- Alliance Laundry Systems, LLC v. Payrange LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 1, 2025 · IPR2025-00573 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 7 or 11 were unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented fails to show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’772 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of claims 7 and 11 of the ’772 patent on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends a person having ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) pertaining to the ’772 patent “would have had an educational background of, engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately three years of experience with electronic payment systems, vending machine technologies, or distributed network systems.” Pet. 19–20; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 20–26. “Lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 20; Ex. 1003 ¶ 22. Patent Owner does not oppose Petitioner’s formulation of ordinary skill. See Prelim. Resp. generally. On this record, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art as it is consistent with the ’772 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“In this inter partes review, we apply the same claim construction standard that would be used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). In applying this standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. See id.; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). We do not need to construe any terms expressly to determine whether or not to institute a trial. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,481,772 - BTL Industries, Inc. v. Inmode Ltd.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 1, 2025 · IPR2024-00703 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–58 were not shown unpatentable: the Edwards, Ingle, and Mosher combination fails to establish key limitations, and Ollivier was not shown to be a prior art printed publication.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“We apply Patent Owner’s proposed definition, as it appears consistent with the field of the ’511 patent and the prior art and is consistent with testimony of Dr. Poulos and the cross-examination testimony of Dr. Berenholz. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355, (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the level of ordinary skill in the art may be reflected in the prior art itself); Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 35–39; Ex. 2005, 55:5–17, 57:17–58:19. In our view, however, Petitioner’s proposed definition is not so different that our decision would change if we were to apply Petitioner’s proposed definition.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner’s argument are persuasive. We agree with Patent Owner that a plain reading of the wherein clause requires the treating to begin at the introitus and extend at least the first centimeter into the vagina and up to 3.5 cm in from the introitus. This construction is consistent with the ’511 patent’s Specification, which states: In typical embodiments, the length of the energy delivery element is about 1 to about 3 cm in length, in other embodiments it may be as long as about 4 cm. This is a length well adapted to treating the lower aspects of the vagina, wherein treatment by the method comprises contacting the vaginal epithelium in a region that extends from the introitus inward to a position about 3 to 4 cm inward from the introitus. In some embodiments of the invention, the method can b[e] practiced with a single row of parallel contract sites immediately inside the introitus. In other embodiments, the method may include deeper rows, or rows that overlap an initial row, while keeping the contact sites within the lower portion of the vagina. Ex. 1001, 3:28–40 (emphasis added); see also id. at 14:47–57. The ’511 patent Specification also states: “the portion of the vagina to be treated is a region between the introitus and a position located no further than about 3 to about 4 cm inward from the introitus.” Id. at 11:48–51 (emphasis added). Given the plain language of claim 1, consistent with the ’511 patent’s Specification, we construe “heating a portion of the vagina extending from the introitus inwardly to a location from 1 cm to 3.5 cm in from the introitus” to require heating a portion of the vagina beginning at the introitus and extending at least the first centimeter into the vagina and up to 3.5 cm in from the introitus.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Patent Owner’s arguments is persuasive. The cited portion of Mosher does not explicitly state the location of the treatment area. Ex. 1006 ¶ 74. In it Reply, Petitioner additionally points to paragraph 54 of Mosher, which states: “Preferably, the location of the treatment volume of endopelvic fascia will be disposed along a length of the urethra between the bladder neck and the external meatus so as to avoid injuring nerves.” Pet. Reply 14 (quoting Ex. 1006 ¶ 54). Petitioner argues that “[t]reating the vaginal wall adjacent to the mid-urethral region is within the claimed region of ‘from 1 cm to 3.5 cm in from the introitus.’” Pet. Reply 14–16. This, however, does not teach the claimed area beginning at the introitus and extending at least the first centimeter into the vagina and up to 3.5 cm in from the introitus. The Petition fails to show that either Edwards or Mosher discloses heating a portion of the vagina beginning at the introitus and extending at least the first centimeter into the vagina and up to 3.5 cm in from the introitus. In its Reply, Petitioner argues that it would have been obvious to modify Edwards to treat the area beginning at the introitus and extending at least the first centimeter into the vagina and up to 3.5 cm in from the introitus. See, e.g., Pet. Reply 2–4, 16–17 (citing Pet. 35). The Petition’s argument is unpersuasive because it is conclusory and does not adequately address Edwards’s use of a speculum. Pet. 35. The Petition includes no” slip op. at 26
