- Kubota North America Corporation v. Vermeer Manufacturing CompanySome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 30, 2026 · IPR2025-00167 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–13, 21, 22, 64, and 65 are unpatentable over the asserted grounds; claims 15, 17, 19, 20, 23–30, 66, and 67 were not shown unpatentable over KR996, JP705, and Beltrami.
RulingsFinal written decision- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“B. Analysis “The moving party has the burden of proof to establish that it is” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelOther
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art We review the grounds of unpatentability in view of the” slip op. at 21
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“lexicographical, we agree with the parties that “mainframe” is not limited to a single weldment. Pet. Init. CC Br. 1; PO Init. CC Br. 1–2. Instead, a single-weldment “mainframe” is merely one disclosed embodiment. See Pet. Init. CC Br. 3 (stating that “by including the term ‘generally’ in a statement, the feature (i.e., single weldment) is expressly identified as merely included in some, but not all embodiments”); PO Init. CC Br. 3 (“This language is merely exemplary, using reference numerals to refer to the embodiment’s features and qualifying ‘single weldment’ as referring ‘generally’ to specific embodiments.”). The Iowa District Court reached the same conclusion. See Ex. 1020 at 4 (holding that “‘mainframe’ will be given its plain and ordinary meaning and does not require a single weldment” (emphasis added)), cited at Pet. Init. CC Br. 2; see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (“Any prior claim construction determination concerning a term of the claim in a civil action, or a proceeding before the International Trade Commission, that is timely made of record in the inter partes review proceeding will be considered.”).” slip op. at 33
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“probative and cogent evidence in the record” and “may often establish that an invention appearing to have been obvious in light of the prior art was not.” Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Thus, notwithstanding what the teachings of the prior art would have suggested to one skilled in the art, secondary considerations (objective evidence of non-obviousness) may lead to a conclusion that the challenged claims would not have been obvious. In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1471–72 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Our obviousness analysis includes consideration and weighing of Patent Owner’s objective indicia of non-obviousness.” slip op. at 55
Patent outcomesUS 9,321,386 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,321,386 - PTAB · Jun 11, 2025 · IPR2025-00139 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–10 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“d. Overlap of Issues “[I]f the petition includes the same or substantially the same claims, grounds, arguments, and evidence as presented in the parallel proceeding, this fact has favored denial.” Fintiv, Paper 11 at 12. “Conversely, if the petition includes materially different grounds, arguments, and/or evidence than those presented in the district court, this fact has tended to weigh against exercising discretion to deny institution under NHK.” Id. at 12–13. Concerns about the degree of overlap may be mitigated where a petitioner agrees not to pursue in the parallel district court litigation the grounds advanced in the petition. Sand Revolution II, LLC v. Cont’l Intermodal Grp.–Trucking LLC, IPR2019-01393, Paper 24 at 11–12 (PTAB June 16, 2020) (informative). The Board suggested that a broader stipulation such as one stipulating that the petitioner “would not pursue any ground raised or that could have been reasonably raised in an IPR, i.e., any ground that could be raised under §§ 102 or 103 on the basis of prior art patents or printed publications” would better address concerns relating to overlapping issues. Id. at 12 n.5. Here, Petitioner’s stipulation is broader—Petitioner stipulates that, if the Board institutes IPR in this proceeding on the grounds presented in the Petition, Petitioners will not pursue an invalidity defense in the [Texas Litigation] that the patent claims subject to the instituted IPR are invalid based on the grounds that were raised or any grounds Petitioner[] reasonably could have raised in the IPR. Prelim. Reply 3. Petitioner’s stipulation is similar to that provided in Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12, 18–19 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential in relevant part), which was found to obviate much, if not all, of any potential overlap between the issues in the proceeding and the district court proceeding. See Prelim. Sur-reply 3 (acknowledging that “Petitioner[] offered a Sotera stipulation.”) Accordingly, the facts underlying this factor weigh strongly against exercising our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 13
- Other 314aDenied
“Patent Owner argues that the Petition improperly presents voluminous and excessive grounds challenging the claims of the ’878 patent. Prelim. Resp. 10–14. Patent Owner argues that the twenty distinct grounds set forth in the Petition alone is reason to deny institution. Id. at 11. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s showing regarding the VFD, switchgear, and enclosure recitations of claim 1 require us to “pick-and-choose” which “prior art evidence” is being applied. Id. at 14. We are not persuaded that the Petition sets forth such voluminous or excessive grounds asserting unpatentability that we should deny institution. Although Petitioner does set forth twenty grounds, sixteen of the grounds are directed to a single dependent claim. See Pet. 16–17. And of the four grounds challenging independent claim 1, Petitioner relies primarily on the combined teachings of Morris and Oehring IV to disclose or teach most of the claim recitations, relying on Premset Catalog and Premset Brochure to teach front-aligned, shielded cable connections and on Payne to provide an alternate teaching of using a common support structure. See Pet. 48–51, 70–74. The instant Petition is quite unlike those in the decisions cited by Patent Owner, which dealt with petitions asserting challenges containing multiple instances of “and/or” that resulted in hundreds of challenges or asserting multiple challenges grouped together in an indiscernible claim chart. See Prelim. Resp. 10 (citing Adaptics Ltd. v. Perfect Co., IPR2018-01596, Paper 20 (PTAB Mar. 6, 2019) (informative); Uber Techs., Inc. v. Surgetech LLC, IPR2023-00738, Paper 8 (PTAB Oct. 23, 2023); EnergySouce Mins., LLC v. TerraLithium LLC, IPR2019-01607, Paper 10 (PTAB May 4, 2020)). And although we agree that the Petition is not the epitome of clarity, we are able to interpret Petitioner’s arguments as set forth below. Accordingly, we determine that the circumstances presented weigh against exercising discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny institution of inter partes review based on the number of challenges presented in the Petition.” slip op. at 15
