• Samsara Inc. v. Motive Technologies, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 29, 2026 · IPR2025-00574 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish the claimed video overlay and transmission for manual review.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s contentions in this ground do not cure the issues for limitations 1D and 1E. Petitioner’s contentions in this ground involve combining Khan and Ali’s teachings of identifying a horizon line and lane lines with Choe. For example, Petitioner argues that “[u]sing predictive models for Choe’s lane and horizon prediction would have combined known elements according to known methods to yield predictable results” and that “[i]mplementing these known mathematical models in Choe’s calibration system, according to their known functions, would have yielded predictable results.” Pet. 39. Petitioner further argues that “[u]sing predictive models for Choe’s lane and horizon prediction would have used a known technique (predictive models) to improve similar devices in the same way” and that “[u]sing predictive models for Choe’s lane and horizon prediction would have also applied a known technique (predictive models) to a known device (a manual annotator device) ready for improvement.” Pet. 40. Petitioner’s proposed combination, therefore, still relies on Choe’s teachings of transmitting an overlaid image to an annotator device. We note that Petitioner asserts that, “[o]nce Khan in view of Ali identifies the horizon and lane lines, it overlays the horizon line and/or lane lines on the video, as shown in the screenshots below.” Pet. 41–42. Although Petitioner mentions Khan and Ali’s teachings with respect to video here, Petitioner does not adequately explain how the teaching of an overlaid video would be combined with Choe’s single image annotator teachings. As discussed above, Choe discloses transmitting a single overlaid image to the annotator” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Thus, Petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence and argument to explain how the additional teachings of Khan and Ali teach limitations 1D and 1E in combination with Choe. Petitioner, therefore, has not demonstrated unpatentability of claims 1–5 by a preponderance of the evidence. F. Obviousness over Choe and Workman (Claims 1–4) Petitioner asserts that claims 1–4 would have been obvious over the combined teachings of Choe and Workman. Pet. 47–52; Pet. Reply 26–30. Petitioner asserts that, “if [Patent Owner] alleges that Choe does not explicitly disclose which predictive models it uses or whether it uses predictive models to identify the horizon line, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have searched for references that use predictive models and how such models were used,” which “would have led to Workman, which discloses predictive models to identify the horizon line.” Pet. 47. According to Petitioner, “[u]sing Workman’s predictive model to identify the horizon line would also have merely been combining known elements ([convolutional neural networks (CNNs)] and annotation for camera calibration) according to known methods to yield predictable results and used known techniques (CNNs) to improve similar devices in the same way.” Pet. 48–49. Thus, Petitioner relies on Workman to teach a predictive model to identify a horizon line. See Pet. 47–49. Choe with respect to limitations 1D and 1E. Indeed, Workman involves horizon line estimation in single images. See Ex. 1011, 10 (§ 5) (“We introduced Horizon Lines in the Wild (HLW), a new dataset for single image horizon line estimation, to address the limitations of existing horizon line detection datasets.”). Petitioner, therefore, has not demonstrated unpatentability of claims 1–4 by a preponderance of the evidence.” slip op. at 24

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner criticizes Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill for not requiring “any training or experience in ‘automotive systems,’ precisely what the ’580 [p]atent relates to.” PO Resp. 7. According to Patent Owner, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a training and/or experience in design of software for camera/sensor systems in the automotive industry.” PO Resp. 8–9 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 35).” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction We need not construe expressly any claim terms to decide the issues before us. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 6