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“In its Reply, Petitioner argues that it would have been obvious to modify Edwards to treat the area beginning at the introitus and extending at least the first centimeter into the vagina and up to 3.5 cm in from the introitus. See, e.g., Pet. Reply 2–4, 16–17 (citing Pet. 35). The Petition’s argument is unpersuasive because it is conclusory and does not adequately address Edwards’s use of a speculum. Pet. 35. The Petition includes no persuasive explanation as to why it would have been obvious to modify Edwards to use the treatment blade without the speculum. See Pet. 22–24, 35–36. We determine that Petitioner fails to meet its burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 is unpatentable over Edwards, Ingle, and Mosher.” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 8,961,511 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 8,961,511 - PTAB · Aug 25, 2025 · PGR2025-00028 · APJ George R Hoskins · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–20 and all asserted grounds after finding claim 1 more likely than not unpatentable under § 101.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), the Director may not authorize a post-grant review unless the information in the petition, if unrebutted, “would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). For the reasons that follow, we institute a post-grant review as to claims 1–20 of the ’423 patent on all grounds of unpatentability asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“ordinary skill in the art would have had “an educational background of, or practical experience equivalent to, a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately three years of experience with electronic payment systems, vending machine technologies, or distributed network systems,” where “[l]ack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 20–26). Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art in its Preliminary Response. Based on the record presented, including our review of the ’423 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’423 patent and cited 2 Petitioner states that it “takes no position on the proper priority date for the [c]hallenged [c]laims” and “uses the earliest possible priority date claimed, December 18, 2013,” for purposes of its asserted grounds. Pet. 14. prior art, we agree with Petitioner’s definition and apply it for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:42–2:21 (stating that “[t]he present application relates to the field of payment processing systems” and describing the functionality of payment accepting units in the “Background” section).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“B. Claim Interpretation We interpret each challenged claim using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(b). Petitioner states that, “for purposes of [its] Petition, the Board need not construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes, and the claims should be given their ordinary and customary meaning.” Pet. 20. Patent Owner agrees that “[n]o constructions are necessary” to decide the issues disputed by the parties. Prelim. Resp. 2–3. We conclude that no express interpretation of any claim term is necessary to determine whether to institute a post-grant review in this proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe [a particular claim limitation] where the construction is not ‘material to the . . . dispute.’” (citation omitted) (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelNot reached
“For the reasons explained below, we conclude, on the merits and based on the current record, that Petitioner has shown that it is more likely than not that claim 1 is unpatentable as claiming patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See Pet. 77–84. Accordingly, we need not determine at this time whether collateral estoppel applies based on the Board’s decision in PGR2021-00093. The parties, however, should address the issue in their papers during trial, with citations to relevant authority. In particular, the parties are encouraged to address (1) how the collateral estoppel requirement that the issue be “identical to one decided in the first action” applies in the context of an asserted ground under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and (2) the parties’ apparent disagreement as to whether collateral estoppel may be applied in such circumstances on a “limitation-by-limitation basis.” See Pet. 72, 75 (quoting Google LLC v. Hammond Dev. Int’l, Inc., 54 F.4th 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2022)); Prelim. Resp. 20–21; see also Kroy IP Holdings, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., – F.4th –, No. 2023-1359, 2025 WL 2178321, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 1, 2025) (Dyk, J., dissenting) (“In subsequent Board proceedings, it is well established that collateral estoppel applies to claims adjudicated by the Board to be unpatentable and also to ‘related claims that present identical issues of patentability,’ i.e., patentably indistinct claims. . . . ‘It is well established that patent claims need not be identical for collateral estoppel to apply.’” (citing MaxLinear, Inc. v. CF CRESPE LLC, 880 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Google, 54 F.4th at 1381)).” