- PTAB · Jul 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00341 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–17, 19, 21–27, 29, and 30 because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would be obvious over TS-23.140 and Ogawa.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“b) Petitioner Shows a Reasonable Likelihood of Prevailing Based on the present record, Petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its challenge to claim 1 as unpatentable over TS-23.140 and Ogawa.” slip op. at 20
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field, and (2) 3–5 years of experience in services and application implementation in communication networks,” and that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and vice versa.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 1–15, 21, 22). Based on the preliminary record, we adopt Petitioner’s asserted level of ordinary skill to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“At this stage, we do not need to interpret expressly any claim term. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We apply Petitioner’s understanding of the claim terms as above described.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted
“Petitioner argues that TS-23.140 would have been implemented with a modem because “it was well-known to use a modem to enable communications over the networks described in TS-23.140,” “would have been a conventional and obvious way to implement what TS-23.140 describes,” and would have been “nothing more than utilizing familiar, known components to achieve a predictable result of facilitating TS- 23.140’s communications.” Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 61–63; Ex. 1004, 14, 17–19, 23–24; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 27–28, 44, Figs. 1, 4); see also id. at 19 (summarizing the proposed combination). Petitioner also argues that there would have been a reasonable expectation of success in implementing a modem in TS-23.140. Id. at 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 63).” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,406,733 - Google LLC v. Flypsi, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 26, 2024 · IPR2023-00358 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4 are unpatentable: claims 1, 2, and 4 as obvious over Backhaus and Taylor, and claim 3 as obvious over Backhaus, Saksena, and Taylor.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science or a related field along with two years of work experience in the field of telecommunication.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 17–18). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s description. PO Resp. 5. We adopt Petitioner’s description for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Patent Owner proposes construing the term “channel” in all challenged claims to refer to “[a] channel [that] does not have to be fully connected on both ends or actually transmitting a particular type of information to qualify as a channel.” PO Resp. 6. Petitioner asserts that Backhaus teaches transmitting an access telephone number via a data channel in two ways. Pet. 23–29. We rely only on the “second way” for purposes of this Decision. See Section II.D.3; Pet. 26–29. Patent Owner’s proposed construction of the term “channel” does not impact the parties’ dispute about the “second way” that Backhaus teaches transmitting an access telephone number via a data channel. PO Resp. 21–23; PO Sur-reply 11; Tr. 10:2–11, 68:3–24.1 Therefore, we determine that the term “channel” does not require an express construction to resolve the parties’ disputes regarding the asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“art to combine the teachings of Backhaus and Taylor so that Backhaus’s SLS platform communicates with the PSTN using Taylor’s PSTN interface. Id. at 55–56; Ex. 1002 ¶ 101. Doing so would have been obvious because Backhaus teaches using its SLS platform with a PSTN, and Taylor provides an interface that allows an external system, such as Backhaus’s SLS platform, to communicate with a PSTN. Pet. 54–56; Ex. 1002 ¶ 101; Ex. 1005 ¶ 32; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 4, 8. In addition, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in using Taylor’s PSTN interface with Backhaus’s SLS platform. Pet. 57; Ex. 1002 ¶ 102.” slip op. at 22
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“because it is “highly conclusory” and “internally contradictory,” and because Dr. Lin “could not explain his opinions at deposition.” PO Resp. 38–39; PO Sur-reply 15–17. In particular, Patent Owner contends that the Lin Declaration “does not contain any statement of the legal standards the expert understood or was applying, such as standards relating to defining the person of ordinary skill in the art, anticipation, or obviousness,” and Dr. Lin “could not recall whether Petitioner gave him instructions on any legal principle.” PO Resp. 39–40 (citing Ex. 2009, 9:1–11, 14:5–17:6, 23:6–11, 25:3–10, 26:9–22, 33:11–34:1, 34:3–11); PO Sur-reply 16. Patent Owner’s argument is unavailing. We do not rely on the Lin Declaration as evidence of any legal standard or for Dr. Lin’s legal conclusions. Rather, we rely on the Lin Declaration to support our factual determinations regarding the teachings of Backhaus, Saksena, and Taylor, as well as why and how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined those teachings. See Sections II.D.3, II.D.6, II.E.1, II.E.2. Thus, irrespective of whether the Lin Declaration discusses a particular legal standard, we do not disregard the entire Lin Declaration.” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 10,334,094 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,334,094 - Google LLC v. Flypsi, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 26, 2024 · IPR2023-00357 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4 are unpatentable: claims 1, 2, and 4 as obvious over Backhaus and Taylor, and claim 3 as obvious over Backhaus, Saksena, and Taylor.