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  • PTAB · Dec 10, 2025 · IPR2024-01186 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–20 were not shown unpatentable because Kwatra does not teach or suggest minimizing rotational velocity and acceleration as required by the claims.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have the following characteristics: “a bachelor’s degree in engineering or computer science, or equivalent field, and two years of experience working on image or video processing or digital cameras.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). Petitioner states that, “[a]lternatively, a POSITA would have four years of experience working on image or video processing 6 Patent Owner asserts objective evidence of nonobviousness. Prelim. Resp. 19–27. or digital cameras.” Id. Petitioner further contends “[a]n advanced graduate degree in the disciplines cited above may make up for the work experience indicated above.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim Resp. 14–15. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’894 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

      “Petitioner “does not believe any terms require a formal construction.” Pet. 6. Patent Owner agrees “no claim terms presently require construction to resolve any current dispute between the parties.” PO Resp. 15. We do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language at this juncture because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “Kwatra teaches, at Equation 7, minimizing velocity and acceleration of a function representing camera path (P). FF ¶¶ 6, 8–9. Kwatra does not state that this camera path function considers rotation. Rather, the words “camera path” suggest x, y, z movement of the camera rather than rotation of the camera. Dr. Foroosh’s testimony that Kwatra’s minimization of a smoothed camera path does not result in minimizing rotational velocity and acceleration is credible because this testimony is consistent with Kwatra as a whole and consistent with the other evidence of record. Id. ¶ 10. Kwatra recognizes that image rotation angle (“θ”) may not remain smooth. Id. ¶ 12. But rather than attempting to minimize velocity and acceleration of rotation of the camera housing, Kwatra states that applying a smoothness constraint on rotation angle “may be non-linear.” Id. ¶ 13. Consistent with Kwatra, Dr. Foroosh credibly explains the difficulty of applying linear techniques to rotation. Id. Thus, Kwatra proposes instead constraining the sine and cosine of theta. Id. ¶ 14. The Kwatra provisional application is part of the Kwatra reference (id. ¶ 15), and it similarly opts for simpler schemes rather than estimating all parameters for all frames jointly. Id. ¶ 16. The provisional explains that the rotational component is relatively small such that non-linear computations minimizing velocity and rotation can be avoided. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. The testimony of Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Foroosh, explaining the provisional is credible (Ex. 2018 ¶ 72) because it is consistent with Kwatra’s complete disclosure. Dr. Foroosh’s testimony is more credible than the testimony of Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Katsaggelos, because Dr. Katsaggelos did not review the Kwatra provisional application and, thus, did not review the entire disclosure of Kwatra. Id. ¶ 19; see also In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (obviousness analysis considers whether “the claimed inventions are rendered obvious by the teachings of the prior art as a whole” (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 28

    • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

      “(id. ¶ 15), and it similarly opts for simpler schemes rather than estimating all parameters for all frames jointly. Id. ¶ 16. The provisional explains that the rotational component is relatively small such that non-linear computations minimizing velocity and rotation can be avoided. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. The testimony of Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Foroosh, explaining the provisional is credible (Ex. 2018 ¶ 72) because it is consistent with Kwatra’s complete disclosure. Dr. Foroosh’s testimony is more credible than the testimony of Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Katsaggelos, because Dr. Katsaggelos did not review the Kwatra provisional application and, thus, did not review the entire disclosure of Kwatra. Id. ¶ 19; see also In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (obviousness analysis considers whether “the claimed inventions are rendered obvious by the teachings of the prior art as a whole” (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 28

    Patent outcomesUS 10,574,894 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,574,894
  • PTAB · May 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00189 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–9 were not shown unpatentable because Fujiwara lacks the claimed horizontal position, and Bandy with Fowler lacks the claimed vertical position.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “A person of ordinary skill in the art . . . would have had at least a Master of Science Degree in an academic area emphasizing electrical engineering, computer engineering, wireless telecommunication systems, or an equivalent field (or a similar technical Master’s Degree, or higher degree). Ex. 1009, ¶34. Alternatively, . . . a Bachelor’s Degree (or higher degree) in an academic area emphasizing electrical engineering, computer engineering, wireless telecommunication systems, or an equivalent field with two or more years of work experience in electrical engineering, wireless telecommunication systems, computer engineering, or an equivalent field. Id. Additional education in a relevant field or relevant industry experience may compensate for a deficit in one of the other aspects of the requirements stated above. Id. Pet. 9. Patent Owner applies the same definition. PO Resp. 17. We apply the parties’ proposed level of ordinary skill because it is reasonably consistent with the level of skill implied in the disclosure of the ’340 patent and the cited prior art.” slip op. at 6