  Patent outcomesUS 11,875,580 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,875,580
• Digital Global Systems, Inc. v. Deepsig, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 6, 2026 · IPR2024-01358 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 7–11, 15–19, 23, and 24 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 4–6, 12–14, and 20–22 were not shown unpatentable because the prior art did not teach the claimed received-signal feedback and transmitter-model update.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that: Persons of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or an equivalent degree and at least two years of experience working with of radio communication systems and machine learning. Additional work or research experience can substitute for less or different education, and vice-versa. Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 33–34). Patent Owner does not appear to challenge this level of skill. We use Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision because it appears consistent with the level of skill reflected in the prior art and ’704 patent.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “parameters “associated with the base station.” PO Resp. 31–32. In particular, Patent Owner argues that a transmitter “implemented in a base station” is not “associated with the base station.” Id. at 31. Petitioner argues that Patent Owner offers no reason to believe that a transmitter “implemented in a base station” is not “associated with the base station.” Pet. Reply 4–5; see also id. at 3–6 (entire argument). A plain reading of a “model associated with a base station” would encompass a model that operates in a base station. We do not see anything in the ’704 specification that would indicate “associated with” has any special meaning, or has a meaning contrary to our understanding of the plain meaning. We do not see the word “associated” outside the claims, whereas we see the word “implement” throughout the specification, generally in reference to an actual use of a model (consistent with our plain reading). See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 5:35–39, 6:3–17, 10:55–11:3 (discussing “implementations” where the model or some other feature of the system is used in a particular way). Accordingly, we construe a model “implemented in a base station” to be “associated with the base station.”” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “scenarios” (see PO Resp. 16–21), Patent Owner argues that “Jüschke does not disclose any association of the weight or bias parameters, . . . to any deployment scenario, and . . . base station” (id. at 19). For the reasons explained in our claim construction section above, we construe “deployment scenarios” to include “inline mode” models located within a base station, according to the list of deployment scenarios set out in the ’704 patent. See Ex. 1001, 2:38–65. The in-line deployment scenario depicted in Figure 6A of the ’704 patent bears a striking resemblance to the arrangement depicted in Figure 1 of Jüschke. In both figures, the analog radio signal is fed directly into the model and then the model directly outputs the signal to the amplifier. Compare Ex. 1001, Fig. 6A, with Ex. 1005, Fig. 1. As construed, the “deployment scenarios” represent the physical configurations of the device in which the model is found, such as “in-line.” Petitioner shows by a preponderance of the evidence that Jüschke’s similar in-line configuration is a “deployment scenario” as claimed because it teaches an inline model for a cellular system transmitter (i.e., base station). Pet. 26–29 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1005, Fig. 1, ¶¶ 6, 59; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 146–147); see also Ex. 1001, 2:37–41 (stating that “[t]he particular deployment scenario[] may be . . . sending a radio transmission from a cellular base station that includes the . . . model . . . in an inline mode”).” slip op. at 26

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “Based on our claim construction analysis of claim 4, above, we agree with Patent Owner that claim 4 requires an actually transmitted signal and an update of the transmitter’s model. This claim construction eliminates Petitioner’s position regarding Holt teaching a modeled signal. See, e.g., Pet. Reply 17–23. We then turn to Petitioner’s argument that Holt teaches updating a model using an actually transmitted signal. See Pet. 59–60. There, Petitioner relies on a disclosure in Holt of an “actual communication channel 302 used to train the channel model 208.” Ex. 1006, 18:1–2. This is depicted in Figure 6 of Holt, in connection with a “fourth loss function” which is used to “train the decoder model.” Id. at 18:42–48; see generally id. at 17:58–18:51 (describing Figure 6). Whether training the channel model or the decoder model, Holt here does not disclose using the actual communication channel to train the encoder, i.e., transmitter. In sum, we find that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the prior art describes the claimed step of “obtaining a received radio signal,” and even if it did, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the prior art describes the claimed step of “updating the value of the model parameters” in the manner required by claim 4. Claims 12 and 20 are nearly identical to claim 4, and Petitioner’s ground fails for similar reasons. See Pet. 76. Claims 5, 6, 13, 14, 21 and 22 depend from claims 4, 12, and 20, and Petitioner’s ground fails for similar reasons as those claims. See id. at 77–80.” slip op. at 31

  Patent outcomesUS 11,018,704 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 11,018,704
• Apple Inc. v. Smith Interface Technologies, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 24, 2026 · IPR2024-01256 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6, 10–14, 16, and 17 were not shown unpatentable because Ahn and Chaudhri did not teach or suggest the claimed movement of an object during the gesture.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “interface objects and, more specifically, the display of user interfaces on applications, in accordance with contacts on the touch-sensitive surface of a display. Ex. 1001, (54), Abstr. Consistent with the scope of the ’727 patent, we find that the level of skill in the art is reflected in a person having a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, human-computer interaction, or a comparable field and at least two years of professional experience working with graphical user interfaces, human-computer interfaces, or equivalents.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Because there is no dispute as to the scope and meaning of these terms, and for consistency with the Decision on Institution, we apply the meaning of the terms “blur” and “distance magnitude” as stated above where applicable. However, we note that our determination does not hinge on the meaning of these terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (only those terms that are in controversy need be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “it was “known to utilize ‘cues’ to help the user know what gesture to utilize and whether they are correctly performing the gesture (e.g., graphics such as movable images that help the user visualize the correct gesture and how to complete it successfully).” Pet. 40 (citing Ex. 1005, Abstract, ¶¶ 54, 62, 73). This sentence does not cure the deficiency noted above regarding Petitioner’s reliance on Ahn’s graphic shadow moving with a gesture. Chaudhri is relied on for the proposition that, Ahn’s graphic shadow is “[i]ndeed” a movable image known to give a user a visual cue. Id. But no such “cue” is provided in Ahn by the graphical shadow alone, because there is no movement of that object. The Petition does not present argument that a Chaudhri object is the movable object or how any of Chaudhri’s teachings of movable objects would have suggested to modify Ahn “to thereby move” the graphical shadow.” slip op. at 18

