• Intuit Inc. v. Samesurf, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 25, 2024 · IPR2023-00339 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–18 are unpatentable as obvious over Lebrun and Wang; the Board did not reach the separate Prajapat and Wang challenge.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “of the parties, we found that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) “would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or electrical engineering, or a similar field, and (2) at least two years of work experience in software development and/or web-based software,” which reflected Petitioner’s proposal. Dec. 11–12; see Dec. 9–12 (discussing the respective proposals and level of ordinary skill reflected in the challenged patent and asserted prior art). Patent Owner accepts this level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 42. Accordingly, we apply this determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “information related to a shared web browsing interaction” is interchangeable with “web browsing interaction data” and, as a result, this portion of the specification should limit the claim term. PO Resp. 18–19 (quoting Ex. 2004 ¶ 40). The quoted portion of Mr. Friedman’s testimony, however, addresses other terms in the specification and not “information related to a shared web browsing interaction.” PO Resp. 18–19 (quoting Ex. 2004 ¶ 40). As such, the testimony cited by Patent Owner does not support Patent Owner’s position. Accordingly, we determine that the patentee has not acted as a lexicographer to set forth a definition of “web browsing interaction data” in the written description. c. Plain and Ordinary Meaning Because the patentee has not acted as a lexicographer to set forth a definition of “web browsing interaction data,” we look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the term. See Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc., from the ordinary meaning will be adopted “when the patentee acted as his own lexicographer and clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term in either the specification or prosecution history” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Pet. Reply 5 (Petitioner arguing that “web browsing interaction data” should be afforded its plain and ordinary meaning) (citing Ex. 1034 ¶ 13). Notably, both Dr. Lieberman and Mr. Friedman agree that the plain and ordinary meaning of “web browsing interaction data” is sufficient to inform how one of ordinary skill would have understood the term. Ex. 1034 ¶ 13 (Dr. Lieberman testifying: “The plain meaning of ‘web browsing interaction data’ is data related to web browsing interactions. No additional definition or limitation is required in my opinion, nor is there any special or specific meaning given to the term in the specification of the ’145 patent.”); Ex. 1033, 171:5–16 (Patent Owner’s expert, Mr. Friedman, testifying that “the plain and ordinary meaning is sufficient.”). According to Petitioner, the plain and ordinary meaning is “data related to web browsing interactions.” Pet. Reply 5 (citing Ex. 1034 ¶ 13); Ex. 1034 ¶ 13 (“The plain meaning of ‘web browsing interaction data’ is data related to web browsing interactions.”). Patent Owner’s expert declined to opine on what the plain and ordinary meaning of “web browsing interaction data” other than it excludes webpages and partially filled webpages related to a web browsing interaction. See Ex. 1033, 171:5–16. slip op. at 27

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Accordingly, we conclude that the plain language of the claims does not require “web browsing interaction data” to be limited to data describing interaction performed on a website by a host device. We turn to the specification because the meaning of “web browsing interaction data” is informed “not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. The written description does not provide a definition or clear meaning for “web browsing interaction data.” Patent Owner acknowledges the term is not expressly used in the written description. PO Resp. 17. Patent Owner, however, identifies “information related to a shared web browsing interaction” as a term that is interchangeable with “web browsing interaction data.” PO Resp. 18, 29. We recognize the specification term “information related to a shared web browsing interaction” is substantially similar10 to Petitioner’s proposed plain and ordinary meaning of “web browsing interaction data” as “data related to web browsing interactions.” 11 Patent Owner identifies three passages that each describe the present invention as receiving information related to a shared web browsing interaction performed by a host device and performing the shared web browsing interaction based on the received information. PO Resp. 17–18 (block quoting Ex. 1001, Abstract, 3:10–24). The identified passages, however, do not show intention to manifestly limit “web browsing interaction data” to data describing interactions” slip op. at 25

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “forth by Petitioner (Pet. 22–34) discloses or suggests all limitations recited by claim 1, we consider Petitioner’s conclusion that it would have been obvious to combine Lebrun and Wang in the manner proposed to arrive at the claimed invention. See Pet. 19–22. (i) Articulated Reasoning To demonstrate obviousness, “there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine Wang’s activating a session invitation with Lebrun’s invitation to join a group-surfing session. Pet. 28. Specifically, Petitioner contends that “activating an invitation via a designated URL address would further enable” Lebrun’s group-surfing server “to coordinate and manage the group-surfing session, which would further Lebrun’s objective of providing an ‘improved technique for group access to web sites.’” Pet. 28 (citing Ex. 1005, 7:1). We agree with Petitioner that activating an invitation via a designated URL address would be a technique that helps coordinate a group-surfing session and would enable multiple related users being able to access “substantially the same” slip op. at 63