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). A decision to institute may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354, 1359–60 (2018). If the Board institutes a trial, the Board will institute on all challenges raised in the petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting . . . review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the parties’ briefs and evidence of record, we conclude that the information presented shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we institute inter partes review of all challenged claims based on all asserted grounds. slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the effective filing date would have had either “a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Petroleum Engineering or an equivalent field, as well as at least 2 years academic or industry 2 At this stage of the proceeding, the parties have not directed us to any such objective evidence. experience in the oil and gas industry, including well drilling, completion, or production” or “at least four years industry experience in the oil and gas industry including well drilling, completion, or production.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1003 §§ V.A, VII). “Patent Owner applies the same skill level proposed by Petitioner.” Prelim. Resp. 9. We find Petitioner’s uncontested definition to be consistent with the problems and solutions disclosed in the ’878 patent and prior art of record, and adopt it as our own for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579 (approving the determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art by appeal to the references of record).” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,208,878 - PTAB · Jun 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00170 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1–36 on all asserted grounds; the petition showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner states that it “does not dispute” the definition of one of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner and “notes that it substantially tracks” Patent Owner’s definition. Prelim. Resp. 20; see also id. at 20–21 n.7 (defining one of ordinary skill in the art as having “at least a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical or Agricultural Engineering and two years of experience in the design of machines, or have had equivalent knowledge and experience”). Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art appears consistent with the record at this stage of the proceeding, including the prior art. See GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579. Patent Owner’s proposal is the same, except for use of the term “machines” instead of “vehicles.” Furthermore, Patent Owner does not argue at this stage of the proceeding that Petitioner’s proposal for the level of ordinary skill leads to an improper understanding of how a skilled artisan would understand either the challenged patent or the prior art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“On March 19, 2025, however, the Texas District Court stayed the Texas Litigation pending the resolution of this inter partes review and the related inter partes reviews. See Ex. 1037 at 6; Prelim. Reply 1. “A district court stay of the litigation pending resolution of the PTAB trial allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts.” Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. Factor 1 strongly weighs against discretionarily denying the Petition.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“In determining whether to deny institution under § 325(d), we use a two-part framework: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of [the] first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential) (“Advanced Bionics”). If part one of Advanced Bionics is unsatisfied, discretionary denial is unwarranted, and we need not proceed to part two of Advanced Bionics. Id.” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Specification. We first address the sentence highlighted in the Board’s request for additional briefing on claim construction: “As used herein, the term ‘mainframe’ generally refers to a single weldment to which the loader 8 is attached, optionally through one or more pivotal linkages.” Ex. 1001, 4:5–8, quoted at Paper 6 at 3. In the request, the Board sought briefing on whether this sentence is (1) a lexicographical definition of “mainframe” or, in the alternative, (2) merely a description of an embodiment. Paper 6 at 3. The parties both responded that this sentence is not lexicographical, but rather, merely describes an embodiment. See PO Init. CC Br. 1–5; Pet. Init. CC Br. 1–4; PO Reply CC Br. 1 (noting agreement); Pet. Reply CC Br. 1 (same). For the reasons below, we agree with the parties. “To act as a lexicographer, a patentee must ‘clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term’ and ‘clearly express an intent to redefine the term.’” Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., 814 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). As argued by both parties, the presence of “generally” in the sentence at issue shows a lack of clear intent to redefine “mainframe.” PO Init. CC. Br. 3; Pet. Init. CC Br. 2; cf. ParkerVision, Inc. v. Vidal, 88 F.4th 969, 976–77 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (finding definitional the sentence “[s]torage modules and storage capacitances, on the other hand, refer to systems that store non-negligible amounts of energy from an input EM signal” (emphasis added)); Sinorgchem Co., Shandong v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 511 F.3d 1132, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding definitional the sentence “[a] ‘controlled amount’ of protic material is an amount up to that which inhibits the reaction of aniline with nitrobenzene, e.g., up to about 4% H2O based on the volume of the reaction mixture when aniline is utilized as the solvent” (emphasis added)). Because the sentence at issue is not lexicographical, we also agree with the parties that “mainframe” is not limited to a single weldment. Pet. Init. CC Br. 1; PO Init. CC Br. 1–2. Instead, a single-weldment “mainframe” is merely one disclosed embodiment. See Pet. Init. CC Br. 3 (stating that “by including the term ‘generally’ in a statement, the feature (i.e., single weldment) is expressly identified as merely included in some, but not all embodiments”); PO Init. CC Br. 3 (“This language is merely exemplary, using reference numerals to refer to the embodiment’s features and qualifying ‘single weldment’ as referring ‘generally’ to specific embodiments.”). The Iowa District Court reached the same conclusion. See Ex. 1020 at 4 (holding that “‘mainframe’ will be given its plain and ordinary meaning and does not require a single weldment” (emphasis added)), cited” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,975,750 - PTAB · Jun 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00171 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1–16 and 19–28 on all asserted grounds because the Petition showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“we view the prior art and the claimed invention. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person presumed to have known the relevant prior art. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, we may consider certain factors, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“On March 19, 2025, however, the Texas District Court stayed the Texas Litigation pending the resolution of this inter partes review and the related inter partes reviews. See Ex. 1037 at 6; Prelim. Reply 1. “A district court stay of the litigation pending resolution of the PTAB trial allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts.” Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. Factor 1 strongly weighs against discretionarily denying the Petition.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“In determining whether to deny institution under § 325(d) we use a two-part framework: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of [the] first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential) (“Advanced Bionics”). If part one of Advanced Bionics is unsatisfied, discretionary denial is unwarranted, and we need not proceed to part two of Advanced Bionics. Id.” slip op. at 16
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We thus institute inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 362–63, 369–70 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,202,266 - PTAB · Jun 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00169 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 50–63, 68, 69, and 80–85 under all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability for at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the additional briefing, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of claims 50–63, 68, 69, and 80–85 of the ’386 patent.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“On March 19, 2025, however, the District Court stayed the Parallel Litigation pending the resolution of this inter partes review and the related inter partes review. Ex. 1037, 6; Pet. DD Br. 1. “A district court stay of the litigation pending resolution of the PTAB trial allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts.” Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. Factor 1 strongly weighs against discretionarily denying the Petition.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“In determining whether to deny institution under § 325(d) we use a two-part framework, as follows: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of [the] first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential). If part one of Advanced Bionics is unsatisfied, discretionary denial is unwarranted, and we need not proceed to part two of Advanced Bionics. Id.” slip op. at 15
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of invention. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. Petitioner proposes the following definition for a POSITA: [A] POSITA in February 2015 (the earliest effective filing date claimed) would have had at least a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical or Agricultural Engineering and two years of experience in the design of vehicles, or have had equivalent knowledge and experience. Lack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa. Pet. 16–17 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 17–20). Patent Owner does dispute this definition in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 21–22. For purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art as it is consistent with the ’386 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,321,386 - PTAB · Jun 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00168 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 31–49, 70–79, 86, and 87 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability based on the petition’s obviousness challenges.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“On March 19, 2025, however, the District Court stayed the Parallel Litigation pending the resolution of this inter partes review and the related inter partes review. Ex. 1037, 6; Pet. DD Br. 1. “A district court stay of the litigation pending resolution of the PTAB trial allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts.” Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. Factor 1 strongly weighs against discretionarily denying the Petition.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“In determining whether to deny institution under § 325(d) we use a two-part framework, as follows: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential). If part one of Advanced Bionics is unsatisfied, discretionary denial is unwarranted, and we need not proceed to part two of Advanced Bionics. Id. For part one of the Advanced Bionics framework, we evaluate the following factors: (a) the similarities and material differences between the asserted art and the prior art involved during examination;” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the additional briefing, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of claims 31–49, 70–79, 86, and 87 of the ’386 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“[A] POSITA in February 2015 (the earliest effective filing date claimed) would have had at least a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical or Agricultural Engineering and two years of experience in the design of vehicles, or have had equivalent knowledge and experience. Lack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa. Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 17–20). Patent Owner does dispute this definition in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 33. For purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art as it is consistent with the ’386 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,321,386 - PTAB · Jun 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00167 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–13, 15, 17, 19–30, and 64–67 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the additional briefing, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of claims 1–13, 15, 17, 19–30, and 64–67 of the ’386 patent.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“On March 19, 2025, however, the District Court stayed the Parallel Litigation pending the resolution of this inter partes review and the related inter partes review. Ex. 1037, 6; Pet. DD Br. 1. “A district court stay of the litigation pending resolution of the PTAB trial allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts.” Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. Factor 1 strongly weighs against discretionarily denying the Petition.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“In determining whether to deny institution under § 325(d) we use a two-part framework, as follows: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of [the] first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential). If part one of Advanced Bionics is unsatisfied, discretionary denial is unwarranted, and we need not proceed to part two of Advanced Bionics. Id.” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of invention. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. Petitioner proposes the following definition for a POSITA: [A] POSITA in February 2015 (the earliest effective filing date claimed) would have had at least a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical or Agricultural Engineering and two years of experience in the design of vehicles, or have had equivalent knowledge and experience. Lack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa. definition in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 21. For purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art as it is consistent with the ’386 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,321,386 - Bazooka-Farmstar, LLC v. Nuhn Industries Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00004 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–40 are unpatentable as obvious over Puck and Bryham; the revised contingent motion to amend proposing claims 41–80 is denied as those claims are unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art We review the grounds of unpatentability in view of the” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Mr. Nuhn states that “[t]he only conclusion I can draw from the Stutsman mechanic’s explanation is that he understood Bazooka was copying Nuhn’s patented Lagoon Crawler and felt uneasy about being involved in Bazooka’s activities.” Ex. 2083 ¶ 75. However, Mr. Nuhn’s unsubstantiated conclusion is not persuasive evidence.” slip op. at 61
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“4. Motivation to Combine Puck and Bryham Petitioner asserts that “Puck describes a cumbersome, manual process” slip op. at 39
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for patent owner
“Mr. Nuhn states that “[t]he only conclusion I can draw from the Stutsman mechanic’s explanation is that he understood Bazooka was copying Nuhn’s patented Lagoon Crawler and felt uneasy about being involved in Bazooka’s activities.” Ex. 2083 ¶ 75. However, Mr. Nuhn’s unsubstantiated conclusion is not persuasive evidence.” slip op. at 61
Patent outcomesUS 11,491,835 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,491,835 - Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co. Ltd. / Yealink Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. Barco N.V.InstitutedPTAB · Apr 8, 2025 · IPR2024-01439 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–11 and 13–21 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on claim 1 over Uchida and Grimshaw.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the Petition and the evidence of record, and in the absence of any argument or evidence to the contrary, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’951 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–11 and 13–21 of the ’951 patent on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“We do not agree that the references relied upon in the Petition are cumulative of the Banerjee and Epstein references previously considered by the Office. For example, during reexamination Patent Owner represented to the Office that neither Banerjee nor Epstein discloses or suggests “an actuator on the peripheral device, wherein said actuator is arranged in a way to enable the user to carry out a user action by actuating the actuator to trigger the processing device to transfer said user selected arbitrary media content to said wireless transmitter through said port to transmit said user selected arbitrary media content to the display node via the communications network” . . . . [T]he skilled person would have appreciated that Banerjee is directed to the plug-and-play device having code that is automatically executed when the plug-and-play device is connected to the remote computer and the remote computer sending a request to share the screen by the master computer, whereas Epstein is directed to a puck that sends an intention to the switching device or wirelessly through the laptop. Ex. 2001, 124–125 (emphasis added). Here, however, Petitioner relies primarily on the structures and operations disclosed by Ono, Ichieda, and Uchida to demonstrate it would have been known to include an actuator on a wireless peripheral device to trigger the transfer of a user selected arbitrary media content. See Pet. 31–33, 57–59, 77. Importantly, unlike Epstein or Banerjee, each of those references discloses display systems that include wireless peripheral devices that have actuators that are at least related to facilitating the transfer of image data from a personal computer to a projector for display. See id. As such, we find that Ono, Ichieda, and Uchida present information that is neither substantively similar nor cumulative of that disclosed or suggested by Banerjee and Epstein. Accordingly, we decline to exercise discretion to deny institution pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had at least a Master’s Degree in Electrical Engineering with . . . five years of work experience in computer science and embedded systems, or Master’s Degree in Computer Science with . . . five years of work experience in electrical and computer engineering and embedded systems. Additional educational experience could substitute for some of the work experience. Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, as it is consistent with the ’951 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 9