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “the theory that Ahn’s graphic shadow moves. Reply 3−4. Petitioner interprets the sentences in Ahn we have analyzed above in conjunction with testimony of Dr. Terveen to argue that temporal descriptions in Ahn make it obvious for a person of ordinary skill in the art to drag in the right direction while continuing to press the graphic 1800. Id. (citing Exs. 1004 ¶¶ 117−119, Ex. 1023 ¶ 10). The Petition, however, relies on an Ahn disclosing a moving graphic shadow according to the embodiment of Figure 18(a), as described in paragraph 118. Petitioner now changes its theory of how Ahn’s graphic shadow would move according to paragraph 119, i.e., that although the graphic shadow is merely pressed (in the embodiment shown in Figure 18(b)) it would also be dragged while pressed. Reply 3. Not only is this a shift from the theory Petitioner presents in the Petition, it is not persuasive. As Patent Owner argues, and we agree, there is no cogent explanation for modifying the graphic shadow embodiment of Figure 18(b), especially in light of Ahn’s disclosure that the graphic shadow disappears when pressed and the menu list is displayed as emerging. Sur-reply 2−3. In other words, Petitioner’s new argument does not account for Ahn’s teaching that the objective of the graphic shadow is merely to notify the user of the start of the gesture, and once that start of the gesture is detected (the press on the graphic shadow), paragraph 119 informs us that there is no longer a need for the graphic shadow—it disappears from the display. Ex. 1004 ¶ 119. The Petition does not offer any argument for a theory in which the gesture of paragraph 119 (the press, not a touch and drag operation) results in graphic 1800 disappearing, while also moving during the disappearance. We are mindful that “[i]t is impermissible within the framework of section 103 to pick and choose from any one reference only so much of it as will support a given position to the exclusion of other parts necessary to the full appreciation of what such reference fairly suggests to one skilled in the art.” Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Barnes-Hind / Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 448 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). Consequently, we determine that Petitioner’s argument in Reply belatedly relying on the different embodiment of paragraph 119 is improper new argument, and that even if considered it is not persuasive.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 11,740,727 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,740,727
• Thermaltake Technology Co., Ltd. / Thermaltake Inc. v. Chien-Hao ChenAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 17, 2026 · IPR2024-01230 · APJ Andreas Baltatzis · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 are unpatentable; substitute claims 6 and 7 are unpatentable, and the Revised Motion to Amend is denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “our Institution Decision comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’336 patent and the prior art of record. Inst. Dec. 15. Accordingly, we adopt the level of skill discussed in our Institution Decision. C.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Pharms. Inc. v. Amino Chemicals Ltd., 715 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). Accordingly, Patent Owner applies a different definition of “side,” in claim 1’s recitation of “an illumination area on at least two sides of the fan at top of the body,” to that definition used to understand “side[s] of the body,” discussed above. Specifically, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s dictionary definition of “side,” including “an area next to something” applies to “an illumination area on at least two sides of the fan at the top of the body.” See id. at 8–9.” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “Hasegawa, and Huang teaches or suggests the limitations of claim 3, and that one skilled in the art would have been motivated to combine those teachings with a reasonable expectation of success. See Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 136– 140; Ex. 1008, 8:4–15, 3:20–29. Accordingly, we determine that claim 3 would have been obvious over Lai and Huang, or Lai, Hasegawa, and Huang. F.” slip op. at 50

  • 112 supportMotion to amend, deniedDenied

    “c) Conclusion We conclude that Patent Owner's Revised Motion to Amend adds new” slip op. at 90

  Patent outcomesUS 10,690,336 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,690,336
• Apple Inc. v. Smith Interface Technologies, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 10, 2026 · IPR2024-01116 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Final written decision

  Petitioner did not prove claims 1, 2, 27, 37, 58, 60–64, 67–79, 186, 187, 189, 191, 192, 197, 199–204, 208–216, 223, 225, or 230 unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish the claimed blurring …