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Mayo · Bilski · Berkheimer · Enfish · Electric PowerPatents in suitUS 11,972,423 - PTAB · Aug 25, 2025 · PGR2025-00027 · APJ George R Hoskins · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR of claims 1–20 on all petitioned grounds, finding claim 1 more likely than not ineligible under § 101.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“A. Legal Standards — Petitioner’s Burden In a post-grant review, “the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (discussing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3), which is identical to 35 U.S.C. § 322(a)(3) in requiring petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”). This 2 Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). burden of persuasion never shifts to the patent owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015).” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends a person having ordinary skill in the art pertaining to the ’920 patent “would have had an educational background of, or practical experience equivalent to, a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately three years of experience with electronic payment systems, vending machine technologies, or distributed network systems.” Pet. 20; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 20–26. Further: “Lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 20; Ex. 1003 ¶ 22. Patent Owner does not oppose Petitioner’s formulation of ordinary skill. See Prelim. Resp. generally. Based on the record presented, including our review of the ’920 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’920 patent and cited prior art, we agree with Petitioner’s definition and apply it for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:42–2:21 (stating “[t]he present application relates to the field of payment processing systems” and describing the functionality of payment accepting units in the “BACKGROUND” section).” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner argues “the Board need not construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes.” Pet. 20. Patent Owner argues: “No constructions are necessary to deny institution because denial is warranted for numerous reasons that do not depend on claim construction.” Prelim. Resp. 3. However, as discussed below, several of Patent Owner’s arguments seeking to distinguish claim 1 from Low rely on underlying claim construction positions. Except as discussed below in connection with those arguments, we determine no explicit construction is needed to resolve the parties’ controversy as to whether institution should be granted here. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 12
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionInstituted
“We determine Petitioner has made a sufficient showing for Step 2A, Prong 1 based on the current record. Petitioner addresses each of limitations [1.2]–[1.14] and explains how they support Petitioner’s contention that the claim, as a whole, is directed to the alleged abstract idea. See Pet. 80–84. For example, Petitioner notes specifically how limitation [1.2], reciting “identifying one or more payment accepting units,” pertains to identifying a merchant, and how limitations [1.6], [1.7], and [1.9] recite user interaction using the mobile device that enables the completion of a purchase. See id. Petitioner thus shows sufficiently how claim 1, by virtue of the limitations reproduced above,5 recites the concept of “identifying a merchant and enabling completion of a purchase from the merchant.” Id. at 80.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Berkheimer · Enfish · Electric PowerPatents in suitUS 11,966,920 - PTAB · Aug 11, 2025 · IPR2025-00560 · APJ Barry L Grossman · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–29 and every asserted ground, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable over Chang and Fang.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The Board determines whether to institute a trial on behalf of the Director. 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or a similar field and at least two years of experience designing human breast pump equipment. More education could substitute for experience and vice versa.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 15–18). Mr. Bauer’s Declaration testimony states he considered some of the factors listed above. Ex. 1003 ¶ 17. Mr. Bauer testifies that based on his background and experience, in his opinion, the level of ordinary skill is as stated by Petitioner. Id. at 18. For purposes of this Decision, based on the prior art, the sophistication of the disclosed technology in the ’381 patent, and Mr. Bauer’s undisputed testimony, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill.13” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We do not perceive the need to construe any claim limitation. Claims must be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 19 F.4th 1325, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. American Science & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because binding. We wish to have the record developed before rendering any binding determination, finding, or conclusion. 14 The citation to Ex. 1005, 2290 appears to be an error. We do not find the cited claim construction at this location. we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe the claim preambles here where the construction is not ‘material to the [obviousness] dispute.’” (citations omitted)).” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner also asserts that “[m]ultiple reasons would have prompted a POSITA to implement a diaphragm pump in Chang’s breast pump device in accordance with Fang’s suggestions.” Id. at 21–24. Based on the record before us, we agree that Fang discloses a diaphragm, as recited in clause 1[a][1]. We also agree, based on the record before us, that a person of ordinary skill would have had multiple reasons to use Fang’s diaphragm pump in Chang’s device with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,813,381 - Fox Factory, Inc. v. Sram, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 4, 2025 · IPR2024-00492 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 7, 8, and 10–12 are unpatentable over Yi, JP’279, and Nagai; the Board did not reach the Fox-based grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Based on the full record, we find that Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the ’207 patent and the asserted prior art. PO Resp. 17 (citing Ex. 2016 ¶ 48). Our analysis below, however, would not change if we applied Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, because it specifies experience in design work related to bicycle suspension technology, instead of the more general design of vehicle components or like technology.” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s declarant has a Ph.D. in Mechanical Engineering with “over 30 years of experience in teaching and directing research related to mechanical engineering and precision machine design.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 4. Based on the full record, we find that his experience “related to mechanical engineering and precision machine design” sufficiently meets or exceeds “experience in design of vehicle components or like technology,” as proposed by Patent Owner (PO Resp. 17). Petitioner’s declarant would, thus, be a person of ordinary skill in the art under either party’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. Therefore, we see no reason to give less weight to the opinions of Petitioner’s declarant. See also Tr. 39:21–40:22 (confirming that the argument is about how much weight to give to the testimony).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner states that “[n]o terms need construction to resolve the controversy in this forum.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 32). “Patent Owner agrees that the ’207 Patent’s claim terms require no special claim construction.” PO Resp. 16. Based on the full record, we determine that express claim interpretation is not necessary to resolve the parties’ dispute. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“d) Petitioner’s Asserted Reason for Combining Petitioner argues that Yi, JP’279, and Nagai are in the same technical field. Pet. 70 (citing Ex. 1006, code (57), 1:7–8; Ex. 1007, 1; Ex. 1008, 1:10–13). We agree, and find, that Yi, JP’279, and Nagai are in the same field of endeavor. Ex. 1006, code (57), 1:7–8; Ex. 1007, 1; Ex. 1008, 1:10– 13. Patent Owner does not dispute that the references are analogous art. See PO Resp.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 7,147,207 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,147,207 - Fox Factory, Inc. v. Sram, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 4, 2025 · IPR2024-00491 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14–18, 20, 22, 24, 26–29, 31, 33–38, 40, 42, 44, 46–49, 51, 53, and 56–64 are unpatentable as obvious over Denk and Moechnig, with Schroeder for claims 31, 51, …
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Both parties’ proposals require a Bachelor’s degree or a Master’s degree in Mechanical Engineering but differ on the number of years of experience (“1–2 years of experience” versus “three years’ experience”) and from where the experience comes (“design work related to optimal mechanical and structural design” or “design of mechanical elements and structures” versus “vehicle component design and like technology” or “design of vehicle components or like technology”). Pet. 8; PO Resp. 14. Based on the full record, we find that Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the ’993 patent and the asserted prior art. PO Resp. 17 (citing Ex. 2016 ¶ 48). Our analysis below, however, would not change if we applied Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, because it specifies experience in “optimal mechanical and structural design,” which would be a part of the “design of vehicle components and like technology.”” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s declarant has a Ph.D. in Mechanical Engineering with “over 30 years of experience in teaching and directing research related to mechanical engineering and precision machine design.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 4. Based on the full record, we find that his experience “related to mechanical engineering and precision machine design” sufficiently meets or exceeds “experience in design of vehicle components or like technology,” as proposed by Patent Owner (PO Resp. 14). Petitioner’s declarant would, thus, be a person of ordinary skill in the art under either party’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. Therefore, we see no reason to give less weight to the opinions of Petitioner’s declarant. See also Tr. 39:21–40:22 (confirming that the argument is about how much weight to give to the testimony).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“Petitioner states that “[n]o terms need construction to resolve the controversy in this forum.