- Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Apple Inc. v. RJ Technology LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 17, 2025 · IPR2024-00597 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 2–4 and 6–18 are unpatentable as obvious over Abe and Guyomard, with claims 9–10 also obvious over Iwaizono; claims 1 and 5 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a Master’s degree in material science, chemical engineering, chemistry, or similar field with four years of experience designing testing, and building secondary lithium batteries.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 51). Petitioner further contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been aware of “(1) positive electrode materials, (2) negative electrode materials, (3) separators, (4) electrolytes, (5) charge-discharge parameters, and (6) protection circuits, as well as ‘battery failure modes’ such as plating and the formation of dendrites.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 50–51). Patent Owner “does not dispute Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 17. Upon review of the prior art of record and the parties’ arguments, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art as it is consistent with the disclosures of the ’641 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“We also agree with Patent Owner that the charge cut-off voltage is not necessarily the applied voltage during charging. PO Resp. 20. Rather, depending on the charging protocol used and when in the charging cycle the voltage is applied, the applied voltage could be higher than the battery voltage. Ex. 2013; Ex. 2006 ¶ 91. For example, as discussed in more detail below with respect to the Uemura grounds, when fast charging using constant current is used and the charging rate is not slow, the applied voltage will be higher than the battery voltage when the constant current charging phase is stopped. Ex. 2006 ¶ 91; Ex. 2013. Likewise, during constant current/constant voltage charging, the applied voltage approximates the battery voltage only when the battery is nearly completely charged. Ex. 2013; Ex. 2006 ¶ 91. Thus, the applied voltage may be, but is not necessarily, the charge cut-off voltage. In view of the foregoing, we construe “charge cut-off voltage” in claims 1 and 5 as “the maximum value to which the battery is configured to be charged.” PO Resp. 18; Ex. 2008, 217:6–11; Pet. Reply 5. Contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, however, we do not understand the phrase “configured to be charged” to necessarily represent a single voltage for the battery that is determined based on the structure and chemistry of the battery. Pet. Reply 4–5. Rather, the charge cut-off voltage is a selected potential, or voltage, of the battery or cell at the end of charging that is controlled by a circuit or device, such as a charger or control circuit within the battery. Ex. 1001, 9:50–55; Ex. 1048, 2, 7–8; Ex. 1008, 3:9–13. And, for the reasons discussed herein, the charge cut-off voltage may be, but is not necessarily, the same as the applied voltage during charging. PO Resp. 20.” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“charge cut-off voltage “greater than 4.2 V but less than 5.8 V” and calculating a specific or theoretic capacity “with a charge cut-off voltage limited to 4.2” (claim 1) or “with a charge cut-off voltage set at 4.2 V” (claim 5). Ex. 1001, 16:56–61, 17:6–11. Although the parties dispute the precise scope of these claim terms, the parties agree that the first use of “charge cut-off voltage” in claims 1 and 5 refers to the potential of the battery as a whole (between the cathode and the anode), and not a half-cell voltage using lithium metal as a counter electrode.10 Tr. 17:1–3 (agreeing 10 With respect to the phrase “as calculated by a theoretic capacity with a charge cut-off voltage set at 4.2 V,” the parties in fact appear to be in that the first use of “charge cut-off voltage” in claim 5 refers to a full-cell voltage); Sur-reply 5; PO Resp. 22. We need not further construe the claims to resolve the disputes between the parties. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 16
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“Given Mr. Juzkow’s unambiguous testimony that Uemura uses constant current charging that would stop when the applied voltage reached 11 The chart is reproduced from SAFT, Charging your lithium-ion batteries: 5 expert tips for a longer lifespan, (https://www.saft.com/energizing-iot/charging-your-lithium-ion-batteries-5-expert-tips-longerlifespan#:~: text=When%20the%20battery%20provides%20current,This%20restore s%20the%20battery's%20capacity). 4.3 V, as well as Dr. Yao’s persuasive testimony that Uemura’s constant charging rate is not slow, we credit the testimony of Dr. Yao that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the internal voltage to which the battery of Uemura was charged is less than 4.3 V. Ex. 2006 ¶ 119. In particular, Dr. Yao persuasively testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art would have believed that the charge cut-off voltage was no more than 4.2 V, and most likely equal to “about 4 V.” Id. ¶¶ 119–122.” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 7,749,641 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,749,641 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Apple Inc. v. RJ Technology LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 17, 2025 · IPR2023-01183 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 2–4 and 6–18 are unpatentable as obvious over Abe and Guyomard, with claims 9 and 10 also obvious over Iwaizono; claims 1 and 5 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a Master’s degree in material science, chemical engineering, chemistry, or similar field with four years of experience designing testing, and building secondary lithium batteries.