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science or a related field along with two years of work experience in the field of telecommunication.” Pet. 4–5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 17–18). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s description. PO Resp. 5. We adopt Petitioner’s description for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Patent Owner proposes construing the term “channel” in all challenged claims to refer to “[a] channel [that] does not have to be fully connected on both ends or actually transmitting a particular type of information to qualify as a channel.” PO Resp. 6. Petitioner asserts that Backhaus teaches transmitting an access telephone number via a data channel in two ways. Pet. 22–26. We rely only on the “second way” for purposes of this Decision. See Section II.D.3; Pet. 25–26. Patent Owner’s proposed construction of the term “channel” does not impact the parties’ dispute about the “second way” that Backhaus teaches transmitting an access telephone number via a data channel. PO Resp. 21–23; PO Sur-reply 11; Tr. 10:2–11, 68:3–24.1 Therefore, we determine that the term “channel” does not require an express construction to resolve the parties’ disputes regarding the asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“had reason to combine the cited teachings of Backhaus and Taylor. Pet. 50– 54 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 94–100). We agree with Petitioner’s rationale. Specifically, it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Backhaus and Taylor so that Backhaus’s SLS platform communicates with the PSTN using Taylor’s PSTN interface. Id. at 53; Ex. 1002 ¶ 97. Doing so would have been obvious because Backhaus teaches using its SLS platform with a PSTN, and Taylor provides an interface that allows an external system, such as Backhaus’s SLS platform, to communicate with a PSTN. Pet. 52–53; Ex. 1002 ¶ 97; Ex. 1005 ¶ 32; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 4, 8. In addition, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in using Taylor’s PSTN interface with Backhaus’s SLS platform. Pet. 53–54; Ex. 1002 ¶ 98.” slip op. at 21
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Sur-reply 15–17. In particular, Patent Owner contends that the Lin Declaration “does not contain any statement of the legal standards the expert understood or was applying, such as standards relating to defining the person of ordinary skill in the art, anticipation, or obviousness,” and Dr. Lin “could not recall whether Petitioner gave him instructions on any legal principle.” PO Resp. 39–40 (citing Ex. 2009, 9:1–11, 14:5–17:6, 23:6–11, 25:3–10, 26:9–22, 33:11–34:1, 34:3–11); PO Sur-reply 16. Patent Owner’s argument is unavailing. We do not rely on the Lin Declaration as evidence of any legal standard or for Dr. Lin’s legal conclusions. Rather, we rely on the Lin Declaration to support our factual determinations regarding the teachings of Backhaus, Saksena, and Taylor, as well as why and how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined those teachings. See Sections II.D.3, II.D.6, II.E.1, II.E.2. Thus, irrespective of whether the Lin Declaration discusses a particular legal standard, we do not disregard the entire Lin Declaration.” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 11,218,585 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,218,585 - Google LLC v. Flypsi, Inc. (D/B/A Flyp)All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 26, 2024 · IPR2023-00359 · APJ James J Mayberry · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4 are unpatentable: claims 1, 2, and 4 over Backhaus and Taylor, and claim 3 over Backhaus, Taylor, and Saksena.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A person of ordinary skill in the art . . . at the time of the alleged invention of the ’554 patent would have had an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science or a related field along with two years of work experience in the field of telecommunication . . . More education can supplement practical experience and vice versa. Pet. 4–5 (referencing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 17–18). Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 5. For the purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s undisputed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. We find that this definition is consistent with the prior art of record and the skill reflected in the Specification of the ’554 patent.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“challenged claims to resolve the underlying controversy.” Pet. 8. Patent Owner proposes construing the term “channel” in all challenged claims to refer to “[a] channel [that] does not have to be fully connected on both ends or actually transmitting a particular type of information to qualify as a channel.” PO Resp. 6. Petitioner asserts that Backhaus teaches transmitting an access telephone number via a data channel in two ways. Pet. 22–26. As will be evident from our analysis below, we rely only on the “second way” for purposes of this Decision. Patent Owner’s proposed construction of the term “channel” does not impact the parties’ dispute about the “second way” that Backhaus teaches transmitting an access telephone number via a data channel. PO Resp. 21–22; Pet. Reply 3 (“Flyp does not even allege that its construction is relevant to the ‘second way’ the Petition addresses limitation [1.b].”); PO Sur-reply 11; Tr. 10:2–11, 68:3–24.5 Therefore, we determine that the term “channel” does not require an express construction to resolve the parties’ disputes regarding the asserted grounds of unpatentability. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Also, we determine that we need not expressly construe any other claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes. To the extent that the scope of any particular claim term requires discussion, however, we provide it in our assessment of the challenges, which we turn to next.” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedMixed