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 30). We did not need to interpret expressly any claim term for institution. Inst. Dec. 14. “Patent Owner agrees that the ’993 Patent’s claim terms require no special claim construction for purposes of denying this Petition.” PO Resp. 13. Petitioner states that “a vertical plane of travel of the bicycle” and “a thickness of the wall at any point in the lower section of the body varying as a function of the cross-sectional angle of the point relative to the plane of travel” have been construed in related litigation. Pet. Reply 2–5 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:8–14, Fig. 1; Ex. 1024 ¶¶ 18, 20, 22, 24, 52–53; Ex. 1025, 8, 10; Ex. 2021 ¶ 43). Petitioner, however, contends that “the Board need not expressly construe these terms.” Id. at 2. Based on the full record, we determine that express claim interpretation is not necessary to determine whether Petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood of prevailing. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“(c) Petitioner Shows a Motivation to Combine Because Petitioner cites a portion of Denk that states, “for the same overall strength and rigidity, the weight may be reduced, or for the same weight, the strength and rigidity may be significantly increased in the load direction specified by the design,” we find that Denk provides a motivation to use its tubular component in the bicycle of Moechnig. Pet. 13–14; Ex. 1006, col. 2. We also credit Petitioner’s testimonial evidence regarding the motivation to combine because the record supports it. Ex. 1003 ¶ 57; Ex. 1006, cols. 1–2; Ex. 1007, 1:10–14; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 1, 9, 49; Ex. 1010, 6:22–26. The record shows that lightweight components were desirable. See, e.g., Ex. 1006, col. 1; Ex. 1008 ¶ 1. We also agree with Petitioner that one of ordinary skill in the art would have reduced weight or improved strength relative to Moechnig, because Denk describes reducing weight or increasing strength as “specified by the design,” indicating that it is a matter of ordinary skill in the art to achieve less weight or more strength when applying Denk to Moechnig. Ex. 1006, col. 2. how Denk combined with Moechnig would have reduced weight or increased strength, because Denk itself indicates it would have done so. PO Resp. 24–25; Ex. 1006, col. 2 (“for the same overall strength and rigidity, the weight may be reduced”). We also do not agree with Patent Owner that “Denk provides no indication that it would be more lightweight than a standard steerer tube with equal wall thickness and circular profile,” because Denk provides an indication. PO Resp. 25; Ex. 1006, col. 2. Based on the full record, Petitioner persuades us, and we determine, that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Denk and Moechnig.” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 10,328,993 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,328,993 - Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co. Ltd. / Yealink Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. Barco N.V.InstitutedPTAB · Jul 29, 2025 · IPR2025-00491 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–18 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 9, and 15 are unpatentable over Ground 1.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by both parties at this stage of the proceeding, we are persuaded that there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioners would prevail in showing that Beel discloses or suggests to a skilled artisan a base unit having a transmitter and a first peripheral device having a receiver and at least one fixed or a configurable endpoint, where the at least one fixed or a configurable endpoint is a data source or a data sink which is able to store or emit data, of the functional device exposed or made available on the first peripheral device.” slip op. at 26
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioners contend that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had “Master of Science (M.S.) degree in electrical engineering or computer science, and five years of work experience in a related field. Additional educational experience could substitute for some of the work experience.” Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). Patent Owner does not dispute this position at this time. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioners’ proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, as it is consistent with the ’972 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionTerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“We do not agree with Patent Owner that “fixed” or “configurable” requires more than what is agreed to by the parties––i.e., the characteristics and operational parameters of the endpoint are either set prior to operation or can be set during operation. We disagree that the ’972 patent defines “fixed or a configurable endpoint” as “a number of descriptive fields of the endpoint.” Rather column 8, lines 5–6, of the ’972 patent states that “[a]n endpoint is defined by a number of descriptive fields,” which speaks more about the mechanism used to establish the characteristics and operational parameters of the endpoint than it does about how “fixed” or “configurable” would be understood by a skilled artisan. And the fact that an endpoint may be defined by descriptive fields does not inform a skilled artisan that “fixed” or “configurable” requires the endpoint to allow the processing device to correctly interpret and utilize the data from the endpoint. Correctly interpreting and utilizing data may be the goal, but that goal is not turned into a requirement of the claims because the recited endpoint is fixed or configurable. Similarly, there is no basis for making that goal a requirement simply because a fixed endpoint is described as providing basic functionality and a configurable endpoint is described as being configurable by the base unit either while pairing or via the processing device. As a result, we find little merit in Patent Owner’s contention that the language “fixed or a configurable” requires a process for setting up the characteristics and operational parameters of an endpoint within a device so that the processing device can correctly interpret and utilize the data of this endpoint. Patent Owner, however, will have an opportunity during trial to further develop this contention.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableInstituted
“Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by both parties at this stage of the proceeding, we are persuaded that there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioners would prevail in showing that Beel discloses or suggests to a skilled artisan a base unit having a transmitter and a first peripheral device having a receiver and at least one fixed or a configurable endpoint, where the at least one fixed or a configurable endpoint is a data source or a data sink which is able to store or emit data, of the functional device exposed or made available on the first peripheral device. Petitioners’ offers evidence, supported by its expert declarant, that the endpoints disclosed in Beel are either fixed, such as a mass storage unit with predefined characteristics, or configurable, such as a virtual audio interface that may change configuration based on driver instructions or use context. Pet. 32–33. As Petitioners point out, the ’972 patent itself acknowledges that Beel’s Figure 11 illustrates a system comprising a combination of vendor-specific and standard endpoints, and further interprets these endpoints to correspond to drivers and host applications used for functionality like screen sharing and audio streaming, which demonstrates a direct conceptual and structural alignment between the ’972 patent and Beel. Id. Furthermore, Petitioner’s evidence demonstrates sufficiently that Beel describes a peripheral device acting as a virtual composite device capable of emulating different functions—such as a USB audio speaker—while rerouting the data stream (e.g., RTP audio stream) over the network. Id. For instance, Petitioners’ evidence demonstrates sufficiently Beel discloses or suggests that audio data can be captured by a virtual sound card interface implemented within the peripheral device, re-encoded, and transmitted to the base unit for playback or synchronization with video content. Id. In addition, Petitioners have demonstrated sufficiently that Beel’s architecture supports the requirement that the endpoint of the functional device—whether it is a camera, microphone, or speaker—is made available through or exposed on the peripheral device. Id. The functional device’s capabilities are effectively rendered accessible to the processing device by way of the peripheral device, which acts as an intermediary. Id. Petitioners’ evidence demonstrates sufficiently that this exposure can occur via logical interfaces, such as USB Audio Class (UAC) virtual drivers, that allow the processing device to recognize and interact with these endpoints using standard protocols. Id. Furthermore, Petitioners show sufficiently Beel discloses that the peripheral device may include software that facilitates communication with and presentation of media content on the processing device, further demonstrating that the endpoints are not only present but also actively used for data transmission. Id. Patent Owner’s arguments, at least at this stage of the proceeding, fail to undermine Petitioners’ showing because they are largely just that–– attorney arguments––without sufficient evidentiary backing and because they lack sufficient clarity regarding how the recited claim language distinguishes Beel’s disclosed system. First, Patent Owner makes several representations that Petitioners misplace its reliance on certain teachings or suggests found in Beel and that Beel does not support the contention Petitioners make, but Petitioners’ positions are backed the testimony of Dr. Almeroth and Patent Owner offers no contradictory evidence for why a skilled artisan would understand Beel differently. And, suffice it to say that, when the declaration of Dr. Almeroth is considered in juxtaposition with the cited evidence from Beel, we have found declarant Dr. Almeroth sufficiently persuasive to demonstrate Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail on the point. For example, Patent Owner simply argues that “there is no indication in Beel of using any fixed or a configurable endpoint of the functional device exposed or made available on the first peripheral device” (Prelim. Resp. 31), but declarant Dr. Almeroth states that “Beel discloses that a peripheral device can act as a ‘virtual audio device’ using a USB Audio Class (UAC) interface,” which “indicates that endpoints of the functional device are ‘exposed or made available on the first peripheral device’” (Ex. 1002 ¶ 130 (emphasis added); see also id. ¶¶ 128–129). Patent Owner’s argument, without any evidentiary support, does little to undermine the opinion testimony from Dr. Almeroth about what Beel’s teachings would indicate to a skilled artisan. Second, although Patent Owner repeatedly states that Beel fails to” slip op. at 26
