- Røde Microphones, LLC / Freedman Electronics Pty Ltd. v. Zaxcom, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 11, 2026 · IPR2025-00232 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held that Petitioner did not prove any challenged claims of the ’207 patent unpatentable under the Strub, Woo, Nagai, and Gleissner obviousness ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“in these respects. The preambles of claims 17 and 59 recite the “audio device wearable by a user for storing locally generated audio.” There is neither mention of “multi-track” audio in the claim, nor is the audio device limited to capturing a single source of sound, such as a single performer. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the ’443 and ’207 patent claims support the limited scope that Patent Owner urges for the term “locally generated audio.” None of Patent Owner’s citations to the specification define or require that the “locally generated audio” correspond to audio generated only by a single performer. See, e.g., 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 8:59−62 (stating that the local audio input device “may be worn by the performer and connects to local audio device 102 at local audio input device port 314”). Patent Owner’s argument that the specification “teaches a single creator/performer per local audio device” is well-taken, but the teachings do not indicate the intent to exclude other sounds from being captured at the local audio device (or indicate how the device would prevent the capture of other sounds, such that the audio would be “isolated” as Patent Owner contends). See 230 Sur-Reply 10 (citing 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 4:28−32, 10:29−34, and Insituform Techs., Inc. v. Cat Contr., Inc., 99 F.3d 1098, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[C]laim 1 refers to ‘a cup’ and ‘the cup’ repeatedly, suggesting that only one cup is involved . . . . [N]either the specification nor the drawings disclose the use of more than one cup.”)). For instance, the specification describes that the “independent track of audio is received from one of the performer’s local audio device 102.” 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 10:33−34. Thus, in this description the audio track corresponds to the audio captured by a particular audio device—which was worn by the performer— but does not limit that captured audio to only sounds made by the performer. As to the “local audio data” term, Patent Owner argues that “audio data” means “mono or stereo audio files created from independent, isolated locally generated audio files, such files suitable for creation of a multi-track audio file.” 230 PO Resp. 9−10 (citing Ex. 2140 ¶¶ 131, 134). This argument is unsupported by the claim language or specification. The claim does not require the creation of audio files, much less a “multi-track audio file.” The specification describes storing audio files in memory without the specificity that Patent Owner urges we adopt. See 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 13:1−14. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “local audio data.” Rather, we understand “audio data” to have a plain and ordinary meaning, such as the one given to the term by the District Court in the underlying litigation. 230 IPR, Ex. 1037, 10. We adopt the District Court’s construction of “audio data” to mean “data comprising audio signals in digital form.” Id. This finds support in the specification as the audio is described as being converted into digital audio and stored in a file. See 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 13:1−14. Our conclusion is consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term as that would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art, and we see no reason to deviate from the conclusions of the District Court on this point.” slip op. at 20
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“data” means “mono or stereo audio files created from independent, isolated locally generated audio files, such files suitable for creation of a multi-track audio file.” 230 PO Resp. 9−10 (citing Ex. 2140 ¶¶ 131, 134). This argument is unsupported by the claim language or specification. The claim does not require the creation of audio files, much less a “multi-track audio file.” The specification describes storing audio files in memory without the specificity that Patent Owner urges we adopt. See 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 13:1−14. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “local audio data.” Rather, we understand “audio data” to have a plain and ordinary meaning, such as the one given to the term by the District Court in the underlying litigation. 230 IPR, Ex. 1037, 10. We adopt the District Court’s construction of “audio data” to mean “data comprising audio signals in digital form.” Id. This finds support in the specification as the audio is described as being converted into digital audio and stored in a file. See 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 13:1−14. Our conclusion is consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term as that would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art, and we see no reason to deviate from the conclusions of the District Court on this point.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Skepticism / industry praiseObjective indicia with nexusDecided for patent owner
“1. Industry Praise: Academy and Emmy Awards Patent Owner argues that it “revolutionized [the] industry with the” slip op. at 97
