• Zhejiang Crystal-Optech Co. Ltd. v. Viavi Solutions Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Feb 7, 2023 · IPR2022-01184 · APJ Debra K Stephens · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim would have been obvious over the asserted combinations.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “8. Conclusion Based on the record before us, we determine Petitioner’s proffered arguments, evidence, and supporting testimony fails to establish a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing that claims 1–7, 9, 10, 12–14, 17, 18, 20–23, 27, 30, and 31 would have been obvious over Pilgrim, Gibbons, Lairson, and Yoda.” slip op. at 32

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Not reached

    “II. ANALYSIS A. Discretionary Denial – 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) Patent Owner argues that we should exercise discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) because the factors identified in Apple, Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”), weigh in favor of denying institution (Prelim. Resp. 49–54). Petitioner argues we should not discretionarily deny institution under Fintiv (Pet. 66–67). Because we determine Petitioner fails to establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing any of the claims challenged would have been obvious as discussed below, we do not reach this issue.” slip op. at 8

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached

    “B. Discretionary Denial – 35 U.S.C. §325(d) Patent Owner contends we should exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) because of the Petition’s “reliance upon the secondary references Gibbons, Lairson, and Yoda. Gibbons and Lairson were considered by the Examiner, and Yoda does not contain any meaningful additional disclosure or basis for unpatentability that was not considered by the Examiner” (Prelim. Resp. 21–22). Because we determine Petitioner fails to establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing any of the claims challenged in those grounds would have been obvious as discussed below, we do not reach this issue.” slip op. at 9

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “Based on the present record including the disclosure in the ʼ269 Patent, we apply a slightly modified version of Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art that removes the qualification of “at least” and clarifies some statements (see Pet. 6). More specifically, we determine a POSITA would have had a Bachelor’s degree or equivalent in physics, or in a related science or engineering field, along with five years of experience in optical element design and optical filters although additional education (e.g., a Master’s degree with exposure to optical element design and optical filters) may substitute for some industrial experience in optical element and optical filter design, and more industrial experience can substitute for a different educational background. We determine this level of skill comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ʼ269 Patent and the prior art of record (cf. Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355 (the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art)).” slip op. at 11

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,588,269
• Unified Patents Inc. v. Sound View Innovations, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 9, 2019 · IPR2018-00599 · APJ Debra K Stephens · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 3 and 9 are unpatentable under § 103 because the cited combinations teach the claimed limitations that the Board found limiting.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related subject, and two or three years of work experience with network-based applications and/or multimedia applications. A lack of experience can be remedied with additional education (e.g., a Master’s degree), and likewise, a lack of education can be remedied with additional work experience (e.g., 6-7 years) (Pet. 7–8 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 38)). Patent Owner does not dispute the educational level or experiential aspects of Petitioner’s definition in its Response (see generally PO Resp.; Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 19–20). We note that the assessment appears consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the prior art in the instant proceeding (see Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355). Based on our review of the ’074 Patent, the types of problems and solutions described in the ’074 Patent and cited prior art, and the testimony of Drs. Reddy and Jones (Ex. 1005 ¶ 38; Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 19–20), we determine a skilled artisan would have possessed a Bachelor of Science degree in Computer Science, Computer Engineering, Electrical Engineering, or an equivalent field, and two or three years of work experience with content delivery networks or applications or comparable education or work experience in the field.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