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,684,972 - Abbott Laboratories / Abbott Diabetes Care Inc. v. Altivera LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 15, 2025 · IPR2024-00425 · APJ Bach V Hoang · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5, 9, and 10 are unpatentable as obvious over Beck, Heller, and Lovejoy; the Board did not reach the alternative Bandy grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not dispute this assessment. See generally PO Resp. Having considered the record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, as articulated above. We are satisfied that Petitioner’s proposal comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’307 Patent. Accord Inst. Dec. 8–9.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“both the unique sensor ID as well as the associated unique wireless device ID is contradicted, or at least unsupported, by the claim language and the Specification. We determine that this limitation does not require authentication of both the unique sensor ID and the unique wireless device ID, or otherwise require authentication using the unique wireless ID. Rather, the limitation only requires authentication of the unique sensor ID. The language and structure of the claim itself, “the remote server authenticates said unique sensor ID associated with said unique wireless device ID,” requires authentication of the unique sensor ID but not the unique wireless device ID. See Ex. 1001, 19:51–52 (emphasis added). The portion of the limitation reciting “associated with said unique wireless device ID” is linguistically an appositive modifying the “unique sensor ID.” Indeed, Patent Owner acknowledges the “plain meaning of the claim term is that the remote server authenticates the unique sensor ID and that such unique sensor ID is associated with a unique wireless device ID.” PO Resp. 18.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed constructions of any of these other claim terms or phrases. PO Resp. 24. We agree with the parties that the identified limitations—which each recite a “means” or “means for” performing a particular function—are means-plus-function limitations that should be interpreted under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (holding that “use of the word ‘means’ creates a presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 applies”). And we agree with Petitioner’s uncontested identification of the recited functions and corresponding structure for these limitations for the reasons explained by Petitioner. See Pet. 11–15 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:20–21, 2:24–28, 3:33–36, 17:18–30); id. at 13–15 (citing Ex. 1009, 9:4–6, 9:19–20, 9:57–65, 10:10– 11) (explaining that Lovejoy is incorporated by reference into the ’307 Patent). We adopt the uncontested constructions identified by Petitioner, as” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that the improvements offered by the incorporation of Heller’s teachings would have motivated one of ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Beck and Heller in the manner proposed by Petitioner. Confirming Petitioner’s assertion that the combination yields improvements, Heller states that it improves the type of glucose monitor used in one of Beck’s embodiments. Beck states that its “medical device 130 includes a glucose meter” which “measure[s] blood glucose levels of blood applied to test strips.” Ex. 1007 ¶ 34. Specifically addressing such “conventional” test strip glucose monitoring, Heller states that its in vivo glucose sensor system addresses a need for continuous or automatic monitoring in a small, comfortable device. Ex. 1016, 2:1–7, 2:15–58, 3:19–25. As such, we agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Beck and Heller to improve Beck’s medical device. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 401. We further agree with Petitioner that a POSITA would have been motivated to incorporate sensor implementation details described in Heller, e.g., an A/D converter and patient attachment systems, with Beck’s medical device. Pet. 44–45, 53, 55; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 228, 234, 236–238, 259, 267, 278, which do no more than yield predictable results, e.g., converting signals or attaching a sensor to a patient. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 401 (“[A] combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”).” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 7,969,307 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 7,969,307 - Interactive Communications International, Inc. v. Blackhawk Network Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00465 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–24 are unpatentable: claims 1–10 and 12–24 as obvious over Szrek and Llach, and claim 11 as obvious over Szrek, Llach, and Gilmore.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner proposes that the level of ordinary skill in the art is an artisan with a working knowledge of POS activation systems and lottery systems that was gained through a mixture of training and work experience in the relevant field such as (i) having a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer communications, electrical engineering, or equivalent degree, coupled with at least three years of work experience; (ii) having a Master’s degree in computer science, computer communications, or electrical engineering, but having less work experience; or (iii) having no formal degree, but having experience in the relevant field of at least six years of work experience. Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 13–14).9 Patent Owner states that, “[f]or the purpose of this proceeding, Patent Owner adopts the Petition’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 19 (citing Pet. 2–3). We find that the parties’ agreed-upon level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’451 patent and the prior art of record. See Inst. Dec. 14; see Okajima v. 9 Petitioner proposes the same level of ordinary skill in the art that the Board adopted in PGR2020-00084 (Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1008, 11)), and IPR2023- 01235 (see IPR2023-01235, Paper 34 at 12–13). Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Therefore, we adopt the parties’ agreed-upon level of ordinary skill in the art, as articulated above, in our consideration of the issues presently before us.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We need not construe “transaction processor” expressly because its meaning is not in dispute and its construction is not necessary to resolve the controversy before us.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“On balance, we find that even with the alleged disadvantages identified by Patent Owner, one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Szrek with Llach’s third-party transaction processor because the advantage of having a “centralized intermediary” allows Szrek’s system to support different game providers, such as different lottery companies, which would reduce some implementation costs and allow the system to be more easily and cheaply extended. Pet. 47 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 181); see Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine”) (citing Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); see also Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 795 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (stating the same). We acknowledge that the combination comes with some disadvantages, including “add[ed] delay, reduce[d] efficiency, and . . . implementation complexities by converting a simple, direct communication exchange into an exchange that traverses multiple systems.” PO Resp. 52 (citing Ex. 2052 ¶ 163). But, “[t]he fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.” Winner, 202 F.3d at 1349 n.8. Here, Szrek expressly teaches indirect communication as a possible implementation of its system and Petitioner’s combination—employing Llach’s third-party transaction processor as part of the indirect communication channel—offers the attractive benefit of allowing Szrek’s system to support different game providers, which would reduce some implementation costs even if it might increase other costs, e.g., by having to program certain components (e.g., the cash registers) differently. Specifically, we find that the ability to expand Szrek’s system to support different game providers provides advantages that outweigh the disadvantages discussed above in the circumstance where one desires a more robust and comprehensive system. See Pet. Reply 23 (noting three advantages of the combination— (1) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to use ‘a centralized system for activating lottery tickets from different retailers and different locations,’” (2) “allow[ing] support for different game providers, such as different lottery companies,” “reduc[ing] implementation costs,” and (3) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to ‘communicate with individual card” slip op. at 37
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“On balance, we find that even with the alleged disadvantages identified by Patent Owner, one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Szrek with Llach’s third-party transaction processor because the advantage of having a “centralized intermediary” allows Szrek’s system to support different game providers, such as different lottery companies, which would reduce some implementation costs and allow the system to be more easily and cheaply extended. Pet. 47 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 181); see Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine”) (citing Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); see also Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 795 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (stating the same). We acknowledge that the combination comes with some disadvantages, including “add[ed] delay, reduce[d] efficiency, and . . . implementation complexities by converting a simple, direct communication exchange into an exchange that traverses multiple systems.” PO Resp. 52 (citing Ex. 2052 ¶ 163). But, “[t]he fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.” Winner, 202 F.3d at 1349 n.8. Here, Szrek expressly teaches indirect communication as a possible implementation of its system and Petitioner’s combination—employing Llach’s third-party transaction processor as part of the indirect communication channel—offers the attractive benefit of allowing Szrek’s system to support different game providers, which would reduce some implementation costs even if it might increase other costs, e.g., by having to program certain components (e.g., the cash registers) differently. Specifically, we find that the ability to expand Szrek’s system to support different game providers provides advantages that outweigh the disadvantages discussed above in the circumstance where one desires a more robust and comprehensive system. See Pet. Reply 23 (noting three advantages of the combination— (1) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to use ‘a centralized system for activating lottery tickets from different retailers and different locations,’” (2) “allow[ing] support for different game providers, such as different lottery companies,” “reduc[ing] implementation costs,” and (3) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to ‘communicate with individual card” slip op. at 37
Patent outcomesUS 11,488,451 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,488,451
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.