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Long-felt need / failure of othersDecided for patent owner
“2. Long-Felt Need Patent Owner further proffers the testimony of two witnesses as” slip op. at 104
Patent outcomesUS 10,276,207 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,276,207 - Røde Microphones, LLC / Freedman Electronics Pty Ltd. v. Zaxcom, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 11, 2026 · IPR2025-00230 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Final written decision
The Board determined that Petitioner had not shown any challenged claims of the ’443 or ’207 patents unpatentable, including under the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonySkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“E. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Based on the argument and evidence presented in the Petition and Patent Owner’s preliminary response, we determined, as stated in our Decision on Institution, that “a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and two or more years of experience working with audio and wireless communications systems.” 230 Dec. on Inst. 16; 232 Dec. on Inst. 22−23. Patent Owner reiterates its position that a person of ordinary skill the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a related subject and two to five years’ experience working with multi-track audio and wireless communications systems in the professional performance industry.” 230 IPR, PO Resp. 6−7 (emphasis added) (identical passage in 232 PO Resp. 8). Thus, the dispute centers on whether the level or ordinary skill includes specific work experience with multi-track audio in the professional performance industry. We do not agree that this specific work experience is necessary to the level of ordinary skill in the instant proceedings. In determining whether an invention would have been obvious at the time it was made, we consider the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of the invention. Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 17−18 (1966). “The importance of resolving the level of ordinary skill in the art lies in the necessity of maintaining objectivity in the obviousness inquiry.” Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu‑Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The “person of ordinary skill in the art” is a hypothetical construct, from whose vantage point obviousness is assessed. In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In determining the level or ordinary skill, we may consider various factors including “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, 57 F.3d 1573, 1579, (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). Patent Owner’s proposed specificity of work with multi-track audio in a professional performance industry is not supported by the record. First, Patent Owner submits conclusory declaration testimony of James DeFilippis—repeating verbatim, and without any supported reasoning, Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. Ex. 2140 ¶ 15. As such, the testimony is not persuasive. Second, Patent Owner’s additional declaration testimony of Jack” slip op. at 12
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“data” means “mono or stereo audio files created from independent, isolated locally generated audio files, such files suitable for creation of a multi-track audio file.” 230 PO Resp. 9−10 (citing Ex. 2140 ¶¶ 131, 134). This argument is unsupported by the claim language or specification. The claim does not require the creation of audio files, much less a “multi-track audio file.” The specification describes storing audio files in memory without the specificity that Patent Owner urges we adopt. See 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 13:1−14. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “local audio data.” Rather, we understand “audio data” to have a plain and ordinary meaning, such as the one given to the term by the District Court in the underlying litigation. 230 IPR, Ex. 1037, 10. We adopt the District Court’s construction of “audio data” to mean “data comprising audio signals in digital form.” Id. This finds support in the specification as the audio is described as being converted into digital audio and stored in a file. See 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 13:1−14. Our conclusion is consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term as that would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art, and we see no reason to deviate from the conclusions of the District Court on this point.” slip op. at 21
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“irrelevant under Federal Rules of Evidence 401–403. Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner has failed to establish that these documents reflect the understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art, or that they are consumer-oriented documents, but not technical references or sources for understanding the meaning of claim terms. 230 IPR, Paper 64, 3−4. According to Patent Owner, these exhibits lack a “technical foundation” that establishes the technical meaning of a claim term. Id. We do not agree with Patent Owner as it conflates relevance with sufficiency of evidence to prove a contention on claim construction. Dictionary definitions are often useful when determining a claim term’s plain and ordinary meaning in the context of the specification, and as such are relevant when claim terms are disputed. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. Furthermore, the evidence of record shows testimony as to whether the “Sweetwater” glossary entry for “body pack” would be relevant to the meaning of the term in the “world of wireless performance.” 230 IPR, Paper 67, 4 (citing Ex. 1073 ¶ 42). Patent Owner’s objections are overruled as to relevance.” slip op. at 116