“suggest that we categorially disregard Dr. Lin’s declaration. As a general point, our precedential decision in Xerox does not provide a blank condemnation of declaration testimony that is identical or virtually identical to language in a paper. Xerox found that the “cited declaration testimony is conclusory and unsupported, adds little to the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support, and is entitled to little weight.” Xerox at 15; see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Here, Dr. Lin cites to evidence to support certain testimony. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶ 73 (citing to Ex. 1007 and Ex. 1011). Also, we do not rely on the Lin Declaration as evidence of any legal standard or for Dr. Lin’s legal conclusions. Rather, we rely on the Lin Declaration to support our factual determinations regarding the teachings of Backhaus, Saksena, and Taylor, as well as why and how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined those teachings. Finally, Patent Owner’s arguments go to the weight of Dr. Lin’s testimony. We assess the appropriate weight to give the testimony in our analyses below.” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“provided a motivation to combine the teachings of a PSTN interface in Backhaus’s system, even though Backhaus discloses interfacing with the PSTN. Backhaus is silent as to how its system interfaces with the PSTN. As such, we agree with Petition that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to connect SLS platform 115 with the PSTN and to also include a PSTN interface in order to facilitate such an connection when implementing Backhaus’s system and processes—such that SLS platform 115 could provide the disclosed second line services to many device users connected to the PSTN that is known to provide reliable communications. Pet. 50. Indeed, Patent Owner’s argument that Backhaus discloses interacting with the PSTN strengthens Petitioner’s position, demonstrating that a person having ordinary skill in the art, when considering Backhaus’s and Taylor’s teachings together, would have used a PSTN interface to ensure a connection with a PSTN. Cf. Pet. Reply 19 (“Rather, it shows that a [person having ordinary skill in the art] would have been motivated to ‘include a PSTN interface similar to that discussed in Taylor when implementing Backhaus’s telephony service system.’” (citing Pet., 49–51)).” slip op. at 32
Patent outcomesUS 11,012,554 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,012,554 - PTAB · Jul 24, 2024 · IPR2024-00465 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–24 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Irwin renders at least one challenged claim obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“Even assuming Linq3 is a real party in interest to Petitioner and assuming we may exercise our discretion to deny institution based on unclean hands (see Kavo Dental Techs, LLC v. Osseo Imaging, Inc., IPR2020-00659, Paper 10 at 19 (PTAB June 10, 2020)), Patent Owner essentially asks us to resolve multiple factual issues related to its contract dispute with Linq3 to justify denial of institution. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 1– 26. Many, if not all, of these issues appear to be involved in the contract dispute, which will be resolved by the Arizona state court. We are not in a good position to make determinations about these particular issues at this stage of the proceeding, on the limited record before us. Rather, we find that the state court is better suited to address the conduct of Linq3 of which Patent Owner complains. Accordingly, we leave these matters for the state court. To the extent Patent Owner seeks to pursue its argument that Linq3 is a real party in interest to Petitioner, even though no time bar under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) has been asserted, Patent Owner may raise the issue of real party in interest again in its Patent Owner Response, and the parties may brief and argue the issue during trial.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticDenied
“We disagree. First, we agree with Patent Owner that the fact pattern presented here is not the typical situation in which the factors from General Plastic are considered. In particular, this proceeding challenges claims of a different patent than the patents at issue in PGR2020-00084 and IPR2023- 01235. Challenging claims of different patents significantly distinguishes the facts here from those in General Plastic, and we decline Patent Owner’s invitation to extend General Plastic in this regard. Accordingly, we do not exercise our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityNot reached