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownNo construction neededGranted in part

      “c) Conclusion Having reviewed the claim language and the specification, we determine that the claimed planogram stores one piece of data with respect to identification—a unique identifier—and two pieces of data with respect to location—a vertical position and a horizontal position. Further, claim 1 states that each location (i.e., each horizontal/vertical position pair) is unique (“one-to-one”) for each unique identifier. Ex. 1001, 8:25–27. Thus, we determine that no horizontal/vertical position pair will be associated with more than one unique identifier (and vice versa). No other terms require construction at this time. See Realtime, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “taught by “the horizontal position of the electronic shelf label along the horizontal shelf part 21, as shown in FIG. 4.” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶ 75). Certainly, each shelf label in the real world, as well as in the drawing of Figure 4, has a horizontal position. However, that does not mean that Fujiwara’s database stores information indicating the horizontal position of the shelf label as required by the claim. The claim is not calling for the shelf label to have a location; it is calling for location information to be accessible by the server so that the server can determine the location of the mobile terminal. Ex. 1001, 8:19–24 (claiming a “method being performed by a central server configured to access a planogram associating . . . identifiers . . . with . . . locations . . . defined by a vertical and horizontal position”), 8:41–46 (claiming a method step of “determining a location of the mobile terminal . . . based on . . . the planogram). For example, fields in a database storing horizontal and vertical positions would be sufficient. Id. at 6:31–36 (“The central server 2 determines the location of said mobile terminal 1 from the identifier of said electronic label 3 using the data of a planogram associating a location with the label identifier.”), 7:16–18 (calling for the planogram to be stored in a database). To the extent we accept that Fujiwara teaches a unique identifier (shelf label ID) and a vertical position (e.g., shelf number 21-1), we find Fujiwara to be missing a horizontal position as required by the claim because neither the shelf number nor the shelf label ID provides an indication of where along the shelf the shelf label is located.” slip op. at 14

    • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

      “III. PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE Patent Owner moves to exclude Exhibits 1013–1021 and 1024–1027. PO Mot. Excl. 1. Our analysis above focuses on a dispositive issue regarding the claimed planogram. We are not apprised of any citations to these documents in the briefing regarding the planogram issue. Indeed, according to Patent Owner, Exhibits 1013–1021 involve one of the issues we did not address, regarding near-field communications. PO Mot. Excl. 3–4. Because this motion involves a question on evidence that is not relevant to the issues discussed in this Decision, we need not rule on the motion at this time. We dismiss Patent Owner’s motion to exclude as moot.” slip op. at 27

    Patent outcomesUS 10,674,340 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 10,674,340
  • PTAB · Apr 4, 2025 · IPR2024-01402 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–19 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is anticipated by Okashita.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “petition and in the parallel proceeding. After the Preliminary Response was filed, Petitioner submitted a stipulation stating that it will not pursue, in the District Court Litigation, any ground that was raised or could have reasonably been raised in this proceeding. Paper 8, 1. Petitioner’s stipulation aligns with the stipulation relied on by the Board in Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 at 18–19 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential). Patent Owner argues that we should reject any “late” Sotera stipulation. Prelim. Resp. 47–48. The only authority cited for this argument are Board decisions concerning stipulations filed after a Decision on Institution was entered. Id. As Petitioner’s stipulation was filed prior to this Decision being entered, it is not “late” under the authority Patent Owner cites, and, thus, on this record, we decline to reject Petitioner’s stipulation. See NXP USA, Inc. v. Impinj, Inc., IPR2021-01556, Paper 13 (Sept. 7, 2022) (precedential) (holding that the only appropriate time for a petitioner to offer a stipulation is prior to the Board’s decision on institution) cited in CAPJ Memo, 2 n.1. In Sotera Wireless, the Board found that a stipulation such as the one proffered here by Petitioner addressed “concerns of duplicative efforts between the district court and the Board, as well as concerns of potentially conflicting decisions” and “ensures that an inter partes review is a ‘true alternative’ to the district court proceeding.” Sotera, IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 at 19. For these reasons, we find that this factor weighs “strongly in favor of not exercising discretion to deny institution.” Id.” slip op. at 9