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “(Ex. 1003), that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had “a Bachelor of Science degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, human-computer interaction, or a comparable field and at least two years of professional experience in the design and development of graphical user interfaces (GUIs), human-computer interfaces, or equivalents thereof,” and that “[a]dditional years of experience could substitute for an advanced-level degree (and vice-versa).” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 29–30).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction In these proceedings, there is no controversy that would require us to decide any claim construction issue. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). D. Obviousness of Claims 2, 27, 37, 58, 60–64, 67–79, 186, 187, 189, 191,” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “obviousness of the menus in the Ahn-Chaudhri combination following a user’s finger as the user performs the dragging gesture to open the menu.” Pet. Reply 2 (citing 01119-Petition, 26–33, substantially identical to Pet. 32– 40). However, again, the Petition does not explain an alternative theory in which Chaudhri supplements Ahn’s menu functionality to move that menu onto the screen, as opposed to teaching visual cues provided by gradual changes of the display during a gesture or the visual cue that an unlock image may provide during the unlock gesture. See Pet. 14–18 (describing Chaudhri teaching “visual differentiation” or “transitioning an optical intensity” between a user-interface object and the background, based on, e.g., transparency), 35–40 (same). In Reply, Petitioner adds evidence to attempt to support its contention that the combination teaches a menu following a user’s finger during a dragging gesture, involving references to Chaudhri’s discussion of a visual cue, further discussing Chaudhri’s unlock image. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 54, 62, 74–79, Figs. 5A-5C (cited at Pet. Reply 4–5). With respect to these citations and arguments, even if they had been timely presented in the Petition, we agree with Patent Owner that they do not articulate a modification of Ahn with Chaudhri or a motivation to combine. PO Sur-reply 6. Additionally, we agree that these embodiments of Chaudhri are distinct from the cited portions of Chaudhri discussed with respect to this theory in the Petition, which relate not to the movement of displayed graphics, but to variations of optical intensity and visual cues. Id. at 6–7. We evaluate the Petition’s arguments in light of Petitioner’s statement in Reply that they require a teaching regarding “menus . . . following a user’s finger as the user performs the dragging gesture.” Pet. Reply 2. To the extent that the Petition shows that the combination of Ahn and Chaudhri would show visual changes as the user performs a dragging gesture, these do not relate to the movement of a menu, but rather to other optical effects. Thus, as we do not find that the Petition supports an Ahn-Chaudhri combination in which a menu follows a user’s finger as the user performs the dragging gesture to open the menu, as Petitioner argues, we determine that Petitioner has not shown limitation 2.d of claim 2 taught or suggested by the combination of Ahn and Chaudhri according to this theory.” slip op. at 31

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner argues that “even under [this] interpretation of Ahn, the only difference between Ahn and the claims is whether the animation occurs in direct correspondence with a user’s dragging gesture or after the dragging gesture is complete – a straightforward design choice if ever there was one.” Pet. Reply 3–4 (citing Ex. 1024, 99:16–108:20; Ex. 1023 ¶ 12). However, as Patent Owner argues (PO Sur-reply 7–8) this argument is presented in Reply and is an improper shift of theory from the Petition. Nevertheless, were we to consider it, we would not find it compelling; Dr. Terveen’s cited testimony repeats this bare statement and is not supported by any evidence or additional explanation. Ex. 1023 ¶ 12; see 37 CFR § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential) (assigning little weight to opinion testimony that “merely repeats” conclusory statements in a brief, without “cit[ing] any additional supporting evidence or provid[ing] any technical reasoning to support [the declarant’s] statement”).” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 10,656,754 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,656,754
• Apple Inc. v. Smith Interface Technologies, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 10, 2026 · IPR2024-01115 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Final written decision

  Apple did not prove claims 1, 2, 27, 37, 58, 60–64, 67–79, 186, 187, 189, 191, 192, 197, 199–204, 208–216, 223, 225, and 230 unpatentable over the asserted Ahn combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “In the Decision on Institution in each proceeding, we noted that Petitioner’s definition left it unclear whether the bachelor’s degree in the proposed definition would be considered by Petitioner to be “an advancedlevel degree,” and did not adopt the portion of the definition relating to the substitution of years of experience for a degree. Dec. on Inst. 15–16. Patent Owner “does not agree with all aspects of Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill” but did not propose an alternative definition. PO Resp. 10–11. Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Rosenberg, adopted Dr. Terveen’s definition for the purposes of his declaration. Ex. 2018 ¶¶ 32–33. We again adopt the main portion of Dr. Terveen’s definition, and determine that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, human-computer interaction, or a comparable field and at least two years of professional experience working with graphical user interfaces and applications for computers.” This definition is commensurate with the problems and solutions in the ’754 patent and prior art of record and is supported by declarant testimony.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction In these proceedings, there is no controversy that would require us to decide any claim construction issue. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). D. Obviousness of Claims 2, 27, 37, 58, 60–64, 67–79, 186, 187, 189, 191,” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “obviousness of the menus in the Ahn-Chaudhri combination following a user’s finger as the user performs the dragging gesture to open the menu.” Pet. Reply 2 (citing 01119-Petition, 26–33, substantially identical to Pet. 32– 40). However, again, the Petition does not explain an alternative theory in which Chaudhri supplements Ahn’s menu functionality to move that menu onto the screen, as opposed to teaching visual cues provided by gradual changes of the display during a gesture or the visual cue that an unlock image may provide during the unlock gesture. See Pet. 14–18 (describing Chaudhri teaching “visual differentiation” or “transitioning an optical intensity” between a user-interface object and the background, based on, e.g., transparency), 35–40 (same). In Reply, Petitioner adds evidence to attempt to support its contention that the combination teaches a menu following a user’s finger during a dragging gesture, involving references to Chaudhri’s discussion of a visual cue, further discussing Chaudhri’s unlock image. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 54, 62, 74–79, Figs. 5A-5C (cited at Pet. Reply 4–5). With respect to these citations and arguments, even if they had been timely presented in the Petition, we agree with Patent Owner that they do not articulate a modification of Ahn with Chaudhri or a motivation to combine. PO Sur-reply 6. Additionally, we agree that these embodiments of Chaudhri are distinct from the cited portions of Chaudhri discussed with respect to this theory in the Petition, which relate not to the movement of displayed graphics, but to variations of optical intensity and visual cues. Id. at 6–7. We evaluate the Petition’s arguments in light of Petitioner’s statement in Reply that they require a teaching regarding “menus . . . following a user’s finger as the user performs the dragging gesture.” Pet. Reply 2. To the extent that the Petition shows that the combination of Ahn and Chaudhri would show visual changes as the user performs a dragging gesture, these do not relate to the movement of a menu, but rather to other optical effects. Thus, as we do not find that the Petition supports an Ahn-Chaudhri combination in which a menu follows a user’s finger as the user performs the dragging gesture to open the menu, as Petitioner argues, we determine that Petitioner has not shown limitation 2.d of claim 2 taught or suggested by the combination of Ahn and Chaudhri according to this theory.” slip op. at 31