- BurdenFwd all claims patentableNot shown unpatentable
“after a full and fair hearing, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that any of the challenged claims are unpatentable.” slip op. at 125
Patent outcomesUS 7,711,443 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,711,443 - Abbott Laboratories v. Miracor Medical SASome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00114 · APJ Annette R Reimers · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14–16, 18, and 19 are unpatentable under §103; claim 20 was not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyDenied
“IV. PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE Patent Owner seeks to exclude portions of Dr. Wieselthaler’s Declaration (Exhibit 1041), portions of Mr. Crosby’s Reply Declaration (Exhibit 1042), portions of the deposition transcript of Dr. Wieselthaler (Exhibit 2028), and the exhibits “upon which that testimony is based” (Exhibits 1015, 1038, 1044, 1046, 1049, and 1050). Mot. 1. According to Patent Owner, the Motion was made “to preserve objections previously made in the record.” Id. (citations omitted). Patent Owner did not timely move to strike any of the evidence at issue as being outside the scope of reply evidence. Patent Owner asserts that because an inter partes review must be based on prior art consisting of patents or printed publications (citing 35 U.S.C. § 311(b)), the testimony of Mr. Crosby and Dr. Wieselthaler concerning “various physical devices allegedly known” to a person of ordinary skill in the art is inadmissible, along with all of the exhibits (consisting of printed materials such a journal abstracts, press releases, and papers) related to those physical devices. Id. at 3–4; see also Mot. Reply 1–4 (arguing that “devices that Petitioner’s witnesses assert were the basis of an inter partes review”). According to Patent Owner, Dr. Wieselthaler was unable to “link two of these physical devices to the printed prior art asserted in this [inter partes review], but those attempts fell apart during his cross examination.” Id. at 4. Patent Owner further reasons that because the evidence “cannot be the basis” of an inter partes review, it “has no tendency to make any fact of consequence in this trial more or less probable,” “is irrelevant and not admissible,” “presents substantial danger of confusing the issues, causing undue delay, and wasting time in this trial,” and “are not ‘based on sufficient facts[,] the product of reliable principles and methods[, or] ‘a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case.’” Id. at 7 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 401–403, 702) (modification in original). With regard to Exhibits 1015, 1038, 1044, 1046, 1049, and 1050, Petitioner argues, and we agree, that Patent Owner identifies no plausible legal theory for their inadmissibility based on the contention that they discuss physical devices. See Mot. Resp. 3. We also agree with Petitioner that the exhibits are not “the basis for any ground” asserted in this proceeding, and may be properly relied upon by Dr. Wieselthaler and Mr. Crosby as support for their rebuttal testimony directed to Patent Owner’s arguments disputing Petitioner’s asserted motivation to combine the prior art relied upon in the instituted grounds. See id. at 3–4. In regard to the disputed testimony of Dr. Wieselthaler and” slip op. at 77
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther
“1. “magneto coupling” Claim 1 recites, in relevant part, “a second magnetic device . . . positioned to magnetically drive rotation of the magnetically driven rotor via a magneto coupling with the first magnetic device.” Ex. 1001, 5:34–37. Claim 11 recites, in relevant part, “the second magnetic device positioned axially closer to the first magnetic device than to the magnetically driven rotor so as to magnetically drive rotation of the magnetically driven rotor relative to the one or more walls via a magneto coupling with the first magnetic device.” Id. at 6:42–48. Petitioner argues that “magneto coupling” means “a transfer of torque from one rotating permanent magnetic component to another rotating permanent magnetic component via a magnetic field.” Pet. 8–9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 68–87). According to Petitioner, this construction is consistent with the ’879 patent, which describes “a coupling between two rotating ‘bar magnets’—a drive wheel rotates one bar magnet which causes another bar magnet (connected to a rotor) to rotate.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 54–55 (analyzing Ex. 1001, 2:28–52, 4:44–64, Fig. 2)). Patent Owner argues that “magneto coupling” should be afforded “its plain and ordinary meaning, which would encompass a magnetic coupling through both rotating magnets and the use of a rotating magnetic Owner directs us to the testimony of Mr. Leschinsky, who explains that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the ’879 patent to use “magneto coupling” to generally describe “a way to couple the rotor to a drive element while sealing the two from one another and avoiding use of a direct mechanical coupling.” Ex. 2015 ¶ 67. According to Patent Owner, “Petitioner provides no recognizable basis for limiting the plain meaning of magnetic coupling to one type of magnet and excluding another type of magnet.” PO Resp. 6–7 (citing Johnson Worldwide Associates, Inc., v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989–992 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner does not provide a sufficient basis for limiting the plain meaning of “magneto coupling.” That the ’879 patent describes embodiments using bar magnets does not serve to require the use of permanent magnets for the recited “magneto coupling.” See Sisvel Int’l S.A. v. Sierra Wireless, Inc., 81 F.4th 1231, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (“[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.”)). Moreover, the claim language here is not so limited. 