  Patent outcomesUS 9,185,145 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,185,145
• Apple Inc. v. Ald Social LLCInstituted
  PTAB · Mar 18, 2024 · IPR2023-01399 · APJ Phillip A Bennett · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–16 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Wolfe renders claim 1 obvious under § 103.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “review is under 35 U.S.C. § 314. See also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). To institute an inter partes review, the information presented in the Petition must show “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “factors, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The prior art of record also reflects the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The asserted prior art, like the challenged patent, presents high-level schematics and functional descriptions of various system components used in monitoring events and crowd behavior using location-based services. These system components largely include servers, websites, and mobile telephones utilizing wireless technologies, such as Wi-Fi, cellular, and global positioning system (GPS) to communicate and generate location data regarding mobile devices, as well as the use of databases to store historical information related to location-based services. The prior art and the patent provide description of monitoring crowd behavior by tracking the location of groups of mobile devices. Neither the challenged patent nor the asserted” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther

    “we agree with Petitioner that “[t]he specification does not provide any explicit definition.” Pet. 14. The written description, however, indicates “[a] viral event is defined as occurring when one or more predefined parameter thresholds have been surpassed, as determined in the exemplary embodiment in the Network Monitor 302.” Ex. 1001, 4:45–48. As Petitioner notes, the written description also provides examples of predefined parameter thresholds used by Network Monitor 302 “to determine if the monitored network indicates that a viral event may be occurring or impending.” Ex. 1001, 5:14–16; Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:16–20). Examples of predefined parameter thresholds include an excessive number of wireless devices in an area, excessive use of wireless devices in an area, two highly dense clusters of wireless devices converging at a significant rate of speed, and the difference in the number of wireless devices in an area exceeds a threshold over consecutive time periods. Ex. 1001, 5:15–20, 5:31–35, 5:41–42 (“to assess the number . . . of wireless devices”), 5:55–57; see Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:31–36, 5:51–57). As such, the written description describes parameter thresholds related to number, use, and movement of wireless devices being used to determine whether a viral event may be occurring.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableInstituted

    “institution. On this preliminary record, Petitioner has sufficiently shown that responsive to the network monitor observing a significant aggregation of devices in a particular area, application 322 functions as a crowd risk determinant because the application 322 assesses the needs arising from the aggregation of devices in that area. Ex. 1004, ¶¶ 46. Additionally, although the example provided in Wolfe relates to determining the number of pizza slices needed based on how many devices are in particular location, on this preliminary record, we agree with Petitioner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to implement a similar risk analysis to determine that police patrols would be needed in a particular area, as taught by Wolfe, based on the determination of crowd’s location, activity, and movement. Id. at 14.” slip op. at 25

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,402,158
• Apple Inc. v. Ald Social, LLCInstituted
  PTAB · Mar 18, 2024 · IPR2023-01398 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–14 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Wolfe and Pfeffer.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “II. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standards Petitioner bears the burden to demonstrate unpatentability. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). At this preliminary stage, we determine whether the information in the Petition shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 7

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Relying on declaration testimony from Dr. Guy (Ex. 1003), Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been someone knowledgeable and familiar with the field of crowd analysis and location-based computing” and would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science/computer engineering, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of crowd analysis and location-based computing.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19–21). Petitioner further notes that “[l]ack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Id. For purposes of this Institution Decision, we adopt the assessment offered by Petitioner as it is consistent with the challenged patent and the asserted prior art. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “agree with Petitioner that “[t]he specification does not provide any explicit definition” for “indication of a viral event.” Pet. 13. The written description, however, indicates “[a] viral event is defined as occurring when one or more predefined parameter thresholds have been surpassed, as determined in the exemplary embodiment in the Network Monitor 302.” Ex. 1001, 4:40–43. As Petitioner notes, the written description also provides examples of predefined parameter thresholds used by Network Monitor 302 “to determine if the monitored network indicates that a viral event may be occurring or impending.” Ex. 1001, 5:9–12; Pet. 13–14 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:9–15). Examples of predefined parameter thresholds include an excessive number of wireless devices in an area, excessive use of wireless devices in an area, two highly dense clusters of wireless devices converging at a significant rate of speed, and the difference in the number of wireless devices in an area exceeds a threshold over consecutive time periods. Ex. 1001, 5:12–14, 5:27–31, 5:35 (“to assess the number . . . of wireless devices”), 5:48–51; see Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:26–31, 5:45–51). As such, the written description describes parameter thresholds related to number, use, and movement of wireless devices being used to determine whether a viral event may be occurring.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