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “review under 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons provided below, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim of the ’886 patent is unpatentable, and we institute an inter partes review. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 2

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

      “We begin our analysis by pointing out that neither party offers a claim construction of “cascaded transistors,” though both parties reference the understanding of the term set forth by Petitioner’s declarant. Although we do not reject Petitioner’s declarant’s definition, we also do not adopt it as the meaning of “cascaded transistors” at this time, absent the parties’ proposal that we do. According to the ’886 patent, transistors simply “coupled in series” are “cascaded.” Ex. 1001, 6:50–51. We use this disclosure to guide our analysis. Reviewing Figure 7 of Okashita, we see a configuration of transistors 1 and 2 that appears, on this record, to be coupled in series. When transistor 2 acts as a shunt for transistor 1, i.e., when the threshold voltage of transistor 2 has been overcome, then current flows through transistor 1, through transistor 2, and then to ground. Ex. 1004, 7:15–17. At this preliminary stage, this is a sufficient showing that Okashita’s transistors are “cascaded” as contemplated by the ’886 patent.” slip op. at 18

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “intervening silicon layer between the source/drain junctions and the buried silicon oxide layer. Pet. 60. Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reason to take advantage of Okashita’s design: (1) to “reduce the operating temperature of the transistors,” which will “enhance their performance and reliability,” (2) to “prevent leakage of radio frequency signals,” and (3) to “minimize the effect of mismatch.” Id. at 60– 63. Patent Owner’s first argument is that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not look to Okashita because Okashita “is entirely focused on keeping AC and DC grounds separate,” something Patent Owner argues “is not present in Burgener.” Prelim. Resp. 37. It is not clear to us on this record that Patent Owner is correct that keeping AC and DC grounds separate is not present in Burgener, given that Burgener has both AC signals coming in from ports A–D, as well as digital control signals coming in from the control ports (e.g., 1708 and 1718, for port A). See Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 100–101 (discussing RF ports and control signals). In any event, even if the particular problem solved by Okashita is not one of the problems articulated in Burgener, that does not mean that the teachings of Okashita cannot be applied to Burgener. KSR, 550 U.S. at 420 (“any need or problem known in the field . . . and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed”). Petitioner has asserted three reasons, mentioned above, why a person of ordinary skill in the art would look to improve Burgener with Okashita’s teachings, and Patent Owner does not appear to contest them at this time.” slip op. at 26

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,745,886
  • PTAB · Mar 7, 2025 · IPR2024-01347 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–27 on all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one challenged claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied

      “framework: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential). We must also consider the non-exclusive factors set forth in Becton, Dickinson and Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, Paper 8 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential in relevant part), which “provide useful insight into how to apply the framework” under § 325(d). Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 9. Those non-exclusive factors include: (a) the similarities and material differences between the asserted art and the prior art involved during examination; (b) the cumulative nature of the asserted art and the prior art evaluated during examination; (c) the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during examination, including whether the prior art was the basis for rejection; (d) the extent of the overlap between the arguments made during examination and the manner in which Petitioner relies on the prior art or Patent Owner distinguishes the prior art; (e) whether Petitioner has pointed out sufficiently how the Examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art; and” slip op. at 13

    • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesNo construction neededOther

      “1. Means-Plus-Function Terms Challenged claim 26 recites elements using the word “means.” See Ex. 1001, 21:6–22:5. The use of the word “means” in a claim element creates a rebuttable presumption that 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 applies.9 See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part). Construing a means-plus-function claim term is a two-step process. We must first identify the claimed function. Then, we must determine what structure, if any, disclosed in the specification corresponds to the claimed function. Id. at 1351 (citation omitted). The parties do not dispute that 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 applies to those “means” elements recited in claim 26. See Pet. 6–8; see generally Prelim. Resp. a. “system firmware means for detecting loss of lockstep (LOL) for a processor in a multi-processor system” (Claim limitation [26a])” slip op. at 24

