• Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Portsmouth Network Corp.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 31, 2026 · IPR2024-01450 · APJ Peter D Shapiro · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 6–11, and 13–20 were not shown unpatentable because Dziong and Sathyanath do not teach the claimed sharing definition for existing connections with allocated bandwidth.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “First, the claims use present-tense language, “one or more other connections, which have respective bandwidths and which are permitted to share a bandwidth allocation with the new connection.”3 Ex. 1001, claim 1 (emphasis added). The exclusive use of the present tense have indicates “other connections” must have current possession of the bandwidth. For these other connections to share bandwidth with a newly established connection, they must already exist and have bandwidth ready for immediate use, rather than merely holding a dormant “reservation” pending a network failure. See PO Supp. Br. 1. The Federal Circuit addressed a similar situation where the Court found the present-tense limitation “is connected to the computer network” means a device was required to be connected at the” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “combination, do not teach or suggest limitations 1.2 and 1.3 requiring: providing a sharing definition specifying one or more other connections, which have respective bandwidths and which are permitted to share a bandwidth allocation with the new connection, such that a total bandwidth allocated jointly to the new connection and to the other connections in any given segment is equal to a maximum of the requested bandwidth and of the bandwidths of the other connections in the given segment Ex. 1001, limitations 1.2, 1.3 (emphasis added); see PO Resp. 17–22; Sur-reply 4–5, 12–14. As discussed above in Section II.C.2, we interpret “other connections” to mean “existing connections in the network that already have bandwidth allocated to them.” Because the information shared in Dziong and Sathyanath, described below, relates to reserved protection paths, rather than existing connections that have bandwidth that can currently transmit network traffic, the references do not teach or suggest the “other connections” part of the sharing definition in limitations 1.2 and 1.3. Dziong describes advertising, across the network, the amount of bandwidth reserved for recovery on each link that would be activated when a protected link fails. See, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶ 60; Pet. 36. Once activated, network traffic from a “primary path” failure is rerouted to these recovery paths. See Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 7–9, 70, 83. Petitioner points to this advertising of the reserved bandwidth information as teaching the claimed “sharing definition.” Pet. 33–36 (arguing that the “protection paths [in Dziong] have bandwidth reservations” and “share an overall protection bandwidth reservation”); Reply 21–23. However, since the advertised information only contains information about the recovery paths “that would be activated” upon a primary path failure, such paths are not existing connections that already have bandwidth allocated to them, and therefore do not teach the claimed “other connections” that are part of the sharing definition. See, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶ 60.” slip op. at 43

  Patent outcomesUS 7,596,088 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,596,088
• Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Portsmouth Network Corp.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 13, 2026 · IPR2024-00913 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 11, 12, 14, 16, and 17 are unpatentable over Blease, Weyman, and Hu, with some claims also over Deng; claims 8–10 and 18 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther

    “disclosure in Weyman (or Blease) for deactivating and activating ports, or performing certain actions in the time between such actions. Again, the only portion of Weyman cited pertains to a request to join the fabric from a processing unit having a “default” configuration, which does not relate to the timing or sequence of events in initialization. See Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 69, 156, 161–162; Ex. 1103 ¶¶ 93–94. Nor does Dr. Lavian point to any other evidence in the record supporting his conclusion that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have “ensure[d] that the processing unit is deactivated prior to being updated for use . . . and then activate[d] the processing unit after updating.” See Ex. 1103 ¶ 94. Accordingly, we give little weight to Dr. Lavian’s conclusory opinion” slip op. at 75

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable

    “See Axonics, 73 F.4th at 957; Allied Erecting, 825 F.3d at 1381; Mouttet, 686 F.3d at 1332–33. Petitioner’s position is that, based on the teachings of Weyman, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Blease’s system to distribute the functionality of control unit 44 (including its existing multicast forwarding information 48 used by OIF mapper 50). See Pet. 23–26, 38; Fleming v. Cirrus Design Corp., 28 F.4th 1214, 1222 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“That the proposed combination of [two references]—rather than one of the individual references—discloses the disputed claim limitations does not defeat the Board’s conclusion of obviousness. In this case, it is sufficient that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the prior art in a way such that the combination discloses the claim limitations.”).” slip op. at 55