    “a. “helper server” The ’074 patent describes “helper server” in the following terms: “Helper Server (HS): a HS, also referred to as a helper, is one of a plurality of servers in the network that provide certain value-added services” (Ex. 1001, 4:11–13). Accordingly, we adopt this interpretation.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner that neither claim 3 nor claim 9 recites where the “receiving” step takes place and, in particular, neither claim recites “receiving said SM object” at the plurality of or one of the helper servers. [C]laim terms cannot be narrowed by reference to the written description or prosecution history unless the language of the claims invites reference to those sources. See, e.g., McCarty v. Lehigh Val. R.R., 160 U.S. 110, 116, 16 S. Ct. 240, (1895) (“[I]f we once begin to include elements not mentioned in the claim in order to limit such claim ..., we should never know where to stop.”); Renishaw [PLC v. Marposs Societa per Azioni], 158 F.3d 1243, 1249 [(Fed. Cir. 1998)]. In other words, there must be a textual reference in the actual language of the claim with which to associate a proffered claim construction (Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989–90 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Here, we do not find a textual reference in “receiving said SM object.” We determine that the inventors did not introduce their own lexicographic definition, i.e., defining the term “receiving said SM object” or “receiving.” Furthermore, we are not persuaded “the term or terms chosen by the patentee[s] so deprive the claim of clarity that there is no means by which the scope of the claim may be ascertained from the language used” (see id. at 990 (citations omitted)). Nor do the preambles of claim 3 and 9, respectively, provide any textual reference that “receiving said SM object” should be interpreted as “receiving said SM object at a helper server.” Thus, “[i]n this case, the [disputed term] has a clear and well-defined meaning. This term is not so amorphous that one of skill in the art can only reconcile the claim language with the inventor’s disclosure by recourse to the specification” (Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree with Patent Owner’s assessment of the preambles of claims 3 and 9. The preamble of claim 3 recites: A method for storing a streaming media (SM) object in a network having a content server which hosts SM objects for distribution over said network through a plurality of helper servers (HSs) to a plurality of clients, said SM object being comprised of a plurality of successive time-ordered chunks, wherein a chunk is further comprised of a discrete number of segments, each segment allocated to a respective disk block of said plurality of HSs, and the preamble of claim 9 recites: A method for managing storage of a streaming media (SM) object in a network having a content server which hosts SM objects for distribution over said network through a plurality of servers to a plurality of clients (Ex. 1001, Claims). Neither of the preambles recites that storage depends on the availability of disk space. Patent Owner additionally points to Reactive Surfaces Ltd., LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp., IPR2016-01914, Paper 64 at 11–14 (PTAB Mar. 1, 2018) (PO Resp. 10). Claim 1 of Reactive Surfaces recites:” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 9,462,074 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,462,074
• Apple, Inc. v. Realtime Data LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 16, 2018 · IPR2016-01738 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 8–12, 14–22, 59–82, 101–104, 114, 115, and 117 are unpatentable as obvious; the motion to amend is granted for substitute claims 174–218.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted

    “substitute claims “without placing the burden of persuasion on the patent owner.” Aqua Products, 872 F.3d at 1328. Yet, Patent Owner’s proposed substitute claims still must meet the statutory requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) and the procedural requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.121. See also “Guidance on Motions to Amend in view of Aqua Products” (Nov. 21, 2017) (https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/guidance_ on_motions_to_amend_11_2017.pdf) (“Guidance”). Accordingly, Patent Owner must demonstrate (1) the amendment responds to a ground of unpatentability involved in the trial; (2) the amendment does not seek to enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent or introduce new subject matter; (3) the amendment proposes a reasonable number of substitute claims; and (4) the proposed claims are supported in the original disclosure. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.121.” slip op. at 51

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “substitute claims. Furthermore, Patent Owner’s arguments on this exhibits goes to the weight to be accorded to the evidence. The Board is capable of determining and assigning the appropriate weight to the evidence. For these reasons, we deny Patent Owner’s motion as to Exhibit 1043.” slip op. at 72

  • Strike new argumentOther

    “IV. CHALLENGE TO PETITIONER’S REPLY ARGUMENTS Patent Owner filed a list of alleged improper reply arguments (Paper 34) to which Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 35). Patent Owner lists several portions of Petitioner’s Reply and evidence allegedly beyond the scope of what can be considered appropriate for a reply. See Paper 34. We have considered Patent Owner’s listing, but disagree that the cited portions of Petitioner’s Reply and reply evidence are beyond the scope of what is appropriate for a reply. Replies are a vehicle for responding to arguments raised in a corresponding patent owner response. Petitioner’s arguments and evidence that Patent Owner objects to are not beyond the proper scope of a reply; rather, we find that they fairly respond to Patent Owner’s arguments raised in Patent Owner’s Response. See Idemitsu Kosan Co. v. SFC LTD, 870 F.3d 1376, 1381: This back-and-forth shows that what Idemitsu characterizes as an argument raised “too late” is simply the by-product of one party necessarily getting the last word. If anything, Idemitsu is the party that first raised this issue, by arguing—at least implicitly—that Arkane teaches away from non-energy-gap combinations. SFC simply countered, as it was entitled to do. We also note for each of the items in Patent Owner’s list, Petitioner cites to pages in the Petition for support. See e.g., Paper 35, 2 (“Support for Petitioner’s argument can be found at, for example, pages 13–16 of the Petition.”), 4 (“Support for Petitioner’s argument can be found at, for example, pages 39–41 of the Petition.”); 5 (“Support for Petitioner’s argument can be found, for example, at pages 6–16, 28–29, and 32–34 of the Petition.”); 6 (“Support for Petitioner’s argument can be found, for example, at pages 11–16 of the Petition.”); 8 (“Support for Petitioner’s argument can be found, for example, at pages 11–16 of the Petition.”).” slip op. at 72

