- Motorola Mobility LLC v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Jul 22, 2020 · IPR2014-00504 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Motorola’s rehearing request, leaving intact the remand decision that claims 1–4, 7, and 18 were not shown unpatentable on the instituted grounds.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Thus, a request for rehearing is not an opportunity merely to disagree with the Board’s assessment of the arguments or weighing of the evidence, or to present new arguments or evidence.” slip op. at 3
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“that Dr. Tewfik’s testimony is not credible because he has “no personal knowledge” and “merely parrots the inventor’s claim chart.” Req. 6. We disagree, because we considered and analyzed expressly Petitioner’s argument and the basis for Dr. Tewfik’s testimony. Remand Dec. 27, 30. We determined that Dr. Tewfik’s testimony was credible, in that it was testimony concerning his opinion with respect to the claim chart, and also that his testimony was based, at least in part, on his personal experience with Windows 98 and its functionalities. Id. at 30. Indeed, the Federal Circuit noted that the rule of reason requires us to consider all pertinent evidence, and then noted explicitly that Dr. Tewfik’s testimony was one example of such pertinent evidence that needed to be considered. See Intellectual Ventures II, 692 F. App’x at 627–628. For these reasons, we are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked the credibility of Dr. Tewfik’s testimony.” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“not have changed the outcome of our Decision. In Figure 4, Kellerer shows a block with a central control unit, address management, routing, an application server, and network managers. Exhibit 1007, 45. This block diagram, however, does not specifically address whether or not Internet access requires an external service controller. Moreover, Petitioner provides no citations to any passages that describe the functions of the central control unit, address management, routing, the application server, and the network managers. See generally Req. 9–13. We are not persuaded that Kellerer teaches all of the components that are necessary to enable Internet access based on Figure 4 alone. That these components are located inside the car, as shown in Figure 3, also does not specifically address whether or not Internet access requires an external service controller. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Figures 3 and 4 render the stand-alone system limitation obvious.” slip op. at 12
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,382,771 - PTAB · Jun 19, 2019 · IPR2018-01159 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied West’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the challenged claims.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“In a request for rehearing, we do not review the merits of the Institution Decision de novo. Instead, we consider whether Petitioner has met its burden of showing that a matter has been misapprehended or overlooked. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (“The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.”). We conclude that Petitioner has not met this burden in its Request for Rehearing.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Initially, we remind Petitioner that we did not find that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to modify Carrel in view of David-Hegerich. See Dec. on Inst. 17–22. Rather, we found that Petitioner did not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of showing that one of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Carrel as proposed by Petitioner. See id.” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Initially, we remind Petitioner that we did not find that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to modify Carrel in view of David-Hegerich. See Dec. on Inst. 17–22. Rather, we found that Petitioner did not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of showing that one of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Carrel as proposed by Petitioner. See id.” slip op. at 3
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,586,011 - Toyota Motor Corporation v. General Electric CompanyRehearing deniedPTAB · Jun 14, 2019 · IPR2019-00018 · APJ Joni Y Chang · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Toyota’s rehearing request, leaving the denial of institution on claims 16–19 in place because the Petition did not explain how the proposed combination supplied the claimed second DC/DC conversion device.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“Mitsutani’s inverter also should be included in its proposed combination of Robinson and Mitsutani. Req. Reh’g 4. Petitioner admits that “the Petition did not call it out separately.” Id. However, a request for rehearing is not an opportunity to supplement the Petition, or submit new arguments that were not made in the Petition, after the Decision has noted the deficiencies in the Petitioner’s original analysis. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“proposed prior art combination teaches or suggests “a second DC/DC conversion device coupleable to an internal charging device,” as recited in independent claim 16. Dec. 11−15. In its Petition, Petitioner asserts that Robinson discloses the claimed “second DC/DC conversion device.” Pet. 31−32 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 145, Fig. 4). Petitioner modifies Robinson’s Figure 4 to “include an additional 4−34 V scavenger power converter for device port 4.” Id. Petitioner’s modified Figure 4 of Robinson is reproduced below with annotations added by Petitioner (id.).” slip op. at 3
