• Cisco Systems, Inc. / Oclaro, Inc. v. Oyster Optics, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 24, 2019 · IPR2017-01719 · APJ Rama G Elluru · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 7, 8, and 12–20 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 1–6 and 9–11 were not shown unpatentable, principally because Nortel was not established as prior art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenDecided for patent owner

    “We agree that Petitioner cannot introduce new argument in a reply. Our regulations require the Petition to identify “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed” and “[h]ow the construed claim is unpatentable.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3),(4). The Supreme Court also has acknowledged that “petitioner’s contentions [in a petition] . . . define the scope of the litigation all the way from institution through to conclusion.” SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1357. Furthermore, Petitioner’s Reply is limited to responding to arguments raised in the Patent Owner Response. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). Petitioner provided the specific explanation of why Bauch satisfies the limitation “the electronic feedback loop being fed back to the electronic input data stream” for the first time in the Reply. In the Petition, Petitioner stated that “Petitioner[] do[es] not believe that construction of any claims is required for, or material to, the resolution of this IPR.” Pet. 22. In contrast, in its Reply, Petitioner provides for the first time an express claim construction, which is the basis of Petitioner’s explanation as to why the limitation at issue is met. Reply 1–2 (“Thus, the proper construction must include . . . .”); id. at 3 (“Even if this claim element were construed to include feeding the feedback loop directly into the input data, it should be construed to also include . . . .”); id. at 3–4 (“[T]he claim language and specification provide that the meaning of Claim 1[b] includes separate inputs of an exclusive-or gate that receive the feedback and the input data stream.”). Petitioner’s Reply, however, does not sufficiently explain why the assertion of this express construction is consistent with its “plain and ordinary” claim construction position in the Petition. See id. at 1–4. Given that an electronic input data stream is neither a location nor a circuit or device, with regard to having the electronic feedback loop “fed back to the electronic input data stream,” Petitioner should have provided its claim construction and corresponding explanation as to why Bauch satisfies the limitation in the Petition. We conclude that in the circumstances here, Petitioner providing its explanation based on its claim construction, for the first time, in its Reply is improper and not acceptable. A reply is not an opportunity to start anew, to fill in gaps or to remedy omissions in a petition.” slip op. at 23

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “Our regulations require the Petition to identify “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed” and “[h]ow the construed claim is unpatentable.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3),(4). The Supreme Court also has acknowledged that “petitioner’s contentions [in a petition] . . . define the scope of the litigation all the way from institution through to conclusion.” SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1357. Furthermore, Petitioner’s Reply is limited to responding to arguments raised in the Patent Owner Response. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b).” slip op. at 23