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther

    “updating boot data lists by removing an association of control information that is associated with management information Table 3A. Specifically, we credit the testimony of Dr. Neuhauser, who explains how and why Sukegawa renders obvious updating a boot data list by disassociating non-accessed boot data from the boot data list. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 474–478 (citing Ex. 1005, 7:40–55). Dr. Neuhauser concludes an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have []found it obvious based on their knowledge of cache operation that upon the deletion of the non-accessed control information, or boot data, that management information table 3A is updated to reflect the deletion.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 474. Accordingly, we find Petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 20, 102, and 104 of the ’862 patent are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Sukegawa and Dye.” slip op. at 42

  Patent outcomesUS 8,880,862 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Markman · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,880,862
• Apple, Inc. v. Realtime Data LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 13, 2018 · IPR2016-01739 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 5, 35–46, 97, 98, and 112 are unpatentable under § 103 over at least one instituted combination; claim 46 was not shown unpatentable over Settsu alone or with Zwiegincew.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenFwd mixedUnpatentable

    “IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we conclude Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) Claims 5, 35–45, and 97 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) in view of Settsu; (2) Claims 5, 35– 45, 97, 98, and 112 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) in view of Settsu and Zwiegincew; (3) Claims 5, 35–46, and 97 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) in view of Settsu and Dye; and (4) Claims 5, 35–46, 97, 98, and 112 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) in view of Settsu, Zwiegincew, and Dye. V. ORDER Accordingly, it is ORDERED that, by a preponderance of the evidence, claims 5, 35–46, 97, 98, and 112 of the ’862 patent are unpatentable;” slip op. at 46

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Therefore, we consult the patent’s specification to help clarify the meaning of claim terms. Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding claims “must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part” (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996))). We must be careful, however, not to import improperly limitations into the claims or to read a particular embodiment appearing in the written description into the claim if the claim language is broader than the embodiment. In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Given our mandate under 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) and the patent’s various descriptions of “boot data list,” we understand that the examples laid out in the specification are exemplary and are not to be read as limitations in the claims. Patent Owner’s proffered claim construction imports selected limitations from specific embodiments in the specification into the claim and provides an overly narrow interpretation of the claim term. Additionally, Patent Owner has not pointed to any definitions or disavowals in the specification or otherwise clearly explained why the specification’s disclosure of “boot data lists” should not guide our claim construction analysis. Thus, we are unpersuaded by Patent Owner’s contentions, which appear to be based on a narrow reading of the claim that is inconsistent with the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claims. Accordingly, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s claim construction as it would limit unnecessarily the scope of the claims. Instead, we find the broadest reasonable construction of “boot data list” to encompass a “list of boot data.”” slip op. at 8

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner does not dispute Dr. Neuhauser’ testimony. See generally PO Resp. Patent Owner’s Declarant, Dr. Godmar Back (“Dr. Back”), however, provides his own assessment regarding a person of ordinary skill in the art relevant to the ’862 patent and agrees with Dr. Neuhauser’s testimony. Ex. 2008 ¶ 50. We do not observe a meaningful differences between the parties’ assessments of a person of ordinary skill in the art. We further note that either assessment appears consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the prior art in the instant proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Our analysis in this Decision is supported by either assessment. Based on our review of the ’862 patent, the types of problems and solutions described in the ’862 patent and cited prior art, and the testimony of Dr. Neuhauser and Dr. Back, we adopt and apply Dr. Back’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention for purposes of this Decision. D. Overview of the Asserted Prior Art” slip op. at 13