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 51). Petitioner further contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been aware of “(1) positive electrode materials, (2) negative electrode materials, (3) separators, (4) electrolytes, (5) charge-discharge parameters, and (6) protection circuits, as well as ‘battery failure modes’ such as plating and the formation of dendrites.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 50–51). Patent Owner “does not dispute Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 17. Upon review of the prior art of record and the parties’ arguments, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art as it is consistent with the disclosures of the ’641 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“constructions. First, we agree with Petitioner that the ’641 patent indicates that the charge cut-off voltage selected for a particular battery need not be a fixed property of the battery or something that is set by the design and chemistry of the battery. Consistent with this conclusion, the ’641 patent discloses that a “charging device controls the charge cut-off voltage of the single lithium-ion cell within a range from 4.3 V to 5.8 V.” Ex. 1001, 9:50– 55. This strongly suggests that the charge cut-off voltage is controlled by the charger and is not necessarily an inherent property of the battery. Patent Owner contends that this is merely an unclaimed embodiment, but the relevant disclosure states that the charging device for the “present invention” may be any type of device “with the proviso that said charging device controls the charge cut-off voltage.” Id. at 9:50–53.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“charge cut-off voltage “greater than 4.2 V but less than 5.8 V” and calculating a specific or theoretic capacity “with a charge cut-off voltage limited to 4.2” (claim 1) or “with a charge cut-off voltage set at 4.2 V” (claim 5). Ex. 1001, 16:56–61, 17:6–11. Although the parties dispute the precise scope of these claim terms, the parties agree that the first use of “charge cut-off voltage” in claims 1 and 5 refers to the potential of the battery as a whole (between the cathode and the anode), and not a half-cell voltage using lithium metal as a counter electrode.10 Tr. 17:1–3 (agreeing 10 With respect to the phrase “as calculated by a theoretic capacity with a charge cut-off voltage set at 4.2 V,” the parties in fact appear to be in that the first use of “charge cut-off voltage” in claim 5 refers to a full-cell voltage); Sur-reply 5; PO Resp. 22. We need not further construe the claims to resolve the disputes between the parties. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 16
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Given Mr. Juzkow’s unambiguous testimony that Uemura uses constant current charging that would stop when the applied voltage reached 11 The chart is reproduced from SAFT, Charging your lithium-ion batteries: 5 expert tips for a longer lifespan, (https://www.saft.com/energizing-iot/charging-your-lithium-ion-batteries-5-expert-tips-longerlifespan#:~: text=When%20the%20battery%20provides%20current,This%20restore s%20the%20battery's%20capacity). 4.3 V, as well as Dr. Yao’s persuasive testimony that Uemura’s constant charging rate is not slow, we credit the testimony of Dr. Yao that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the internal voltage to which the battery of Uemura was charged is less than 4.3 V. Ex. 2006 ¶ 119. In particular, Dr. Yao persuasively testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art would have believed that the charge cut-off voltage was no more than 4.2 V, and most likely equal to “about 4 V.” Id. ¶¶ 119–122. Petitioner argues that because the battery of Uemura is charged “to” a maximum voltage of 4.3 V, Uemura discloses the claimed charge cut-off voltage under either Petitioner’s or Patent Owner’s construction of the term. Pet. Reply 11–12 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶ 81; Ex. 1044 ¶¶ 56–59). This argument is not persuasive because Mr. Juzkow unambiguously testified that charging in Uemura stopped when the applied voltage reached 4.3 V, and Uemura discloses that the battery was charged “at” a voltage ranging from 4.3 V to 2.0 V, not “to” such a voltage. Ex. 1009 ¶ 81; Ex. 2008, 113:2–13; Ex. 2006 ¶ 119 n.64; Sur-reply 9. In view of the foregoing, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Uemura anticipates independent claims 1 and 5 of the ’641 patent.” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 7,749,641 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,749,641 - PTAB · Jan 8, 2025 · IPR2024-00959 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–10 on all petitioned grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that Google would prevail on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), institution of review requires the information in the record to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Applying that standard on behalf of the Director (37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a)), we institute an inter partes review to determine whether Petitioner demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–10 are unpatentable, considering all grounds in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s position in this regard invites us to err “by looking at [Fisher] individually” and separately from Kuwata, because “[t]he question in an obviousness inquiry is whether it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the relevant disclosures of the two references, not whether each individual reference discloses all of the necessary elements.” Palo Alto Networks, Inc. v. Centripetal Networks LLC, 122 F.4th 1378, 1385–86 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (quoting Game & Tech. Co. v. Wargaming Grp. Ltd., 942 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2019)); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (nonobviousness is not established by attacking references individually