- BurdenInstituted
“Patent Owner’s assertion fails to undermine Petitioner’s contention because it does not actually address Petitioner’s point, which is that a skilled artisan would recognize, when a user slides switch 140 back to the ‘OFF’ position to allow image transfer to resume, that action would trigger image data transmission of user selected arbitrary media content from wireless through the wireless communications network for display. Instead, Patent Owner’s argument only addresses when a user slides switch 140 to the “ON” position to stop image transmission. On this record, we determine that Petitioner’s evidence and analysis shows sufficiently that Uchida and Grimshaw disclose this last claim element of claim 1. 4. Conclusion After considering Petitioner’s evidence and argument, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of claim 1 based on the combination of Uchida and Grimshaw (Ground 2). We also note that both parties rely on substantially the same evidence and arguments to address independent claims 9, 16, and 21. See Pet. 49–59 (claim 9), 64–66 (claim 16), 67 (claim 21); Prelim. Resp. 34–47 (claims 9, 16, 21). Therefore, our determination for claim 1 applies equally to claims 9, 16, and 21.” slip op. at 16
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,422,951 - Par-Kan Company, LLC v. Unverferth Manufacturing CompanyInstitution deniedPTAB · Mar 19, 2025 · IPR2024-01427 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 10–21, finding no reasonable likelihood that claims 10–20 were unpatentable and declining institution based at most on claim 21.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“1. Legal Standards A patent owner may antedate a reference by proving an earlier 4 Assembly Manual: Part Number 80504785 REV A, Hiniker Company, Jan. 2001 (“Hiniker Manual”) (Ex. 1007). 5 Screen capture of the archived version of a Hiniker Company webpage captured by the Internet Archive on March 14, 2006, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20060314112127/http://www.hiniker. com/ag_products/4800features.htm (“Hiniker Webpage”) (Ex. 1008). 237 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see 37 C.F.R. § 1.131. For an actual reduction to practice, a patent owner must show three things: (1) construction of an embodiment or performance of a process meeting all limitations in the challenged claims; (2) “that the invention would work for its intended purpose”; and (3) “sufficient evidence to corroborate inventor testimony regarding these events.” Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 2006). If a patent owner attempts to antedate a reference in an inter partes review, the patent owner bears the burden of producing evidence supporting an invention date before the reference’s effective date. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2015). At the institution stage of an inter partes review, the statutory “reasonable likelihood” standard for institution applies to the issue whether a reference qualifies as prior art. Cf. Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 12 (precedential) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 314(a)).” slip op. at 6
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“contend that Morris and Hiniker Webpage are not available as prior art with regard of claim 21 because Patent Owner does not contend the invention of claim 21 was actually reduced to practice prior to the alleged publication dates of Morris and Hiniker Webpage. Nevertheless, even assuming a reasonable likelihood of prevailing was shown by Petitioner with respect to claim 21, we still consider whether we should exercise discretion to deny the Petition. That is because when a petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to one or more claims institution of review remains discretionary. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (2018) (“[Section] 314(a) invests the Director with discretion on the question whether to institute review . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.”). The Board may consider the number of claims and grounds that meet the reasonable likelihood standard when deciding whether to institute inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). See Chevron Oronite Co. v. Infineum USA L.P., IPR2018-00923, Paper 9 at 10–11 (PTAB Nov. 7, 2018) (informative); Deeper, UAB v. Vexilar, Inc., IPR2018-01310, Paper 7 at” slip op. at 14
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“3500 persuaded us that Petitioner, as explained below, has not produced sufficient evidence to show a reasonable likelihood in refuting that the subject matter of claims 10–20 was actually reduced to practice (i) before February 15, 2006; (ii) no later than February 18, 2006; (iii) no later than February 28, 2006; and (iv) no later than May 16, 2006. Accordingly, Patent Owner persuaded us that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood in establishing that either Morris, which published by August 13, 2006, or Hiniker Webpage, which published by March 14, 2006, are prior art to claims 10–20 of the ’123 patent.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not reached
“4. Conclusion Petitioner’s grounds all rely upon either Morris (Ex. 1004) or Hinkier Webpage (Ex. 1008) with respect to claims 10–20 of the ’123 patent. Pet. 1. establishing that either Morris or Hiniker Webpage are prior art to claims 10–20, we determine that Petitioner fails to show a reasonable likelihood that claims 10–20 are unpatentable.” slip op. at 13
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,745,123
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.