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner argues that these terms “should be construed to include both mismatch errors and errors that may eventually result in mismatch errors constituting a ‘precursor to lockstep mismatch’—including at least one of (1) detecting a lockstep mismatch error; and (2) detecting an error that may eventually cause a lockstep mismatch error.” Pet. 6. Petitioner asserts that “[t]he specification provides detecting these two types of errors as examples of detection of LOL.” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 2:40–3:6, 7:25–36; Brogioli Decl. ¶¶ 34–36). Petitioner further asserts that this construction “is consistent with the undisputed construction in the IPR challenging U.S. Patent No. 7,502,958.” Id. (citing BMW of N. Am., LLC v. Foras Techs. Ltd., IPR2023-01373, Paper 18 at 2 (PTAB July 12, 2024)). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s position or discuss claim construction in the Preliminary Response. meaning of these claim terms that would affect this Decision. Therefore, we determine that at this stage, we do not need to expressly construe these claim terms to resolve a controversy. 3. Summary and Conclusion For the reasons given, we determine that at this stage, we do not need expressly to construe any claim term for this Decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803)).” slip op. at 26

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “alleged invention “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or equivalent, and at least two years of prior work experience with computer architecture design, including fault-tolerant computer architecture design,” and “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Pet. 4 (citing Brogioli Decl. ¶¶ 28–30). At this stage, Patent Owner does not respond to this contention. For the purpose of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’302 patent specification and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 27

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,624,302
  • PTAB · Mar 7, 2025 · IPR2024-01346 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–30 and all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability based on Fox, Safford, and Arai, with or without Landry.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied

      “As can be seen in the discussion above and the analysis of Petitioner’s grounds below, Arai and Landry are significant to Petitioner’s challenges. Because the Office did not previously consider all of the prior art references or combinations of references relied on in the Petition, including Arai and Landry, and because Arai and Landry are not the same or substantially the same as the art that was previously considered, we determine the Office did not previously consider the same or substantially the same prior art as is relied on in the Petition.8 Further, we find that there is not a substantial overlap, if any, between the arguments made during examination and the manner in which Petitioner relies on the prior art, including Arai and Landry, as discussed above. Therefore, part one of the Advanced Bionics framework is not met, and we need not proceed to part two of the Advanced Bionics framework. See Advanced Bionics, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8.” slip op. at 24

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “We have authority to determine whether to institute review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons provided below, we determine, based on the record before us, there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioner would prevail in showing at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Furthermore, we deny Patent Owner’s request that we exercise our discretion to deny institution in this proceeding under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). We therefore institute inter partes review on all challenged claims and all grounds. See” slip op. at 2

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “Motivation to Combine Fox, Safford, and Arai and Fox, Safford, Landry, and Arai Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill “would have found it obvious to combine Fox’s multiprocessor system with Safford’s lockstep processor and error detection logics and Arai’s processor-switching implementation details.” Pet. 10. Dr. Brogioli testifies that “[a person of ordinary skill] would have been motivated to implement the processors in Fox as lockstep processors to improve reliability and availability of Fox’s server system for critical processes, for which higher reliability and availability of the system are desired.” Brogioli Decl. ¶ 90. He further testifies that “[a person or ordinary skill] also would have been motivated to implement in Fox the error detection logics that detect loss of lockstep together with the lockstep processors as taught by Safford to implement lockstep functions and further improve availability of the system.” Id. He testifies that “[a person of ordinary skill] would have understood how to implement Fox’s processors as lockstep processors with error detection logics and expect success. [A person of ordinary skill] would only have applied well-known configurations and ordinary hardware and software configuration skills.” Id. ¶ 91. Dr. Brogioli provides additional reasons motivating the combination. Id. ¶¶ 92–99. Petitioner contends that “Arai discloses switching the role of a failing processor with a spare processor.” Pet. 10. Dr. Brogioli testifies that “[a person of ordinary skill] would have been motivated to incorporate Arai’s teaching of transferring processor context from the failing processor to the spare processor not to interrupt the operating system and its running applications as desired by Fox.” Brogioli Decl. ¶ 109. He reasons that “[a person of ordinary skill] would have understood that incorporating Arai’s benefit of switching the role of the failing processor to the spare processor without affecting the operating system and running applications, which is expressly taught as desirable by both Fox and Arai and well known in the art.” Id. ¶ 110. Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill also would have been motivated to further combine these references with Landry. Pet. 33–35. Dr. Brogioli testifies that “Landry discloses a fault-tolerant boot process that dynamically designates a functional CPU as logical CPU0 that performs the unique functions of a boot processor.” Brogioli Decl. ¶ 147. He testifies further that “[a person of ordinary skill] would have understood Landry’s process would have been a suitable option for selecting a boot processor in Fox’s system consistent with the initialization protocol of the IA-32 multiprocessor system.” Id. He asserts that “[a person of ordinary skill] would have understood the benefits of implementing Landry’s boot processor selection process in Fox.” Id. ¶ 148. Among other reasons, “[a person of ordinary skill] would have further understood that using the logical CPU0 as the identification for the boot processor allows for transparent replacement of the physical processor experiencing a failure with another processor without interrupting the operating system.” Id. At this stage, Patent Owner does not respond to these arguments by Petitioner or refute the testimony by Dr. Brogioli. On this record, we find that Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated a motivation to combine Fox and Safford with Arai and to further combine these references with Landry with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 29