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “10 In the Cisco IPR, we determined that Cisco had proven claims 8 and 18 to be unpatentable based on a different combination of references (identified as Weyman, Jain, and LeMaire), finding that limitation 8[f.ii] was taught by Jain and LeMaire. IPR2024-00506, Paper 38 at 58–77. As explained herein, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments in this proceeding that limitation 8[f.ii] is taught or suggested by Weyman. Also, in the Decision on Institution in this proceeding, the Board found that there were questions as to Petitioner’s showing for limitation 8[f.ii] and declined to reach a conclusion on whether Petitioner had shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its asserted ground based on Blease and Weyman. Dec. on Inst. 43.” slip op. at 71

  Patent outcomesUS 8,014,394 mixed
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,014,394
• Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Portsmouth Network Corp.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 9, 2025 · IPR2024-00893 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 3, 8, 11, 12, 15, 20, 23, and 24 are unpatentable as obvious over Gai and IEEE 1999.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that at the time of the application for the ’986 patent (January 2002), a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a related field, plus at least two years of industry experience or graduate-level academic experience with computer networking.” Pet. 20. In the Decision on Institution, the Board agreed with and applied Petitioner’s proposed definition, removing the phrase “at least” to avoid unnecessary ambiguity. Dec. on Inst. 18–19. Patent Owner uses Petitioner’s proposed definition for its Response. PO Resp. 5. Neither party made any further argument regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art in its papers during trial. In the Cisco IPR, we adopted a similar definition, determining that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or in an equivalent field, or approximately two years of experience working in the field of information technology and networking,” where “[l]ack of professional experience can be substituted by additional education, and vice versa.” IPR2024-00505, Paper 29 at 10–11 (alteration in original); see Dec. on Inst. 19 n.7 (noting the proposed definition in the Cisco IPR). Based on the full record developed during trial, including our review of the ’986 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’986 patent and cited prior art, we adopt the same definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art as the Cisco IPR and apply it for purposes of this Petitioner’s similar proposed definition in this proceeding.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “Gai discloses entering an Enable_Uplinkfast command at an access switch (e.g., access switch 114) to block a failed port (e.g., the root port) and configure the access switch to send dummy traffic upstream through a new active port. . . . When modified in view of IEEE 1999’s disclosure that self-healing network traffic can advantageously be sent both upstream and downstream, the command would be entered at a backbone switch (e.g., backbone switch 122) to block a failed port (e.g., a designated port connected to access switch 114) and configure the backbone switch to send dummy traffic downstream to an access switch (e.g. access switch 114) through a new active port. While Gai uses its protocol signaling command, Enable_Uplinkfast, to send dummy traffic through a new root port, [a person of ordinary skill in the art] would deem it an obvious implementation detail to modify the parameters of the port on a backbone switch. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 139 (citing Ex. 1005, col. 6, ll. 39–46).” slip op. at 34

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In the Cisco IPR, we addressed four claim terms in the final written decision: “access switch” and “edge switch,” which appear in independent claims 1 and 13 and various dependent claims, and “downstream” and “upstream,” which appear in claims 11, 12, 23, and 24. IPR2024-00505, Paper 29 at 11–14. We interpreted “access switch” to mean “a switch with ports that connect to LANs and/or to other network endpoints, such as user computer systems,” interpreted “edge switch” to mean “a core switch that is directly connected to an access switch,” interpreted “downstream” to mean “away from the root switch,” and interpreted “upstream” to mean “toward the root switch.” Id. As noted above, Patent Owner did not appeal that decision. We incorporate herein our previous analysis in the Cisco IPR, but note that none of the analysis of the disputed issues below depends on such determine whether Petitioner has met its burden to prove unpatentability of the challenged claims. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe [a particular claim limitation] where the construction is not ‘material to the . . . dispute.’” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “1999, supported by the testimony of Mr. McNair, which we credit, is persuasive. See Pet. 25–30, 40–46; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 132–145, 165–174. Based on the full trial record, we find that Gai and IEEE 1999 teach limitation [1E] and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine their teachings in the manner described by Petitioner. Based on all of the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 3 would have been obvious over Gai and IEEE 1999 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). 4. Claims 8, 15, and 20 Claim 8 depends indirectly from independent claim 1. Claims 15 and 20 depend indirectly from independent claim 13, which is similar to claim 1 but recites a network switching device rather than a method. As to independent claim 13, Patent Owner refers to its earlier arguments regarding claim 1, asserting that limitation [13C] is “substantially similar” to limitation [1E]. PO Resp. 14–15. We disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments for the reasons explained above. See supra Section II.D.3.b. Patent Owner does not argue dependent claims 8, 15, and 20 separately from their respective parent claims 1 and 13. See PO Resp. 19. We have reviewed Petitioner’s contentions and supporting evidence, including the testimony of Mr. McNair, and are persuaded that Petitioner has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 8, 15, and 20 would have been obvious based on Gai and IEEE 1999 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), for the reasons stated by Petitioner. See Pet. 21–46, 48–52, 55–59; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 113–175, 179–185, 194–203.” slip op. at 41