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “Settsu fails to teach “updating a boot list.” Rather, we agree with the testimony of Dr. Neuhauser regarding the similarities between Settsu’s OS and the functionality of the Windows 98 OS, and why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have considered updates to have occurred to the boot data lists in Settsu. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 117; Ex. 1003, 5:39–51, 13:55–65, 14:44–52, 16:7–17:62, Figs. 12, 20(ST213). Specifically, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that OS modules, such as Settsu’s, would have required updates when new, updated code becomes available. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 117 (citing O’Reilly 110–112). We agree with Dr. Neuhauser that to accomplish these updates, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that updates occur to boot data lists in Settsu; namely, updates to lists of boot data included within OS functional module files stored in boot device 3, as well as updates to lists of boot data, such as the function definition file 71 or the OS main body module 8. See id. Given the explicit teaching of Settsu and the credible testimony of Dr. Neuhauser regarding the state of the art and the knowledge of one of skill the art, we are unmoved by Patent Owner’s argument regarding the prosecution history of the ’862 patent or that the Examiner fully understood the implications of Settsu’s Figure 20. Accordingly, based on the entirety of the record and evidence, and crediting the testimony from Dr. Neuhauser (see Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 78, 116–118), we determine that “updating the boot data list” is taught or suggested by Settsu, and the subject matter of the claim as whole would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in art in view of Settsu.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 8,880,862 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Markman · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,880,862
• Apple, Inc. v. Realtime Data LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 13, 2018 · IPR2016-01737 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 6, 7, 13, 23–34, 47–58, 83–96, 99, 100, 105–111, 113, and 116 are unpatentable as obvious; substitute claims 118–173 are allowed.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Therefore, we consult the patent’s specification to help clarify the meaning of claim terms. Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding claims “must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part” (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996))). We must be careful, however, not to import improperly limitations into the claims or to read a particular embodiment appearing in the written description into the claim if the claim language is broader than the embodiment. In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Given our mandate under 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) and the patent’s various descriptions of “boot data list,” we understand that the examples laid out in the specification are exemplary and are not to be read as limitations in the claims. Patent Owner’s proffered claim construction imports selected limitations from specific embodiments in the specification into the claim and provides an overly narrow interpretation of the claim term. Additionally, Patent Owner has not pointed to any definitions or disavowals in the specification or otherwise clearly explained why the specification’s disclosure of “boot data lists” should not guide our claim construction analysis. Thus, we are unpersuaded by Patent Owner’s contentions, which appear to be based on a narrow reading of the claim that is inconsistent with the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claims. Accordingly, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s claim construction as it would limit unnecessarily the scope of the claims. Instead, we find the broadest reasonable construction of “boot data list” to encompass a “list of boot data.”” slip op. at 9

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner does not dispute Dr. Neuhauser’ testimony. See generally PO Resp. Patent Owner’s Declarant, Dr. Godmar Back (“Dr. Back”), however, provides his own assessment regarding a person of ordinary skill in the art relevant to the ’862 patent and agrees with Dr. Neuhauser’s testimony. Ex. 2008 ¶ 55. We do not observe a meaningful differences between the parties’ assessments of a person of ordinary skill in the art. We further note that either assessment appears consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the prior art in the instant proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Our analysis in this Decision is supported by either assessment. Based on our review of the ’862 patent, the types of problems and solutions described in the ’862 patent and cited prior art, and the testimony of Dr. Neuhauser and Dr. Back, we adopt and apply Dr. Back’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention for purposes of this Decision. D. Overview of the Asserted Prior Art” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “Based on (1) the teachings of Dye that are directed to improved memory capacity and performance, specifically improved data density, efficiency, and bandwidth (Ex. 1008, at [57], 2:42–46), (2) the teachings of Dye ’284 directed to implementing Dye’s techniques to hard disk drives and flash memory, and (3) crediting of the persuasive testimony of Dr. Neuhauser demonstrating both the applicability of Dye to Sukegawa and explaining why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the prior art teachings, we find Petitioner has articulated sufficient reasoning with rational underpinning to combine the references as asserted.” slip op. at 33

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted

    “of right, but rather must be proposed as a part of a Motion to Amend. 35 U.S.C. § 316(d). The Board must assess the patentability of proposed substitute claims “without placing the burden of persuasion on the patent owner.” Aqua Products, 872 F.3d 1290. Yet, Patent Owner’s proposed substitute claims still must meet the statutory requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) and the procedural requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.121. See also “Guidance on Motions to Amend in view of Aqua Products” (Nov. 21, 2017) (https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/guidance_ on_motions_to_amend_11_2017.pdf) (“Guidance”). Accordingly, Patent Owner must demonstrate (1) the amendment responds to a ground of unpatentability involved in the trial; (2) the amendment does not seek to enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent or introduce new subject matter; (3) the amendment proposes a reasonable number of substitute claims; and (4) the proposed claims are supported in the original disclosure. See Guidance. For reasons set forth below, we determine Patent Owner has satisfied its burden with respect to the above-discussed requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.121. Patent Owner seeks to add fifty-five (55) substitute claims to replace the fifty-five (55) challenged claims found unpatentable, and each substitute claim adds limitations that purport to narrow the scope of the original claim it replaces. See Mot. 2–4, Claim Appendix, iii–xii. Patent Owner also identifies disclosures in the originally-filed application that fall within the scope of proposed substitute claims 118–173. Mot. 4–17 (citing Ex. 2010; Ex. 2017; Ex. 2022). Patent Owner further identifies support in the original specification for the limitation in substitute independent claims 118, 122, and 124 that the preloading may occur into volatile memory. Mot. 5–6 (citing Ex. 2017, 12:16–18 (“[T]he cache 13 may comprise volatile or non-volatile memory, or any combination thereof. Preferably, the cache 13 is implemented in SDRAM (static dynamic random access memory), 41:4– 9, 42:17–20, 43:13–14, Fig. 7B), 8–15.” According to the testimony of Dr. Back, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that SDRAM is volatile memory. See Ex. 2022 ¶ 23. We note that further support for substitute claims 118–173 can be found in the original specification’s discussion of preloading portions of the computer operating system from the boot device (e.g., hard disk) into the onboard cache memory. Ex. 2017, 41:4–5. We, thus, find written description support for Patent Owner’s proposed substitute claims. Moreover, Patent Owner proposes a narrowing limitation in each proposed substitute claim in direct response to the grounds of unpatentability involved in this trial. Therefore, Patent Owner has satisfied the procedural” slip op. at 44