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Neither party has proposed an articulation for the level of ordinary skill in the art. We determine that no express finding is necessary, and that the level of ordinary skill in the art, in this case, is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “not sufficiently explain, either in the Petition or the Reply, why Bauch’s disclosure of inputting the electronic feedback and the input data steam to separate inputs of an exclusive-OR gate teaches the claimed “the electronic feedback loop being fed back to the electronic input data stream.” We, therefore, are not persuaded that the limitation “the electronic feedback loop being fed back to the electronic input data stream” is met by Bauch, as proposed by Petitioner. Thus, Petitioner has not shown that Bauch teaches this limitation of claim 1. Petitioner does not rely on the additional references for this limitation of claim 1. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 would have been obvious over Bauch and Heflinger. 3. Summary In sum, we determine that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1, and for the same reasons dependent claims 4 and 64, would have been obvious over Bauch and Heflinger. Likewise, for the same reasons, with respect to asserted Ground 3, we determine that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 and 4–65 would have been obvious over the combination of Bauch, Heflinger, and Nortel.6” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 6,469,816 mixed
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,469,816
• Pfizer, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 28, 2018 · IPR2017-01358 · APJ Jacqueline T Harlow · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7, 12, and 13 were not shown unpatentable because Shadle did not establish the claimed molarity and conductivity limitations, and the obviousness showing was insufficient.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “and several years of postgraduate training or practical experience in a relevant discipline such as biochemistry, process chemistry, protein chemistry, chemical engineering and/or biochemical engineering, among others.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 28). Petitioner further contends that “[s]uch a person would also understand that protein purification is a multidisciplinary field, and could take advantage of the specialized skills of others using a collaborative approach.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 28). Patent Owner does not address Petitioner’s position on this matter and does not propose its own description for a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. We agree with Petitioner, and adopt Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention of the ’815 patent. We also note that the applied prior art reflects a level of skill at the time of the claimed invention consistent with our determination. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Consistent with the Institution Decision, we determine that “the plain language of the claims, as well as the specification of the ’815 patent, indicates that the term ‘molarity’ refers to the total concentration of solute present in the solution, rather than the concentration of one particular solute.” Id. at 10–11. The claims of the ’815 patent refer consistently to the overall molarity of solutions, and not of any particular solute in a given solution. For example, claim 1 requires “an acidic aqueous solution of low conductivity . . . having a molarity of 100 mM or less” (Ex. 1001, 12:42–44 (emphasis added)), and further recites that the molarity of the “adjusted sample is 100 mM or less” (id. at 12:45–47 (emphasis added)). Claim 2 9 similarly limits the molarity of the “acidic aqueous solution.” Id. at 12:50– 52. Notably, these claims do not identify any particular solute to which the term molarity refers; rather, the claims of the ’815 patent describe solutions having certain characteristics, of which solution molarity is one. As we stated in our Institution Decision: Similarly, the specification of the ’815 patent refers to the molarity of the complete solution, rather than one solute in that solution. See, e.g., id. at 4:61–64 (“As used herein, a ‘neutral aqueous solution . . .’ generally refers to an aqueous solution . . . which has a molarity of 0 to 100mM”), 5:28–31 (“an ‘acidic aqueous solution of low conductivity’ generally refers to an aqueous solution . . . , which has a molarity of 0 to 100 mM”). The file history of the ’815 patent likewise references the molarity of the solution, rather than of a given solute in the solution. See e.g., Ex.1005, 82 (“an important feature of the present invention is to adjust pH value of the solution, the eluate, to from 4 to 8 while maintaining the molarity of the solution at 100mM or less.”), 107 (“0.1 M buffer was used as an eluent, and 1 M Tris-HCl was used to adjust the pH of the eluted fraction, that is, the fact that 0.1 M and 1 M solutions were used means that the molarity of the eluted fration [sic] must be over 0.1 M (100 mM)”). Inst. Dec. 11.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “In the Institution Decision, we concluded that the claim terms “conductivity” and “ionic strength,” for which Petitioner proffered constructions in its Petition (Pet. 30, 35–36), did not require express construction for purposes of this proceeding. Dec. 8. Neither Petitioner nor Patent challenges that determination. See PO Resp. 11–22; Reply, passim. In its Response, Patent Owner proposes constructions for several additional 11 terms. Namely, Patent Owner contends that the preambles of claims 1 and 13 should be construed as limiting (PO Resp. 12), “to form particles” should be construed to require that the solution becomes clouded (id. at 16), and “the treated sample containing a physiologically active protein,” as recited in claim 5, should be interpreted to mean “the sample resulting from performing the method of claim 1, which concludes with removing particles in step 3” (id. at 17). Because interpretation of these claim terms is not necessary to our anticipation or obviousness analyses, we need not construe them. See Nidec, 868 F.3d at 1017.” slip op. at 11

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “To anticipate a claim, a prior art reference must disclose every limitation of the claimed invention, either expressly or inherently. Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “To establish that a prior art reference inherently—rather than expressly— discloses a claim limitation, ‘the limitation at issue necessarily must be present, or [is] the natural result of the combination of elements explicitly disclosed by the prior art.’” Endo Pharm. Sols., Inc. v. Custopharm Inc., 894 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharm., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.” slip op. at 14

