. We adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art as it appears consistent with the disclosures of the ’690 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7

  Patent outcomesUS 10,788,690 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,788,690

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.