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “(3) Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, Petitioner has not shown limitation 2.d to be taught, suggested, or otherwise rendered obvious by Ahn and Chaudhri. Thus, we determine that Petitioner does not show by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 2 would have been obvious over the combination of Ahn and Chaudhri.” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 10,656,754 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,656,754
• Apple Inc. v. Smith Interface Technologies, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 26, 2026 · IPR2024-01084 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 8–18, 22–30, and 34–39 are unpatentable as obvious over Shiplacoff and over Shiplacoff combined with Nan.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, human-computer interaction, or a comparable field and at least two years of professional experience in the design and development of graphical user interfaces (GUIs), human-computer interfaces, or equivalents thereof. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 22). Petitioner’s declarant, Loren Terveen, Ph.D., testifies that “[s]uch experience could be obtained through research and study in a graduate program or through comparable exposure through industry employment, and additional years of experience could substitute for the advanced-level degree.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 22. Patent Owner agrees with this definition. PO Resp. 13 (citing Dec. 5). As Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the subject matter before us, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision. Also, the level of ordinary skill in the art can be evidenced by the references cited, and we find it commensurate with the cited references in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “according to the Phillips standard.” Pet. 4. Patent Owner contends that under the plain language of claim 1, the “one or more criteria” is satisfied when a “movement parameter” of “the second input” is detected to be “above a movement threshold.” PO Resp. 14. Patent Owner contends that under the plain language of claim 27, the “second one or more criteria” is satisfied when “a duration parameter” of the “second input” is detected to be “above a duration threshold.” Id. at 15. Patent Owner contends that the plain language of limitations [1j] and [1k] requires an operation capable of detecting a second input by a second contact that includes movement across a display in a direction, determining whether the second input meets or does not meet the recited criteria, and triggers performance of each of the corresponding display actions as appropriate. Id. at 15–19. Patent Owner 15. Id. at 21–23. Patent Owner contends that the plain language of limitations [27d]–[27f] recited in claim 27 require an operation that enables the device to detect a second input by a second contact that includes movement across the display in a direction, determine whether the second input meets or does not meet the two recited criteria, and trigger performance of each of the recited display actions as appropriate. Id. at 19– 20. Patent Owner contends that for “the second input” recited in limitations [1j] and [1k], “the second input” must be detected in the same operational context. Id. at 23–24. In particular, Patent Owner contends that limitations [1j] and [1k], and similar limitations recited in claims 15 and 27, “require a single, common contact event as the starting point of the claimed logic operations.” Id. at 24; see id. at 25–26. We do not need to determine whether Patent Owner’s proposed constructions are correct, because under either Petitioner’s or Patent Owner’s proposed constructions, we find that the prior art would have rendered all challenged claims obvious as discussed below in our patentability analysis.” slip op. at 6

