- Everstar Merchandise Co., Ltd. v. Willis Electric Co., Ltd.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 18, 2025 · PGR2019-00056 · APJ Stacey G White · PGR · Remand
Claims 2–7, 9–19, 21–25, 27, 30, 31, and 33 are unpatentable as obvious; Petitioner did not prove claims 8, 20, 26, 28, 29, and 32 unpatentable.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandMixed
“The Federal Circuit found that “[t]he factual record and Willis’s concession on appeal conclusively establish that the cost of copper was a known problem in the art, Debladis ’120 (and Kumada) helped address that issue, and Willis has not disputed that combining the teachings of Kumada and Debladis ’120 was within the skill of an ordinary artisan,” concluding “[n]othing more is required to establish a motivation to combine.” Everstar II, 2025 WL 1501940, 4. The Federal Circuit observed that “Willis has conceded that the combination of Kumada and Debladis ’120 disclose all the limitations in claim 1,” and accordingly, “reverse[d] the Board’s patentability determination as to that claim and vacate[d] the Board’s judgment as to the remaining claims of the ’037 patent,” remanding to us for further proceedings. Id. at 4–5. With those instructions in mind, we review the Petitioner’s allegations regarding claims 2–33.” slip op. at 6
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner
“F. Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art In the First Final Written Decision, we determined that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have (1) at least two years of experience in the design of decorative lighting, or (2) at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, or an equivalent field, and a basic familiarity with circuits used in decorative lighting.” Paper 40, 12. We see no reason to depart from that earlier determination.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The parties agree that we do not need to construe any claim terms. Pet. 8–9; PO Resp. 16–17. We likewise agree. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner did not dispute that the combined teachings of Kumada and Debladis ’120 disclose each limitation of claim 1. Patent Owner, however, did dispute Petitioner’s proposed reasons for combining Kumada and Debladis ’120, and argues that Debladis ’120 is not analogous art. PO Resp. 36–61. The Federal Circuit stated that substantial evidence only supports the conclusion that a POSA would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Kumada and Debladis ’120. The factual record and Willis’s concession on appeal conclusively establish that the cost of copper was a known problem in the art, Debladis ’120 (and Kumada) helped address that issue, and Willis has not disputed that combining the teachings of Kumada and Debladis ’120 was within the skill of an ordinary artisan. Nothing more is required to establish a motivation to combine. Given that Willis has conceded that the combination of Kumada and Debladis ’120 disclose all the limitations in claim 1, we reverse the Board’s patentability determination as to that claim and vacate the Board’s judgment as to the remaining claims of the ’037 patent. Everstar II, 2025 WL 1501940, 4 (internal citations omitted). The Federal Circuit further noted Patent Owner’s secondary considerations arguments as to claim 1 and stated [t]he cited evidence consists only of a temporal connection between the introduction of Willis’s invention and the UL 588 standards, and deposition testimony of a single witness who seemingly disclaimed any connection between the two. This is not sufficient to rescue a claim as to secondary considerations. Id. at 4, n. 5 (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, the Federal Circuit ruled that claim 1 would have been obvious over Kumada and Debladis ’120. 6. Analysis of Independent Claim 33” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 10,222,037 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,222,037 - Tomtom, Inc. v. Blackbird Tech, LLC D/B/A Blackbird Technologies, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 11, 2019 · IPR2017-02023 · APJ Debra K Stephens · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5 are unpatentable over Jimenez, Levi, and ordinary-skill knowledge; claims 6–8 were not shown unpatentable because Jimenez did not teach the claimed transmitter.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We find the ’212 Patent is directed to data for a particular user (see, e.g., ’212 Patent, Abstract). This conclusion is supported by the Specification. Indeed, all discussion in the ’212 patent is directed to a pedometer for use by and relying on data obtained from an individual user. Thus, the Specification suggests that the term “calibration” should be construed as a process that correlates a user’s stride rate and stride length. The Oral hearing confirms this conclusion. In the Oral Hearing, Petitioner’s counsel, Mr. Doshi, responded to a request to identify the calibration and the plurality of calibrations as follows: JUDGE STEPHENS: So what are you pointing at in the 212 patent as being [a] calibration and the plurality of calibrations? MR. DOSHI: That’s in column 5. So at column 5 it says that after a proper warm up the user completes a sample run or walk on the track at normal pace, et cetera, et cetera. So it's saying that here’s S1 and following completion of the first run, so here it’s saying you’re doing different walks at different speeds . . .where you're having the user walk at different walking speeds and measuring their step size as you do that (Trans. 