  Patent outcomesUS 7,927,815 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,927,815
• Pfizer, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 28, 2018 · IPR2017-01357 · APJ Jacqueline T Harlow · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–8 and 13 were not held unpatentable because Petitioner failed to prove anticipation by Shadle or obviousness over Shadle.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “According to Petitioner, a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had “at least a graduate degree, such as a Ph.D., 6 and several years of postgraduate training or practical experience in a relevant discipline such as biochemistry, process chemistry, protein chemistry, chemical engineering and/or biochemical engineering, among others.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 28–29). Petitioner further contends that “[s]uch a person would also understand that protein purification is a multidisciplinary field, and could take advantage of the specialized skills of others using a collaborative approach.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 28–29). Patent Owner does not address Petitioner’s position on this matter and does not propose its own description for a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. We agree with Petitioner, and adopt Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention of the ’289 patent. We also note that the applied prior art reflects a level of skill at the time of the claimed invention consistent with our determination. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Consistent with the Institution Decision, we determine that “the plain language of the claims, as well as the specification of the ’289 patent, indicates that the term ‘molarity’ refers to the total concentration of solute present in the solution, rather than the concentration of one particular solute.” Id. at 10. The claims of the ’289 patent refer consistently to the overall molarity of solutions, and not of any particular solute in a given solution. For example, claim 1 requires “an acidic aqueous solution of low conductivity having a molarity of 100 mM or less” (Ex. 1001, 12:50–51 (emphasis added)), and further recites that the “molarity of the neutralized 9 eluate is 100 mM or less” (id. at 12:54 (emphasis added)). Claim 2 similarly limits the molarity of the “acidic aqueous solution.” Id. at 12:59–61. Notably, these claims do not identify any particular solute to which the term molarity refers; rather, the claims of the ’289 patent describe solutions having certain characteristics, of which solution molarity is one. As we stated in our Institution Decision: Similarly, the specification of the ’289 patent refers to the molarity of the complete solution, rather than one solute in that solution. See, e.g., id. at 4:61–66 (“As used herein, a ‘neutral aqueous solution . . .’ generally refers to an-aqueous [sic] solution . . . which has a molarity of 0 to 100mM”), 5:28–31 (“an ‘acidic aqueous solution of low conductivity’ generally refers to an aqueous solution . . . , which has a molarity of 0 to 100 mM”). The prosecution history of the ’289 patent likewise references the molarity of the solution, rather than of a given solute in the solution. See e.g., Ex.1005, 12 (“an important feature of the present invention is to adjust pH value of the solution, the eluate, to from 4 to 8 while maintaining the molarity of the solution at 100mM or less.”), 37 (“0.1 M buffer was used as an eluent, and 1 M Tris-HCl was used to adjust the pH of the eluted fraction, that is, the fact that 0.1 M and 1 M solutions were used means that the molarity of the eluted fration [sic] must be over 0.1 M (100 mM)”). Inst. Dec. 10–11.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “In its Response, Patent Owner proposes constructions for several additional terms. Namely, Patent Owner contends that the preamble of claim 1 should be construed as limiting (PO Resp. 12), “to form particles” should be construed to require that the solution becomes clouded (id. at 17), and “the treated sample containing an antibody,” as recited in claim 5, should be interpreted to mean “the sample resulting from performing the method of claim 1, which concludes with removing particles in step 4” (id. 11 at 18). Because interpretation of these claim terms is not necessary to our anticipation or obviousness analyses, we need not construe them. See Nidec, 868 F.3d at 1017.” slip op. at 11

  • ExcludeOther

    “Petitioner asserts that Patent Owner untimely introduced Exhibits 2201–2207 for the first time during the deposition of Petitioner’s Reply declarant, Dr. Przybycien. Paper 36, 4. Petitioner additionally asserts that the challenged exhibits are inadmissible because they are irrelevant. Id. Patent Owner responds that the objected-to exhibits were timely introduced because they were used to challenge opinions presented by Dr. Przybycien for the first time in conjunction with Petitioner’s Reply. Paper 44, 2. Patent Owner further asserts that the exhibits are relevant because they illuminate gaps in Dr. Przybycien’s Reply testimony. Id. at 3. Because we have not relied on Exhibits 2201–2207, or Dr. Przybycien’s testimony regarding those exhibits in this Final Written Decision, we dismiss Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude Exhibits 2201–2207 as moot.” slip op. at 33

  Patent outcomesUS 7,332,289 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,332,289
• Ebay Inc. / Alibaba.Com Hong Kong Ltd. et al. v. Global Equity Management (SA) Pty. Ltd.Rehearing granted
  PTAB · Oct 12, 2018 · IPR2016-01828 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Rehearing

  Rehearing was granted in part: review was instituted on all challenged claims and grounds, but claims 16 and 28 were not shown unpatentable because their scope could not be determined without speculation.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted in part

    “For the reasons explained below, we grant Patent Owner’s request for rehearing to the extent we (1) modify our Institution Decision to institute on all of the challenged claims, including claims 16 and 28, and all of the grounds presented in the Petition, including Ground 2; and (2) modify our Final Written Decision to include a determination with respect to claims 16 and 28. We deny, however, Patent Owner’s request for rehearing to the extent we decline to read claims 16 and 28 on the prior art.” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “In SAS, the Supreme Court held that a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on less than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc., 1348 at 1359–60. In our Institution Decision, we determined that Petitioner demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would establish that at least one of the challenged claims of the U.S. Patent No. 8,650,591 B2 is unpatentable. Inst. Dec. 23. Because of the Supreme Court’s ruling in SAS, we now modify our Institution Decision to institute on all of the challenged claims, including claims 16 and 28, and on all of the grounds presented in the Petition, including Ground 2, and we determine, in this Decision on Patent Owner’s Motion for Rehearing, whether claims 16 and 28 have been shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, to be unpatentable.” slip op. at 4