  Patent outcomesUS 6,917,986 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,917,986
• The Boeing Company v. The Regents Of The University Of CaliforniaNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 2, 2025 · IPR2024-00761 · APJ Alyssa A Finamore · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1–24 not unpatentable because the asserted references did not show the glass element propagating a modified stress wave to generate tensile stress at the interface.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the invention of the ’684 patent “would have had an M.S. in Mechanical Engineering or a related field, and at least five years of experience using laser systems to characterize and test mechanical behavior in materials” and that “[m]ore education may supplement practical experience or vice versa.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 38). Patent Owner” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Decided for patent owner

    “Both parties maintain that no claim term needs to be construed. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 40); PO Resp. 20. Patent Owner, however, provides an express construction for limitation [1.d] of independent claim 1 and the similar limitation of independent claim 13, namely limitation [13.c]. PO Resp. 20 (citing Ex. 2011 ¶ 25). To resolve the controversy before us, we determine that these limitations require express construction. 1. “the glass element is configured to propagate and modify a stress wave to the coating/substrate interface to generate a tensile stress between the substrate and the coating” (limitation [1.d]) and “propagating and modifying a stress wave through the glass element to the coating/substrate interface to generate a tensile force between the substrate and the coating” (limitation [13.c]) Patent Owner argues these limitations mean “changing the profile of the laser generated compressive wave and propagating the wave profile as modified to the free surface of the coating, which upon reflection from the free surface as a tension wave generates a tensile stress at the coating/substrate interface.” PO Resp. 20 (citing Ex. 2011 ¶ 25). Petitioner does not refute this proposed construction and, during the oral argument, Petitioner confirmed it agrees with the proposed construction. Tr. 8:16–9:12. We so no reason to depart from the parties agreed-upon construction of limitations [1.d] and [13.c]. Accordingly, for purposes of this Final Written Decision, we adopt the parties’ construction of limitations [1.d] and [13.c].” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “a shock in the compression wave in the fused silica substrate. Even if we were to agree with Petitioner that Wang-Dissertation’s fused silica substrate modifies the compression waveform, we would not be persuaded that the fused silica substrate propagates the modified wave to the free surface of the coating, which upon reflection from the free surface as a tension wave generates a tensile stress at the coating/substrate interface, as limitation [1.d] requires. In view of the presence of tension-wave-1 in Wang-Dissertation’s experiments, we find Petitioner has not demonstrated persuasively that the fused silica substrate propagates a modified stress wave to the free surface of the coating to generate a tensile stress at the coating/substrate interface. Also, we find credible Dr. Gupta’s unrebutted testimony that any modified compression wave would attenuate in the substrate and not propagate to the free surface coating or generate a tensile stress at the coating/substrate interface. Ex. 2011 ¶¶ 93–98. Petitioner does not dispute that the experiments in Wang-Dissertation include tension-wave-1. See Ex. 1005, 65 (“The experimental picture is complicated somewhat by the presence of a tensile wave, reflected from the back of the confining layer.”). Nor does Petitioner dispute that Wang-Dissertation discloses that the tension-wave-1 propagates faster than the compression-wave-1 and eventually overtakes compression-wave-1. See id. at 65–66 (“Being tensile, it propagates faster that the peak compressive stress, and faster than the low stress tail of the main pulse. It eventually overtakes the compressive pulse and linear dissipative mechanisms govern the final thickness of the shock.”). Rather, Petitioner relies on Dr. Wang’s testimony regarding the timing of the waves through the sample and argues that tension-wave-1 does not overtake compression-wave-1 in the fused silica substrate. Pet. Reply 17 (citing Ex. 1038 ¶ 5). Dr. Wang testifies that the peak stress from tension-wave-1 is about 2 ns behind the peak of compression-wave-1 and will not reach the interface before the reflected tensile peak of compression-wave-1 reaches the interface in 0.3 ns. Ex. 1038 ¶ 5. However, as Dr. Gupta persuasively explains, the delay between tension-wave-1 and compression-wave-1 depends on the properties of the confining layer, and Wang-Dissertation acknowledges that these properties are not well controlled. Ex. 2011 ¶ 54; see also Ex. 1005, 65 (“The surface properties of that confining layer are not well controlled.”).” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “claimed subject matter. Pet. 35–38; Pet. Reply 23–24. In doing so, Petitioner continues to rely on Wang-Dissertation to disclose limitation [1.d] of independent claim 1 and limitation [13.c] of independent claim 13. Pet. 35–38; Pet. Reply 23–24. Petitioner does not put forth any further obviousness rationale in this ground based on Wang-Dissertation for teaching these limitations. For the same reasons discussed in sections II.C.2–3, Petitioner has not persuaded us that Wang-Dissertation teaches or suggests limitations [1.d] and [13.c]. Thus, Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Wang-Dissertation renders obvious the subject matter set forth in claims 4, 6, 9, 15, 17, 20, 23, and 24, which depend from independent claims 1 and 13.” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 7,487,684 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 7,487,684
• Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Portsmouth Network Corp.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 1, 2025 · IPR2024-00506 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4–12, and 14–18 are unpatentable as obvious over the combinations of prior art listed in the decision.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “d) Conclusion Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Weyman and Li collectively” slip op. at 50