    “4. The Combination of Wolfe and Pfeffer To demonstrate obviousness, Petitioner must provide “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. More specifically, to prevail, Petitioner must demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that “a skilled artisan would have had reason to combine the teaching of the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention, and that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success from doing so.” PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharm., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Regarding the required articulate reasoning, Petitioner contends that “[a]lthough Wolfe teaches providing relevant crowd information to police, Wolfe does not provide the details for how to alert and notify the police.” Pet. 24 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 14). “Pfeffer, however, fills in Wolfe’s details by specifically teaching techniques for receiving information about crowds, evaluating the information, and alerting first responders when needed,” according to Petitioner. Pet. 24 (citing Ex. 1005, Abstract, ¶¶ 6, 40–41). Petitioner also contends that the combination would provide additional benefits to Wolfe’s system from Pfeffer’s additional features, such as providing “continuous updates to the incident scenario model saved for future use, recommendations for the most effective methods to respond to the incident based on past responses and current trends, and determining if an incident should be elevated based on the number of people involved in the incident.” Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 77; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 28, 77, 85). Regarding the required expectation of success, Petitioner contends that “[a] POSITA would have found the combination of Wolfe and Pfeffer predictable” because they are similar in that “both systems analyze crowd information to identify safety risks.” Pet. 25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 75; Ex. 1004, Abstract, ¶¶ 11, 14; Ex. 1005 ¶ 28). Petitioner further asserts that “[a] POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success when combining Wolfe and Pfeffer because [they] are implemented in the same manner,” with both being implemented on servers and with Pfeffer indicating that its techniques could be “any combination of software and/or hardware that is configured to perform one or more tasks.” Pet. 25–26 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 78; Ex. 1004 ¶ 70, 74; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 37, 32). Petitioner also contends “the combination would use known techniques (Pfeffer’s implementation details of an incident response method) to improve a similar system (Wolfe’s crowd detection and incident response system) in the same way (providing crowd details and incident information to first responders so that they may better respond to comprised crowd safety).” Pet. 26–27 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 77–79). Petitioner’s showing (Pet. 23–27) of articulated reasoning to support” slip op. at 23

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 9,198,054
• Intuit Inc. v. Samesurf, Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Jun 28, 2023 · IPR2023-00341 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Institution

  Instituted IPR of claims 1–16 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that Lebrun and Wang render at least claim 1 obvious.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “review is under 35 U.S.C. § 314. See also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). To institute an inter partes review, the information presented in the Petition must show “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “claim construction standard employed in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2020). Under the principles set forth by our reviewing court, the “words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning,’” as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). “In determining the meaning of the disputed claim limitation, we look principally to the intrinsic evidence of record, examining the claim language itself, the written description, and the prosecution history, if in evidence.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–17). We construe claim terms only as relevant to the parties’ contentions and only to the extent necessary to resolve the issues in dispute. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner propose express constructions for any claim terms. Pet. 12; Prelim. Resp. 34. For purposes of this decision, we agree that no claim terms need be expressly construed. Patent Owner arguments regarding the asserted grounds of unpatentability, however, raise particular claim scope contentions, particularly regarding “information related to the shared web browsing interaction” recited in each of the independent claims. We preliminarily address issues of claim scope in our later discussion of the asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 12

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Accordingly, based on this preliminary record, we find Patent Owner’s assessment of “internet web browsing software development, web connectivity software development, or networking software development” to be too narrow in view of the asserted prior art that describes in large measure requesting and receiving web pages from web servers. Thus, we find that Petitioner’s assessment of “software development and/or web- based software” more appropriate for purposes of institution on this limited record. We also agree with Petitioner that additional education could have substituted for professional experience, and significant work experience could have substituted for formal education. For the purpose of this decision, for these reasons, we find that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a similar field, and (2) at least two years of work experience in software development and/or web-based software. We apply that level of ordinary skill in this decision. Our decision, however, would not change, however, if we had applied Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “Accordingly, there is evidence to consider in making a determination whether Dr. Lieberman possesses the requisite ordinary level of skill. We, however, need not make such a determination for purposes of this decision because it has not been necessary for us to rely on Dr. Lieberman’s declaration in this decision. “No rule requires a Petition to be accompanied by any declaration, let alone one from an expert guiding the Board as to how it should read prior art.” Belden Inc. v. Berk–Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 2015). “[E]xpert testimony is not required when the references and the invention are easily understandable.” Id. (quoting Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). “Board members, because of expertise, may more often find it easier to understand and soundly explain the teachings and suggestions of prior art without expert assistance.” Id. Here, the invention and prior art are presented in high-level functional terms and are easily understandable, as we indicated previously in Section II.A and as shown by our discussion of the invention and prior art throughout this decision. To determine that the Petition met the institution threshold of showing “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition,” we have not relied on Dr. Lieberman’s declaration testimony. Patent Owner, of course, may raise the issue of Dr. Lieberman’s qualifications during trial.” slip op. at 58