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “at 418; see also id. at 421 (“A person of ordinary skill is . . . a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”). Patent Owner’s contention and the supporting testimony of Dr. Madisetti does not address Shiplacoff’s teaching of using a gesture, such as Shiplacoff’s flick gesture, to return to launch screen. We agree with Petitioner and Dr. Terveen in finding that Shiplacoff’s disclosure that “returning to the launch screen . . . is performed by performing a gesture” (Ex. 1004 ¶ 99) such as a flicking gesture (Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 126, 129; Ex. 1023 ¶ 13) teaches using a flicking gesture to return from home screen to launch screen. See Pet. 16, 22–24; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 52–53, 59; Ex. 1023 ¶ 13; Reply 7–10. Because Dr. Terveen’s testimony is consistent with and supported by the teachings of Shiplacoff as a whole (in contrast to that of Dr. Madisetti), we credit the testimony of Dr. Terveen in finding that using a gesture to return from home screen to launch screen as taught by Shiplacoff, where the gesture is a flick gesture as taught by Shiplacoff, yields the predictable result of using a flick gesture to return from home screen to launch screen. Ex. 1023 ¶ 13; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 52–61; KSR, 550 U.S. at 416.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “articulate why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have used Shiplacoff’s flicking gesture to switch from full screen mode to the launch screen. PO Resp. 47–49. Petitioner contends that Shiplacoff’s swipe up gesture teaches limitation [1j] by including a movement parameter above a movement threshold. Pet. 17–23. Petitioner contends that Shiplacoff teaches that a user can perform another gesture to return to the home screen. Id. at 23. Petitioner contends that when a gesture different from the swipe up gesture is used to return to the home screen, a person of ordinary skill would have used a flicking gesture because the flicking gesture has a different movement parameter than the swipe up gesture, namely, a movement parameter that does not meet the movement threshold. Pet. 23– 24 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 99–102, 167; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 60–61). We agree with Petitioner for the reasons given in the Petition and as discussed above. We reiterate that using a gesture to return from home screen to launch screen as taught by Shiplacoff, where the gesture is a flicking gesture as taught by Shiplacoff, yields the predictable result of using a flicking gesture to return from home screen to launch screen. Ex. 1023 ¶ 13; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 52–61; KSR, 550 U.S. at 416. We disagree with Patent Owner’s contention that Shiplacoff teaches away from using the flicking gesture to switch from full screen mode to the launch screen because, according to Patent Owner, Shiplacoff already uses the flick gesture to perform scrolling in full screen mode. PO Resp. 49–52 the same gesture in a given mode can be assigned to different functions depending on where, when, and how the gesture is input by the user, as discussed above. Reply 11–12 (discussing Shiplacoff’s teaching of associating the same tap gesture with different functions depending on where the tap occurs), 13–14 (discussing Duarte’s teaching of associating both a drag gesture and a scrolling gesture to the same mode). Ex. 1023 ¶¶ 16–19. We agree with Petitioner and Dr. Terveen, that based on the teachings of Shiplacoff (and, by incorporation, Duarte), a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that a flick started in area 102 or near an edge of screen 101 and continuing onto screen 101 would be distinguished from a flick entirely within screen 101 based on location, and would perform a different function. Ex. 1023 ¶¶ 18–19. We also agree with Petitioner and Dr. Terveen, that Duarte teaches associating a gesture with one function when a modifier key is not pressed, and associating the same gesture with a different function when the modifier key is pressed, such that a flick performed when the key is not pressed would perform one function such as scrolling and a flick performed when the key is pressed would perform another, such as changing the display mode. Reply 15 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 64; Ex. 1023 ¶ 20). We agree with Petitioner that Shiplacoff does not teach away from using a flicking gesture to change from full screen mode to home screen because it “does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage investigation into the invention claimed.” Reply 10 (quoting Depuy Spine, 567 F.3d at1327).” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 10,649,578 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,649,578
• Universal Electronics, Inc. / Gemstar Technology (Qinzhou) Co. Ltd. et al. v. ROKU, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 21, 2026 · IPR2022-00818 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Remand