when unpatentability is predicated upon a combination of prior art disclosures); see also KSR, 550 U.S. at 420–421 (stating “[a] person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton,” and “in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle”). Finally, as to motivation for combining Kuwata and Fisher to practice the invention of claim 1, Petitioner’s contentions and Dr. Stevenson’s testimony justify institution of review. In particular, Dr. Stevenson testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated, in light of Fisher’s disclosures regarding updating of data files on a camera, to configure Kuwata’s camera to download updated image processing control data from a server via the Internet, in order to pair the camera with various printers including printers that were not yet on the market when the camera was manufactured. See Pet. 15–18, 22–26; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 86–89, 102–108. Based on the present record, we conclude Kuwata does not teach away from this combination, as Patent Owner would have it. Kuwata merely discloses that the camera manufacturer (as opposed to individual users of the camera) is in the best position to optimize the output control information CI utilized by the camera to reduce differences between images displayed to the user by the camera and images that are outputted by particular printers. See Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 75, 77. This does not detract from the benefits of updating the output control information CI after the camera is manufactured, for example so that the camera can be paired with printers that were not yet on the market when the camera was manufactured. Indeed, Fisher recognizes that “a manufacturer may create various ancillary data files 418, and make the ancillary data files 418 available on a distributed computer network like the Internet for subsequent downloading and utilization by camera device 110.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 55. That teaching in Fisher dovetails with Kuwata’s disclosure concerning camera manufacturers optimizing their cameras with various different printers. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the preliminary record supports, sufficiently to justify institution, Petitioner’s contention that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Kuwata and Fisher to practice the invention of claim 1.” slip op. at 24
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s position in this regard invites us to err “by looking at [Fisher] individually” and separately from Kuwata, because “[t]he question in an obviousness inquiry is whether it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the relevant disclosures of the two references, not whether each individual reference discloses all of the necessary elements.” Palo Alto Networks, Inc. v. Centripetal Networks LLC, 122 F.4th 1378, 1385–86 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (quoting Game & Tech. Co. v. Wargaming Grp. Ltd., 942 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2019)); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (nonobviousness is not established by attacking references individually when unpatentability is predicated upon a combination of prior art disclosures); see also KSR, 550 U.S. at 420–421 (stating “[a] person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton,” and “in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle”).” slip op. at 24
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“D. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends a person having ordinary skill in the art pertaining to the ’082 patent “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or related engineering disciplines, and two years of experience in digital image processing,” wherein “[r]elevant work experience can substitute for formal education and additional education could substitute for work experience.” Pet. 5; Ex. 1003 ¶ 60. “Patent Owner does not dispute the level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art . . . set forth in the Petition.” Prelim. Resp. 11–12. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears to be consistent with the ’082 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,428,082 - Google LLC v. 138 East LCD Advancements LimitedInstituted in partPTAB · Jan 8, 2025 · IPR2024-00957 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–8, 10–16, and 18 on all petitioned grounds, but did not institute review of disclaimed claims 9 and 17.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), institution of review requires the information in the record to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Applying that standard on behalf of the Director (37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a)), we institute an inter partes review to determine whether Petitioner demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–8, 10–16, and 18 are unpatentable, considering all grounds in the Petition directed to those claims. We do not institute review as to claims 9 and 17 on any ground because they have been disclaimed. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e).” slip op. at 2
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgment
“disclaimer,” and “[n]o inter partes review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e). As a result of the statutory disclaimer, claims 9 and 17 are no longer regarded as claims challenged in the Petition. See Vectra, 162 F.3d at 1383 (“This court has interpreted the term ‘considered as part of the original patent’ in section 253 to mean that the patent is treated as though the disclaimed claims never existed.”) (citing Guinn v. Kopf, 96 F.3d 1419, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); see also Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Inc., 933 F.3d 1367, 1372–75 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (disclaimer of claims during District Court patent infringement litigation “mooted any controversy” over the disclaimed claims, ending the Article III case or controversy requirement for District Court jurisdiction). In considering Federal Circuit precedent and our rules, we conclude we cannot institute a trial on claims that have been disclaimed, and, thus, no longer exist. Our conclusion is consistent with the statutory scope of inter partes review as laid out in 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(b) and 318(a) and is not at odds with SAS, supra. See, e.g., SAS, 584 U.S. at 367 (recognizing that “the claims challenged ‘in the petition’ will not always survive to the end of the case; some may drop out thanks to the patent owner’s actions”). Accordingly, we treat claims 9 and 17 as having never been part of the ’056 patent, such that Petitioner cannot seek inter partes review of those claims. Thus, we deny institution of review as to whether disclaimed claims 9 and 17 are unpatentable per Petitioner’s Grounds Three and Four.” slip op. at 32
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not dispute the level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art . . . set forth in the Petition.” Prelim. Resp. 8; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 27–28. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears to be consistent with the ’056 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“Petitioner argues “[n]o terms need to be construed . . . to resolve unpatentability.” Pet. 16–17. “Patent Owner contends that the claim terms should receive their ordinary and customary meaning in light of the specification and prosecution history, as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 8. Patent Owner does not proffer any constructions for particular terms. See id. Based on the arguments and evidence presented at this time, we determine no explicit construction is needed to resolve the parties’ controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,454,056 - Alivecor, Inc. v. Apple Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 23, 2024 · IPR2023-00950 · APJ Josiah C Cocks · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–14 were not shown unpatentable; claims 15–22 were shown unpatentable over Markel. The revised contingent motion to amend was dismissed as moot.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“In carefully and faithfully wrangling the parties’ views and explanation as to the meaning of limitation [1.c.iii], we conclude that Petitioner’s “correct interpretation” of that limitation is that a first pad is recognized as a distinct structure or component from a first portion of an enclosure, and that the pad is positioned underneath that first portion in a manner such that the pad is concealed from a user. We adopt that interpretation. We determine that it is unnecessary to discuss an express construction for any other term to resolve this proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 19
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is somewhat broader in both education and proposed work experience. Patent Owner’s proposed work experience is somewhat vague and potentially outside the scope of the claimed invention. For example, the requirement that the person of ordinary skill in the art have experience with the “capture and processing of data or information, including but not limited to physiological information,” would seemingly encompass data processing areas that do not relate to the scope of the claimed invention. We adopt Petitioner’s level of the level of ordinary skill in art because it is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). Nevertheless, our analysis and the end result are the same under either proposed definition.” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner makes a more persuasive case as to what a person of ordinary skill in the art reasonably would have understood from Markel’s disclosure. In particular, we agree with Patent Owner that the record before us readily conveys that a skilled artisan would have followed Markel’s practice of forming or molding electrodes from conductive plastic rather than locating a separate electrode component underneath a conductive plaster layer. See, e.g., PO Resp. 30–31 (“[a] POSITA would find nothing in cited portions of Markel to inform or encourage placement of an electrode underneath an exterior layer.”). Indeed, as Patent Owner articulates, Petitioner “fails to provide any reasoning as to why a POSITA would have found Markel’s method of concealment to be deficient, or why a POSITA would have been motivated in light of Markel’s manner of concealment to nevertheless place an electrode underneath the exterior portion of the device.” Id. To that end, we credit Dr. Kenny’s supporting testimony as consistent with Markel’s express teachings. See, e.g., Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 77–83; Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 81–88. We credit that testimony over the countervailing testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Berger (see, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 122, 135–139), as we agree with Patent Owner that Dr. Berger’s testimony “is not supported by Markel’s actual disclosures.” PO Resp. 31.” slip op. at 33