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“The burden to prove unpatentability is on the petitioner, not on the patent owner or the Board. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. National Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (noting that the petitioner in an inter partes proceeding has the initial burden of production and the burden” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“internal charging device” to device port 4 (light pink). Pet. 31. Petitioner asserts that “[t]his second 4−34V scavenger power converter is ‘coupleable to an internal charging device,’ as claimed, because the combined Robinson/Mitsutani system teaches a motor generator that is internal to the vehicle and would be connected to Robinson’s device port 4.” Id. at 32 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 76) (emphases added). slip op. at 4
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,821,668 - Toyota Motor Corp. v. GE Hybrid Technologies, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · May 9, 2019 · IPR2019-00015 · APJ Lynne H Browne · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing, leaving institution denied for claims 1–16 because the petition did not adequately explain why the prior art would be modified to meet the vehicle-control limitation.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. PRINCIPLES OF LAW A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a single request for rehearing without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “When rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“pertaining to a vehicle control unit. Pet. 20, 24; Ex. 1002 ¶ 55. The Petition and the Miller Declaration provide evidence that Sugimoto discloses control device 60, and that one skilled in the art would have considered Sugimoto’s control device 60 to be a vehicle control unit, as required by each of claims 1 and 5. Id. The Petition and the Miller Declaration also provide evidence that Sugimoto’s control device 60 controls a switch. Pet. 17–19; Ex. 1002 ¶ 50. Such evidence alone, however, does not provide sufficient reasoning, with adequate rational underpinnings, for modifying Fassnacht’s process to include a vehicle control unit that is allowed to turn on a first switch when the vehicle is below a first threshold temperature. Rather, as we explained in our Decision, “[t]he allegations in the Petition rely on an assumption that mere inclusion of a vehicle control unit as part of Fassnacht’s method would result in the claimed method.” Dec. 13 (citing Pet. 20, 22–24). Further, even though we did not specifically cite paragraphs 52–53, 61–62, and 103–109 of the Miller Declaration in our Decision, we did not overlook or misapprehend them. These paragraphs provide detailed explanations of how Sugimoto’s control device 60 could have been incorporated in to Fassnacht’s vehicle, but these descriptions also start from the assumption that merely including Sugimoto’s control unit 16 in Fassnacht’s process would have resulted in the claimed method. Neither the Petition nor the Miller Declaration explain why one skilled in the art would modify Fassnacht’s process to include the step of allowing the vehicle control unit to turn on a switch when such a step is unnecessary to Fassnact’s process. In re Giannelli, 739 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he mere capability of pulling the handles is not the inquiry that the Board should have made; it should have determined whether it would have been obvious to modify the prior art apparatus to arrive at the claimed rowing machine.”).” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“pertaining to a vehicle control unit. Pet. 20, 24; Ex. 1002 ¶ 55. The Petition and the Miller Declaration provide evidence that Sugimoto discloses control device 60, and that one skilled in the art would have considered Sugimoto’s control device 60 to be a vehicle control unit, as required by each of claims 1 and 5. Id. The Petition and the Miller Declaration also provide evidence that Sugimoto’s control device 60 controls a switch. Pet. 17–19; Ex. 1002 ¶ 50. Such evidence alone, however, does not provide sufficient reasoning, with adequate rational underpinnings, for modifying Fassnacht’s process to include a vehicle control unit that is allowed to turn on a first switch when the vehicle is below a first threshold temperature. Rather, as we explained in our Decision, “[t]he allegations in the Petition rely on an assumption that mere inclusion of a vehicle control unit as part of Fassnacht’s method would result in the claimed method.” Dec. 13 (citing Pet. 20, 22–24). Further, even though we did not specifically cite paragraphs 52–53, 61–62, and 103–109 of the Miller Declaration in our Decision, we did not overlook or misapprehend them. These paragraphs provide detailed explanations of how Sugimoto’s control device 60 could have been incorporated in to Fassnacht’s vehicle, but these descriptions also start from the assumption that merely including Sugimoto’s control unit 16 in Fassnacht’s process would have resulted in the claimed method. Neither the Petition nor the Miller Declaration explain why one skilled in the art would modify Fassnacht’s process to include the step of allowing the vehicle control unit to turn on a switch when such a step is unnecessary to Fassnact’s process. In re Giannelli, 739 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he mere capability of pulling the handles is not the inquiry that the Board should have made; it should have determined whether it would have been obvious to modify the prior art apparatus to arrive at the claimed rowing machine.”).” slip op. at 3