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,483,448
• Intuit Inc. v. Samesurf, Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Jun 28, 2023 · IPR2023-00339 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Institution

  Instituted review of claims 1–18 on all asserted grounds because the petition showed a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim was obvious.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “review is under 35 U.S.C. § 314. See also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). To institute an inter partes review, the information presented in the Petition must show “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Accordingly, based on this preliminary record, we find Patent Owner’s assessment of “internet web browsing software development, web connectivity software development, or networking software development” to be overly narrow in view of the asserted prior art that describes in large measure requesting and receiving web pages from web servers. Thus, we find that Petitioner’s assessment of “software development and/or web-based software” more appropriate for purposes of institution on this limited record. We also agree with Petitioner that additional education could have substituted for professional experience, and significant work experience could have substituted for formal education. For the purpose of this decision, for these reasons, we find that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s a similar field, and (2) at least two years of work experience in software development and/or web-based software. We apply that level of ordinary skill in this decision. Our decision, however, would not change, however, if we had applied Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyDecided for petitioner

    “Accordingly, there is evidence to consider in making a determination whether Dr. Lieberman possesses the requisite ordinary level of skill. We, however, need not make such a determination for purposes of this decision because it has not been necessary for us to rely on Dr. Lieberman’s declaration in this decision. “No rule requires a Petition to be accompanied by any declaration, let alone one from an expert guiding the Board as to how it should read prior art.” Belden Inc. v. Berk–Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 2015). “[E]xpert testimony is not required when the references and the invention are easily understandable.” Id. (quoting Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). “Board members, because of expertise, may suggestions of prior art without expert assistance.” Id. Here, the invention and prior art are presented in high-level functional terms and are easily understandable, as we indicated previously in Section II.A and as shown by our discussion of the invention and prior art throughout this decision. To determine that the Petition met the institution threshold of showing “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition,” we have not relied on Dr. Lieberman’s declaration testimony. Patent Owner, of course, may raise the issue of Dr. Lieberman’s qualifications during trial.” slip op. at 46

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner propose express constructions for any claim terms. Pet. 12; Prelim. Resp. 32. For purposes of this decision, we agree that no claim terms need be expressly construed. Patent Owner particular claim scope contentions regarding “web browsing interaction data” recited in each of the independent claims. We preliminarily address those issues of claim scope in our later discussion of the asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 12

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,185,145
• Apple, Inc. / LG Electronics, Inc. et al. v. Gesture Technology Partners, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 30, 2022 · IPR2022-00359 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10, 12, and 14–31 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 11 and 13 were not shown unpatentable because Numazaki does not teach or suggest their transmission and cellular-phone limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We apply these principles to the Petition’s challenges. 2. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that “[a] person having ordinary skill in the art (‘PHOSITA’) at the time of the ’431 Patent would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or equivalent with at least one year of experience in the field of human computer interaction” and that “[a]dditional education or experience might substitute for the above requirements.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 30–32). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 6. We are persuaded, on the present record, that Petitioner’s declarant’s statement is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’431 patent and prior art of record. We adopt this definition for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner argues that the preambles should be limiting because they recite essential structure or steps and are “necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality” to the claims. PO Resp. 6 (quoting Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 908 F.3d 765, 770 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). Specifically, Patent Owner asserts that each claim includes one or more limitations that refer back to the preamble’s “handheld computing device” or “handheld computer apparatus” for antecedent basis. Id. at 6–7. Patent Owner further argues that the ’431 patent discloses different embodiments, with some embodiments being in the form of a computer and some embodiments being in the form of a handheld device. Id. at 7 (citing Ex. 1001, 12:59–13:7, Fig. 10A). Patent Owner contends that the claims are directed to the latter embodiments related to a handheld device and, therefore, “the preamble is necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality to claims 1, 7, and 14, consistent with the embodiments that the inventor chose to claim.” Id. We agree that the preambles of claims 1, 7, and 14 are limiting. This is primarily because the body of each claim includes “said device” or “said apparatus” which refers back to the preamble and is understood with reference thereto. For example, the last clause of claim 7 states: “means for controlling a function of said apparatus using said information.” Ex. 1001, 26:4–5 (emphasis added). “Said apparatus” derives antecedent basis from the “[h]andheld computer apparatus” recited in the preamble. Moreover, the “means for controlling a function of said apparatus” is understood because of this reference to the handheld computer apparatus. The limitations of claims 1 and 14 are similar and so this logic applies equally to these claims as well. Thus, we agree that the preamble recites essential structure and is “necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality” to claims 1, 7, and 14.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) does not applyDecided for petitioner