  On remand, the Board held claim 11 unpatentable under §103 over Wouters and Verzulli because Wouters’s fixer saves the combined codeset for reinstallation.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “We agree with Petitioner that the above-quoted paragraph of Wouters teaches “combining . . . correct working codes from the scanned remote control code-sets into a new custom configuration code set” using Wouters’s “fixer,” which combines the codes into a custom codeset, gives it a name, such as “user1,” and stores it in a memory (the “RC code set data base”). See Pet. Reply 2; Ex. 1009, 10:18–20. This custom codeset includes a combination of the working codes previously tested and installed by the user. Ex. 1009, 10:18–20. We also find that the above-quoted paragraph of Wouters teaches “installing . . . the combined correct working codes of the new custom configuration code set for use by the remote control.” Specifically, Wouters teaches that, when the remote control’s batteries die, “the user may easily reinstall the chosen code set by choosing ‘user1’ from the proposed list or immediately selecting ‘user1.’” Ex. 1009, 10:20–22 (emphasis added). This reinstallation is of the combined correct working codes of a new custom configuration codeset previously stored and named by the fixer, such as the “user1” codeset. Id. at 10:20–24. We find that Wouters’s “reinstallation” of the chosen code set (e.g., the “user1” codeset) is an “installation” of that codeset. The claim merely recites “installing” the codeset, and does not distinguish between an initial installation and a re-installation, such as after the batteries of the remote control die. Ex. 1001, 10:45. Patent Owner also does not point to anything in the ’875 patent Specification or the other intrinsic evidence that would limit the “installing” in limitation 11[e] to an initial installation, or that would exclude a re-installation after the remote control’s batteries die. Consequently, we find that Wouters’s reinstallation of the codeset after the batteries die is an “install[ation]” as required by limitation 11[e]. We further agree with Petitioner that the Wouters-Verzulli combination discloses that these operations would be performed using a processor and memory, which Patent Owner does not appear to dispute. FWD 52; Pet. 24–27, 37; PO” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “Additionally, the obviousness inquiry typically requires an analysis of “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (requiring “articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”)); see In re Warsaw Orthopedic, Inc., 832 F.3d 1327, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We agree with Petitioner that the above-quoted paragraph of Wouters teaches “combining . . . correct working codes from the scanned remote control code-sets into a new custom configuration code set” using Wouters’s “fixer,” which combines the codes into a custom codeset, gives it a name, such as “user1,” and stores it in a memory (the “RC code set data base”). See Pet. Reply 2; Ex. 1009, 10:18–20. This custom codeset includes a combination of the working codes previously tested and installed by the user. Ex. 1009, 10:18–20. We also find that the above-quoted paragraph of Wouters teaches “installing . . . the combined correct working codes of the new custom configuration code set for use by the remote control.” Specifically, Wouters teaches that, when the remote control’s batteries die, “the user may easily reinstall the chosen code set by choosing ‘user1’ from the proposed list or immediately selecting ‘user1.’” Ex. 1009, 10:20–22 (emphasis added). This reinstallation is of the combined correct working codes of a new custom configuration codeset previously stored and named by the fixer, such as the “user1” codeset. Id. at 10:20–24. We find that Wouters’s “reinstallation” of the chosen code set (e.g., the “user1” codeset) is an “installation” of that codeset. The claim merely recites “installing” the codeset, and does not distinguish between an initial installation and a re-installation, such as after the batteries of the remote control die. Ex. 1001, 10:45. Patent Owner also does not point to anything in the ’875 patent Specification or the other intrinsic evidence that would limit the “installing” in limitation 11[e] to an initial installation, or that would exclude a re-installation after the remote control’s batteries die. Consequently, we find that Wouters’s reinstallation of the codeset after the batteries die is an “install[ation]” as required by limitation 11[e]. We further agree with Petitioner that the Wouters-Verzulli combination discloses that these operations would be performed using a processor and memory, which Patent Owner does not appear to dispute. FWD 52; Pet. 24–27, 37; PO” slip op. at 20

  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner

    “We also find that Petitioner has not forfeited its argument that Wouters’s fixer and reinstallation functionality satisfies limitation 11[e]. The Petition pointed to Wouters’s “fixer” for limitation 11[e], and cited Dr. Houh’s Declaration specifically identifying and quoting Wouters’s disclosure of reinstallation at page 10, lines 14 through 24. Pet. 35 (quoting Ex. 1009, 10:14–20) (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 167); Ex. 1003 ¶ 167 (quoting Ex. 1009, 10:14–24). We find that a person of ordinary skill in the art reading the Petition and its cited evidence (including paragraph 167 of Dr. Houh’s first Declaration) would be apprised that Petitioner was relying on the portion of Wouters describing the “fixer” and reinstallation functionality.” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 8,378,875 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,378,875
• Smaxtec Inc. / Smaxtec Animal Care GmbH v. St Reproductive Technologies, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 16, 2026 · IPR2024-01067 · APJ Andreas Baltatzis · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 5–7, 9, and 10 are unpatentable: claims 5 and 6 are anticipated by Harvey and Riskey, claim 7 is obvious over Harvey and Rettedal, and claims 9 and 10 are obvious over Harvey and …

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “Considering the entire record, we determine that Petitioner “did not make out its obviousness case in its petition” and its arguments on reply “effectively abandoned its petition in favor of a new argument.” Wasica at 1286. To the extent Petitioner asserts the claims would have been obvious over Harvey and Riskey in the Petition, it does so using a merely conclusory statement that “[t]o the extent Patent Owner alleges that either Harvey or Riskey fails to teach any claim element, that element is provided by the other reference.” See Pet. 42; Wasica at 1286. And, as discussed in our Institution Decision, the Petition at a minimum does not explain what reference is the primary versus second reference, and what elements should be combined to reach the claimed invention. See Sisvel, 82 F.4th at 1364. reference to be modified with Riskey’s bolus and data compression. See Pet. Reply 15–17. Rather than explaining how its original petition was correct, Petitioner’s subsequent arguments amount to an entirely new theory of prima facie obviousness absent from the Petition. See Wasica, 853 F.3d at 1286; see also Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“the expedited nature of IPRs bring with it an obligation for petitioners to make their case in their petition to institute”). We decline to engage in this new argument. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has not met is burden to show that claims 5 and 6 would have been obvious over Harvey and Riskey. G. Asserted Obviousness of Claim 7 over Harvey and Rettedal” slip op. at 54