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “We are not aware of any controversy between the parties over the meaning of these claim terms that would affect this Decision. Therefore, we determine that at this stage, we do not need to expressly construe these claim terms to resolve a controversy.” slip op. at 26

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,627,781
  • PTAB · Sep 12, 2024 · IPR2024-00638 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–11 and all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 was obvious over Kim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “based on the related district court matters identified above. Prelim. Resp. 23–35; see Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 11–12 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (holding that PTAB has discretion to deny institution in certain circumstances where there are parallel district court proceedings). Our analysis under Fintiv is guided by the USPTO Director’s Memorandum issued on June 21, 2022, titled “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation” (“Director’s Memo”). Pursuant to the Director’s Memo, we “will not discretionarily deny institution . . . where a petitioner presents a [Sotera] stipulation.” Director’s Memo at 3 (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A)). Because Petitioner has offered a stipulation like in Sotera, i.e., to “not pursue in the associated litigation . . . the grounds raised in the Petition for IPR or any other grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB in this proceeding” (Paper 7), we do not discretionarily deny institution under Fintiv.” slip op. at 5

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “surface. Patent Owner passes over the disclosure in Kim’s Figure 5b, which appear to depict the claimed big toe-to-little toe slope when the golfer is attempting a swing. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Mustek Systems, Inc., 340 F.3d 1314, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Just as ‘an accused product that sometimes, but not always, embodies a claimed method nonetheless infringes,’ Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 622–623 (Fed. Cir. 1995), a prior art product that sometimes, but not always, embodies a claimed method nonetheless teaches that aspect of the invention.”). In addition, Figures 1, 2, and 3a of Kim appear to show an incline from the toe to heel (as is typical in shoes). See also Ex. 1005 ¶ 27 (“Except for the outsole 10 including the inclined lower surface 12, the golf shoe 100 of the present invention is substantially the same as conventional golf shoes.”). Thus, on this record, we are persuaded that Kim sufficiently discloses the slopes required by claim 1. Reviewing the Petition and Preliminary Response, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of success in showing that claim 1 would have been obvious in view of Kim.” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

      “2. Analysis Patent Owner argues that Kim does not disclose the slopes required in independent claim 1. Prelim. Resp. 35–40. Patent Owner focuses its analysis on Figure 5a, however, which depicts the golfer standing on a hard surface. Patent Owner passes over the disclosure in Kim’s Figure 5b, which appear to depict the claimed big toe-to-little toe slope when the golfer is attempting a swing. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Mustek Systems, Inc., 340 F.3d 1314, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Just as ‘an accused product that sometimes, but not always, embodies a claimed method nonetheless infringes,’ Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 622–623 (Fed. Cir. 1995), a prior art product that sometimes, but not always, embodies a claimed method nonetheless teaches that aspect of the invention.”). In addition, Figures 1, 2, and 3a of Kim appear to show an incline from the toe to heel (as is typical in shoes). See also Ex. 1005 ¶ 27 (“Except for the outsole 10 including the inclined lower surface 12, the golf shoe 100 of the present invention is substantially the same as conventional golf shoes.”). Thus, on this record, we are persuaded that Kim sufficiently discloses the slopes required by claim 1. Reviewing the Petition and Preliminary Response, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of success in showing that claim 1 would have been obvious in view of Kim.” slip op. at 10