“Even assuming Linq3 is a real party in interest to Petitioner and assuming we may exercise our discretion to deny institution based on unclean hands (see Kavo Dental Techs, LLC v. Osseo Imaging, Inc., IPR2020-00659, Paper 10 at 19 (PTAB June 10, 2020)), Patent Owner essentially asks us to resolve multiple factual issues related to its contract dispute with Linq3 to justify denial of institution. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 1– 26. Many, if not all, of these issues appear to be involved in the contract dispute, which will be resolved by the Arizona state court. We are not in a good position to make determinations about these particular issues at this stage of the proceeding, on the limited record before us. Rather, we find that the state court is better suited to address the conduct of Linq3 of which Patent Owner complains. Accordingly, we leave these matters for the state court. To the extent Patent Owner seeks to pursue its argument that Linq3 is a real party in interest to Petitioner, even though no time bar under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) has been asserted, Patent Owner may raise the issue of real party in interest again in its Patent Owner Response, and the parties may brief and argue the issue during trial.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“5. Weighing the Graham Factors “Once all relevant facts are found, the ultimate legal determination [of obviousness] involves the weighing of the fact findings to conclude whether the claimed combination would have been obvious to an ordinary artisan.” Arctic Cat, 876 F.3d at 1361. On balance, considering the record presently before us, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that Irwin would have rendered the subject matter of claims 1–9 and 11–24 of the ’451 patent obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 38
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,488,451 - PTAB · Jul 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00374 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–10 and all asserted grounds because the petition showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“petition for inter partes review. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016). In determining whether to exercise that discretion on behalf of the Director, the Board considers an early trial date in related litigation, among other factors, as part of an assessment of all relevant circumstances of the case—including the merits—to balance considerations such as system efficiency, fairness, and patent quality. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 5. When the same prior art is submitted in district court and to the Board, there are “concerns of inefficiency and the possibility of conflicting decisions.” Id. at 12. Petitioner can mitigate those concerns by presenting a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“(2) if either condition of first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. If a condition in the first part of the framework is satisfied and the petitioner fails to make a showing of material error, the Director generally will exercise discretion not to institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim challenged in the Petition. Thus, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“engineering, electrical engineering, or a related field, and (2) at least two years of industry experience in digital video processing, or a related field.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 10035 ¶¶ 76–78). Petitioner also asserts that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner uses the same skill level in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 21. We also apply Petitioner’s proposed skill level in this Decision. Pet. 3.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,090,025 - PTAB · Jul 18, 2024 · IPR2024-00372 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 2–4 and 11 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Samsung would show them unpatentable as obvious over Phek, Segall, Martins, and He.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“such as system efficiency, fairness, and patent quality. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 5. When the same prior art is submitted in district court and to the Board, there are “concerns of inefficiency and the possibility of conflicting decisions.” Id. at 12. Petitioner can mitigate those concerns by presenting a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the Board. Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 at 19 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential). Here, Petitioner has presented such a stipulation: if the Board grants institution, Petitioner “agrees not to pursue any grounds raised in the petition, or any grounds [Petitioner] could have reasonably raised in the petition, in [the] district court litigation or any parallel proceeding” Ex. 1028, 1. “Consistent with [Sotera], the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Katherine K. Vidal, Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation (USPTO June 21, 2022).5 Thus, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny the Petition.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“present arguments specifically directed to the subject matter recited in the rest of the claim. See Prelim. Resp. Even so, Petitioner has the burden to show that the challenged claims are unpatentable. Thus, we have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence submitted in connection with the remaining limitations and find them to be sufficient at this stage and on this record. From the current record, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in demonstrating that claim 2 is unpatentable.” slip op. at 25
