- CSPC Megalith Biopharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Lepu Biopharma Co. Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 8, 2026 · IPR2025-00685 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–23 are unpatentable as obvious over Wei and Liu, and over Leanna, Wei, and Liu.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“appears to be generally consistent with the level of skill presented in the cited prior art. See generally, e.g., Exs. 1005–1008; see also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). However, as at institution, we reject the portion of Petitioner’s proposed definition that includes having “access to other individuals with that knowledge and experience,” as not reflecting the individual level of skill of a given skilled artisan. See, e.g., Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that “[t]he person of ordinary skill is a hypothetical person who is presumed to be aware of all the pertinent prior art.”) (emphasis added, footnotes omitted); but see Indivior Inc. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labys., S.A., 930 F.3d 1325, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (no clear error in determination that “a person of ordinary skill . . . ‘would be on a team with an engineer or scientist . . . .’”). Consequently, we find the person of ordinary skill in the art was a person who had a Ph.D. in immunology, molecular biology, cellular biology, or a similar field, or an M.D. with similar experience, and had at least five years of experience with antibodies and antibody engineering.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner submits that no term of the Challenged Claims requires construction to resolve the challenges in this Petition.” Pet. 32. We did not construe any terms in our Institution Decision. See DI 6–7. Patent Owner presents no express positions on claim construction. See generally Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, no terms of the challenged claims require construction. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. D. slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“2 G. Wei et al., US 2015/0071923 Al, pub. March 12, 2015. Ex. 1005 (“Wei”). 3 J. Liu, CN 103772504 A, pub. May 7, 2014. Ex. 1007. The Liu reference is published in Simplified Chinese and Petitioner filed a certified English translation, to which we refer herein. See Ex. 1008 (“Liu”). Patent Owner does not contest the accuracy of the translation. See generally Resp. 4 M.R. Leanna & C.L. Becker, WO 2014/152199 A1, pub. Sept. 25, 2014. Ex. 1006 (“Leanna”). 5 Based on our review of each deposition transcript in view of the record as a whole, although each witness appears competent, we are left with the impression that Dr. Bournazos’s testimony is somewhat more credible than Dr. Atanackovic’s. This conclusion is based, inter alia, on each witness’s ability to recall the relevant record and respond to questions on evidentiary and technical issues.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“We find that combining Liu’s BA03 antibody with Wei’s ADC platform would have been desirable, predictable, and routine for the ordinarily skilled artisan based on the facts that: (1) cetuximab was a wellknown and well-studied, U.S. regulatory approved, anti-EGFR antibody that would have served as a starting point for new cancer therapies; (2) humanization of therapeutic antibodies is generally desired (and “[e]very antibody can be humanized” and it is advantageous according to Patent Owner’s counsel); (3) BA03 was a well-known humanized version of cetuximab that had several known advantages over cetuximab in addition to lower immunogenicity from humanization; and (4) Wei taught a similar cetuximab-derived antibody, and a humanized cetuximab-derived antibody, each provided in an ADC with a well-known and validated off-the-shelf linker-drug platform, i.e., vc-MMAE, that exhibited a strong anti-tumor response. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:57–2:32, 2:50–3:1, 5:6–53, 18:3–33, 19:26– 29; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 14, 38, 42–43, 45–53, 56–73, 84–92, 109–117, 178–189, 202–271; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 9–10, 229–232, 434, 437, 476, 491–506, 664–675, 685, 688, 715, 732, 1103, 1092–1141; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 3–6, 60, 74, 141–160; Ex. 2027 ¶¶ 7–8, 38, 50, 57 (confirming our understandings regarding the claimed antibody and linker-drug payload); Ex. 2023, 173, 300; see also Resp. 1, 5–6, 23 (Patent Owner made the “choice” to use the prior-art-known BA03 antibody, and known-candidate cytotoxic payload MMAE); Hr’g Tr. 34:20–23, 36:6–38:20, 47:16–50:16 (Patent Owner’s counsel’s argument). When Liu’s BA03 antibody is provided in an ADC with a vc- MMAE or a Mc-vcPAB-MMAE platform (and used as cancer therapy as the references instruct) the invention of the challenged claims is achieved.” slip op. at 52