  Patent outcomesUS 8,880,862 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Markman · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,880,862
• Captioncall, L.L.C. v. Ultratec, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 14, 2016 · IPR2015-01355 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–13, 15, and 18 are unpatentable under § 103 over the stated combinations of Liebermann, Aronow, O’Toole, and McLaughlin.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not challenge directly Mr. Occhiogrosso’s testimony. See generally PO Resp. 5. Mr. Ivan Zatkovich, Patent Owner’s declarant, does not propose a level of ordinary skill in the art to be adopted, but he does testify that the opinions set forth in his declaration would not change if he “assumed that [one of ordinary skill in the art] had the qualifications set forth in Mr. Occhiogrosso’s declaration.” Ex. 2098 ¶ 24 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 27). Having reviewed the prior art asserted in this proceeding (see, e.g., Exs. 1002–1005), we determine that the level of ordinary skill proposed by Petitioner’s declarant and employed by both declarants is consistent with the challenged patent and the referenced prior art, and we adopt Mr. Occhiogrosso’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art for the purposes of the analysis below.” slip op. at 11

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “Turning to the merits of the Motion to Exclude, we find Patent Owner’s assertion that a person of ordinary skill in the art “must know the relevant prior art of telephone technology for the deaf and HOH” (Mot. Exc. 4) lacks sufficient factual corroboration or explanation. For example, Patent 10 Mr. Zatkovich is referring to the level of ordinary skill discussed previously and which we adopted for this proceeding. 14 Owner does not address the sentence that immediately precedes the single citation in the challenged patent on which Patent Owner relies: “[t]he present invention relates to the general field of telephone communications.” Ex. 1001, 1:13–14. Nor does Patent Owner discuss the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art of record or other factors that may be considered, including the types of problems encountered in the art, the sophistication of the technology, and educational level of active workers in the field. Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355. Even if we were to adopt Patent Owner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art, we find Mr. Occhiogrosso meets Patent Owner’s proffered level of ordinary skill: “must know the relevant prior art of telephone technology for the deaf and HOH” (Mot. Exc. 4). Mr. Occhiogrosso’s experience providing expert testimony in proceedings regarding assistive technologies for the deal or hard of hearing is uncontroverted. See Mot. Exc. 4–5 (identifying three inter partes reviews); Ex. 2105, 5:23–6:10 (deposition on August 9, 2016 indicating Mr. Occhiogrosso has been deposed between twelve and twenty times concerning Patent Owner’s patents). Furthermore, the five prior art references Mr. Occhiogrosso considered for this case (Ex. 1008 ¶ 28) all involve telephone technology for the deaf and HOH and support his qualification under the definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art now offers for the first time in its Motion to Exclude (and after it relied on the testimony of its declarant as to a different level). 15” slip op. at 14

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “Mr. Occhiogrosso testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art “would consider the screen in Figure 6 [shown on a cellular phone] as analogous to the screen depicted in Figure 8.” Ex. 1043 ¶ 6; see Pet. Reply 9–10 (citing Ex. 1043 ¶ 4–7). Mr. Occhiogrosso’s testimony relies on, and better comports with, Liebermann’s description of Figure 8 as illustrating “a layout for the visual display to present multiple information to the deaf person.” Ex. 1002, 6:29–36; Ex. 1043 ¶ 6. Mr. Occhiogrosso opines that the layout in Figure 8 “can be applied to different devices with displays of varying dimensions,” including the cellular embodiment of Figure 6, the personal computer embodiment in Figure 5a, and the kiosk embodiment in Figure 5c. Ex. 1043 ¶ 6. Mr. Occhiogrosso explains that Figure 8 depicts a “three-part, logical screen layout [that would be] identical and would be scaled appropriately, depending on display size.” Id. We credit Mr. Occhiogrosso’s testimony over that of Mr. Zatkovich because Mr. Occhiogrosso’s testimony better comports with the express disclosure of Liebermann—Figure 8 is not described as being limited to the embodiments in Figures 5a–5c or otherwise not being applicable to the cellular phone embodiment shown in Figure 6. Rather, Figure 8 is described more generally as being “a layout for the visual display.” Ex. 1002, 6:31– 34 36. In addition, Mr. Zatkovich opines that one of ordinary skill in the art purportedly would not incorporate the display shown in Figure 8—that is, the three-part display. At issue here, however, is only a small portion of that display—the incoming text screen—showing the text communication representing a transcription of the voice of the person speaking to a user of the personal interpreter device.” slip op. at 34