  Patent outcomesUS 8,014,394 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,014,394
• Qualcomm Incorporated v. Unm Rainforest InnovationsAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 30, 2025 · IPR2021-00375 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Remand

  Proposed substitute claims 44–47, 49, and 50 are unpatentable as obvious under collateral estoppel; the Board denied Patent Owner’s motion to amend.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “the Acting Director of the USPTO (Paper 81, “Acting Director’s Order”) and after a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“the Federal Circuit”) in ZyXEL Communications Corp. v. UNM Rainforest Innovations, 107 F.4th 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (“Federal Circuit Decision”) regarding the Board’s original Final Written Decision (Paper 68, “Final Written Decision” or “Final Dec.”) in this proceeding. In particular, the court remanded to the Board to determine if proposed substitute claims 44–47, 49, and 50 are unpatentable as obvious under collateral estoppel based on the court’s holding that claims 1–4 and 6–8 are unpatentable as obvious. ZyXEL, 107 F.4th at 1371, 1384.” slip op. at 2

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “proposed substitute claim 44 presents the same issues as those litigated before the Federal Circuit: whether it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to include the first key element and whether it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to include the second key element.” slip op. at 9

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied

    “Final Written Decision, and the Federal Circuit Decision, as well as the postremand briefing, we determine that the application of collateral estoppel to proposed substitute claim 44 is appropriate. It is also appropriate to apply collateral estoppel to substitute claims 45–47, 49, and 50. This is because proposed substitute claims 45–47, 49, and 50 depend from proposed substitute claim 44 and recite identical limitations to dependent claims 2–4, 6, and 7. Therefore, the resolution of the question of obviousness of the subject matter of proposed substitute claims 45–47, 49, and 50 necessarily presents the same issues of whether it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to include the first key element and whether it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to include the second key element.” slip op. at 11

  Patent outcomesUS 8,265,096 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 8,265,096
• Nintendo Co., Ltd. / Nintendo Of America Inc. v. American GNC CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 20, 2025 · IPR2024-00668 · APJ Lisa L Tsang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1 and 4 are unpatentable as obvious over Smith, Chan, and Bernstein (claim 1), Smith, Chan, Bernstein, Irwin, and Merhav (claim 4), and Tingleff, Chan, and Bernstein (claims 1 and 4).