Patent outcomesUS 10,792,370 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,792,370 - Evenflo Company, Inc. v. Baby Jogger II, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 29, 2026 · IPR2025-01122 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–16 are unpatentable as obvious over Liao or Liao and Cheng; Rolicki is not prior art, and the challenge over Offord ’341 and Offord ’797 fails.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Baby Jogger does not dispute Evenflo’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is that a person of ordinary skill in the art (hereinafter, “one skilled in the art”) would have had “a bachelor’s degree in a relevant field (e.g., mechanical engineering or industrial design) and at least two years of product design experience and/or industry experience with juvenile products” and that “[m]ore education can replace product design experience, and vice versa.” Pet 8 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 31–33); PO Resp. generally. We apply that definition here, as it accords with the problems addressed in the prior art and the specification of the ’682 patent.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“At the outset, we note that the claim language requires only that “the first seat and the second seat” be arranged in an inline descending configuration, not that the seat’s mounting points or other physical connections be so arranged. Ex. 1010, 17:31–33. Baby Jogger improperly reads “seats” out of the claim and substitutes the seat’s “mounting points” on the frame. A proper reading of the claim language focuses on what happens when both seats are connected to the frame, not where they are so connected. In other words, “when connected to the frame” simply emphasizes that both seats must be connected to the frame to form the inline descending configuration, as opposed to the single stroller embodiment of Figure 1, where there cannot be an inline descending configuration because only one seat is connected to the frame and the other seat is removed, i.e., not connected to the frame. That reading is supported by the specification of the ’682 patent,” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedDecided for patent owner
“We find that testimony persuasive, for it shows what one skilled in the art would have recognized the 2008 Provisional as necessarily disclosing. The relevant inquiry is whether the disclosure of the prior application “convey[s] with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, the inventor was in possession of the invention.” PowerOasis, 522 F.3d at 1306 (emphasis in original; citation omitted). “While a prior application need not contain precisely the same words as are found in the asserted claims, . . . the prior application must indicate to a person skilled in the art that the inventor was ‘in possession’ of the invention as later claimed.” Id. In other words, “to satisfy the written description requirement, ‘the missing descriptive matter must necessarily be present in the [original] application’s specification such that one skilled in the art would recognize such a disclosure.’”7 Id. (quoting Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). “This requires that the written description actually or inherently disclose the claim element.” Id. at 1306–07. Moreover, a drawing may supply written description for the arrangement it depicts even though the text describes that arrangement in different terms. See Cooper Cameron Corp. v. Kvaerner Oilfield Prods., Inc., 291 F.3d 1317, 1319–23 (Fed. Cir. 2002).” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Instead, Evenflo’s argument rests on isolating the statement—“A similar sub-frame arrangement is disclosed in [Offord ’797]”—from the remainder of the passage in which that statement appears in order to arrive at a reason to incorporate the reversibility teaching of Offord ’797. However, when that statement is read in the context of the full passage in which it appears, nowhere does that passage suggest reversibility as the reason for referencing Offord ’797. More accurately, it suggests a different reason that relates to a curved lug 108 by which sub-frame 100 rests on the stroller’s main frame 4 to carry the weight of the stroller’s two occupants— When the interface components 100 are attached to the frame assembly 4 they form a sub-frame of the frame assembly 4, and when the child-carrying units are mounted thereon, one behind the other, they are in a compact echelon formation, one of the connector sockets 106 of each component 100 being at a higher level in relation to the ground than the other connector sockets 106. The higher connector socket 106 and further connecting leg 102 are both connected to the respective opposite ends of an upper mounting piece 107. In addition, on the inner side of the lower connector sockets 106 there is a downwardly curved lug 108 which serves to rest upon a part of the basket frame 44, such that the weight of two infants is fully supported by the frame assembly 4. A similar sub-frame arrangement is disclosed in [Offord ’797]. Ex. 1051, 9:23–36 (emphasis added). That passage shows that, rather than reversibility of the sub-frame, the reference to Offord ’797 is more aptly directing the reader to the arrangement and details of a similarly curved lug structure in the stroller sub-frame of Offord ’797. Indeed, Figures 5 and 6 of Offord ’797, reproduced below, disclose just such a curved lug in the context of “corner pieces 20” having “channel 21.” Ex. 1054, 4:10–23.” slip op. at 53