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,409,052 - Necksgen, Inc. v. Simpson Performance Products, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Jul 25, 2018 · IPR2018-00133 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing, leaving in place its denial of institution because Petitioner did not show the asserted art taught claim 1[d] or establish motivation to combine with a reasonable expectation of success.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW When considering a request for rehearing, the Board reviews its decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if the decision was based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Additionally: “The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“the Preliminary Response. In our Decision, we determined that “[w]e do not need to construe expressly any claim terms for purposes of this Decision” because it did not appear, from the arguments presented, that any claim terms were in dispute. Dec. 6. When we considered the parties’ positions in reaching our Decision, we were aware that the term “tether” was defined in the ’529 patent, even though Petitioner did not state that expressly. In other words, we understood, and now explicitly determine, that the patentee acted as his own lexicographer by setting forth a specific definition for “tether” in the ’529 patent. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (if the specification “reveal[s] a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess[,] . . . the inventor’s lexicography governs”) (citing CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).” slip op. at 4
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Motivation to Combine & Reasonable Expectation of Success Petitioner contends that we abused our discretion by failing to consider the appropriate claim scope when evaluating motivation to combine and reasonable expectation of success. Req. Reh’g 10–14. First, as discussed above, we did not fail to consider the appropriate claim scope. Second, we have now set forth that claim scope expressly. In light of our discussion above, our analysis regarding motivation to combine and reasonable expectation of success is no different from that which we set forth in our Decision. Dec. 11–15. Petitioner’s reiteration of the same positions set forth in Petition does not persuade us that we abused our discretion in finding that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of demonstrating that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been promoted to modify and combine the teachings as proposed by Petitioner with a reasonable expectation of success. Accordingly, we are unpersuaded by Petitioner’s argument that we abused our discretion with respect to these issues.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,351,529 - Nevro Corp. v. Boston Scientific Neuromodulation Corp.Rehearing deniedPTAB · May 31, 2018 · IPR2017-01831 · APJ Hubert C Lorin · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing and maintained its denial of institution for claims 1, 3, 14, and 15 because Nevro did not sufficiently show Schulman rendered the no-stimulation voltage-measurement limitation obvious.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. ANALYSIS A request for rehearing must identify specifically all matters that the requesting party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). When rehearing a decision on institution, the Board will review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsNot shown unpatentable
“Schulman simply discloses that (a) when no stimulation is provided a request is made for a battery recharge and (b) when a battery recharge occurs, battery voltage is measured. Based on that alone, it is unclear when, or even if, the requested recharge will, in fact, ever occur, or whether it will occur when there is no stimulation provided. Arguably, a battery recharge normally follows a battery recharge request. But there is insufficient evidence that a battery recharge request, when there is no stimulation due to low voltage, necessarily leads to the battery being recharged, let alone recharged when there is no stimulation due to low voltage. As we stated in the Decision, “[i]ndeed, we find that the fact that microstimulator 100 has ceased operation when it emits a status signal (due to the low voltage condition) suggests the opposite; that is, the battery is not being recharged and is not performing any operation aside from emitting a status signal, which would include measuring the voltage of the rechargeable battery.” Dec. 15– 16. Accordingly, even Petitioner’s current position lacks sufficient evidence to support Petitioner’s contention that Schulman renders obvious the claimed subject matter whereby “voltage is measured when no stimulation is being provided by the electronic subassembly.”” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“The Petition went no further. No explanation was given as to how one of ordinary skill in the art, given that Schulman discloses (a) requesting battery recharge via emitted periodic signals when no stimulation is provided due to low battery and (b) monitoring (and measuring) voltage during recharge, would have been led to measure voltage “when no stimulation is being provided by the electronic subassembly,” as claimed. The Petition did not explain, for example, as Petitioner now contends, that “[a]t some point, [Schulman’s] recharge request will be honored. And when recharging commences from that low voltage, zero stimulation condition, Schulman will begin measuring voltage where there is still no stimulation.” Req. 3. We could not have misapprehended or overlooked this explanation, as it was not given.” slip op. at 7
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,437,193 - Abiomed, Inc., Abiomed R&D, Inc., And Abiomed Europe GmbH v. Maquet Cardiovascular, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Feb 7, 2018 · IPR2017-01209 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing, leaving in place the denial of institution because the petition did not sufficiently show that Aboul-Hosn disclosed or supported combining the challenged embodiments.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW When considering a request for rehearing, the Board reviews its decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if the decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of 2 The ’1025 Petition challenges claims 16–18 of the ’100 patent. 3 The ’1208 Petition challenges claims 7–9 and 11–15 of the ’437 patent. 4 The ’1209 Petition challenges claims 5, 10, 16, and 25 of the ’437 patent. 