    “b) Camera Means Petitioner asserts that, though claim 7 recites “camera means,” it is not a means-plus-function limitation under §112 ¶ 6. Pet. 6. Petitioner argues that “a PHOSITA would have considered ‘camera means associated with said housing’ to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure.” Id. (citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 36). Petitioner further argues that “all optical sensors obtain images by capturing light, so the claimed function is simply describing the general process that all optical sensors employ to obtain images of objects.” Id. (citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 36). “Patent Owner agrees” with Petitioner’s construction PO. Resp. 7. We accept Petitioner’s construction as consistent with the current record.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Decided for petitioner

    “c) Computer Means Petitioner contends that claim 7’s limitation of “computer means within said housing for analyzing said image to determine information concerning a position or movement of said object” is a means-plus-function limitation under §112 ¶ 6. Pet. 7. Petitioner argues that the limitation’s function is analyzing an image “to determine positioning or movement of an object.” Id. Petitioner argues that the corresponding structure “includes a computer/processor programmed (1) to identify either natural or artificial features on an object as described . . . or (2) to track the movement using one of the disclosed methods.” Id. at 9; see id. at 8–9 (discussing the disclosure of the ’431 patent) (citing Ex. 1001, 3:38–47, 3:57–62, 4:9–14, 5:2–23, 6:64–7:13, 8:40–59, 11:16–35). Petitioner also argues that “objects” should be construed to mean “both separate objects held/controlled by the user and also part of the user’s body, such as a user’s finger or hand.” Id. at 8; see id. at 7–8 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:39–41, 3:48–50, claims 7–8). “Patent Owner does not contest” Petitioner’s construction. PO Resp. 6. We accept Petitioner’s construction as consistent with the current record.10 d) Means for Controlling a Function Petitioner argues that claim 7’s limitation of “means for controlling a function of said apparatus using said information” is a means-plus-function” slip op. at 10

  Patent outcomesUS 7,933,431 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 7,933,431
• Apple, Inc., LG Electronics, Inc., LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc., And Google LLC v. Gesture Technology Partners, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 30, 2022 · IPR2022-00091 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10, 12, and 14–31 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 11 and 13 were not shown unpatentable because Numazaki did not teach or suggest their cellular phone or transceiver limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We apply these principles to the Petition’s challenges. 2. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that “[a] person having ordinary skill in the art (‘PHOSITA’) at the time of the ’431 Patent would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or equivalent with at least one year of experience in the field of human computer interaction” and that “[a]dditional education or experience might substitute for the above requirements.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 30–32). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 6. We are persuaded, on the present record, that Petitioner’s declarant’s statement is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’431 patent and prior art of record. We adopt this definition for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner argues that the preambles should be limiting because they recite essential structure or steps and are “necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality” to the claims. PO Resp. 6 (quoting Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 908 F.3d 765, 770 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). Specifically, Patent Owner asserts that each claim includes one or more limitations that refer back to the preamble’s “handheld computing device” or “handheld computer apparatus” for antecedent basis. Id. at 6–7. Patent Owner further argues that the ’431 patent discloses different embodiments, with some embodiments being in the form of a computer and some embodiments being in the form of a handheld device. Id. at 7 (citing Ex. 1001, 12:59–13:7, Fig. 10A). Patent Owner contends that the claims are directed to the latter embodiments related to a handheld device and, therefore, “the preamble is necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality to claims 1, 7, and 14, consistent with the embodiments that the inventor chose to claim.” Id. We agree that the preambles of claims 1, 7, and 14 are limiting. This is primarily because the body of each claim includes “said device” or “said apparatus” which refers back to the preamble and is understood with reference thereto. For example, the last clause of claim 7 states: “means for controlling a function of said apparatus using said information.” Ex. 1001, 26:4–5 (emphasis added). “Said apparatus” derives antecedent basis from the “[h]andheld computer apparatus” recited in the preamble. Moreover, the “means for controlling a function of said apparatus” is understood because of this reference to the handheld computer apparatus. The limitations of claims 1 and 14 are similar and so this logic applies equally to these claims as well. Thus, we agree that the preamble recites essential structure and is “necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality” to claims 1, 7, and 14.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Term construed petitioner construction§112(f) does not applyDecided for petitioner