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “A person of ordinary skill in the art would have (1) at least a B.S. or equivalent degree related to industrial or product design and at least two years’ experience designing or developing athletic shoes; or (2) at least five years designing or developing athletic shoes. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 31). Patent Owner does not contest. Prelim. Resp. 17. Reviewing the ’760 patent and the cited prior art, we determine that Petitioner’s proposed level of skill is reasonable and adopt it for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,064,760
  • PTAB · Sep 12, 2024 · IPR2024-00636 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–8 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1 and 5 would have been obvious over Kim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “based on the related district court matters identified above. Prelim. Resp. 22–34; see Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 11–12 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (holding that PTAB has discretion to deny institution in certain circumstances where there are parallel district court proceedings). Our analysis under Fintiv is guided by the USPTO Director’s Memorandum issued on June 21, 2022, titled “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation” (“Director’s Memo”). Pursuant to the Director’s Memo, we “will not discretionarily deny institution . . . where a petitioner presents a [Sotera] stipulation.” Director’s Memo at 3 (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A)). Because Petitioner has offered a stipulation like in Sotera, i.e., to “not pursue in the associated litigation . . . the grounds raised in the Petition for IPR or any other grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB in this proceeding” (Paper 7), we do not discretionarily deny institution under Fintiv.” slip op. at 6

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “review under 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons provided below, we determine that Petitioner has satisfied the threshold requirement set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Because Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim of the ’786 patent is unpatentable, we institute an inter partes review. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “A person of ordinary skill in the art would have (1) at least a B.S. or equivalent degree related to industrial or product design and at least two years’ experience designing or developing athletic shoes; or (2) at least five years designing or developing athletic shoes. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 31). Patent Owner does not contest. Prelim. Resp. 17. Reviewing the ’786 patent and the cited prior art, we determine that Petitioner’s proposed level of skill is reasonable and adopt it for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “Patent Owner proposes that the term “athletic positioning” in independent claim 5 should be construed to mean “a heel section higher than the toe section and the outside edge of the toe section higher than the inside edge of the toe section.” Prelim. Resp. 20–22. However, independent claim 5 already appears to give the term “athletic positioning” this meaning, where it describes the various slopes. In particular, the claim recites that the toe section forms an angled support platform that has a first slope along the inner edge of the sole and a third slope along the outer edge of the sole, each of which extend from the toe to the heel. Accordingly, Patent Owner’s proposed construction appears unnecessary in view of the claim. In sum, we do not explicitly construe any limitations at this time.” slip op. at 8

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,674,786
  • PTAB · Aug 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00385 · APJ Michael L Woods · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–4, 6, and 7 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied

      “Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). The Board evaluates discretionary denial under § 325(d) using a two-part framework: first, the Board considers whether the same or substantially the same art or arguments were previously presented to the Office; and if so, second, the Board considers whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of the challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019- 01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential). In determining whether the same or substantially the same art or arguments were previously presented to the Office, the Board considers the following nonexclusive factors: (1) the similarities and material differences between the asserted art and the prior art involved during examination; (2) the cumulative nature of the asserted art and the prior art evaluated during examination; and (3) the extent of the overlap between the arguments” slip op. at 9

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a), we have authority to institute an inter partes review if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Reply, the PO Sur-reply, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims of the ’332 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–4, 6, and 7 of the ’332 patent on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

      “A person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have had: (i) a B.S. degree in Chemical Engineering, Petroleum Engineering, or an equivalent field and (ii) two or three years of academic or industry experience in chemical processing systems, oil and gas production and/or refining; or comparable experience. Additional work experience can substitute for educational or research experience, and vice versa. Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 26–29); see also Prelim. Resp. 16 (agreeing with Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSITA). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the parties’ assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 13

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “At this stage of the proceeding, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s interpretation that cryogenic conditions occur only below 50°F. See Prelim. Resp. 19 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 55). For purposes of this Decision, we need not and do not formally determine the temperature at which cryogenic conditions occur, as our construction would not affect our decision to institute. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We agree with Petitioner that “[e]xplicit construction of terms is unnecessary because it is not dispositive—the art teaches the claims under any reasonable construction.” Pet. 8 (citing Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803). As explained below, for purposes of institution, Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that Aycaguer does not disclose subjecting the recited streams to “cryogenic conditions” at any temperature, as recited in Limitation 1.6. See Pet. 34–36; see also infra § IV.D.2.g.” slip op. at 15

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,505,332
  • PTAB · Jul 25, 2024 · IPR2024-00478 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–19 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on anticipation by Rosenberg-I.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “In view of the above, we determine that this factor strongly weighs against the exercise of discretionary denial. 2. Factor 2: proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected” slip op. at 13

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “We do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language at this juncture because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8