21:1–10; see also Tr. 19:4–7) JUDGE ZADO: Okay. And then so taking that further then, I understand your argument to be that in the 212 patent the runner for the first sample S1 will run at one pace and that’s, according to Petitioner, that's one calibration and then the runner will run at a second pace for the S2 sample and that’s the second calibration, and then the runner will run at a third pace and then that's the S3 sample and then that's a third calibration? Is that Petitioner's argument? MR. DOSHI: Yes 13 (Tr. 22:4–11). Therefore, based on Petitioner’s statements at the Oral Hearing, the term “calibration” should be construed as the process of taking a sample that correlates step rate and step length for an individual.” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not dispute the educational level or experiential aspects of Petitioner’s definition in its Response (see generally PO Resp.), 18 despite Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Caloyannides, opining that the level of ordinary skill would not be so limited as proposed by Mr. Blackadar: I note that although the qualifications Mr. Blackadar describes would qualify one as a PHOSITA in this case, I do not believe the definition of a PHOSITA here would be so limited. The technology of the ‘212 Patent implicates other fields, such as Sports Medicine, Exercise Science, and Physiology. I believe that a bachelor’s degree in one of these fields, or a similar field, with at least two years of practical experience working with pedometers and/or health or fitness trackers or sensors, or an advanced degree in one of these areas, could qualify one as a PHOSITA in this case (Ex. 2001 ¶ 26). Petitioner argues that Patent Owner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art would mean a “[person having ordinary skill in the art] under Patent Owner’s definition would be more well-informed than Patent Owner’s own expert” (Pet. Reply. 2); however, we do not read Patent Owner’s assertion or Dr. Caloyannides’ testimony as suggested by Petitioner. Rather, we read Dr. Caloyannides’ testimony as expanding the fields of expertise. We do not observe a meaningful difference between the parties’ assessments of a person of ordinary skill in the art. We further note that either assessment appears consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the prior art in the instant proceeding (see Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355). Our analysis in this Decision is supported by either assessment. Based on our review of the ’212 Patent, the types of problems and solutions described in the ’212 Patent and cited prior art, and the testimony of Mr. Blackadar and Dr. Caloyannides, we adopt and” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved (In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Here, Petitioner has persuaded us that Levi is from the same field of endeavor as the ’212 Patent –– pedometers that count the number of steps taken to calculate distance traveled (see Pet. 20). Specifically, although Levi adds a navigation feature, Levi is directed to a pedometer that, in pertinent part, adjusts step size according to step frequency in order to estimate distance traveled by a user (Levi, 6:6–43). Levi states “[t]he present invention for a ground speed/distance sensor is an improvement over a common hiker’s pedometer” and “[t]he present invention analyzes the frequency of a user’s footsteps to aid in the detection of future footsteps, and further to aid in determining the size of footsteps taken by the user” (Levi, Abstract, 2:57–60, 2:65–67). Similarly, the ’212 Patent is directed to a pedometer and specifically, a pedometer that calculates actual stride lengths of a user based on relative stride rates (’212 Patent, Abstract). Thus, both the ’212 Patent and Levi are from the same field of endeavor –– pedometers or devices that include or rely on pedometers. Furthermore, both Levi and the ’212 Patent are pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved –– accurate distance identification. 44 Patent Owner additionally argues “[t]he different problems addressed” slip op. at 44
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“A holding of obviousness can be based on a showing that “there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed” (KSR Int’l v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)). Such a showing requires some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. . . . [H]owever, the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ. (id. at 418 (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). As admitted by Patent Owner, an ordinarily skilled artisan would have known a user’s stride length could vary with stride rate at the time of invention (see PO Resp. 52). As noted by Petitioner, Levi discloses using a dynamic step size algorithm that “improve[s] the accuracy of distance 49 measurements of a human footstep sensor” (Pet. Reply 25 (citing Levi, 6:17–21)). We further credit Mr. Blackadar’s testimony that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to improve Jimenez using Levi’s dynamic step size algorithm, to improve the calculated distances (Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 92). Indeed, we find that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Jimenez and Levi to “monitor [ ] the distance traveled more accurately than prior pedometers that calculated distance based on average stride length” (Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 90), 32 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 92)). In particular, we find that, given it was known a user’s stride length could vary with stride rate, as admitted by Patent Owner (PO Resp. 52), an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to implement a data processor that accounted for this relationship, such as that described in Levi (Pet. 32–33 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 93–94)).” slip op. at 49
Patent outcomesUS 6,434,212 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,434,212 - Apple, Inc. v. Realtime Data LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 13, 2018 · IPR2016-01739 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 5, 35–46, 97, 98, and 112 are unpatentable under § 103 over at least one instituted combination; claim 46 was not shown unpatentable over Settsu alone or with Zwiegincew.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenFwd mixedUnpatentable
“IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we conclude Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) Claims 5, 35–45, and 97 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) in view of Settsu; (2) Claims 5, 35– 45, 97, 98, and 112 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) in view of Settsu and Zwiegincew; (3) Claims 5, 35–46, and 97 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) in view of Settsu and Dye; and (4) Claims 5, 35–46, 97, 98, and 112 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) in view of Settsu, Zwiegincew, and Dye. V. ORDER Accordingly, it is ORDERED that, by a preponderance of the evidence, claims 5, 35–46, 97, 98, and 112 of the ’862 patent are unpatentable;” slip op. at 46
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Therefore, we consult the patent’s specification to help clarify the meaning of claim terms. Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding claims “must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part” (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996))). We must be careful, however, not to import improperly limitations into the claims or to read a particular embodiment appearing in the written description into the claim if the claim language is broader than the embodiment. In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Given our mandate under 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) and the patent’s various descriptions of “boot data list,” we understand that the examples laid out in the specification are exemplary and are not to be read as limitations in the claims. Patent Owner’s proffered claim construction imports selected limitations from specific embodiments in the specification into the claim and provides an overly narrow interpretation of the claim term. Additionally, Patent Owner has not pointed to any definitions or disavowals in the specification or otherwise clearly explained why the specification’s disclosure of “boot data lists” should not guide our claim construction analysis. Thus, we are unpersuaded by Patent Owner’s contentions, which appear to be based on a narrow reading of the claim that is inconsistent with the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claims. Accordingly, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s claim construction as it would limit unnecessarily the scope of the claims. Instead, we find the broadest reasonable construction of “boot data list” to encompass a “list of boot data.”” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner does not dispute Dr. Neuhauser’ testimony. See generally PO Resp. Patent Owner’s Declarant, Dr. Godmar Back (“Dr. Back”), however, provides his own assessment regarding a person of ordinary skill in the art relevant to the ’862 patent and agrees with Dr. Neuhauser’s testimony. Ex. 2008 ¶ 50. We do not observe a meaningful differences between the parties’ assessments of a person of ordinary skill in the art. We further note that either assessment appears consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the prior art in the instant proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Our analysis in this Decision is supported by either assessment. Based on our review of the ’862 patent, the types of problems and solutions described in the ’862 patent and cited prior art, and the testimony of Dr. Neuhauser and Dr. Back, we adopt and apply Dr. Back’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention for purposes of this Decision. D. Overview of the Asserted Prior Art” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Settsu fails to teach “updating a boot list.” Rather, we agree with the testimony of Dr. Neuhauser regarding the similarities between Settsu’s OS and the functionality of the Windows 98 OS, and why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have considered updates to have occurred to the boot data lists in Settsu. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 117; Ex. 1003, 5:39–51, 13:55–65, 14:44–52, 16:7–17:62, Figs. 12, 20(ST213). Specifically, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that OS modules, such as Settsu’s, would have required updates when new, updated code becomes available. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 117 (citing O’Reilly 110–112). We agree with Dr. Neuhauser that to accomplish these updates, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that updates occur to boot data lists in Settsu; namely, updates to lists of boot data included within OS functional module files stored in boot device 3, as well as updates to lists of boot data, such as the function definition file 71 or the OS main body module 8. See id. Given the explicit teaching of Settsu and the credible testimony of Dr. Neuhauser regarding the state of the art and the knowledge of one of skill the art, we are unmoved by Patent Owner’s argument regarding the prosecution history of the ’862 patent or that the Examiner fully understood the implications of Settsu’s Figure 20. Accordingly, based on the entirety of the record and evidence, and crediting the testimony from Dr. Neuhauser (see Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 78, 116–118), we determine that “updating the boot data list” is taught or suggested by Settsu, and the subject matter of the claim as whole would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in art in view of Settsu.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 8,880,862 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Markman · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,880,862
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.