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner

    “partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (emphasis added). Accordingly, a petition for inter partes review may be considered only if, among other things, it “identifies all real parties in interest,” and no real party in interest was served with a complaint alleging infringement of the challenged patent more than one year before the petition was filed. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2). “[T]he IPR petitioner bears the burden of persuasion to demonstrate that its petitions are not time-barred under § 315(b) based on a complaint served on a real party in interest more than a year earlier.” Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, “an IPR petitioner’s initial identification of the real parties in interest should be accepted unless and until disputed by a patent owner,” who, in turn, “must produce some evidence that tends to show that a particular third party should be named a real party in interest.” Id. at 1242, 1244 (footnote omitted).” slip op. at 8

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the arguments and evidence of record, we determine that Patent Owner has not produced sufficient evidence to support a finding that STMicro should be named a real party in interest to this proceeding. At best, Patent Owner’s evidence and arguments establish only that Patent Owner previously filed a complaint against STMicro, asserting that STMicro infringed patents related to the ’648 patent (see generally Ex. 2012); and that Patent Owner served a subpoena to compel STMicro to testify and produce documents in Patent Owner’s infringement suit against Petitioner (see generally Ex. 2014). The record before us does not demonstrate a relationship between Petitioner and STMicro sufficient to show that STMicro is a real party in interest. See Worlds, 903 F.3d at 1242, 1244 (“[A]n IPR petitioner’s initial identification of the real parties in interest should be accepted unless and until disputed by a patent owner,” who, in turn, “must produce some evidence that tends to show that a particular third party should be named a real party in interest.” (footnote omitted)).” slip op. at 9

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 12–14). Patent Owner counters that the skilled artisan would have had “at least a ‘Master’s Degree in Electrical or Electronics Engineering, and approximately five years of relevant experience in the development of control systems for inertial navigation, MEMS semiconductor processing, and analog circuit design.’” PO Resp. 18 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶ 57). We adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’648 patent and prior art of record, and we apply it in our obviousness evaluations below. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We note, however, that we would reach the same conclusions applying either Petitioner’s or Patent Owner’s definition of the level of skill in the art.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

    “We find unavailing Petitioner’s reliance on Catalina to support its claim construction position. See Reply 2. In particular, although Petitioner contends the body of the claims “define[s] a structurally complete invention,” Petitioner does not explain how the claims additionally “use[] the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention,” as Catalina further requires. See Catalina, 289 F.3d at 808 (“a preamble is not limiting ‘where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention” (emphasis added)). In this regard, we discern no reason to interpret “[a] micro inertial measurement unit” as reciting only a purpose or intended use because the term, on its face, uses “micro inertial measurement” as an adjective that conveys further structural details of the unit. Accordingly, on the complete record, and for the reasons set forth in our Institution Decision, we maintain our construction that “[a] micro inertial measurement unit” recited in the preamble is limiting and requires a micro-sized inertial measurement unit, and that the structures recited in the limitations of the claims are limited to structures implemented as MEMS devices. Dec. 21–24.” slip op. at 14

  Patent outcomesUS 6,671,648 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,671,648
• Nintendo Co., Ltd. / Nintendo Of America Inc. v. American GNC CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 20, 2025 · IPR2024-00667 · APJ Jennifer S Bisk · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1 and 3 are unpatentable under § 103 over Fujiyoshi, Kumar, Cox, and Townsend, and independently over Mitamura and Townsend.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerNot time barredDecided for petitioner