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “skill in the art would combine Aronow’s initiation switch into Liebermann’s device to save power. PO Resp. 35–36. We agree with Patent Owner that, because the initiation switch is not an “on/off switch” that would enable a user to turn off the device and save power, Mr. Occhiogrosso’s power saving rationale (Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 58–59) is an insufficient motivation to combine the initiation switch. PO Resp. 35–36 (citing Ex. 2098 ¶ 62; Ex. 2097, 141:21– 142:12). Similarly, we also agree with Patent Owner’s challenge regarding Mr. Occhiogrosso’s testimony that Aronow’s switch improves Liebermann’s communicator by making it a “low cost, self contained telephonic interface device requiring no programming for operation.” Id. at 36. Relying on Mr. Zatkovich’s testimony, Patent Owner indicates “the communicator/cellular phone embodiment of Fig. 6 of Liebermann[] already appears to be a self-contained device.” Id. (citing Ex. 2098 ¶ 61). Nevertheless, we note that there is no dispute that Liebermann’s communicator and cellular telephone implementations provide for a user initiating a call to the center by dialing the center. See, e.g., PO Resp. 36 (“As a special case of a telephone, Liebermann can initiate a call simply by dialing a stored number to the Center.”). We disagree with Patent Owner that the addition of Aronow’s switch would not simplify the communicator 48 of Liebermann. Id. Common sense suggests that a single initiation switch is a simpler way to initiate a call than by dialing the multiple digits of a telephone number. Furthermore, we credit Mr. Occhiogrosso’s testimony of the simplifying benefits of a user-operated initiation switch, which is based on Aronow’s discussion about the benefits of the initiation switch to simplify operations of the telephonic device, especially for elderly people who are hard of hearing. Ex. 1008 ¶ 58. For these reasons, we determine that Petitioner has provided sufficient” slip op. at 48

  Patent outcomesUS 5,974,116 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 5,974,116
• Captioncall, L.L.C. / Sorenson Communications, Inc. v. Ultratec, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 7, 2016 · IPR2015-00637 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–30 are unpatentable as obvious; Patent Owner’s contingent motion to amend is denied for lack of written-description support and indefiniteness.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part

    “admitted that the patented features of voice and revoiced text are responsible for ‘giv[ing] the phone back to folks with hearing loss.’” PO Resp. 48 (emphasis added). Thus, Patent Owner is offering the statement for the truth that voice and re-voiced text gives the phone back to folks with hearing loss. Patent Owner’s argument that Mr. Puzey was discussing the existence of features in his company’s product rather than features in Patent Owner’s product does not change that his statement is offered as proof regarding an alleged long-felt need for the features. Accordingly, his testimony is hearsay. slip op. at 15

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “art is telecommunication systems. Thus, a [POSA] is a person familiar with at least that technology by way of background and/or experience.” CaptionCall, LLC v. Ultratec, Inc., Case IPR2013-00549, Paper 71, 13 (Final Written Decision) (PTAB 2015); see also CaptionCall, LLC v. Ultratec, Inc., Case IPR2013-00780, Paper 35, 9 (Final Written Decision) (PTAB 2015) (reaffirming our finding in IPR2013- 00549). Patent Owner states that it “does not agree” with that definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art, and that, “without waiving the foregoing objection and reserving all rights,” states that it will “appl[y]” our prior definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art “for purposes of this Response.” PO Resp. 3. By not setting forth arguments advocating a particular definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, and by applying our prior definition, Patent Owner has waived arguments for any other definition. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, as expressed by its declarant, Mr. Occhiogrosso. Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 26–27. This person typically has “a bachelor’s degree” slip op. at 35

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “understand a “communication link,” as claimed, to refer to the “communication line” described in the specification. In particular, the link is “intended not only to apply to a traditional land-line . . . but also to all equivalents that offer similar functionality.” Id. at 8:60–63. A link could be “a portion of the bandwidth” of a particular connection, such that a single mode of connection (e.g., IP) could carry out two types of communication (voice and text), with each type corresponding to a different “communication link.” See id. at 8:44–47, 8:63–65. For example, as explained in the ’838 patent, “[e]ach of the telephone lines could be . . . a portion of the bandwidth of an ISDN or DSL service.” Id. at 8:53–65. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s construction of “communication link” as “any communication session, protocol, link, connection, or path distinguishable from [another] communication link[].”” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “3. Combination of References As we discussed above, Petitioner’s combination takes the two-line” slip op. at 43