Patent outcomesUS 11,731,682 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 11,731,682 - GD Energy Products, LLC v. Kerr Machine CompanyAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 29, 2026 · PGR2025-00031 · APJ Ryan H Flax · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–14 are unpatentable as obvious under each of four asserted grounds: Kerr; Aplex and Stanton; Blume, Stanton, and Wilkinson; and the sale of the Kerr Pump.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The person of ordinary skill in the art would have a minimum of a bachelor’s degree in mechanical or petrochemical engineering, or a comparable engineering discipline, and a minimum of 3-5 years of work experience in the design and/or manufacturing of reciprocating pumps and valves, including fluid ends and/or comparable high pressure fluid components, for industrial applications, including for use in the oil and gas industry. See, e.g., EX1003, ¶32.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We decline to expressly construe any claim language. slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Regarding the combining of Aplex and Stanton, Petitioner asserts that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood that providing a packing/stuffing arrangement, as taught by Stanton, within a fluid end housing, as taught by Aplex, would improve pressure and fluid isolation compared with an arrangement where the packing was bolted to the outside of the fluid end as in Aplex unmodified. Pet. 66 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 189, 236). Patent Owner does not dispute this rationale. We find this to be a reason, with rationale underpinning, why the person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined these references with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 29
- Adverse judgmentOther
“The record indicates that Patent Owner has statutorily disclaimed claim 15 as of April 28, 2025. Ex. 2206.” slip op. at 8
Patent outcomesUS 12,152,582 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 12,152,582 - First Quality Retail Services, LLC / First Quality Consumer Products, LLC et al. v. Essity Hygiene And Health ABAll claims unpatentablePTAB · May 12, 2026 · IPR2024-01487 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5, 7, 8, 20–22, 24, and 25 are unpatentable, based on anticipation by Bergstrom and obviousness over the stated combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In the Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s definition. Dec. 9–10. In its Response, Patent Owner cites to Petitioner’s definition and states that Patent Owner “applies Petitioners’ definition.” PO Resp. 7. Because Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art is consistent with the ’138 patent and the asserted prior art, we maintain it for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“We begin our analysis with the language of the claims. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312; see also SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 874–875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“There is a ‘heavy presumption’ that the terms used in the claims ‘mean what they say and have the ordinary meaning that would be attributed to those words by persons skilled in the relevant art.’”). Claim 1 recites, in relevant part, “said fluid flow control structure being a layered structure comprising a non-perforated fibrous polymeric layer and a first perforated polymeric layer.” Ex. 1001, 13:62–64 (limitation [1h]). The plain language of claim 1 does not address additional properties of the perforated polymeric layer; the language of the dependent claims, however, imposes additional limitations on the properties of the perforated polymeric layer such as a particular basis weight (claim 2), a particular makeup (claim 3), a particular aperture size (claim 7), a particular open area (claim 8), and that it “is a three-dimensionally formed layer having penetrating apertures extending from a first surface of the first perforated polymeric layer towards a second surface of the first perforated polymeric layer and forming protrusions on said second surface” (claim 4). The dependent claims’ additional language indicates that the term “perforated” within the term “perforated polymeric layer” in claim 1 is not limited in the manner asserted by Patent Owner’s proposed construction.” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“layer pierced through with holes or apertures,” we are persuaded that Petitioner meets its burden as to this limitation. Petitioner argues that under our construction, Bergstrom’s express disclosure of forming element 60, and Bergstrom’s explanation of the properties of forming element 60, meets the claimed “perforated polymeric layer” limitation. Pet. 38–41 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 114–117). Even under Patent Owner’s proposed construction, Petitioner argues, forming element 60 would also allow free flow of liquid bodily waste. Pet. Reply 3– 4 (citing Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 20–23). Importantly, Bergstrom expressly discloses: “suitable materials for the forming element 60 are plastic films, perforated plastic films and reinforced tissue or reinforced nonwoven materials.” Ex. 1004, 10:1–4. This express disclosure is clear. Even though the forming element 60 in Bergstrom might be “typically” liquid-impermeable (Ex. 1004, 9:24–30), that does not preclude a layer that is perforated, particularly where Bergstrom expressly discloses a perforated plastic film as one of the possibilities for forming element 60. Ex. 1004, 10:1–4. Additionally, although Patent Owner focuses on Bergstrom’s disclosure that forming element 60 is “typically liquid-impermeable” (PO Resp. 58–60; Ex. 1004, 9:24–30), we do not view Bergstrom’s use of the word “typically” as mandating that the forming element always be liquid impermeable. We agree that the word “typically” does not mean “always” and that such a reading would render “typically” superfluous. Pet. Reply. 5. We do not find any ambiguity in Bergstrom’s disclosure regarding possible use of perforated plastic films for its forming element 60; whether or not the forming element 60 provides other functions (like stiffness) does not dictate whether it may also be perforated, or be part of a fluid flow control structure. On this point, we credit Petitioner’s arguments and explanation, as supported by Dr. Pourdeyhimi’s testimony. Pet. Reply 6–7; Ex. 1021 ¶ 27–28 (“components of absorbent articles could be multifunctional”).” slip op. at 20