    “other things, it “identifies all real parties in interest.” 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2). “[T]he IPR petitioner bears the burden of persuasion to demonstrate that its petitions are not time-barred under § 315(b) based on a complaint served on a real party in interest more than a year earlier.” Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, “an IPR petitioner’s initial identification of the real parties in interest should be accepted unless and until disputed by a patent owner,” who, in turn, “must produce some evidence that tends to show that a particular third party should be named a real party in interest.” Id. at 1242, 1244 (footnote omitted). Whether a non-party is a real party in interest is a “highly fact-” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “would have possessed a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or similar degree, with two to three years of practical experience designing and/or implementing systems that include sensors for measuring movement, such as acceleration and rotational position. . . . A skilled artisan could also have had more formal education and less practical experience, or vice versa. Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 12–14). Patent Owner states that “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art with respect to the ’122 Patent would have at least a five years of relevant experience in the development of control systems for inertial navigation, MEMS semiconductor processing, and analog circuit design.” PO Resp. 18 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶ 57). We adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’122 patent and prior art of record, and we apply it in our obviousness evaluations below. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We note, however, that we would reach the same conclusions applying either Petitioner’s or Patent Owner’s definition of the level of skill in the art.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019). In this context, claim terms “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning” as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citations omitted) (en banc). “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms ... that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Neither party argues that any claim term requires construction. Pet. 6; PO Resp. 18. Accordingly, we do not explicitly construe any term.” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Record evidence supports Petitioner’s contentions that a skilled artisan would have had reason to look to Kumar for further implementation details of a circuit that performs functions like those performed by Fujiyoshi. See Pet 24–26. For example, Dr. Young testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that Kumar discloses the details, at a granular level, of Fujiyoshi’s capacitive sensing systems and would have looked to Kumar for understanding of how to implement Fujiyoshi’s system. Ex. 1002 ¶ 145. Patent Owner does not point to persuasive evidence to rebut this opinion. Moreover, Petitioner cites to Kumar, not only for an explicit disclosure of capacitive pickoff signals, but also for its disclosure of both DC bias and AC carrier signals and recognizing the applicability of an AC carrier pickoffs that operates without DC bias. Pet. 24–26 (citing Ex. 1005 3:65–4:2, 6:29–36). We credit Dr. Young’s testimony on this issue and agree with Petitioner that a person of ordinary skill in the art, looking at Fujiyoshi’s description of capacitive sensing systems, would be motivated to look to Kumar for its more detailed teachings of the implementation details of such systems and would combine these details to arrive at limitation 1(a). We determine that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Fujiyoshi and Kumar in the manner argued by Petitioner.” slip op. at 37

  Patent outcomesUS 6,508,122 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,508,122
• Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Portsmouth Network Corp.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 4, 2025 · IPR2024-00503 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–18 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted obviousness combinations did not cure the failure to show the claimed request and routing steps.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art in the field of the ’279 patent in January 2001 “would have had a working knowledge of the network communication technologies that are pertinent to the ’279 patent, including network flow allocation in a ring topology.” Pet. 12. More specifically, Petitioner argues, a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a master’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or an equivalent, and two years of professional experience relating to network communications and resource allocations,” where “[a]dditional work experience can substitute for specific educational background, and vice versa.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 20). Patent Owner represents that it “does not dispute Petitioner’s definition” for the purposes of its Response. PO Resp. 5. We find Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and the ’279 patent, and, therefore, we likewise adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Neither party contends that any formal claim construction is necessary. See Pet. 12 (“Petitioner submits that, for the purposes of this proceeding and the grounds presented herein, no claim term requires express construction.”); PO Resp. 4 (“Here, at this stage in the proceeding, Patent Owner will apply the ordinary and customary meaning to the ’279 Patent’s claim terms.”). Patent Owner notes, however, that Petitioner had asserted specific constructions in the Cisco litigation for the term “predetermined,” as recited in claims 1, 10, 14–16, and 18, and for the term “quantum.” PO Resp. 4. Specifically, according to Patent Owner, Petitioner proposed that “predetermined” be construed as “determined before the data flow request” and that “quantum” be construed as “an amount of a requested resource by which to increase or decrease.” Id. (citing Ex. 2007). Patent Owner contends asserted prior art combinations disclose or render obvious the challenged claims under these constructions. Id. Because our conclusion that Petitioner has not demonstrated that any of the challenged claims are unpatentable does not turn on the construction of either “predetermined” or “quantum,” there is no need for us to construe those terms. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 12