5 Petitioner filed a Request for Rehearing in each of the above-captioned proceedings. The Requests for Rehearing effectively are identical. This Decision specifically references the Request from IPR2017-01025 although the discussion applies equally to Petitioner’s Requests in IPR2017-01208 and IPR2017-01209. Citations are to IPR2017-01025, unless otherwise indicated. law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). We further note that 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) states: The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“assessment of all evidence in the record to determine whether the challenged claims would have been obvious. Rather, the Decision to deny institution of inter partes review was based on Petitioner’s failure to establish a reasonable likelihood of success at trial based on the arguments presented in the Petition, and the evidence relied upon in support of those particular arguments. Petitioner has the burden of showing, in its petition, a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). That reasonable likelihood is measured by considering the analysis offered by Petitioner. 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) (setting forth the requirements of a petition, including specificity and identification of support).” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“There is no express disclosure from Aboul-Hosn identified by Petitioner, in the Petition, or even in its Request, that the pump in Figures 1– 13 is included in Figure 23. In fact, and as noted in our Decision (Dec. 9), Aboul-Hosn expressly states that “Figure[] 23 . . . illustrate[s a] different embodiment[] of the present invention” (Ex. 1004, 30:20–21). Petitioner faults our characterization of the above passage from Aboul-Hosn, noting “[t]he ellipses, missing language and brackets are materially important.” Req. Reh’g 12. Petitioner contends that “[t]he Board’s errant paraphrase gives the misimpression that Figure 23 is an entirely different invention than any other in Aboul-Hosn. But, in context, the meaning is different. Figure 23 is a different embodiment than Figure 24. . . .” Id. at 12–13. The entire sentence spanning lines 20–21 on page 30 of Aboul-Hosn reads: “Figures 23 and 24 illustrate two different embodiments of the present invention.” Ex. 1004, 30:20–21. We are not persuaded that we misread that sentence. That sentence specifically references Figures 23 and 24 as two different embodiments, meaning that Figures 23 and 24 are each different embodiments, not only with respect to one another, but also with respect to the other embodiments disclosed.6” slip op. at 4
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,597,437 - PTAB · Feb 7, 2018 · IPR2017-01208 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied the rehearing request, leaving institution denied because Petitioner did not sufficiently show that Aboul-Hosn disclosed or supported combining the cited embodiments.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW When considering a request for rehearing, the Board reviews its decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if the decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of 2 The ’1025 Petition challenges claims 16–18 of the ’100 patent. 3 The ’1208 Petition challenges claims 7–9 and 11–15 of the ’437 patent. 4 The ’1209 Petition challenges claims 5, 10, 16, and 25 of the ’437 patent. 5 Petitioner filed a Request for Rehearing in each of the above-captioned proceedings. The Requests for Rehearing effectively are identical. This Decision specifically references the Request from IPR2017-01025 although the discussion applies equally to Petitioner’s Requests in IPR2017-01208 and IPR2017-01209. Citations are to IPR2017-01025, unless otherwise indicated. law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). We further note that 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) states: The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“assessment of all evidence in the record to determine whether the challenged claims would have been obvious. Rather, the Decision to deny institution of inter partes review was based on Petitioner’s failure to establish a reasonable likelihood of success at trial based on the arguments presented in the Petition, and the evidence relied upon in support of those particular arguments. Petitioner has the burden of showing, in its petition, a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). That reasonable likelihood is measured by considering the analysis offered by Petitioner. 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) (setting forth the requirements of a petition, including specificity and identification of support).” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“There is no express disclosure from Aboul-Hosn identified by Petitioner, in the Petition, or even in its Request, that the pump in Figures 1– 13 is included in Figure 23. In fact, and as noted in our Decision (Dec. 9), Aboul-Hosn expressly states that “Figure[] 23 . . . illustrate[s a] different embodiment[] of the present invention” (Ex. 1004, 30:20–21). Petitioner faults our characterization of the above passage from Aboul-Hosn, noting “[t]he ellipses, missing language and brackets are materially important.” Req. Reh’g 12. Petitioner contends that “[t]he Board’s errant paraphrase gives the misimpression that Figure 23 is an entirely different invention than any other in Aboul-Hosn. But, in context, the meaning is different. Figure 23 is a different embodiment than Figure 24. . . .” Id. at 12–13. The entire sentence spanning lines 20–21 on page 30 of Aboul-Hosn reads: “Figures 23 and 24 illustrate two different embodiments of the present invention.” Ex. 1004, 30:20–21. We are not persuaded that we misread that sentence. That sentence specifically references Figures 23 and 24 as two different embodiments, meaning that Figures 23 and 24 are each different embodiments, not only with respect to one another, but also with respect to the other embodiments disclosed.6 Contrary to Petitioner’s contentions, we considered the arguments and supporting evidence presented in the Petition and determined it insufficient to institute trial. See, e.g., Dec. 10 (“Ultimately, the Petition is deficient because of the failure to explain sufficiently and support the challenges therein.”). We are not persuaded that we abused our discretion in reaching that determination.7 Disagreeing with our Decision is not, by itself, an appropriate basis for rehearing.” slip op. at 4