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“from the start” (PO Resp. 29), and that “using all or part of [Glaug’s] fluid-acquisition system in place of [Nakazawa’s] diffusion sheet would be antithetical to the teachings of both references” (id. at 35), we agree that the proposed combination of Nakazawa’s structure with the layers of Glaug is sufficiently motivated and reasonably expected to result in a successful article, for the reasons articulated by Petitioner. See, e.g., Pet. 59–65; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 176–192. Namely, although fluid may flow in both Z directions in Nakazawa (PO Resp. 30), that does not foreclose the combination with Glaug in the manner proposed by Petitioner. See generally Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 176–192; see id. ¶ 184 (detailing the mechanics of the proposed combinations), ¶¶ 188–191 (discussing motivation to combine), ¶ 192 (discussing reasonable expectation of success). The combination can be achieved “either by adding the lower acquisition layer 64 [of Glaug] to diffusion sheet 63 [of Nakazawa], or by replacing diffusion sheet 63 [of Nakazawa] with the two-layer fluid acquisition system 34 [of Glaug],” and as persuasively explained by Dr. Pourdeyhimi, the arrangement constitutes a “fluid flow control structure.” See Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 45–47. Additionally, the diffusion sheet in Nakazawa can be made from the same material as used in Glaug, namely, AquiDry™. Id. ¶¶ 53–55; see also Tr. 17:25–18:3 (“although Glaug does not specify the name AquiDry in its disclosure, Patent Owner’s expert testified that it’s his understanding that Glaug is discussing the AquiDry material, the same material that is in Nakazawa . . . . they disclose using the same material, and Nakazawa says this material work[s]”). When asked if Patent Owner’s expert had any concerns that AquiDry was not the same as between Nakazawa and Glaug, Patent Owner’s counsel replied “They are the same, Your Honor. And we embrace that.” Tr. 46:8–12; see also id. at 58:19 (Petitioner’s counsel commenting about Patent Owner’s counsel: “they agree, AquiDry is used in both Nakazawa and Glaug”). Thus, Patent Owner’s argument that Nakazawa’s diffusion sheet and Glaug’s fluid acquisition layer have different purposes because Nakazawa’s diffusion sheet allegedly must promote fluid flow in the Z-directions, both toward and away from the body (PO Resp. 29–37; Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 26–28, 30– 35)) is not clearly supported by Nakazawa, and is also contravened by the shared disclosure of Nakazawa and Glaug as to the composition of the disputed layer. We have reviewed the complete record, including Patent Owner’s and Mr. Sheldon’s assertions that Nakazawa requires promoting fluid flow in both Z-directions (see id.), but find that Petitioner carries its burden to demonstrate that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Nakazawa and Glaug with a reasonable expectation of success. On this complete record, Petitioner explains sufficiently why and how a person of ordinary skill would modify Nakazawa’s diffusion sheet, i.e., to use Glaug’s fluid acquisition system, or the lower non-perforated layer of its fluid acquisition system, in Nakazawa, and Petitioner provides well-supported reasons for doing so.” slip op. at 36
Patent outcomesUS 9,308,138 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,308,138 - Penumbra, Inc. v. Rapidpulse, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 17, 2026 · IPR2024-01261 · APJ Jamie T Wisz · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not teach the claimed predetermined cycle for controlling distal fluid flow.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(1) a person with a B.S. in engineering or an equivalent field, with two-four years of academic or industry experience in aspiration embolectomy and thrombectomy or comparable industry experience who would, where appropriate, work or consult with others, including a physician, to develop embolectomy or thrombectomy devices; or (2) an interventional neurosurgeon with at least three years of experience developing and/or using medical devices in embolectomy or thrombectomy procedures, and who would, where appropriate, work or consult with others, including an engineer, to develop such a medical device. Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 48). Petitioner also contends that, “[a] person with less education but more relevant practical experience, or more relevant education but less practical experience, may also meet this standard.” Id. Patent Owner states that for purposes of its PO Response, it “accepts ¶ 44). We adopt Petitioner’s characterization because it is consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected by the ’402 patent and the cited prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“specification explicitly includes sensors similar to those in the prior art in support of their argument that the claimed “predetermined cycle” must not exclude the use of such sensors. Pet. Reply 15 (citing Ex. 1001, 32:55–33:7, 40:66–41:5, 44:9–29). We reviewed the portions of the specification cited by Petitioner. We agree with Patent Owner that one excerpt discussing sensor use appears to be directed to triggering the predetermined cycle rather than causing timing changes during the cycle itself (Ex. 1001, 32:55–66) (describing use of a pressure sensor to “determine when the vacuum channel 3 is clogged by a thrombus and automatically perform the unclogging procedures described herein”), while another excerpt discusses a sensor that Petitioner that the ’402 patent discusses the use of sensors to “tune” the system and that such “tuning” can be done statically (setting the cycle timing in advance) or dynamically (adjusting the timing during the cycle itself). See Ex. 1001, 48:19–49:50. Overall, we find that these disclosures involving sensors demonstrate that sensors may be used in various ways in different embodiments. However, none of these disclosures explicitly discuss the use of sensors in conjunction with a “pre-determined cycle.” Therefore, we find that the ’402 patent specification’s discussion of “sensors” are not particularly informative as to the appropriate construction of a “predetermined cycle” and do not outweigh the other explicit disclosures of “predetermined cycle” in the patent. We next turn to the other intrinsic evidence discussed by the parties — the prosecution history. As discussed by Patent Owner, in the Notice of Allowance, the Examiner found that Garrison did not teach or suggest a “predetermined cycle” because Garrison’s controller “changed the cycle of opening and closing the valves based on feedback from sensors.” Ex. 1004, 86. We acknowledge that the patent applicant filed subsequent comments during prosecution in which they stated that they “do[] not concede that the Examiner’s characterizations of the terms of the claims and the prior art are correct.” Id. at 29. However, we agree with Patent Owner that the importance of the Examiner’s statement in the Notice of Allowance does not rely on it being an express disclaimer (a standard which it does not meet). PO Sur-reply 8. We also considered Petitioner’s contention that the Examiner’s interpretation of Garrison may have been in error (PO Resp. 16); however, even if this were true, the Examiner’s statement still provides helpful insight into how the Examiner was interpreting the term sensors to change the opening and closing of valves during a cycle was not a “predetermined cycle.” Id. at 86. In sum, we find that Patent Owner’s proposed construction is consistent with the usage of the term “predetermined cycle” in the ’402 patent specification and prosecution history. Thus, after considering all of the cited evidence, we construe “predetermined cycle” to mean that “the timing of the sequence of valve operations in the cycle is determined beforehand, i.e., fixed, rather than varying based on feedback after operation begins.”” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“2. Other Terms The parties also provided proposed constructions for the limitations of “[limited/limiting] to a positive amount of exit flow” and “control[ling] fluid flow in and out from the distal end of the catheter.” See Pet. 15–16; Pet. Reply 1–8; PO Resp. 22–24; PO Sur-Reply 2–6. However, having evaluated the arguments and evidence before us, we determine that construction of these terms is not necessary for purposes of this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that neither Petitioner nor Mr. Brown propose any combination of Yang and Mullins that does not include Mullins’s pressure sensor in order “to control fluid flow in and out from the distal end of the catheter.” Indeed, in addressing the “predetermined cycle” limitation, Mr. Brown contends that Mullins discloses a “cycling controller that ‘varies aspiration pressure according to sensed pressure within the catheter lumen.’” Ex.1005 ¶¶ 131–32 (citing, e.g., Ex.1008, 27:40–28:20 (“[a] novel aspect of this pump system is the incorporation of feedback into the pump algorithm in order to produce more effective pressure cycling”)). This use of a sensor to change pressure during a cycle, is not a “predetermined cycle” under our construction. combinations is its discussion of distal end flow control, not for its sensors.” Pet. Reply 17 (citing Ex. 1035 ¶ 83). However, Petitioner’s obviousness grounds rely on the combination of Yang and Mullins, especially with regard to Mullins’s disclosure of “a controller” in order “to control fluid flow in and out.” As discussed above, Mullins relies on the sensor-feedback approach in order to control flow and we find that Petitioner has not presented persuasive evidence of how the combined disclosures of Yang and Mullins would control flow without using Mullins’s sensor feedback approach. See W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (error to “consider[] … references in less than their entireties, i.e., in disregarding disclosures in [them] … that diverge from and teach away from the invention”). Therefore, we determine that Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the combination of Yang and Mullins discloses or renders obvious “a controller configured to open and close the vacuum valve and the vent valve in a predetermined cycle to change a level of vacuum at the distal end of the catheter and to control fluid flow in and out from the distal end of the catheter.” Accordingly, having considered the parties’ respective evidence and arguments, we find that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 of the ’402 patent would have been unpatentable as obvious over the combination of Yang and Mullins.” slip op. at 27