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“digital video processing, or a related field.” Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 10036 ¶¶ 123–125). Petitioner also asserts that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and vice versa.” Id. at 4. Patent Owner uses the same skill level in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 13. We also apply Petitioner’s proposed skill level in this Decision.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Patent Owner’s arguments, however, are based on an implicit construction for the second resolution converter. See § II.D.5.c supra. For the reasons discussed below, we disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments and the implicit construction. See id. Apart from rejecting the implicit construction of the second resolution converter, we agree with the parties that no claim term needs to be construed in this Decision.” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,218,995 - PTAB · Jun 11, 2024 · IPR2024-00245 · APJ Nathan A Engels · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–4 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Samsung would show at least one claim unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.108. Upon consideration of the evidence currently of record, we conclude that the information presented shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’150 Patent.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“DISCRETIONARY DENIAL Patent Owner argues that we should exercise our discretion to deny the Petition based on the parallel district court litigation. Prelim. Resp. 35 (citing Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential)). Petitioner, however, presented a Sotera stipulation.7 Pet. 88 (citing Ex. 1023). Thus, we do not exercise our discretion to deny institution here. See Katherine K. Vidal, Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with 7 See Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 at 19 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential). Parallel District Court Litigation (June 21, 2022) (“Consistent with [Sotera], the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.”).8” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther
“Petitioner states that (i) “coded multi-view video signal,” recited in each of the challenged claims, “encompasses a coded video signal for two or more viewpoints, including at least one base viewpoint and at least one nonbase viewpoint” (Pet. 7), and (ii) “picture signal,” also recited in each of the challenged claims, “refers to a signal that represents at least one picture from a viewpoint” (Pet. 9). Petitioner also identifies four elements of claim 1 that Petitioner contends are means-plus-function claim elements under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 (pre-AIA). Patent Owner states that for the purposes of its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner “does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed constructions . . . , including terms that it contends are subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112(6).” Prelim. Resp. 10. At this stage, we apply the parties’ agreed-upon constructions for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“and DTS are provided in optional fields of packetized elementary stream packets. Ex. 1005, 7:19–25. Further, “[t]he video DTS . . . indicates the time when the picture needs to be decoded by the STD” (Ex. 1005, 7:47– 49), and on the current record, we understand Petitioner to cite the DTS parameters encoded in the transport stream for enhancement layer pictures as teaching the claimed coded information representing a desired delay time. Pet. 33. Among other examples, Petitioner (Pet. 34) and Dr. Reader (Ex. 1005 ¶ 201) cite Chen-736’s example of the formula DTSEi = DTSLi +1.5F, where F is a time interval based on the frame rate (Ex. 1005, 8:9–20), as indicating that DTSEi represents the start of decoding of the ith picture in the enhancement layer being delayed 1.5F relative to the start of decoding of the ith picture frame of the base layer. Pet. 36 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 201); see Pet. 35–40 (citing additional examples of serial and parallel decoding with similar DTS calculations). At this stage, we find Petitioner’s position that the claim’s recitation that the coded information must “represent” the desired delay time to be a reasonable reading of the plain language of the claim such that a DTS value can represent the desired delay time even if it requires calculation. Pet. 35 n.8. Even if Chen-736’s use of F-based offsets as time intervals “is different than the concept of a desired delay between decoding” and Chen-736 recognizes the distinction between PTS and DTS (Prelim. Resp. 14–15), on the current record, these arguments do not rebut Petitioner’s mapping of Chen-736 to the claim language. Similarly, Patent Owner’s argument that Chen-736 teaches a DTS for all picture signals, including the base viewpoints and non-base viewpoints (Prelim. Resp. 16), does not rebut Petitioner’s mapping of Chen-736’s enhancement-layer DTS to the claim language. At this stage, on the current record we determine Petitioner has sufficiently shown that Chen-736 teaches or reasonably suggests this claim element.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,139,150 - PTAB · May 28, 2024 · IPR2024-00085 · APJ Michael L Woods · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7–11, 13, and 15 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a), we have authority to institute an inter partes review if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Preliminary Reply, the Preliminary Sur-reply, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims of the ’659 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the Challenged Claims on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“We disagree with Patent Owner. Our analysis under Fintiv is guided by the USPTO Director’s Memorandum issued on June 21, 2022, titled “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation.”8 The Director’s Memorandum explains that, when a petitioner makes a Sotera-type stipulation, “it mitigates concerns of potentially conflicting decisions and duplicative efforts between the district court and the PTAB” and “[w]ith such a stipulation, if an IPR or PGR is instituted, the grounds the PTAB resolves will differ from those present in 8 https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_discretio nary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf (“Director’s Memorandum”). the parallel district court litigation.” Director’s Memorandum 7 (citing Sotera, IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 at 18–19). Pursuant to the Director’s Memorandum, we “will not discretionarily deny institution of an IPR or PGR in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition.” Id. Because Petitioner provides a Sotera-type stipulation, we do not exercise our discretion to deny institution under Fintiv.