    “b) Camera Means Petitioner asserts that, though claim 7 recites “camera means,” it is not a means-plus-function limitation under §112 ¶ 6. Pet. 6. Petitioner argues that “a PHOSITA would have considered ‘camera means associated with said housing’ to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure.” Id. (citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 36). Petitioner further argues that “all optical sensors obtain images by capturing light, so the claimed function is simply describing the general process that all optical sensors employ to obtain images of objects.” Id. (citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 36). “Patent Owner agrees” with Petitioner’s construction PO. Resp. 7. We accept Petitioner’s construction as consistent with the current record.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed petitioner construction§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner

    “c) Computer Means Petitioner contends that claim 7’s limitation of “computer means within said housing for analyzing said image to determine information concerning a position or movement of said object” is a means-plus-function limitation under §112 ¶ 6. Pet. 7. Petitioner argues that the limitation’s function is analyzing an image “to determine positioning or movement of an object.” Id. Petitioner argues that the corresponding structure “includes a computer/processor programmed (1) to identify either natural or artificial features on an object as described . . . or (2) to track the movement using one of the disclosed methods.” Id. at 9; see id. at 8–9 (discussing the disclosure of the ’431 patent) (citing Ex. 1001, 3:38–47, 3:57–62, 4:9–14, 5:2–23, 6:64–7:13, 8:40–59, 11:16–35). Petitioner also argues that “objects” should be construed to mean “both separate objects held/controlled by the user and also part of the user’s body, such as a user’s finger or hand.” Id. at 8; see id. at 7–8 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:39–41, 3:48–50, claims 7–8). “Patent Owner does not contest” Petitioner’s construction. PO Resp. 6. We accept Petitioner’s construction as consistent with the current record.10 d) Means for Controlling a Function Petitioner argues that claim 7’s limitation of “means for controlling a function of said apparatus using said information” is a means-plus-function” slip op. at 10

  Patent outcomesUS 7,933,431 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 7,933,431
• Apple, Inc. / LG Electronics, Inc. et al. v. Gesture Technology Partners, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 30, 2022 · IPR2021-00920 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10, 12, and 14–31 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 11 and 13 were not shown unpatentable because Numazaki does not teach or suggest their limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “(‘PHOSITA’) at the time of the ’431 Patent would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or equivalent with at least one year of experience in the field of human computer interaction” and that “[a]dditional education or experience might substitute for the above requirements.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 30–32). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 6. We are persuaded, on the present record, that Petitioner’s declarant’s statement is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’431 patent and prior art of record. We adopt this definition for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

    “they recite essential structure or steps and are “necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality” to the claims. PO Resp. 6 (quoting Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 908 F.3d 765, 770 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). Specifically, Patent Owner asserts that each claim includes one or more limitations that refer back to the preamble’s “handheld computing device” or “handheld computer apparatus” for antecedent basis. Id. at 6–7. Patent Owner further argues that the ’431 patent discloses different embodiments, with some embodiments being in the form of a computer and some embodiments being in the form of a handheld device. Id. at 7 (citing Ex. 1001, 12:59–13:7, Fig. 10A). Patent Owner contends that the claims are directed to the latter embodiments related to a handheld device and, therefore, “the preamble is necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality to claims 1, 7, and 14, consistent with the embodiments that the inventor chose to claim.” Id. We agree that the preambles of claims 1, 7, and 14 are limiting. This is primarily because the body of each claim includes “said device” or “said apparatus” which refers back to the preamble and is understood with reference thereto. For example, the last clause of claim 7 states: “means for controlling a function of said apparatus using said information.” Ex. 1001, 26:4–5 (emphasis added). “Said apparatus” derives antecedent basis from the “[h]andheld computer apparatus” recited in the preamble. Moreover, the “means for controlling a function of said apparatus” is understood because of this reference to the handheld computer apparatus. The limitations of claims 1 and 14 are similar and so this logic applies equally to these claims as well. Thus, we agree that the preamble recites essential structure and is “necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality” to claims 1, 7, and 14.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) does not applyDecided for petitioner