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “If our unpatentability analysis requires “considerable speculation as to the meaning and assumptions as to the scope” of the claims, In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862 (CCPA 1962), the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art cannot be ascertained. See id.; see also BlackBerry Corp. v. MobileMedia Ideas, LLC, Case IPR2013-00036, slip op. at 19–20 (PTAB Mar. 7, 2014) (Paper 65) (citing Steele, 305 F.2d at 862–63 for the proposition that “the prior art grounds of unpatentability must fall, pro forma, because they are based on speculative assumption[s] as to the meaning of the claims” and reasoning that “an obviousness determination based on less than all of the claimed elements is speculative as to the meaning or scope of the claims”). In other words, “[w]ithout ascertaining the proper claim scope, we cannot conduct a necessary factual inquiry for determining obviousness—ascertaining differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art.” Id. at 20 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966)).” slip op. at 6

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “least one partition of said at least one secondary storage device through said secondary storage partitions window,” “means for manipulating said at least one cabinet record through said cabinet visible partition window,” and “means for modifying said at least one cabinet record through said cabinet visible partition window.” Ex. 101, 9:66–10:25. In related litigation, the district court found in its claim construction opinion that the ’400 patent does not provide structure corresponding clearly to the functions of these limitations. Ex. 1010, 49–61. We have reviewed and considered the district court’s analysis and findings and we concur with the district court’s conclusion. We are unable to discern structure in the ’400 patent that corresponds clearly to the functions recited in the “means for” limitations of claim 16. Claim 28 recites similarly “program code for configuring said at least one partition of said at least one secondary storage device through a secondary storage partitions window,” “program code for manipulating said virtual cabinet record through said cabinet visible partition window,” and “program code for means for modifying said at least one cabinet record through said cabinet visible partition window.” Ex. 1001, 10:65–11:29. The district court also found that the ’400 patent did not provide structure corresponding clearly to the function of these limitations. Ex. 1010, 49–61. We have reviewed and considered the district court’s analysis and findings and we concur with the district court’s conclusion. We are unable to discern structure in the ’400 patent that corresponds clearly to the functions recited in the “program code for” limitations of claim 28.” slip op. at 5

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,690,400
• SK Hynix Inc. / SK Hynix America Inc. et al. v. Netlist, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 5, 2018 · IPR2017-00692 · APJ Matthew R Clements · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–15 are unpatentable: claims 1–14 as anticipated by Best and obvious over Best, and claim 15 as obvious over Best, Mills, and Bonella.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “construction “requires two layers of IC packages, in which a first IC package (the Board’s ‘carrier’) contains one or more second IC packages (the Board’s memory chips).” PO Resp. 39. Petitioner counters that “[t]he Board’s construction does no such thing.” Pet. Reply 18–19. We agree with Petitioner. Patent Owner’s argument is predicated upon the erroneous assertion that “[e]ach memory chip in the Board’s ‘carrier’ requires a different IC package (i.e., a second IC package) that encloses at least one memory die.” PO Resp. 39. Each memory chip does not require its own integrated circuit package. On the contrary, it may be, as Best discloses, a die enclosed with another die in a single IC package. Having considered the arguments and evidence, we maintain our construction of “memory module” to mean “a carrier that contains one or more memory chips,” where “carrier” encompasses an integrated circuit package.” slip op. at 14

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “Otherwise, we determine that no express finding on a specific corresponding level of technical education and experience is necessary. Here, the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 15

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “We have reviewed the arguments provided by Patent Owner and determine such arguments are insufficient to have Mr. Maltiel’s declaration excluded in its entirety. Rather, it is within our discretion to assign the appropriate weight to be accorded evidence. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a); see also, e.g., Yorkey v. Diab, 601 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding the Board has discretion to give more weight to one item of evidence over another “unless no reasonable trier of fact could have done so”); In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Board is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the declarations.”); and Velander v. Garner, 348 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“In giving more weight to prior publications than to subsequent conclusory statements by experts, the Board acted well within [its] discretion.”). Based on the record before us, we are not persuaded that we should give the entirety of Mr. Maltiel’s declaration no weight.” slip op. at 16