    • Skill levelOther

      “would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related field, plus at least two years of industry or graduate level experience with software engineering, haptics programming, and/or human-computer interaction, including experience with user-interfaces and applications involving touchscreens, touchpads, and related technologies.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37–43). Patent Owner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer science (or an equivalent degree), and two years of practical or industry experience in the field of human computer interaction (HCI), including implementation of computer-based systems and software for providing haptic feedback effects to a user,” and adds that a person having ordinary skill in the art “could have qualified . . . with more formal education and less practical or industry experience, or vice versa.” Prelim. Resp. 9 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 32). Although not identical, the parties’ definitions are substantially similar. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we determine that no express finding is necessary, and that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We note, however, that our obviousness analysis in this Decision would not differ if we adopted either Petitioner’s or Patent Owner’s definition. slip op. at 7

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,430,042
  • PTAB · May 29, 2024 · IPR2024-00063 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–6, 8–15, and 17–19 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Prikowitsch or Sar-Shalom.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “16–23; see Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 11–12 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (holding that PTAB has discretion to deny institution in certain circumstances where there are parallel district court proceedings). Our analysis under Fintiv is guided by the USPTO Director’s Memorandum issued on June 21, 2022, titled “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation” (“Director’s Memo”). Pursuant to the Director’s Memo, we “will not discretionarily deny institution . . . where a petitioner presents a [Sotera] stipulation.” Director’s Memo at 3 (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A)). Because Petitioner has offered a stipulation like in Sotera, i.e., to “not pursue as to the challenged claims any ground raised or that could have been reasonably raised in the IPR” (Ex. 1055, 2), we do not discretionarily deny institution under Fintiv. As to Patent Owner’s allegation that Petitioner should not be able to file a stipulation after the Preliminary Response (Prelim. Resp. 22–23), we determine that Petitioner’s filing of its Sotera stipulation at the time it did is proper. NXP USA, Inc. v. Impinj, Inc., IPR2021-01556, Paper 13 (PTAB Sept. 7, 2022) (precedential) (holding the Board may only consider stipulations offered before a decision on institution).” slip op. at 6

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Having reviewed the Petition and Preliminary Response, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood in showing that the subject matter of claim 1 of the ’227 patent is unpatentable over Prikowitsch.” slip op. at 14

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “In summary, we determine that adoption of either party’s proposed construction does not provide a meaningful difference at this time; both appear to cover the same idea. Indeed, given that the claims already state that the call completion application detects an incomplete call, receives a call completion action, and triggers execution of the call completion action, we see no reason to construe “call completion application” to require anything beyond what is already in the claims. On this record, we see no support in the claims or specification to hold that a “call completion application” can be read as operating without reliance on a network in some way.2 Instead, after the call completion application becomes aware of an incomplete call, the application receives a choice from a user and triggers execution of that choice, and in accordance with the ’227 patent 2 To the extent Patent Owner’s proposed construction is seeking to preclude a network in the performance of the call completion application, then we would not agree with that construction. The call completion application is always dependent on the infrastructure of a communication network; as should be clear from our analysis above, the ’227 patent is focused on independence from the call completion services provided by the called party’s network. Notwithstanding the choice of call completion action being independent of the call completion services provided by the called party’s network, the call completion action still must rely on the network to provide the infrastructure to carry out certain actions. specification, it is that choice that is not premised on a limitation imposed by the called party’s network. Ex. 1001, 1:54–62 (“a system that complete[s] an incomplete call . . . independent of a preconfigured call completion service on the called party’s network”) (emphasis added), 2:39–43 (“the system . . . enables transmission of a voice message by a calling party to a called party when a network component or a called party device is not configured to offer a call completion option to the calling party to leave a voice message”). We do not explicitly provide a claim construction of any claim limitation in this Decision at this time because the issue of whether Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood can be resolved without explicitly construing the claim. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms. . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). However, our analysis places the parties on notice of the potential scope of the claims.” slip op. at 11

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art: would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, computer engineering, or a related field, and two-three years of experience with multimedia and Internet-related communications technologies, or the equivalent, with additional education substituting for experience and vice versa. Pet. 7. Patent Owner agrees with Petitioner’s proposed level of skill at this time. Prelim. Resp. 4. We adopt Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision, which appears consistent with the level of disclosure provided in the ’227 patent and the prior art cited.” slip op. at 7

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,185,227
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