13 Patent Owner notes that Petitioner’s grounds of unpatentability based on Wampler and Bourque depend on the disclosure only of electromagnetic drives in each reference, implying that “Petitioner does not believe its own proposed narrower construction.” PO Resp. 6; see also Pet. 8 (Petitioner alleging that in the Parallel Proceeding Patent Owner “conflates ‘magneto coupling’ . . . with a stator drive using a stationary electromagnet, instead of a rotating magnet, to rotate the rotor magnet,” and asserting that as the basis for Petitioner’s reliance on Wampler and Bourque as teaching a “magneto coupling” in this proceeding (citing Ex. 1019, 7; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 84–87)).” slip op. at 24
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableUnpatentable
“reasons discussed above. See supra Section III.D.3. Accordingly, because Petitioner’s contentions are premised on an unsupported claim construction that we reject, Petitioner fails to show how Wampler teaches or suggests “a magnetically driven rotor . . . axially adjacent to a first magnet device,” as required by claims 1 and 11, as well as by claims 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14– 16, and 18–20, which depend from either claim 1 or claim 11. In its Reply, Petitioner suggests that “[u]nder [Patent Owner’s] construction from the [Patent Owner Response], Wampler also teaches or suggests this limitation,” because Patent Owner “concedes [that] ‘axially adjacent’ components ‘have” slip op. at 36
Patent outcomesUS 11,572,879 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,572,879 - Abbott Laboratories v. Miracor Medical SAAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 8, 2026 · IPR2025-00112 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 10, 11, 14, and 17 are unpatentable as obvious over Schima and Akamatsu; the other asserted grounds were not established.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in engineering; knowledge and experience in human circulatory system anatomy and physiology; and at least five years’ experience designing and developing implantable medical devices.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 18).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“sufficient basis for limiting the plain meaning of “magneto coupling.” That the ’357 patent describes embodiments using bar magnets does not serve to require the use of permanent magnets for the recited “magneto coupling.” See Sisvel Int’l S.A. v. Sierra Wireless, Inc., 81 F.4th 1231, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (“[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.”)). Moreover, the claim language here is not so limited. 11 Patent Owner notes that Petitioner’s grounds of unpatentability based on Wampler and Bourque depend on the disclosure only of electromagnetic drives in each reference, implying that “Petitioner does not believe its own proposed narrower construction.” PO Resp. 6; see also Pet. 8 (Petitioner alleging that in the Parallel Proceeding Patent Owner “conflates ‘magneto coupling’ . . . with a stator drive using a stationary electromagnet, instead of a rotating magnet, to rotate the rotor magnet,” and asserting that as the basis for Petitioner’s reliance on Wampler and Bourque as teaching a “magneto coupling” in this proceeding (citing Ex. 1019, 9–11; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 84–87)). distinguished “magneto coupling” drives from drives using stators. Pet. 7–8 (citing Ex. 1011, 1 (explaining that the rotating field is generated by rotating magnets in a magnetic coupling pump and by electric stator windings in a stator pump)). Petitioner does not explain how this cited reference evidences that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood “magneto coupling” requires rotating permanent magnets. At most, this reference teaches an example device that provides “magneto coupling.” See Ex. 1011, 1. In sum, we agree with Patent Owner that “magneto coupling,” consistent with our Institution Decision, encompasses generating a rotating field either by rotating magnets or by an electromagnet / stator. See Inst. Dec. 22” slip op. at 22