Patent outcomesUS 11,406,402 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,406,402 - PTAB · Feb 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00687 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board instituted IPR on claims 1–8 and 10–18 over all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandInstituted
“Paper 34, 1 (requesting “Director Review of the Director’s August 22, 2025 Decision Referring the Petition to the Board (‘Referral Decision’)”). Patent Owner argued that institution of IPR2025-00687 and IPR2025-00688 “should be discretionarily denied.” Id. at 5. Petitioner opposed. Paper 37. The Director granted review and found that “granting institution of two petitions that each challenge the same claims of the ’370 patent and ’218 patent 2” was an “abuse[] of discretion.” Paper 40, 1. The Director remanded the cases “to the Board panel to determine which of the two petitions challenging each of the ’370 and ’218 patents to institute.” Id. at 3. Pursuant to the Director’s instruction that we choose only one of the two petitions challenging the ’370 patent to institute, and for the reasons set forth below, we choose to institute review of the ’370 patent in this Petition, and not in IPR2025-00688.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner
“the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2) and § 315(b). See, e.g., Ventex Co., Ltd. v. Columbia Sportswear N. Am., Inc., IPR2017-00651, Paper 152 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019)” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Furthermore, the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner “[does] not, at this time, contend that any term requires construction,” and instead, states that “[a]ll terms have been accorded their plain and ordinary meaning.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 212–215). Patent Owner asserts that it “does not presently propose any constructions,” but discusses the Board’s claim construction in IPR2020- 00834, Paper 18, 7–8. Prelim. Resp. 7. Claim terms need only be construed to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011). On this record and for purposes of this Decision, we see no need to construe any claim term expressly.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,933,370 - PTAB · Feb 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00717 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board instituted IPR of claims 1–4 and 6–26 on all six asserted obviousness grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.
RulingsRemand decision- Director reviewDirector review, grantedOther
“The Director granted Director Review, finding that the panel “abused its discretion in granting institution of two petitions that each challenge the same claims” of the ’218 patent. Paper 39, 2. The Director vacated the DI and remanded the case “to the Board panel to determine which of the two petitions” to institute. Id. at 4.” slip op. at 4
- Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner
“On November 4, 2025, we instituted inter partes review of all challenged claims based on all the grounds raised in the Petition. Paper 35 (“DI”). In the DI, we noted that “Petitioner filed an explanation regarding the necessity of multiple petitions,” and “Patent Owner d[id] not challenge that multiple petitions are necessary” in the Preliminary Response. Paper 23, 3 n.3.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons provided below, we determine Petitioner has satisfied the threshold requirement set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Therefore, we institute inter partes review of all challenged claims based on all the grounds raised in this Petition.3” slip op. at 4
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art [“POSITA”] would have at least a bachelor’s degree in chemical engineering, mechanical engineering, or a related field of study with at least two years of experience implementing pollution control in power generation plants for natural gas, coal, and/or industrial waste incineration.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 48–51). Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSITA because it is consistent with the skill level reflected in the disclosures of the ’218 patent and prior art. See Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355 (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,926,218 - Axion Biosystems, Inc. v. Agilent Technologies, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 2, 2026 · IPR2024-01467 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–8 and 11–15 were not shown unpatentable over Xu-752 and Jones because the proposed combination did not establish obvious millisecond time resolution.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) as of May 2009 “would have had a B.S. in electrical/mechanical/biomedical engineering or biological science, or a related field, and approximately 2 years of relevant experience or equivalent study in systems and methods for bioanalysis of cells.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 23–25). Patent Owner adopts this definition for purposes of this proceeding. PO Resp. 9 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 19). We find Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art to be consistent with the level of skill reflected in the ’508 patent and in the prior art of record. Accordingly, we apply Petitioner’s definition in this decision.