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “8–14. Pet. 30–37, 44–49. Notwithstanding Patent Owner’s arguments, which we have considered and which we address below, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s showing, which we adopt as our own findings and conclusions, that claims 1–14 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as anticipated by Best.” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 8,874,831 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,874,831
• SK Hynix Inc. / SK Hynix America Inc. et al. v. Netlist, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 5, 2018 · IPR2017-00561 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 2–7 were held unpatentable as obvious over Averbuj and Tsern; trial as to claim 1 was terminated based on collateral estoppel.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel appliesDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner asserts that “collateral estoppel does not apply to the application of the claim 1 limitations in assessing dependent claims 2–7.” Id. at 2. Patent Owner further asserts “[a] party seeking to apply collateral estoppel based on a prior action must show that (1) the identical issue was actually litigated; (2) the issue was actually decided in a final decision on the merits; (3) the issue was necessary to the final decision; and (4) the party being estopped was adequately represented in the prior action [i.e. “the United Access test”].” Id. at 2 (citing United Access Techs., LLC v. CenturyTel Broadband Services LLC, 778 F.3d 1327, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). We agree that this is the proper test to use to assess the applicability of collateral estoppel. Nevertheless, we note United Access applies collateral estoppel in a different context and suggests that issue preclusion can be applied in an obvoisness challenge, even if the final decision on the original issue was considered under an anticipation challenge. In particular, in United Access it was noted that “[i]ssue preclusion [traditionally called “collateral estoppel”3] applies to issues litigated in prior disputes . . . [and, thus, i]t thus makes no difference that the earlier no-damages-due-to-competition ruling arose in a case under the Truth in Negotiation Act and that this dispute arises under the False Claims Act and the common law.” United Access, 778 F.3d. at 726. The “issue” of whether Averbuj teaches the limitations of claim 1 is identical to the issue in and has been litigated in the ‘970 IPR which found that Averbuj anticipates the limitations of claim 1.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Only those terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017).” slip op. at 16

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “the ‘434 Patent would have been someone with “a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or in a related field and at least one year of work experience relating to memory systems, and would be familiar with the design of memory devices, memory modules, and BIST.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 51). Patent Owner asserts through its declarant: [A Person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have been] working on the design of memory devices, would have at least a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical and/or Computer Engineering, and at least five years of industry experience designing memory devices and controllers. Alternatively, one of ordinary skill in the art would have a Master of Science degree in Electrical and/or Computer Engineering, and at least three years of industry experience designing memory devices and controllers. Also alternatively, one of ordinary skill in the art would have a Doctorate degree in Electrical and/or Computer Engineering, and have at least one year of industry experience designing memory devices and controllers. I agree with Petitioner’s expert that the memory industry requires a POSITA with industry experience. Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 32–33. 16 Neither party has argued that the difference between the parties’ articulated level of skill should change the analysis as to patentability. Therefore, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of skill, above, and acknowledge that, commensurate with that articulation of the level of skill, the level of ordinary skill in the art is also reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 16

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “Pet. 41. In other words, Petitioner asserts that because a BIST unit can be incorporated into a chip mounted on a PCB and because memory module 12 is part of the BIST unit, memory unit 12 is mounted on a PCB. We disagree. Unlike claim 1, which simply requires the memory unit is “on” the PCB, claim 2 requires that the memory module be a “physically separate component” and “mounted” on the PCB. Petitioner has not shown sufficient support for its broad reading that a module which is a circuit embedded in a larger circuit included in a chip may be considered a physically separate component mounted on a PCB. Claims 3–7 depend from claim 2, and the Petition fails to provide additional prior art disclosures that cure the deficiency with respect to claim 2; that is, disclosure of separate components 22 mounted on a printed circuit board in Averbuj. Pet. 41–48. Thus, Petitioner has failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, its assertion that claims 2–7 are anticipated by Averbuj.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 8,001,434 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,001,434
• SK Hynix Inc. / SK Hynix America Inc. et al. v. Netlist, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 5, 2018 · IPR2017-00562 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 4 was held unpatentable as obvious over Averbuj and Tsern; the trial was terminated as to claim 1 based on collateral estoppel.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther

    “Active Video Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The court noted that because the expert “failed to explain how specific references could be combined, which combination(s) of elements in specific references would yield a predictable result, or how any specific combination would operate or read on the asserted claims,” the expert’s testimony was conclusory and bore no relation to any specific combination of prior art elements. Id. at 1327. Although the declarant’s testimony here goes further than in Active Video, it fills in gaps about how the combination would be made with only conclusory testimony that appears to be tainted with hindsight.” slip op. at 26

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “C. Level of Skill Analysis Petitioner asserts “[a] a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ‘501 Patent would have been someone with “a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or in a related field and at least one year of work experience relating to memory systems, and would be familiar with the design of memory devices, memory modules, and BIST” Pet. 6 (citing, inter alia, Ex. 1003 ¶ 51). Patent Owner asserts through its declarant: [A Person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have been] working on the design of memory devices, would have at least a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical and/or Computer Engineering, and at least five years of industry experience designing memory devices and controllers. Alternatively, one of ordinary skill in the art would have a Master of Science degree in Electrical and/or Computer Engineering, and at least three years of industry experience designing memory devices and controllers. Also alternatively, one of ordinary skill in the art would have a Doctorate degree in Electrical and/or Computer Engineering, and have at least one year of industry experience designing memory devices and controllers. I agree with Petitioner’s expert that the memory industry requires a POSITA with industry experience. Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 32–33. Neither party has argued that the difference between the parties’ articulated level of skill should change the analysis as to patentability. Therefore, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of skill, above, and acknowledge that, commensurate with that articulation of the level of skill, the level of ordinary skill in the art is also reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 15