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “We again are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument. As an initial matter, we find no argument with respect to “best effort data traffic” or dropped packets in the Petition. See Tr. 12:10–21 (conceding that “the phrase ‘best effort’ was not in the Petition” but arguing that it was raised in response to the Patent Owner Response). Moreover, we are unable to identify any argument in the Patent Owner Response to which this line of argument is properly responsive, and Petitioner does not identify any such line of argument. Instead, Petitioner’s argument appears to advance belatedly a new theory. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b); Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019), 73–74, available at” slip op. at 43

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedMixed

    “We credit the supporting testimony of Dr. Olivier on the points discussed above, as it is explained sufficiently and consistent with the testimony simply mirrors the Petition and does not explain sufficiently why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Kovvali in the manner Petitioner asserts. See Pet. 35; Reply 17–18; Ex. 1003 ¶ 83.” slip op. at 44

  Patent outcomesUS 7,035,279 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,035,279
• Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Portsmouth Network Corp.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 4, 2025 · IPR2024-00505 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4–7, 9, 10, 13, 14, 16–19, 21, and 22 are unpatentable as obvious over Gai under theory 1B; claims 11, 12, 23, and 24 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “patent, we look to “1) the types of problems encountered in the art; 2) the prior art solutions to those problems; 3) the rapidity with which innovations are made; 4) the sophistication of the technology; and 5) the educational level of active workers in the field.” Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 666–67 (Fed. Cir. 2000). “Not all such factors may be present in every case, and one or more of them may predominate.” Id. at 667.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningOther

    “The most common type of MAC bridge is a switch, which has multiple ports connecting it to LANs, other switches, host computing systems, or other network elements. Switches can be roughly classified as access switches or core switches. An access switch has ports that connect to LANs and/or to other network endpoints, such as user computer systems. Core switches interconnect the access switches into a Wide Area Network (WAN), by direct connection between the core switch and access switches and/or by connection to other core switches. Core switches that are directly connected to access switches are referred to herein as edge switches. Ex. 1001, col. 1, ll. 27–38. Both parties refer to this disclosure when arguing whether particular switches in the asserted prior art (Gai) qualify as an “access switch” or “edge switch.” See Pet. 5, 22, 27–28 (“edge switches are ‘[c]ore switches that are directly connected to access switches’”), 71; PO Resp. 31–32 (“The ’986 patent discloses that ‘[a]n access switch has ports that connect to LANs and/or to other network endpoints.’ . . . The ’986 patent also discloses that edge switches are ‘[c]ore switches that are directly connected to access switches.’”); Reply 20, 22. Dr. Houh and Dr. Olivier do so as well. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 39, 66–67, 82–83, 166, 171, 193; Ex. 2001 ¶ 80. Based on the full trial record, we agree and conclude that the descriptions of “access switch” and “edge switch” in the ’986 patent reflect what was understood to be the plain and ordinary meanings of these terms at the time of the invention. Accordingly, we interpret “access switch” to mean a switch with ports that connect to LANs and/or to other network endpoints, such as user computer systems, and interpret “edge switch” to mean a core switch that is directly connected to an access switch.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “and conclude that Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to designate switch 117 as the root switch when implementing the network reconfiguration method of Gai. The only mention of an access switch connected to port 7 of switch 114 is at column 13, lines 59–63 of Gai. While that sentence establishes that such an access switch may exist in the network, it does not state or imply that it would be the root switch. Instead, when discussing the operation of the Figure 1 network, Gai only identifies switches 120 and 121 as the root switch. See Ex. 1005, col. 10, ll. 37–41, col. 11, ll. 60–64, col. 14, ll. 16–20, col. 15, ll. 27–29, 38–51, col. 16, ll. 42–45. To be sure, Gai does disclose that “execution of the spanning tree algorithm causes the switches to elect a single switch, among all the switches within each network, to be the ‘root’ switch,” where “[e]ach switch has a unique numerical identifier (switch ID) and the root is the switch having the lowest switch ID numeric value,” such that an access switch can be the root switch if it has the lowest switch ID. See Ex. 1005, col. 2, ll. 42–47, col. 10, ll. 29–36. As Patent Owner and Dr. Olivier explain in detail, though, Gai expressly cautions against doing so. Gai discloses that [d]epending on the configuration of a given network, the location of the root can significantly affect the distance that messages must travel. For example, many networks include a plurality of switches designated as access switches that provide connectivity to LANs, end stations, etc., and a plurality of backbone switches that, in turn, interconnect the various access switches. If the root is located at an access switch and the principal server utilized by the end stations (i.e., clients) is coupled to a backbone switch, the average distance between end stations and the primary server may be quite high, resulting in inefficient network operation. In addition, the backbone switches may become partitioned as ports between them are blocked. Id. at col. 3, ll. 17–29; see also id. at col. 10, ll. 26–29 (the “location of the root may affect the average distance (i.e., the average number of hops) a message travels and/or cause undesirable partitioning of backbone switches”). Thus, the location of the root is not an unimportant consideration—it affects the distance messages must travel and can cause backbone switches to be partitioned. See id. Gai, therefore, discloses that “[t]o reduce the average distance and avoid partitioning of the backbone switches, it is desirable to locate the root at a backbone switch.”10 Id. at col. 3, ll. 29–31 (emphasis added). Switch 117 in Petitioner’s modified Figure 1 is an access switch, not a backbone switch. See id. at col. 6, ll. 10–12 (“Access switches are preferably coupled to entities (e.g., LANs, end stations, etc.) whereas backbone switches provide the interconnections between access switches.”).” slip op. at 44