  Patent outcomesUS 8,908,838 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,908,838
• Fujitsu Semiconductor Limited / Fujitsu Semiconductor America, Inc. et al. v. Zond, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 2, 2015 · IPR2014-00805 · APJ Jennifer Meyer Chagnon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 3–7, 18–20, 31, 32, 36, 40, 41, 44, and 45 are unpatentable under § 103 over Wang with Kawamata, Wang with Lantsman, or Wang with Lantsman and Kawamata.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

    “Subsequent to institution, we granted revised Motions for Joinder filed by other Petitioners listed in the Caption above, joining Cases IPR2014-00851, IPR2014-00990, and IPR2014-01069 with the instant trial (see Papers 12, 13), and also granted a Joint Motion to Terminate with respect to TSMC (Paper 30).5 Patent Owner filed a Patent Owner Response (Paper 27, “PO Resp.”), along with a Declaration of Larry D. Hartsough, Ph.D. (Ex. 2015) to support its positions. Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 41, “Reply”) to the Patent Owner Response, along with a Declaration of Lawrence J. Overzet, Ph.D (Ex. 1126). An oral hearing6 was held on June 8, 2015. A transcript of the hearing is included in the record. Paper 49 (“Tr.”).” slip op. at 3

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the evidence before us, we determine that “creates” would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to mean “to bring into existence,” consistent with the use of the word in the Specification and the plain and ordinary meaning thereof. See Create Definition, Merriam- Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 271 (10th edition 2000). Furthermore, the ’421 patent does not explicitly define “creates a weakly-ionized plasma.” While Patent Owner provides examples described in the Specification (PO Resp. 18), we will not import the suggested “ignition” limitation into the claim. See Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also, SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Though understanding the claim 14 language may be aided by the explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim limitations that are not a part of the claim.”). As such, we interpret the term “creates a weakly-ionized plasma” as “brings into existence a weakly-ionized plasma,” and do not limit the claim to a circumstance that the gas is ignited from a state in which there is no existing plasma, as proposed by Patent Owner.” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Given the evidence before us in the entire record, for the reasons discussed above, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated, by a preponderance of evidence, that Wang discloses a “power supply that generates a voltage pulse between the anode and the cathode assembly that 25 creates a weakly-ionized plasma and then a strongly-ionized plasma from the weakly-ionized plasma.”” slip op. at 25

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “Petitioner asserts “[o]ne of ordinary skill would have been motivated to incorporate the teachings of Kawamata in Wang, e.g., using input power to control the density of the plasma and thereby control the temperature of the sputtering material so as to control the sputtering yield,” because “[b]oth Wang and Kawamata provide ways to enhance the sputtering rate” and it “would have been a combination of old elements in which each element behaved as expected.” Pet. 40–41 (citing Ex. 1102 ¶¶ 118–120). Beyond the arguments provided with respect to the independent claims, which we do not find persuasive for the reasons discussed above, Patent Owner does not provide separate arguments or otherwise address claims 3–5, 18–20, 36, 40, and 41 in its Response. We have reviewed 32 Petitioner’s arguments and evidence regarding these dependent claims (Pet. 39–42, 24–29; Ex. 1102 ¶¶ 76–79, 83, 85–86, 89, 116–120, 122, 124– 125; Ex. 1109, 2:6–9, 3:18–20, 3:34–38, 5:66–6:3, 7:36–40, 7:53–58, Figs. 1, 2; Ex. 1104, 4:27–29; Ex. 1101, 2:9–10, 9:57–61), and, given the evidence in the record before us, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated, by a preponderance of evidence, that the combination of Wang and Kawamata renders obvious each of claims 3–5, 18–20, 36, 40, and 41.” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 7,811,421 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,811,421
• The Gillette Company / Fujitsu Semiconductor Limited et al. v. Zond, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 1, 2015 · IPR2014-00580 · APJ Joni Y Chang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 and 34–39 are unpatentable under § 103(a) over the five instituted grounds; the majority finds the Mozgrin Thesis publicly accessible, with a partial dissent on claim 2.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

    “Subsequent to institution, we granted the Motion for Joinder filed by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, Ltd., TSMC North America Corp. (collectively, “TSMC”), Fujitsu Semiconductor Limited, and Fujitsu Semiconductor America, Inc. (collectively, “Fujitsu”), joining Case IPR2014-01479 with the instant trial (Paper 20), and also granted a Joint Motion to Terminate with respect to TSMC (Paper 37).2 Zond filed a Response (Paper 32 (“PO Resp.”)), and Gillette filed a Reply (Paper 39 (“Reply”)). Oral hearing3 was held on June 16, 2015, and a transcript of the hearing was entered into the record. Paper 47 (“Tr.”).” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelOther

    “B. Principles of Law A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). In that regard, an obviousness analysis “need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418; Translogic, 504 F.3d at 1262. The level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “their broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see also In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1275–79 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Congress implicitly approved the broadest reasonable interpretation standard in enacting the AIA,”6 and “the standard was properly adopted by PTO regulation.”). Claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). An inventor may rebut that presumption by providing a” slip op. at 6

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We are not persuaded by Zond’s arguments, as they narrowly focus on Mozgrin’s regime 3, and fail to consider Mozgrin’s regime 2 that is dedicated to sputtering. It is well-settled that, when evaluating claims for obviousness, “the prior art as a whole must be considered.” In re Hedges, 783 F.2d 1038, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 1986). As Gillette points out (Pet. 13–14), Mozgrin explicitly states that, in regime 2, the voltage pulse that generates a strongly-ionized plasma from the weakly-ionized plasma is appropriate for sputtering. Ex. 1002, 402, 406, 409 (“The implementation of the high-current magnetron discharge (regime 2) in sputtering . . . provides an enhancement in . . . plasma density (exceeding 2 x 1013 cm-3).”), Figs. 1, 3). Mozgrin also discloses specific process parameter ranges that are more efficient for sputtering in regime 2. Id. Therefore, contrary to Zond’s assertion that Mozgrin’s voltage pulse creates a direct transition to regime 3, one of ordinary skill in the art reading Mozgrin would have been able to select the pulse characteristics and parameter ranges to generate a strongly-ionized plasma in regime 2 that is dedicated to sputtering. Upon consideration of Mozgrin and Fortov, as a whole, we do not share Zond’s view that there are contradictory teachings between Mozgrin and Fortov that would dissuade one of ordinary skill in the art from combining the prior art teachings to achieve Fortov’s non-linear increase in sputtering yield.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 6,896,773 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,896,773
• Fujitsu Semiconductor Limited / Fujitsu Semiconductor America, Inc. et al. v. Zond, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 28, 2015 · IPR2014-01057 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 2, 11, 13, 14, and 16 are unpatentable under § 103(a) over the asserted combinations of Wang, Lantsman, and the applicable additional reference.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “North America Corporation (collectively, “TSMC”) filed a Petition requesting an inter partes review of claims 2, 11, 13, 14, and 16 of U.S. Patent No. 6,853,142 B2 (Ex. 1101, “the ’142 Patent”). Paper 2 (“Pet.”). Patent Owner Zond, LLC (“Zond”) filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 8 (“Prelim. Resp.”). We instituted the instant trial on October 20, 2014, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314. Paper 9 (“Dec.”).” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

    “Subsequent to institution, we granted the revised Motions for Joinder filed by other Petitioners (collectively, “GlobalFoundries”) listed in the Caption above, joining Cases IPR2014-00863, IPR2014-01013, and IPR2014-01057 with the instant trial (Papers 12–14), and also granted a Joint Motion to Terminate with respect to TSMC (Paper 32). Zond filed a Response (Paper 26 (“PO Resp.”)), and GlobalFoundries filed a Reply (Paper 39 (“Reply”)). Oral hearing2 was held on June 12, 2015, and a transcript of the hearing was entered into the record. Paper 46 (“Tr.”).” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelOther

    “B. Principles of Law A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). In that regard, an obviousness analysis “need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418; Translogic, 504 F.3d at 1259. The level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). We analyze the asserted grounds of unpatentability in accordance with the above-stated principles.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “plasma to generate a strongly-ionized plasma,” with independent claim 10 reciting a similar limitation. All of the challenged claims depend from claim 1 or 10. During the pre-trial stage of this proceeding, the parties submitted their constructions for the claim terms “a weakly-ionized plasma” and “a strongly-ionized plasma.” Pet. 14–15; Prelim. Resp. 20–22. In our Decision on Institution, we adopted Zond’s proposed constructions, in light of the Specification, as the broadest reasonable interpretation. Dec. 8–10. Upon review of the parties’ explanations and supporting evidence before us, we discern no reason to modify our claim constructions set forth in the Decision on Institution with respect to these claim terms. Id. Therefore, for purposes of this Final Written Decision, we construe, in light of the Specification, the claim term “a weakly-ionized plasma” as “a plasma with a relatively low peak density of ions,” the claim term “a strongly-ionized plasma” as “a plasma with a relatively high peak density of ions.”” slip op. at 7

  Patent outcomesUS 6,853,142 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,853,142

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.