    “b) Camera Means Petitioner asserts that, though claim 7 recites “camera means,” it is not a means-plus-function limitation under §112 ¶ 6. Pet. 6. Petitioner argues that “a PHOSITA would have considered ‘camera means associated with said housing’ to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure.” Id. (citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 36). Petitioner further argues that “all optical sensors obtain images by capturing light, so the claimed function is simply describing the general process that all optical sensors employ to obtain images of objects.” Id. (citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 36). “Patent Owner agrees” with Petitioner’s construction PO. Resp. 7. We accept Petitioner’s construction as consistent with the current record.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Decided for petitioner

    “c) Computer Means Petitioner contends that claim 7’s limitation of “computer means within said housing for analyzing said image to determine information concerning a position or movement of said object” is a means-plus-function limitation under §112 ¶ 6. Pet. 7. Petitioner argues that the limitation’s function is analyzing an image “to determine positioning or movement of an object.” Id. Petitioner argues that the corresponding structure “includes a computer/processor programmed (1) to identify either natural or artificial features on an object as described . . . or (2) to track the movement using one of the disclosed methods.” Id. at 9; see id. at 8–9 (discussing the disclosure of the ’431 patent) (citing Ex. 1001, 3:38–47, 3:57–62, 4:9–14, 5:2–23, 6:64–7:13, 8:40–59, 11:16–35). Petitioner also argues that “objects” should be construed to mean “both separate objects held/controlled by the user and also part of the user’s body, such as a user’s finger or hand.” Id. at 8; see id. at 7–8 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:39–41, 3:48–50, claims 7–8). “Patent Owner does not contest” Petitioner’s construction. PO Resp. 6. We accept Petitioner’s construction as consistent with the current record.10 d) Means for Controlling a Function Petitioner argues that claim 7’s limitation of “means for controlling a function of said apparatus using said information” is a means-plus-function 10 In related IPR2021-00917 the petitioner there offered a slightly different construction. See IPR2021-00917, Paper 31, 11–12. The parties do not address the slight differences and we determine that the outcome here is not construction dependent. limitation under §112 ¶ 6. Pet. 10. According to Petitioner, the limitation’s function is “controlling a function of the apparatus using information about the object’s location or movement.” Id. Petitioner argues that the corresponding structure “is a processor programmed to perform the specific algorithms that accomplish this function” which “includes at least [the] Fig. 9 disclosure.” Id. at 10–11. “Patent Owner does not contest” Petitioner’s construction. PO Resp. 6. However, as discussed above, we determine that “said apparatus” refers to the handheld computer apparatus in the preamble. Thus, we accept Petitioner’s construction with the added requirement that the general purpose computer be a handheld computer apparatus. e) Means for Transmitting Information Petitioner asserts that claim 11’s limitation of “means for transmitting information” is a means-plus-function limitation under §112 ¶ 6. Pet. 11. Petitioner argues that the ’431 patent teaches the structure for performing the limitation’s function of “transmitting information” is a “wireless cellular transceiver” and thus the corresponding structure required by the claim “includes at least a wireless cellular transceiver.” Id. at 11–12 (citing Ex. 1001, 12:59–13:3). “Patent Owner does not contest” Petitioner’s construction. PO Resp. 6. We accept Petitioner’s construction as consistent with the current record.11” slip op. at 10