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,597,437 - PTAB · Feb 7, 2018 · IPR2017-01025 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing of its decision denying institution because the petition did not sufficiently show that Aboul-Hosn linked the pump embodiments or provide a rationale to combine them.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW When considering a request for rehearing, the Board reviews its decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if the decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of 2 The ’1025 Petition challenges claims 16–18 of the ’100 patent. 3 The ’1208 Petition challenges claims 7–9 and 11–15 of the ’437 patent. 4 The ’1209 Petition challenges claims 5, 10, 16, and 25 of the ’437 patent. 5 Petitioner filed a Request for Rehearing in each of the above-captioned proceedings. The Requests for Rehearing effectively are identical. This Decision specifically references the Request from IPR2017-01025 although the discussion applies equally to Petitioner’s Requests in IPR2017-01208 and IPR2017-01209. Citations are to IPR2017-01025, unless otherwise indicated. law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). We further note that 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) states: The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“assessment of all evidence in the record to determine whether the challenged claims would have been obvious. Rather, the Decision to deny institution of inter partes review was based on Petitioner’s failure to establish a reasonable likelihood of success at trial based on the arguments presented in the Petition, and the evidence relied upon in support of those particular arguments. Petitioner has the burden of showing, in its petition, a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). That reasonable likelihood is measured by considering the analysis offered by Petitioner. 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) (setting forth the requirements of a petition, including specificity and identification of support).” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner, in the Petition, or even in its Request, that the pump in Figures 1– 13 is included in Figure 23. In fact, and as noted in our Decision (Dec. 9), Aboul-Hosn expressly states that “Figure[] 23 . . . illustrate[s a] different embodiment[] of the present invention” (Ex. 1004, 30:20–21). Petitioner faults our characterization of the above passage from Aboul-Hosn, noting “[t]he ellipses, missing language and brackets are materially important.” Req. Reh’g 12. Petitioner contends that “[t]he Board’s errant paraphrase gives the misimpression that Figure 23 is an entirely different invention than any other in Aboul-Hosn. But, in context, the meaning is different. Figure 23 is a different embodiment than Figure 24. . . .” Id. at 12–13. The entire sentence spanning lines 20–21 on page 30 of Aboul-Hosn reads: “Figures 23 and 24 illustrate two different embodiments of the present invention.” Ex. 1004, 30:20–21. We are not persuaded that we misread that sentence. That sentence specifically references Figures 23 and 24 as two different embodiments, meaning that Figures 23 and 24 are each different embodiments, not only with respect to one another, but also with respect to the other embodiments disclosed.6” slip op. at 4
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,022,100 - PTAB · Jan 3, 2018 · IPR2017-01205 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing in five proceedings, upholding denial of institution because the petitions did not sufficiently support the asserted obviousness challenges.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if the decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). We further note that 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) states: The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“assessment of all evidence in the record to determine whether the challenged claims would have been obvious. Rather, the Decision to deny institution of inter partes review was based on Petitioner’s failure to establish a reasonable likelihood of success at trial based on the arguments presented in the Petition, and the evidence relied upon in support of those particular arguments. Petitioner has the burden of showing, in its petition, a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). That reasonable likelihood is measured by considering the analysis offered by Petitioner. 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) (setting forth the requirements of a petition, including specificity and identification of support).” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not reached
“assessment of all evidence in the record to determine whether the challenged claims would have been obvious. Rather, the Decision to deny institution of inter partes review was based on Petitioner’s failure to establish a reasonable likelihood of success at trial based on the arguments presented in the Petition, and the evidence relied upon in support of those particular arguments. Petitioner has the burden of showing, in its petition, a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). That reasonable likelihood is measured by considering the analysis offered by Petitioner. 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) (setting forth the requirements of a petition, including specificity and identification of support).” slip op. at 3
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,561,314
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.