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“ignores the readily apparent fact that the lower arrow is placed in a location that misrepresents the minimum distance between the magnetically driven rotor and the second magnetic device to suggest that Wampler teaches “the second magnetic device positioned axially closer to the first magnetic device than to the magnetically driven rotor,” as required by claim 1. Petitioner purports to justify this misrepresentation by asserting that “the vast majority of the impeller 74 is spaced significantly farther apart from the stators 90 and 94 than the magnetic pieces 88 are positioned from the stators 90 and 94.” Id. at 33–34. Claim 1 does not recite any feature based on the “vast majority” of a component and it is readily apparent from Petitioner’s own annotated version of Figure 11a that the distance from both the “motor magnets [88]” and “impeller 74” to the “circular electromagnetic stator[s] [90 and 94]” is the same. We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has provided a “misleading Figure with two red arrows denoting measurement distances to illustrate its incorrect view that the second magnetic device is farther from the magnetically driven rotor than from the first magnetic device.” PO Resp. 13–15 (providing an annotated version of Wampler’s Figure 11a with an orange arrow showing that in Wampler the distances from the second magnetic device to both the rotor and the first magnetic device are the same). Accordingly, Petitioner fails to show that Wampler teaches “the second magnetic device positioned axially closer to the first magnetic device than to the magnetically driven rotor.”” slip op. at 29
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“To orient the pump in the least obtrusive position (i.e., in the human configuration, as in Figure 3), it was decided that the rotational axis of the pump’s rotor should be perpendicular to the body’s long axis. That resulted in a sharp bend in the flow before it enters the impeller. To minimize the losses in this transition, the flow is slightly accelerated through this elbow. that this type of elbow [i.e., the elbow used with Bourque’s centrifugal pump] was unnecessary,” applying Wampler to Bourque would have improved “blood flow.” Pet. 73 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 418–419; Ex. 1007, 402; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 75–76). As explained above, Wampler does not teach that “this type of elbow” was unnecessary. Bourque uses a centrifugal pump with an additional elbow specifically so that the centrifugal pump may be oriented “in the least obtrusive position.” Ex. 1007, 402. Moreover, there is no persuasive evidence to support Petitioner’s assertion that eliminating the elbow from Bourque would improve “blood flow.” Mr. Crosby’s declaration provides no additional explanation or support to show how “blood flow” would have been improved. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 419. Nor does Mr. Crosby address the fact that Bourque expressly states that “flow is slightly accelerated” through the elbow to “minimize losses in this transition.” Ex. 1007, 402. Eliminating the elbow from Bourque, as Petitioner and Mr. Crosby propose, would mean the pump could no longer be placed in “the least obtrusive position” according to Bourque and there is no persuasive evidence that such a modification would improve blood flow.” slip op. at 45
Patent outcomesUS 11,351,357 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,351,357 - Abbott Laboratories v. Miracor Medical SAAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 4, 2026 · IPR2025-00113 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5, 10, 11, 14, 16, and 17 are unpatentable under §103 over Schima and Akamatsu.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“reasons discussed above. See supra Section III.D.3. Accordingly, because Petitioner’s contentions are premised on an unsupported claim construction that we reject, Petitioner fails to show how Wampler teaches or suggests “a magnetically driven rotor . . . axially adjacent to a first magnet device,” as required by claim 1, as well as by claims 2–5, 10, 11, 14, 16, and 17, which depend from claim 1. In its Reply, Petitioner suggests that “[u]nder [Patent Owner’s] construction from the [Patent Owner Response], Wampler also teaches or suggests this limitation,” because Patent Owner “concedes that ‘axially adjacent’ components ‘have positioning that is next to one another, perhaps touching or sharing a common side, when measured along the axis.’” Pet. Reply 11 (citing PO Resp. 17). Petitioner mischaracterizes Patent Owner’s arguments and ignores Patent Owner’s showing that “axially adjacent” components are “distinct from components that are aligned with one another such that they overlap or occupy the same portion of an axis” slip op. at 32
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“endeavor of the ’415 patent (i.e., “[a] method and device to assist the performance of a heart with at least one pump that is formed as a rotary pump and driven via magneto coupling”). See Ex. 1001, code (57); Ex. 1005 code (57); Ex. 1006, 1. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has sufficiently shown that Schima and Akamatsu are analogous art to the ’415 patent.” slip op. at 71
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“endeavor of the ’415 patent (i.e., “[a] method and device to assist the performance of a heart with at least one pump that is formed as a rotary pump and driven via magneto coupling”). See Ex. 1001, code (57); Ex. 1005 code (57); Ex. 1006, 1. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has sufficiently shown that Schima and Akamatsu are analogous art to the ’415 patent.” slip op. at 71
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“not identified a persuasive basis under any of the Federal Rules of Evidence for the exclusion of evidence in this proceeding and deny the Motion.” slip op. at 78
Patent outcomesUS 11,376,415 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,376,415 - Ipr2026-00212Institution deniedPTAB · Jun 2, 2026 · IPR2026-00212 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review
The Director denied institution in IPR2026-00212 after review of discretionary and non-merits considerations.