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “a. Claim 1 Claim 1 is anticipated by Averbuj under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. See supra Section II. A. b. Claim 4 Claim 4 recites “[t]he memory system of claim 1, wherein the memory system comprises at least two physically separate integrated circuit packages, wherein each of the at least two physically separate integrated circuit packages comprises at least one data handler of the plurality of data handlers.” Petitioner asserts that Averbuj discloses that BIST units are “commonly incorporated into memory chips and other integrated circuits.” Ex. 1005 at ¶ [0003]. Because the memory interfaces are part of a BIST unit, Averbuj also discloses the memory interface (10, 41) is commonly incorporated into (memory or other) chips, or “integrated circuits.” Ex. 1012 at 98, 277; Ex. 1003 at ¶ 126. Averbuj further discloses that the device block (6) and the components contained therein, such as the sequencer (8) and the memory modules (12), are “distributed” and “located throughout an electronic device,” i.e., physically separated. See e.g., Ex. 1005 at ¶¶ [0013], [0015]; Ex. 1003 at ¶ 127. Since memory interfaces (10, 41) are also components of each device block (6), at a minimum, the different sets of memory interfaces (10, 41) belonging to different device blocks (6) must also be physically separated. Ex. 1003 at ¶ 127. Averbuj also discloses that the various integrated circuits or chips of an electronic device are “mounted on a circuit board,” indicating that the integrated circuits and chips comprising the electronic device are packaged integrated circuits or chips. Ex. 1005 at ¶ [0005]; Ex. 1016 at 1:15-27; Ex. 1003 at ¶ 128. Therefore, Averbuj discloses that the memory interfaces (each containing a “data handler”) of different device blocks (which comprise a “memory system”) must be distributed across “at least two physically separate integrated circuit packages.” Ex. 1003 at ¶ 129. Pet. 30–31. In other words, Petitioner asserts that because the sequencer can be” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “There must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted) (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). For example, in ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon, our reviewing court 7 Patent Owner chose not to request additional briefing to address this ground and arguments in the Preliminary Response are generally waived (Paper 8, 2–3), however, we acknowledge these arguments due to the unusual circumstance created by the Supreme Court’s decision in SAS and to explain the background in the context of Patent Owners’ Motion to Strike. held that the following expert testimony on the motivation to combine was deficient as a matter of law: [Y]ou wanted to build something better. You wanted a system that was more efficient, cheaper, or you wanted a system that had more features, makes it more attractive to your customers, because by combining these two things you could do something new that hadn’t been able to do before. Active Video Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The court noted that because the expert “failed to explain how specific references could be combined, which combination(s) of elements in specific references would yield a predictable result, or how any specific combination would operate or read on the asserted claims,” the expert’s testimony was conclusory and bore no relation to any specific combination of prior art elements. Id. at 1327. Although the declarant’s testimony here goes further than in Active Video, it fills in gaps about how the combination would be made with only conclusory testimony that appears to be tainted with hindsight. As to other of Petitioner’s arguments supported by its declarant, we find those to employ hindsight to piece together the device as claimed. The expert provides a host of rationales for separating the components of Averbuj into separate ICs including structures of Tsern (Ex. 1003 ¶ 143) and other secondary references. We acknowledge that Tsern contains structures that suggest the claimed configuration of the data handlers, but in this ground Petitioner does not assert Tsern as a reference, rather simply as evidence of the knowledge of one of skill in the art. Pet. 34–38. Relying on knowledge in the art does not obviate the need to prove a reference is prior art as of the critical date and show a motivation to combine existing slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 8,359,501 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,359,501
• SK Hynix Inc. / SK Hynix America Inc. et al. v. Netlist, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 5, 2018 · IPR2017-00577 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 7, 8, and 10–12 are unpatentable as obvious over Halbert and Amidi; the other asserted grounds did not establish unpatentability.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Neither party has argued that the difference between the parties’ articulated level of skill should change the analysis as to patentability. Therefore, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of skill and acknowledge that the level of ordinary skill in the art is also reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. 10 Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction Analysis We determine that it is not necessary to provide an express interpretation of any term of the claims.” slip op. at 11