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Upon review of the prior art of record and the parties’ arguments, we adopt Patent Owner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision as it appears consistent with the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art). Petitioner’s proposed definition appears overly restrictive, as it requires a graduate degree in a narrow field of engineering or equivalent experience. We find that a bachelor’s degree with the accompanying experience proposed by Patent Owner more closely aligns with the prior art of record and the ’659 patent. We note, however, there is some overlap in the proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art because Patent Owner’s proposal includes “at least” a bachelor’s degree, which would encompass Petitioner’s master’s degree as well. Prelim. Resp. 19. Nonetheless, our determination herein would be the same under either party’s definition.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We disagree with Patent Owner’s claim construction. By using the word “or,” the plain and ordinary meaning of “prone, kneeling, or standing” is that only one must be satisfied to meet the claim. See, e.g., SkinMedica, Inc. v. Histogen Inc., 727 F.3d 1187, 1199 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The disjunctive ‘or’ plainly designates that a series describes alternatives.”). Furthermore, and although claims are read in light of the specification, limitations in a specification are not read into a claim. In re van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Even if the Specification describes embodiments in which the user can begin in a prone position and then transition to a kneeling or standing position, as Patent Owner points out (see Prelim. Resp. 20), the claim does not recite the term “transitioning,” and we do not read the terms “each of” or “substantially flat surface” into this claim limitation. For example, the claim does not recite a “substantially flat” top surface and Patent Owner’s attempt to infer this structure into the claim is not supported under the law. See id. at 29–30. For purposes of this Decision, we agree with Petitioner and construe “prone, kneeling, or standing” in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning as alternatives, and the prior art need only show one to satisfy this aspect of the claim.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 9,586,659 - PTAB · May 28, 2024 · IPR2024-00086 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 5-8, 10-15, 17, 18, 20, and 21 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of success and declining Fintiv denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in an inter partes review). slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“1. “wherein a user can be disposed on the top surface of the flotation device in a prone, kneeling, or standing position” With respect to the claim term “wherein a user can be disposed on the top surface of the flotation device in a prone, kneeling, or standing position,” Patent Owner points to passages of the Specification, arguing that all three positions are possible. Prelim. Resp. 19–21 (citing Ex. 1001, Abstr., 4:13–17, 4:33–40; Ex. 2006 ¶ 18). We do not agree with Patent’s Owner proposed construction because even if the Specification discloses that all three positions are possible, that is not what the plain language of the claim requires. Claim 1 recites “or,” which means that a user can be disposed on the top surface of the flotation device in any one of the three positions. See, e.g., SkinMedica, Inc. v. Histogen Inc., 727 F.3d 1187, 1199 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The disjunctive ‘or’ plainly designates that a series describes alternatives.”). Patent Owner does not identify any definition or disclaimer that would modify this plain meaning. See Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Thus, we agree with Petitioner and apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase “wherein a user can be disposed on the top surface of the flotation device in a prone, kneeling, or standing position,” to construe “prone, kneeling, or standing” as alternatives, and the prior art need only show one to satisfy this aspect of the claim.” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Neither party explains how or why its particular proposal impacts the issues before us in this proceeding. We find that a bachelor’s degree with the accompanying experience proposed by Patent Owner more closely aligns with the prior art of record and the ’044 patent. We note, however, there is some overlap in the proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art because Patent Owner’s proposal includes “at least” a bachelor’s degree, which would encompass Petitioner’s master’s degree as well. Prelim. Resp. 10. Nonetheless, our determination herein would be the same under either party’s definition.” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedInstituted
“As the Board has held in a precedential decision, “at the institution stage, the petition must identify, with particularity, evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the reference was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent and therefore that there is a reasonable likelihood that it qualifies as a printed publication.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential).” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,359,044
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.