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“As used herein, “impedance measurement at millisecond time resolution” refers to the ability to perform a series of at least two consecutive impedance measurements within milliseconds of one another for each and every well of the system where each well is associated with an electrode array for impedance measurement. In each instance the time between two consecutive impedance measurements are less than 300 milliseconds from one another. Id. at 10:8–15. There does not appear to be any dispute as to the definitional nature of the first sentence in the passage above. That is, the parties agree that millisecond time resolution should be construed to mean: “the time between two consecutive impedance measurements for each and every well being evaluated in the claimed apparatus or system.” PO Resp. 15 (proposing construction); Pet. Reply. 23 (“Axion also agrees that the term ‘millisecond time resolution’ is ‘the time between two consecutive impedance measurements for each and every well being evaluated in the claimed apparatus or system.’”). The parties also agree that we do not need to determine whether the time interval between two consecutive impedance measurements is less than 300 milliseconds, as set forth in the definition portion of the specification, or whether it can be met by some other time interval, as suggested by other portions of the specification. See e.g., Ex. 1001, 23:49–55 (explaining that “[i]n some embodiments 500 millisecond time resolution is sufficient”), 24:37–39 (similar); PO Resp. 15 (arguing that “the distinction between 300 milliseconds and 500 milliseconds is immaterial to the dispute in this IPR because Jones teaches a 1.5 second update period, thus at least three times longer than the 500 milliseconds formulation”); Pet. Reply 23–24 (section headed “[Petitioner] Agrees That, In This IPR, The 300 Versus 500 Milliseconds Distinction is Immaterial To Addressing the Unpatentability of the Challenged Claims”), see also, Pet. Reply 24–26 (asserting that the claims are indefinite because it is not clear whether they require a 300 or a 500 millisecond time interval, but arguing that “the claims’ unpatentability can be determined without resolving the 300 versus 500 milliseconds indefiniteness issue”). We agree with the parties that “millisecond time resolution” should be construed to mean: “the time between two consecutive impedance measurements for each and every well being evaluated in the claimed apparatus or system.” PO Resp. 15; Pet. Reply. 23. We further agree that resolution of this case does not require that we determine whether the period between two consecutive impedance measurements is less than 300 or less than 500 milliseconds because Petitioner has not carried its burden under either time interval.” slip op. at 7
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Ex. 1003 ¶ 179. But Dr. Kim does not cite to any additional supporting evidence or provide any technical reasoning to support his statements. The notion that one can reduce the time between measurements by, e.g., reducing the number of frequencies measured, has intuitive appeal and appears mathematically correct. However, the absence of technical reasoning and supporting evidence diminishes the persuasiveness of Dr. Kim’s testimony that the POSA would made such modifications to reduce the time between measurements. Dr. Kim does provide some technical reasoning in connection with his discussion of eliminating all reference channels as a way to get the time resolution down to the levels required by, e.g., claim 14, which recites a millisecond time resolution of “less than 5 milliseconds.” See e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶ 172 (“A POSA seeking to study biological cell phenomena occurring on the order of a few milliseconds would have recognized that after measuring the reference network channels at the start, the reference network channels would not need measured again for some time, e.g., because temperature and other drift factors do not change appreciably on a millisecond time scale.”). However, even if we were to credit this testimony, Dr. Kim still lacks support and reasoning for the selection of the other parameters in his noreference-channel calculations. See, e.g., id. ¶ 173 (positing, but not providing technical reasoning for using, a no-reference-channel impedance system with 16 wells, a single 10kHz measurement frequency, and 16 daughter boards that measure simultaneously rather than sequentially).” slip op. at 29
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Given that Jones’s only exemplified embodiment targets a 1.5 second update period, that Jones does not suggest reducing the update period, and that much of Jones’s focus is on benefits other than speed of measurement, Jones’s impedance analyzer seems an unlikely choice for a POSA seeking to take measurements having millisecond time resolution. Put another way, we find no persuasive non-hindsight reason that supports Petitioner’s assertion that the POSA would have sought to apply Jones’s impedance analyzer to Xu-752’s system in order to take measurements in millisecond time resolution.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 11,906,508 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,906,508 - Allstate Insurance Company v. Atos, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 30, 2026 · IPR2021-01449 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Remand
Claims 3–5 are unpatentable; claims 1 and 2 are not shown unpatentable. Claims 3 and 4 are obvious over the applied grounds under the remand construction of “movement vector.”