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “written to or read from simultaneously. Pet. 37–41. In particular, Petitioner asserts that Halbert’s directing of data, during a write operation, from the system memory data bus to registers 126 and 128 in successive clock cycles means that data being received by the memory devices corresponding to registers 126 and 128, respectively (e.g., ranks 140 and 142, respectively), occurs in successive clock cycles. Thus, according to Petitioner, “those memory devices associated with register 126 (i.e. Rank 140) receive data transmission from the system memory controller in the first clock cycle, but not in the second clock cycle . . . [and] those memory devices associated with register 128 (i.e., Rank 142) receive data transmissions from the system memory controller in the second clock cycle, but not in the first clock cycle.” Id. at 38. Therefore, according to Petitioner, Halbert does not, and cannot, write to the memory devices in ranks 140 and 142 simultaneously, because the memory devices in ranks 140 and 142 do not receive data concurrently. Id. In its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner asserts8 while data is sequentially latched onto registers 126 and 128, that data is then concurrently, not sequentially, written to memory device array 140/142—such operation is illustrated in Fig. 4, 8 Patent Owner chose not to request additional briefing to address this ground and arguments in the Preliminary Response are generally waived (Paper 8, 2–3), however, we acknowledge these arguments due to the unusual circumstance created by the Supreme Court’s decision in SAS. 15 above. Thus, all of Halbert’s memory devices are selected or enabled concurrently such that Halbert can write to all of its memory devices simultaneously. This is not, and is exactly counter to, the Petitioner’s assertions that the memory devices in ranks 140 and 142 receive—and thus, store—data sequentially. Prelim. Resp. 27–28. We agree. Petitioner has not explained how latching data to registers 126 and 128 is data transmission between a memory controller and a memory module when registers 126 and 128 are outside of the memory module. Moreover, Petitioner’s arguments and evidence with respect to claims 2, 3, 7, 8, and 10–12 do not cure this deficiency.” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “Based on Petitioner’s citations to specific prior art disclosures and supporting evidence, we are persuaded that Petitioner sets forth sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion that it would have been obvious to modify the teachings of Halbert with Amidi’s teachings to include rank select functionality. Pet. 64– 66. For example, Petitioner asserts: 19 To employ this chip select functionality of Amidi in the system of Halbert would have been only the arrangement old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform and yielding no more than one would expect from such an arrangement, i.e., the predictable result of operating each rank at desired times, and well within the level of ordinary skill to achieve. EX1003 ¶¶175-176. Moreover, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to use the chip select functionality of Amidi in the system of Halbert to permit the use of lower density, and therefore cheaper and more readily available, memory in the system of Halbert, while using the existing address and data signal lines of Halbert. EX1019, ¶[0008]; see also id., ¶¶ [0002- 0012]; EX1003 ¶177. A skilled artisan would also have been motivated to include such prior art chip selection signals in Halbert in order to follow the traditional design of memory ranks including the use of traditional memory devices and the traditional address signals, as Halbert explains. EX1005, 3:55-57; EX1003 ¶178. Furthermore, Halbert suggests such a use by disclosing that “[m]any other variations on the illustrated embodiments are possible. For instance, . . . [t]he illustrated examples also show two ranks of memory, but other numbers of ranks are also possible.” EX1005, 9:20-26. Skilled artisans at the time would have understood that, in case the number of ranks is increased, chip/bank select signals would need to be used to activate some but not all of the ranks. See, e.g., EX1019 at FIGS. 5, 6A-6B (showing logic circuitry to generate chip select signals for” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 8,516,185 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,516,185
• Alcatel-Lucent USA Inc. / Ciena Corporation et al. v. Oyster Optics, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · May 1, 2018 · IPR2017-02173 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because petitioner had not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any challenged claim, chiefly because it did not establish a reason to loop transmitted signals back to the receiver.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “In each of independent claims 1, 14, 25, and 36, prior to the recitation of “the optical signals,” there is only one introduction of an element as “optical signals.” That element is the signals transmitted by the transmitter. Independent claims 1, 14, 25, and 36 each recite “the transmitter transmitting optical signals for telecommunication as a function of the input data.” Ex. 1101, 6:51–53, 7:32–34, 8:12–14, 8:57–59 (emphasis added). Nothing else is expressly introduced in any of independent claims 1, 14, 25, and 36 as optical signals. Although data carried by the second optical fiber also are optical signals, they are referred to in these claims simply as data and not as optical signals. Thus, in these claims there is clear antecedent basis for the recitation “the optical signals.” The recited term refers to optical signals transmitted by the recited transmitter on the transceiver card.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner’s explanation does not constitute reasoning with rational underpinning for routing the signals from the first optical fiber, transmitted by the recited transmitter on the transceiver card, to the second optical fiber to be sent back and received by the receiver on the same transceiver card. Notably, Petitioner uses the word “could” to support its reasoning. But the issue is not whether one with ordinary skill in the art “could” perform an operation but whether one with ordinary skill in the art, without hindsight based on the disclosure of the ’327 patent, would have reason to do so. See Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“obviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention”); Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Intern., Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Petitioner has not articulated sufficient motivation for one with ordinary skill in the art, without hindsight based on the claims of the ’327 patent, to convert transmitted output into received input on the same transceiver card.” slip op. at 24