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner does not appear to disagree that Markel, itself, does not convey that an electrode, or any structure identifiable as a “pad,” is positioned underneath any surface of any enclosure. Rather, Petitioner’s theory of unpatentability is premised on modification of Markel to so position such a pad. Although seemingly acknowledging that Markel contemplates a concealment technique involving molding an electrode into an exterior surface, Petitioner extrapolates from that disclosure that a skilled artisan would be motivated to try an alternative means of concealing an electrode pad by placing the pad underneath an outer layer or portion, i.e., “audio output portion 610.” See Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 135). Neither Petitioner, nor Dr. Kenny, however, meaningfully explains why a skilled artisan would have deviated from Markel’s express teachings of concealing an electrode via molding techniques to then arrive at an entirely different concealment approach of placing an electrode pad underneath the audio output portion. Petitioner’s modification proposal in that regard appears borne of hindsight bias based on the disclosure of the ’257 patent rather than any dutiful consideration of what Markel’s actual teachings would have conveyed to a skilled artisan. See Ex. 2004 ¶ 84 (Dr. Kenny explaining why Petitioner’s proposed modification to Markel to hide the electrode underneath a plastic conductive layer was based on improper hindsight). Such hindsight bias is impermissible. See, e.g., Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc. v. The Toro Co., 848 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e cannot allow hindsight bias to be the thread that stitches together prior art patches into something that is the claimed invention.”). Patent Owner makes a more persuasive case as to what a person of ordinary skill in the art reasonably would have understood from Markel’s disclosure. In particular, we agree with Patent Owner that the record before us readily conveys that a skilled artisan would have followed Markel’s practice of forming or molding electrodes from conductive plastic rather than locating a separate electrode component underneath a conductive plaster layer. See, e.g., PO Resp. 30–31 (“[a] POSITA would find nothing in cited portions of Markel to inform or encourage placement of an electrode underneath an exterior layer.”). Indeed, as Patent Owner articulates, Petitioner “fails to provide any reasoning as to why a POSITA would have found Markel’s method of concealment to be deficient, or why a POSITA would have been motivated in light of Markel’s manner of concealment to nevertheless place an electrode underneath the exterior portion of the device.” Id. To that end, we credit Dr. Kenny’s supporting testimony as consistent with Markel’s express teachings. See, e.g., Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 77–83; Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 81–88. We credit that testimony over the countervailing testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Berger (see, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 122, 135–139), as we agree with Patent Owner that Dr. Berger’s testimony “is not supported by Markel’s actual disclosures.” PO Resp. 31.” slip op. at 32
Patent outcomesUS 10,076,257 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,076,257 - Commscope Technologies LLC. v. Belden Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 18, 2024 · IPR2023-01061 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 19, 20, and 22 are unpatentable as obvious over Yanagita, Jachimowicz, and, for claims 20 and 22, Gingue; alternative grounds were not reached.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther
“Based on the record before us and crediting this testimony by Mr. Cornelison, we agree that a POSITA would have understood that Yanagita” slip op. at 20
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art (sometimes abbreviated herein as “POSITA”). Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). Petitioner argues that a “person of ordinary skill in the art of the ’537 patent would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and a minimum of 3–4 years of industry experience in connection with designing, manufacturing, and testing of twisted-pair data cables.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 12). Petitioner also argues an “individual with a master’s degree in electrical engineering would require less industry experience (e.g.,1–2 years).” Id. (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 12). Patent Owner did not dispute this proposed definition prior to institution. See generally Prelim. Resp. In our Decision on Institution, we adopted Petitioner’s proposal. During the trial, neither party expressly disputed our definition of a POSITA or explicitly argued that the outcome of this case would differ based upon our adoption of any particular definition of a POSITA. See generally Pet. Reply; PO Resp. Upon review of the full record, we see no reason to modify, and we thus maintain, the definition of a POSITA applied in our Decision on Institution.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“After institution, Patent Owner argued that the plain and ordinary meaning of twisted pairs requires “two insulated conductors twisted together around one another to form a balanced transmission line” as shown in Figure 4 of the ’537 patent. PO Resp. 13. Petitioner replied that Patent Owner’s addition of “balanced transmission line” to the Board’s preliminary construction is unnecessary as the dispute is whether the conductors of the asserted art are “twisted together” (i.e., twisted around each other) and that neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner dispute that if a pair of conductors are twisted around one another, they form a balanced transmission line. See Pet. Reply 1. Based upon a full record, we maintain our construction of the term “twisted pairs,” which both parties agree require a “pair of insulated conductors that are twisted together,” (i.e., “two insulated conductors twisted around each other”). We agree with Petitioner that no further construction of the term is required as there is no dispute between the parties that if a pair of insulated conductors are twisted together (i.e., two insulated conductors are twisted around each other), that they form a balanced transmission line. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“c) Motivation to Combine Based upon review of the full record, we determine Petitioner has articulated a sufficient reason a POSITA would have added the foamed polymer tape of Jachimowicz to Yanagita’s cable between core material 2 (separator) and at least one set of twisted pairs. See Pet. 40–42. In particular, Petitioner states that additing a foamed polymer tape to Yanagita’s separtor core material 2 would have been expected to improve the electrical perforamce of the cable by reducing the capitance between twisted pairs on one side of Yanagita’s separator and twisted pairs on the other side, thus reducing current leakage between them and reducing the transmission loss due to such leakage. Pet. 42 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 45, 139). Petitioner asserts that a POSITA would have been motivated to add a foamed polymer tape, such as Jachimowicz’s foamed polyethlyene tape to Yangida’s core, because it would have been expected to beneficially lower the dielectic contsant of the material between twisted pairs on either side of the separator due to the addition of low-dielectric constant foamed material. Pet. 42–43.” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 6,998,537 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,998,537 - Commscope Technologies LLC v. Belden Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 18, 2024 · IPR2023-01062 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 27–33 are unpatentable: claims 27–29 are anticipated by GmbH-866, and claims 30–33 are obvious over GmbH-866, Jachimowicz, and Gingue.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art (sometimes abbreviated herein as “POSITA”). Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18. Petitioner argues that a “person of ordinary skill in the art of the ’095 patent would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and a minimum of 3–4 years of industry experience in connection with designing, manufacturing, and testing of twisted-pair data cables.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 13). Petitioner also argues an “individual with a master’s degree in electrical engineering would require less industry experience (e.g., 1–2 years).” Id. (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 13). Patent Owner did not dispute this proposed definition prior to institution. See generally Prelim. Resp. In our Decision on Institution, we adopted Petitioner’s proposal. During the trial, neither party expressly disputed our definition of a POSITA or explicitly argued that the outcome of this case would differ based upon our adoption of any particular definition of a POSITA. See generally Pet. Reply; PO Resp. 7 Patent Owner does not rely on evidence of secondary considerations to support its patentability arguments. See generally PO Resp.; PO Sur-reply. thus maintain, the definition of a POSITA applied in our Decision on Institution.” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“To the extent Petitioner argues that Dr. Eldering does not meet the minimum qualifications of a POSITA, we disagree. First, our definition of a POSITA requires 3–4 years of industry experience for those holding only a bachelor’s degree and that less years of industry experience is required for those with additional education. Inst. Dec. 8–9. Dr. Eldering holds a Ph.D. in electrical industry and, thus, less than 3–4 years of industry experience is required. Moreover, Dr. Eldering’s declaration, testimony, and CV demonstrate that Dr. Eldering has many years of industry experience with twisted pair data cables. See, e.g., Ex. 2001 ¶ 13 (discussing his 1990–1993 industry experience with twisted wire pairs, including research regarding delivery of high-speed digital data services over twisted wire pair cable), ¶ 14 (discussing industry experience at General Instrument, including the development of products using twisted wire pair cable for distribution of voice signals), ¶ 15 (discussing additional industry experience including evaluation of crosstalk in systems using twisted pair wire cabling and optimizing modulation format), App’x A; Ex. 1070, 201:1–202:7. We thus determine that Dr. Eldering’s education and industry experience qualifies him to testify regarding the perspective of a POSITA. experience of Dr. Eldering, Petitioner does not allege that Dr. Eldering is not qualified to opine from the perspective of a POSITA and did not file an objection to Dr. Eldering’s testimony under 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b) or a motion to exclude Dr. Eldering’s testimony under 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(c). See Kyocera Senco Industrial Tools Inc. v. International Trade Commission, F.4th 1369, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (stating that an expert witness in a patent case must have at least an ordinary skill in the art to offer expert testimony from the perspective of a skilled artisan). We address how much weight should be given to Dr. Eldering’s testimony, as well as to Mr. Cornelison’s testimony, throughout our Decision below.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownNo construction neededDecided for petitioner
“After institution, Patent Owner argued that the plain and ordinary meaning of “twisted pair of insulated conductors” requires “two insulated conductors twisted together around one another to form a balanced Petitioner replied that Patent Owner’s addition of “balanced transmission line” to the Board’s preliminary construction is unnecessary as the dispute between the parties centered only on whether the conductors of the asserted art are “twisted together” (i.e., twisted around each other) and that neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner dispute that if a pair of conductors are twisted around one another, they form a balanced transmission line. See Pet. Reply 1. Based upon a full record, we maintain our construction of the term “twisted pairs,” which both parties agree require a “pair of insulated conductors that are twisted together,” (i.e., “two insulated conductors twisted around each other”). We agree with Petitioner that no further construction of the term is required as there is no dispute between the parties that if a pair of insulated conductors are twisted together (i.e., two insulated conductors are twisted around each other), that they form a balanced transmission line. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“GmbH-866 discloses a first and second “twisted pair of insulated conductors” as required by claim 27. Anticipation is assessed from the perspective of a person of ordinarily skill in the art. Dayco Prods., 329 F.3d at 1368. The “dispositive question regarding anticipation [i]s whether one skilled in the art would reasonably understand or infer from the [prior art reference’s] teaching” that every claim element was disclosed in that single reference. Id. (quoting Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d at 390). Thus, the understand or infer that the “stranded” conductors in GmbH-866 constitute “twisted pairs,” not whether the term “stranded” or “stranding” conductors could have another meaning in another context.” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 6,570,095 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,570,095 - PTAB · Dec 16, 2024 · IPR2024-00997 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–10, exercising its discretion under § 314(a) because the Fintiv factors favored denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“Based on the preliminary record, we can reasonably expect trial in the parallel district court proceedings to begin four to five months prior to the deadline for our final written decision, based on the scheduled trial date and the median time-to-trial statistics. See Fintiv Memo 8–9 & n.12 (approving the use of median time-to-trial statistics). Even if the proceedings are staggered, at least one of the proceedings would likely begin and conclude well before our decision, making it highly likely that there will be duplicate efforts in evaluating the challenged claims based on the prior art. Thus, we agree with Patent Owner that the second factor weighs substantially in favor of discretionary denial.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“and Trademark Office under 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a), we may only institute an inter partes review when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c). However, institution of inter partes review is discretionary. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“ordinary skill in the art. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312– 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (the level of ordinary skill is pertinent to claim construction); Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966) (the level of ordinary skill is one of the factors to consider when determining obviousness). For this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, which is “the equivalent of an undergraduate degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, or Computer Engineering; familiarity with the relevant 3GPP standards as of this time; and at least two years of experience in design, development, and/or testing of cellular networks.” Pet. 15–16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 43–44). Although Patent Owner argues for a higher level of ordinary skill (see Prelim. Resp. 7–8), our determination that the Petition lacks compelling merits would be the same under Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The parties argue that we need not address any claim-construction issues for our analysis, and we agree. See Pet. 15; Prelim. Resp. 25. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,798,754 - Boe Technology Group Co., Ltd. v. 138 East LCD Advancements LimitedInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 16, 2024 · IPR2024-00976 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because BOE did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on claims 1–3 under any of its three obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“We have authority to institute an inter partes review where a petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one challenged claim. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). For reasons that follow, Petitioner does not meet that evidentiary threshold. We decline to reach the issues raised in the Reply or Sur-reply, which relate to Patent Owner’s alternative argument that a discretionary denial of the Petition is warranted.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Pet. 26. Patent Owner “does not dispute the level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art” as “set forth in the Petition.” Prelim. Resp. 11. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition (Pet. 26) because, on this record, it is consistent with the specification. We take note that neither party indicated that the result would change under any different definition.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We construe terms in controversy only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner discusses the terms a “data line having a broad-width portion” and a “scanning line having a broad-width portion” recited in claim 1, as well as a “data line having a broad portion” and a “scanning line having a broad-width portion” recited in claim 2. Petitioner cites the ’079 patent for “offering a lexicographic definition of the term ‘broad width’” to support the plain meaning interpretation of the terms “‘broad-width portion’ and ‘broad portion’ as a portion that is broader than another portion of the subject element.” Pet. 16. Patent Owner does not provide arguments directed specifically to Petitioner’s proposed claim constructions. See Prelim. Resp. 10–11. Taking account of the information presented, we determine that no claim term requires express construction for purposes of deciding whether to institute review. Compare Pet. 16 (addressing issues of claim construction, citing the ’079 patent for supporting the plain and ordinary meaning of “broad-width portion” and “broad portion” without demonstrating that an express construction is necessary to resolve whether to institute review), with Prelim. Resp. 10–11 (addressing the merits of Petitioner’s challenges, without asserting an express claim construction). To the extent that the scope of any claim term requires discussion, however, we provide it in the following analysis of the challenges.