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundMotivation not foundMixed

    “We agree with Petitioner. For purposes of claim 1, which does not recite “downstream” communication of dummy traffic (unlike claims 11, 12, 23, and 24), the only modification to Figure 1 is the addition of switch 117 and server 112e—otherwise, in Petitioner’s analysis, Gai’s method operates exactly as described when a failure occurs at root port 3 of switch 114. See Pet. 69–73, 81–85; Tr. 47:20–48:2. That modification is expressly supported by Gai, which discloses the following: Rapid reconfiguration entity 234 similarly generates one or more separate multicast messages 400 for each remaining entity directly coupled to access switch 114 (i.e., entities or end stations on LANs 102–104). In each message 400, entity 234 loads SA field 414 with the address of the corresponding entity. Each of these messages are similarly forwarded by access switch 114 through the new forwarding port (i.e., port number four). In addition, entity 234 generates and transmits one or more multicast messages 400 for entities reachable through switch 114 on ports other than its root port. For example, if port number seven at switch 114 were coupled to another access switch, entity 234 would transmit multicast messages 400 carrying the source address of entities directly coupled to this additional access switch as well. Thus, at least one multicast message 400 is generated and transmitted for each entity directly coupled to or downstream of access switch 114 (relative to the root). As set forth above, upon receipt of these multicast messages 400, the other devices within network 100 update their corresponding filtering databases with the new destination ports, as necessary. Ex. 1005, col. 13, l. 50–col. 14, l. 3 (emphasis added). Gai thus expressly contemplates the addition of “another access switch” coupled to port 7 of switch 114. Switch 117 in the modified Figure 1 is such a switch. See PO Resp. 30 (Patent Owner arguing that “a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would understand that switch 117 is an access switch”); Ex. 1018, 84:14–85:9 (Dr. Olivier agreeing that switch 117 is an “access switch”). And because an “access switch” has “ports that connect to LANs and/or to other network endpoints, such as user computer systems,” and the above disclosure mentions “entities directly coupled to th[e] additional access switch,” switch 117 would be directly connected to a device like server 112e as well. See Ex. 1001, col. 1, ll. 31–33; Ex. 1005, col. 13, ll. 59–63; supra Section II.B. We credit Dr. Houh’s testimony that Gai in its written description expressly discloses the particular “variation of the topology” of Figure 1 that Petitioner asserts. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 165. Third, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner has not established that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a reasonable expectation of success in modifying Gai to meet the claims.” PO Resp. 14–16 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 47–49). Patent Owner’s arguments are primarily directed to Petitioner’s asserted modification for its “1A” theory. See id. To the extent Patent Owner’s arguments apply to claim 1 and “1B,” we disagree, as Gai expressly describes the asserted modification to Figure 1 (i.e., adding an access switch connected to port 7 of switch 114). Thus, we are persuaded that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in achieving the method of claim 1 based on Gai’s full disclosure.” slip op. at 33

  Patent outcomesUS 6,917,986 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,917,986

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.