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Riskey discloses “said sensor signal varies based on a corresponding change in one or more physiological parameters of said ruminant animal” (limitation 5[B]). We find Riskey’s description of temperature sensors to be persuasive evidence on this issue. Riskey discloses sensors for measuring changing animal characteristics, e.g., temperature, over time. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 35, 44; see also id. ¶¶ 75, 76 (detecting temperature changes). We further credit Dr. Young’s testimony that one skilled in the art would understand that generated sensor signals, e.g., temperature, would change over time, whereby the sensor signal varies based on any corresponding change in the ruminant physiological parameter that the signal represents. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 84, 85; see Cont’l Can Co. USA v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“This modest flexibility in the rule that ‘anticipation’ requires that every element of the claims appear in a single reference accommodates the reference; that is, where technological facts are known to those in the field of the invention.”). We consider Dr. Kan’s testimony that Riskey is silent as to details about the sensor signal, but are not persuaded because the testimony appears to contradict Riskey’s disclosure of a bolus including sensors for monitoring changes in animal characteristics, generating animal characteristic messages, i.e., signals, and wirelessly transmitting data corresponding to the monitored characteristics. See Ex. 2006 ¶¶ 170–174; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 25, 63, 67, 68, 75–78, 101. Given Riskey’s express description of monitoring animal characteristics over time, we agree with Petitioner’s argument that Riskey discloses that said sensor signal varies based on changes to the animal’s physiological parameters.” slip op. at 16

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) as of the claimed priority date would have “had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a related or equivalent field, and three or more years of experience researching, developing, designing and/or evaluating sensor systems for humans or other animals.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 35) (emphasis added). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s characterization of the level of skill in the art. See PO Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 2006 ¶¶ 19–20). On the entire record, we determine this level of skill, with the exception of the open-ended phrases “at least” and “or more,” which we remove from Petitioner’s proposal, comports with the qualifications a person 5 In the present record, neither party presents arguments or evidence relating to secondary considerations.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “We construe claim terms according to the standard set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc), i.e., as construed in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under Phillips, claim terms are afforded “their ordinary and customary meaning.” Id. at 1312. “[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Id. at 1313. “Importantly, the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Id. Neither party expressly seeks a specific claim construction or definition for any claim term. See Pet. 10; PO Resp. 12. To the extent Patent Owner seeks to interpret claim 7 in view of the Specification, we address that argument in our discussion of claim 7, below. See infra, § III.G.3. For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no claim terms require express construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)). D. Asserted Anticipation of Claims 5 and 6 by Riskey” slip op. at 11

  Patent outcomesUS 10,231,644 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,231,644
• Apple Inc. v. Smith Interface Technologies, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 14, 2026 · IPR2024-01089 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 9–11, 13, 15, 16, 56–64, and 84 are unpatentable as obvious; claim 14 was not shown unpatentable because the motivation to combine the gesture teachings was not established.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “In our Decision on Institution, we noted that Petitioner’s definition left it unclear whether the bachelor’s degree in the proposed definition would be considered by Petitioner to be “an advanced-level degree,” and did not adopt the portion of the definition relating to the substitution of years of experience for a degree. Dec. on Inst. 9. Additionally we did not adopt Petitioner’s proposed additional requirement that one of ordinary skill of the pertinent technologies employed by the ’212 patent.” Id. We adopted, for the purposes of the Decision on Institution, the portion of the definition proposed by Petitioner requiring “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or a comparable field and at least two years of professional experience working with graphical user interfaces and applications for computers” as “consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’212 patent and prior art of record and . . . supported by declarant testimony.” Id. Patent Owner adopted this definition (PO Resp. 12–13), noting Dr. Cockburn’s testimony regarding this definition (Ex. 2006, 12:15– 21). Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Madisetti, also agreed with and adopted this definition. Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 23–25. For the same reasons discussed in the Decision on Institution, we again adopt this definition.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction The parties’ papers include some discussion of claim construction. PO Resp. 13–17; Pet. Reply 1–2; PO Sur-reply 2–3. Each party asserts, and we agree, that there is no controversy that would require us to decide any claim construction issue. Pet. Reply 2; PO Sur-reply 3; see Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

  Patent outcomesUS 10,671,212 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,671,212

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.