RulingsDirector review decision- Director reviewDirector review, deniedDenied
“NOTICE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), after review of discretionary and non- merits considerations, institution of inter partes review is denied in the following proceeding: IPR2026-00212 IPR2026-00252 Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), after review of discretionary” slip op. at 1
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,931,286 - Ipr2026-00181Institution deniedPTAB · May 26, 2026 · IPR2026-00181 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review
The Director denied institution of IPR2026-00181 after reviewing discretionary and non-merits considerations.
RulingsDirector review decision- Director reviewDirector review, deniedDenied
“NOTICE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), after review of discretionary and non- merits considerations, institution of inter partes review is denied in the following proceeding: IPR2026-00181 Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), after review of discretionary” slip op. at 1
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,860,450 - Berkshire Hathaway Energy Company / Pacificorp v. Birchtech Corp.Institution deniedPTAB · May 20, 2026 · IPR2025-00423 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–4 and 6–29 because it instituted the ranked IPR2025-00422 under the Director’s instruction to maintain at most one IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- Parallel petitionsInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“Paper 34. Birchtech Corp. (“Patent Owner”) filed a Request for Director Review in each case. See Paper 40; IPR2025-00422, Paper 39. The Director denied the request without prejudice in each case and remanded the cases to the Board to “allow discovery, narrowly tailored to resolve the RPI and privity issues.” Paper 49, 4. The Director later issued an Order Supplementing Director Review Decision in each case, instructing that “if the Board determines that Petitioners met their burden to identify all RPIs in the Petitions, then the Board should maintain at most one IPR challenging” the ’430 patent. Paper 72, 3.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,668,430 - Pgr2026-00021Institution deniedPTAB · May 19, 2026 · PGR2026-00021 · APJ John A Squires · PGR · Director review
The Director denied institution in PGR2026-00021 after discretionary review; the notice does not identify challenged claims or a specific discretionary ground.
RulingsDirector review decision- Director reviewDirector review, deniedDenied
“Before JOHN A. SQUIRES, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office. NOTICE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(a) and 324(a), after review of discretionary and non-merits considerations, institution of inter partes review and post-grant review is denied in the following proceedings: IPR2026-00200 IPR2026-00202 IPR2026-00223 IPR2026-00201 IPR2026-00221 PGR2026-000211 Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(a) and 324(a), after review of” slip op. at 1
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 12,280,146 - Ipr2026-00221Institution deniedPTAB · May 19, 2026 · IPR2026-00221 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review
The Director denied institution of IPR2026-00221 after reviewing discretionary and non-merits considerations.
RulingsDirector review decision- Director reviewDirector review, deniedDenied
“NOTICE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(a) and 324(a), after review of discretionary and non-merits considerations, institution of inter partes review and post-grant review is denied in the following proceedings: IPR2026-00200 IPR2026-00202 IPR2026-00223 IPR2026-00201 IPR2026-00221 PGR2026-000211 Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(a) and 324(a), after review of” slip op. at 1
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,058,757
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.