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing that claims 1 and 36 would have been obvious over the combination of Kitano and Choy. 4. Claims 2 and 9 Each of claims 2 and 9 depends directly from claim 1 and thus includes all the limitations of claim 1. 35 U.S.C. § 112, fourth paragraph. All of the Petition’s deficiencies in the context of claim 1 carry through to each of dependent claims 2 and 9. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would establish unpatentability of claims 2 and 9 as obvious over Kitano and Choy.” slip op. at 27

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,620,327
• Superior Communications, Inc. v. Voltstar Technologies, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 20, 2018 · IPR2017-00067 · APJ Christa P Zado · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 4, 11, 12, 16–18, and 20–22 are unpatentable under § 103 as obvious over the stated combinations of prior art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel does not applyDecided for petitioner

    “The petitioner in an inter partes review of a claim in a patent under this chapter that results in a final written decision under section 318(a), or the real party in interest or privy of the petitioner, may not request or maintain a proceeding before the Office with respect to that claim on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review. (Emphasis added). The language of the statute makes clear § 315(e) applies to grounds the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during an “inter partes review . . . that results in a final written decision under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a).” The statute does not refer to grounds that were raised or reasonably could have been raised during reexamination. Because the prior proceeding was a reexamination proceeding under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 311, not an inter partes review under post-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 311, and did not result in a final written decision under § 318(a), Petitioner is not estopped under § 315(e) from bringing this inter partes review.” slip op. at 13

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner

    “Section 315(b) provides that: An inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). Patent Owner alleges a privy of Petitioner, AT&T,10 was served with a complaint on or about February 29, 2012 and Petitioner was served with a complaint on or about February 1, 2013. PO Resp., 9; see also Prelim. Resp. 8. Petitioner does not dispute that it was served with a complaint alleging infringement of the ’833 patent more than one year prior to filing the Petition in the instant proceeding. Pet. 3–5. Petitioner argues, however, that the instant proceeding is not barred under § 315(b) because the district court action resulting from the earlier-filed complaint was dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a), leaving the parties “as though the action had never been brought.” Pet. 5 (citing Ariosa Diagnostics v. Isis Innovation Ltd., Case IPR2012-00022, slip op. at 17 (PTAB Sept. 2, 2014) (Paper 166)); see also Ex. 1008 (dismissal order). As we have noted in previous Board decisions, the “Federal Circuit has consistently interpreted the effect of such dismissals as leaving the parties as though the action had never been brought.” Oracle v. Click-to-call, Case IPR2013-00312, slip op. at 17 (PTAB Oct. 30, 2013) (Paper 26) (precedential); Macauto U.S.A. v. Bos GmbH & KG, Case IPR2012-00004, 10 Patent Owner adduces insufficient evidence that AT&T is a privy of Petitioner. In any event, the action against AT&T was consolidated with the action against Petitioner (PO Resp.), and both actions were dismissed, in a single consolidated order, without prejudice (Ex. 1008). slip op. at 15 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2013) (Paper 18) (citing Graves v. Principi, 294 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Bonneville Assocs., Ltd. P’ship v. Baram, 165 F.3d 1360, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Because the effect of a voluntary dismissal without prejudice is to render the prior action a nullity, such action does not give rise to a statutory bar under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).” slip op. at 15

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “J. Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Patent Owner filed a Motion to Exclude Evidence (Paper 29), Petitioner filed an opposition thereto (Paper 32), and Patent Owner filed a reply (Paper 33). Patent Owner seeks to exclude paragraphs 4–13 of the Declaration of Andrew S. Flior (Ex. 1018, “the Flior Declaration”), which relate to prior art searches relating to the ’833 patent obtained by Mr. Flior’s law firm. This evidence relates to arguments we need not, and do not, address regarding whether Petitioner is estopped under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) from bringing this inter partes review. See supra Section II.D. Because we do not rely on, or reference, paragraphs 4–13 of the Flior Declaration in our Final Written Decision, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence is dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 65

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “For purposes of our determination below, we determine the level of ordinary skill in the art with respect to the ’833 patent is consistent with the assessment provided by Dr. Horenstein, which Patent Owner does not dispute. Accordingly, we adopt the level of ordinary skill in the art asserted by Petitioner. Also, we are guided by the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art of record. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

  Patent outcomesUS 7,910,833 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,910,833

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.