  Patent outcomesUS 7,933,431 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 7,933,431
• Apple, Inc. / LG Electronics, Inc. et al. v. Gesture Technology Partners, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 28, 2022 · IPR2022-00360 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6, 8–16, 18–26, and 28–30 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 7, 17, and 27 were not shown unpatentable because Numazaki teaches away from using ring or other targets.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “2. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that “[a] person having ordinary skill in the art (‘PHOSITA’) at the time of the ’079 Patent would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or equivalent with at least one year of experience in the field of human computer interaction” and that “[a]dditional education or experience might substitute for the above requirements.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 29–31). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 6. We are persuaded that Petitioner’s declarant’s statement is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’079 patent and prior art of record. We adopt this definition for the purposes of this Final Decision.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “the light source is used is not a sufficient reason for us to read a limitation into the claims from the Specification. If the specification “reveal[s] a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess[,] . . . the inventor’s lexicography governs.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citing CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see also Reply 19. However, this is not the case here. Patent Owner does not identify anywhere in the Specification where “light source” or “plurality of light emitting diodes” are defined as “the light source illuminates the gesture by having two or more (i.e., a plurality) LEDs of the light source emit light at the same time.” For these reasons we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s claim construction. We determine that the added limitation in claims 3, 15, and 23 should be read according to its plain and ordinary meaning. In other words, “the light source includes a plurality of light emitting diodes,” simply means exactly what it says “the light source includes a plurality of light emitting diodes.”” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away foundNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “A reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant. The degree of teaching away will of course depend on the particular facts; in general, a reference will teach away if it suggests that the line of development flowing from the reference’s disclosure is unlikely to be productive of the result sought by the applicant. In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994).” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Petitioner argues that Numazaki ’863 teaches using a plurality of light emitting diodes to illuminate a hand gesture and to control a computer based on the gesture. Pet. 37. Petitioner also identifies a number of reasons to modify Numazaki’s light source to use Numazaki’s ’863’s plurality of light emitting diodes as the light sources are used for similar purposes. Id. at 38– 39. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s positions in the Petition, other than to argue that the combination does not teach the claim limitation under Patent Owner’s construction. PO Resp. 20–22. Patent Owner further admits that Numazaki ’863 teaches a plurality of light emitting diodes used to illuminate an object. Id. at 21 (citing Ex. 1005, 16:36–57, Fig. 4). As we previously rejected Patent Owner’s attempt to read limitations from the Specification into the claims, Patent Owner’s arguments here do not apply to the requirements of the claims. We have reviewed Petitioner’s assertions with respect to these claims and the supporting evidence, and determine that Petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 3, 15, and 23 are unpatentable.” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 8,553,079 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,553,079
• Apple, Inc. / LG Electronics, Inc. et al. v. Gesture Technology Partners, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 28, 2022 · IPR2022-00090 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6, 8–16, 18–26, and 28–30 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 7, 17, and 27 were not shown unpatentable because Numazaki teaches away from using targets.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “The mere fact that the Specification provides an example as to how the light source is used is not a sufficient reason for us to read a limitation into the claims from the Specification. If the specification “reveal[s] a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess[,] . . . the inventor’s lexicography governs.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citing CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see also Reply 19. However, this is not the case here. Patent Owner does not identify anywhere in the Specification where “light source” or “plurality of light emitting diodes” are defined as “the light source illuminates the gesture by having two or more (i.e., a plurality) LEDs of the light source emit light at the same time.” For these reasons we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s claim construction. We determine that the added limitation in claims 3, 15, and 23 should be read according to its plain and ordinary meaning. In other words, “the light source includes a plurality of light emitting diodes,” simply means exactly what it says “the light source includes a plurality of light emitting diodes.”” slip op. at 8

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “2. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that “[a] person having ordinary skill in the art (‘PHOSITA’) at the time of the ’079 Patent would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or equivalent with at least one year of experience in the field of human computer interaction” and that “[a]dditional education or experience might substitute for the above requirements.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 29–31). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 6. We are persuaded that Petitioner’s declarant’s statement is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’079 patent and prior art of record. We adopt this definition for the purposes of this Final Decision.” slip op. at 6

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “A reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant. The degree of teaching away will of course depend on the particular facts; in general, a reference will teach away if it suggests that the line of development flowing from the reference’s disclosure is unlikely to be productive of the result sought by the applicant. In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994).” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “Petitioner argues that Numazaki ’863 teaches using a plurality of light emitting diodes to illuminate a hand gesture and to control a computer based on the gesture. Pet. 37. Petitioner also identifies a number of reasons to modify Numazaki’s light source to use Numazaki’s ’863’s plurality of light emitting diodes as the light sources are used for similar purposes. Id. at 38– 39. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s positions in the Petition, other than to argue that the combination does not teach the claim limitation under Patent Owner’s construction. PO Resp. 20–22. Patent Owner further admits that Numazaki ’863 teaches a plurality of light emitting diodes used to illuminate an object. Id. at 21 (citing Ex. 1005, 16:36–57, Fig. 4). As we previously rejected Patent Owner’s attempt to read limitations from the Specification into the claims, Patent Owner’s arguments here do not apply to the requirements of the claims. We have reviewed Petitioner’s assertions with respect to these claims and the supporting evidence, and determine that Petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 3, 15, and 23 are unpatentable.” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 8,553,079 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,553,079

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.