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Id. (emphasis added). Sato ¶ 26 is entirely silent on scan lines and clearly links the cited benefits to “this arrangement” of “data lines composed of an Al film.” Id. Importantly, Petitioner does not connect Sato’s disclosure, relating to benefits associated with a data line arrangement, to any particular arrangement of scan lines. Sato ¶ 28 is equally deficient. Sato ¶ 28 also discusses benefits of utilizing a specific “arrangement,” namely, “capacitance lines formed of [a] metal film.” Id. ¶ 28. [0028] With this arrangement, the provision of the function as the shading layer with the capacitance lines formed of the metal film, the polysilicon film, or the like, in addition to the function as the wiring, as well as the provision of the function as the light absorption layer with the capacitance electrodes formed of the polysilicon film, or the like, in addition to the function as electrodes, prevents the laminated structure from becoming complex by additionally forming a dedicated shading layer and a dedicated light absorption layer. Accordingly, this arrangement is very advantageous by simply arranging the electro-optical device, and simplifies a manufacturing process thereof. Id. (emphasis added). Here again, Sato ¶ 28 is entirely silent on scan lines and clearly links the cited benefits to “this arrangement” of “capacitance lines formed of metal film.” Id. Petitioner does not bridge the gap in its rationale to combine by attempting to explain why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have extrapolated benefits, pertaining to an arrangement of capacitance lines, to a similar arrangement of scan lines. Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Flasck, provides no further insight as to how or why Sato ¶¶ 26 and 28 would have been understood to apply to scan lines. Dr. Flasck’s comments on Sato ¶¶ 26 and 28 merely repeat, nearly verbatim, the Petition’s conclusory contentions. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 139 (Dr. Flasck declaring “Sato specifically teaches that its device ‘is very advantageous by simply arranging the electro-optical device, and simplifies a manufacturing process thereof.’”); Pet. 37. Dr. Flasck does not cite to any additional supporting evidence other than Sato ¶¶ 26 and 28. Ex. 1002 ¶ 139.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,502,079 - Boe Technology Group Co., Ltd. v. 138 East LCD Advancements LimitedInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 16, 2024 · IPR2024-00977 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 7–13 and 15–20 unpatentable on any asserted ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2023).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had at least a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, physics, or a similar field and at least two years of experience designing semiconductor display devices, including LCD displays.” Pet. 19. Petitioner also asserts that “[a]dditional relevant work experience can compensate for less education, and vice versa.” Id. On the record presented, Patent Owner “does not dispute the level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art . . . set forth in the Petition.” Prelim. Resp. 8. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any particular proffered definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears consistent with the ’606 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“As discussed below, we are able to determine whether to institute review without resolving the construction of any claim terms. Accordingly, we need not and do not construe any terms expressly. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“view. First, as Petitioner admits, data line 6a is not connected to image signal line 101d and line 109 other than when sample hold circuit 101c connects them due to shift register 101b outputting an enabling signal. Pet. 49. This is supported by the layout of the four elements in Fujikawa’s Figure 2. Ex. 1005, Fig. 2 (depicting sample hold circuits 101c between and connecting data lines 6a and signal lines 101d). In addition, Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. E. Fred Schubert, testifies that “two separate lines straddling circuitry are [not] one line.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 64. The dispute between the parties on this issue is largely one of claim construction: should the term “wiring line” in claim 7 be construed broadly enough to encompass a collection of lines separated by a sample hold circuit? In order to determine that Fujikawa discloses or teaches the recited wiring lines, we would need to answer this question in the affirmative. Yet, as discussed above, neither party proposes construing “wiring line,” or any other term used in the claims of the ’606 patent. Pet. 18; Prelim. Resp. 7. The failure to argue for and sufficiently support a broad construction of the term “wiring line” means that Petitioner does not show sufficiently, for purposes of supporting institution of review, that Fujikawa discloses or teaches the “wiring line” limitation of claim 7. b) Conclusion Regarding Claim 7 Based on the record presented, we determine that Petitioner has not shown that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in demonstrating that claim 7 is unpatentable as anticipated by or obvious in view of Fujikawa.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,557,606
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.