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“was incorrect, vacated the Final Written Decision as to claims 3 and 4, and remanded the case to the Board to determine the ordinary and customary meaning of “movement vector” and decide the outcome for claims 3 and 4 in accordance with that meaning. Atos, LLC v. Allstate Insurance Company, 2025 WL 1482404, at *5 (Fed. Cir. May 23, 2025); Paper 35 (“Federal Circuit Remand,” “Remand,” or “Fed. Cir. Remand”). Pursuant to the Federal Circuit’s instructions, the Board authorized the” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“considered individually and together, have well-understood, common meanings to ordinarily skilled artisans as of the invention date, reflected by the ’174 patent’s specification and other evidence of record noted above. Accordingly, we determine that the ordinary and customary meaning of “movement vector” is “a vector indicating movement of an object.” 3) “operation indicator” Petitioner” slip op. at 20
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Dr. Kanellakopoulos’s explanation that angular momentum is not inherent to an object, and its computation requires an arbitrary choice of a point of origin that has no physical meaning in the context of vehicle motion, also supports Patent Owner’s position. Id. ¶ 71 (citing Ex. 2004, 262). Accordingly, Patent Owner’s argument, that angular momentum cannot be used to detect a vehicle turning, is persuasive. Id. We also find persuasive, as Dr. Kanellakopoulos explains, that Petitioner’s argument regarding the figure on Kleppner 234 is based on misinterpretation of the vectors in that figure. Id. ¶ 67 (explaining that Kleppner 233–234 does not depict a gravity vector).” slip op. at 35
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Kleppner does not disclose a rotation vector, a person of ordinary skill would have used the knowledge of a rotation vector (because it is a term of art) alongside Kleppner’s teaching, to arrive at claim 1. See Pet. Reply 11. This argument does not satisfy Petitioner’s burden to provide articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the conclusion of obviousness. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 419 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Petitioner does not explain which teaching of Kleppner a person of ordinary skill would have selected and combined with their knowledge of a rotation vector to yield the method of claim 1, or explain why a person of ordinary skill would have recognized based on Kleppner that estimating the angle between a rotation vector and gravity vector could be used to detect a vehicle turning. Nor does Petitioner respond to Patent Owner’s assertion that Kleppner provides no rationale for estimating an angle of alignment between a rotation vector and gravity vector as a way of detecting a vehicle turning. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 65.” slip op. at 35
Patent outcomesUS 9,846,174 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,846,174 - Avation Medical, Inc. v. Emkinetics, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 7, 2026 · PGR2024-00043 · APJ Ryan H Flax · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–39 are unpatentable under Grounds 1–10; Petitioner did not prove lack of enablement under Ground 11, and Patent Owner’s motion to exclude was denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“REAL PARTIES-IN-INTEREST Petitioner identifies Avation Medical, Inc. as the real party-in-interest. Pet. x. Patent Owner identifies EMKinetics, Inc. as the real party-in-interest. Paper 5, 1; Paper 6, 1. Neither party contests the other’s assertions on this. C.” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A POSA at the time of the claimed invention would have had an undergraduate degree in the field of biomedical engineering or a related discipline, such as electrical engineering, and at least two years of experience in the design and/or analysis of biomedical devices. Additional work experience could substitute for a formal degree and vice versa. Ex.1003, ¶21. Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1003). Patent Owner does not contest this proposed definition or offer an alternative. See generally Resp. We accept and use Petitioner’s uncontested definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan, which appears to comport with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the ’943 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the prior art itself [may]” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“same claim construction standard that is used to construe patent claims in a civil action in federal district court. 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(b). In construing claims, district courts and the Board here, by default, give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, which is “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Petitioner states that, “no terms require construction for purposes of this Petition.” Pet. 21. Patent Owner presents no express position on claim construction. See generally Resp. We do not expressly construe any claim terms. E.” slip op. at 20
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedReference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“question, based on factual findings. VidStream, 981 F.3d at 1063–64. Moreover, public accessibility is the touchstone in determining whether a reference is a printed publication and such depends on whether the reference was available to interested, ordinarily skilled persons exercising reasonable diligence, which is determined on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 1065. Particularly pertinent here is that “[w]hen there is an established publisher there is a presumption of public accessibility as of the publication date.” Id. Hulu (which cites VidStream on this issue) concerned, inter alia, whether certain asserted references were shown to be publicly available and could be considered as prior art. Hulu, 2021 WL 487622. Hulu holds that, although testimonial evidence is one way to prove public accessibility, there are also a variety of hallmarks of publication and other evidence that may be considered as a totality of the evidence to determine if an asserted reference was publicly accessible and prior art. Id. at *10–13, 21. Facts to be considered in analyzing the issue, other than testimonial evidence, include, for example, whether there is an established publisher, a copyright date/notice, other publication-related dates (impression, printing, etc.), an ISBN number, citations to the reference before (and to a lesser degree, after) the priority date at issue corroborating its availability and/or that the publisher was established, and whether the reference’s “purpose of publishing . . . was ‘dialogue with an intended audience.’” Id. at *10–21 (citing Valve Corp. v. Ironburg Inventions Ltd., 8 F.4th 1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2021)).” slip op. at 30
Patent outcomesUS 11,844,943 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,844,943
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.