- PLR Worldwide Sales Limited v. Flip Phone Games, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 24, 2025 · IPR2024-00171 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–14 are unpatentable as obvious over Hays; the Board did not reach the remaining grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner, relying on the testimony of Dr. Zagal, argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have had an undergraduate degree in game design or development, computer science, computer engineering, or a related field, with at least two years of experience working with computer gaming systems or software application development.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 62–66). Petitioner also contends that “[l]ess work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education or vice versa.” Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 62–66). Patent Owner, relying on the testimony of Dr. Akl, contends that a skilled artisan “would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a similar field, along with one to two years of experience developing or programming video games or video game systems, or similar types of computer systems,” but notes that a skilled artisan “may have additional education that might substitute for some of the experience, and additional substantial experience might substitute for some of the educational background.” PO Resp. 2–3 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶ 28). According to Patent Owner, Petitioner’s proposal does not require Owner states, “[t]his difference does not materially affect the analysis presented below.” PO Resp. 3. We see very little difference between the parties’ respective proposals. We adopt Patent Owner’s more specific proposal because it is consistent with the level of skill evidenced in the ’958 patent and the applied prior art, but we agree with Patent Owner that this does not affect our analysis; we would reach the same conclusions under Petitioner’s proposal.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“requirements for the language “for use in a video game,” including that the updated video-game content be an interactive object that is inserted into an existing game, or at least a new ad unit not already present in the game, and that the updated content alter the function of the game. PO Resp. 15–17. Patent Owner offers no persuasive support for these restrictions on the claim language. The claim language itself suggests no such restrictions. Rather, the claim language simply recites video-game content that is for use in the video game. The claim language does not specify who or what must use the content or how it must be used. Thus, the claim language itself is broad and includes none of the restrictions Patent Owner would place on it.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Owner’s position to be that mere storage of content is not enough to show pre-selection of that content. For example, during oral argument, Patent Owner’s counsel argued as follows: I don’t think it’s just as simple as saying, well, anytime you store anything, it’s been pre-selected, because again, that kind of reads out pre-selection, as well. And the same thing with indexing. I think that’s simply too broad. There must be some pre-selection of, you know, kind of narrowed down content, if you will, but then when the request comes in, you choose among that pre-selected content for the final selection. Tr. 31:18–23; see also PO Resp. 11 (“[E]xtending the claim to content that is merely selected from storage and sent gives no meaning to pre-selected . . . .”), 12 (“[C]ontent is not shown to be pre-selected by selecting it from storage and sending.”); Tr. 31:2–5 (Patent Owner’s counsel’s argument that “there must be a pre-selection of certain content that will be available from which to select once the request is received, and then the checking step is performed in the various claims here”), 34:23–24 (Patent Owner’s counsel’s argument that “[t]here still must be a pre-selection, which we don’t think is simply, you know, the act of storing”). As explained below in Sections II.D.2.b and II.D.6, Petitioner’s contentions based on Hays show that Hays teaches pre-selected ads, as recited in claims 1 and 8, and a pre-selected message, as recited in claims 5 and 12, according to Patent Owner’s understanding of the term. Therefore, we apply Patent Owner’s interpretation in our patentability analysis, and we need not provide a full claim interpretation, nor do we need to resolve whether pre-selecting can be met by merely storing data. See Realtime” slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“unpatentable 1 or more claims of a patent only on a ground that could be raised under section 102 or 103 and only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.” 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). Patent Owner argues that “Hays is only a ‘printed publication’ under § 311(b) as of the date it became available to the public—i.e., after the June 26, 2007, priority date of the ’958 Patent,” and, therefore, that Hays is “ineligible to be prior art in an IPR.” PO Resp. 48–50. The Federal Circuit has rejected this argument, holding that a published patent application is, by its literal terms, a “printed publication.” So, when § 311(b) permits IPR challenges based upon “prior art . . . printed publications,” it includes within its literal scope challenges based upon a published patent application—this specific type of “printed publication”—is deemed prior art as of its filing date. Therefore, the plain language of §§ 311(b) and 102(e)(1) permits IPR challenges based upon published patent applications, and such published patent applications can be deemed prior art in IPRs as of their filing date. Lynk Labs, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 125 F.4th 1120, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 2025). Thus, Petitioner asserts a permissible ground of unpatentability under 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) by arguing that claims 1–14 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) on the basis of Hays, which is a prior art printed publication.” slip op. at 15
Patent outcomesUS 10,617,958 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,617,958 - PLR Worldwide Sales Limited v. Flip Phone Games, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 24, 2025 · IPR2024-00132 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–9 are unpatentable as obvious over Hays; claim 6 is also unpatentable over Hays and van Datta.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“We see very little difference between the parties’ respective proposals. We adopt Patent Owner’s more specific proposal because it is consistent with the level of skill evidenced in the ’202 patent and the applied prior art, but we agree with Patent Owner that this does not affect our analysis; we would reach the same conclusions under Petitioner’s proposal.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“The claim language itself suggests no such restrictions. Rather, the claim language simply recites video-game content that is usable in the video game. The claim language does not specify who or what must use the content or how it must be used. Thus, the claim language itself is broad and includes none of the restrictions Patent Owner would place on it. As Petitioner points out (Reply 5), the specification directly refutes Patent Owner’s position. The ’202 patent’s Figure 2A (reproduced above) is instructive. In this example, “several items 210, 220, 225, 230, and 235 are shown within scene 200,” and virtually any of these items may be changed by receiving updated content on the mobile communication device. For instance, the shirt 230 might be updated to include a logo associated with third party X (as shown). The poster 225 might advertise an upcoming movie for third party Y, and chalk board 220 may contain a handwritten advertisement for third party Z (as shown). Ex. 1001, 6:42–50. When an advertising contract changes, “the mobile communication device may thereafter download updated content reflecting a new graphic, shirt, or entirely new object, to place at 230.” Id. at 6:55–57. These are examples of updated video-game content (updated advertisements on posters, T-shirts, and chalk boards) that are usable (e.g., by the game or mobile communication device executing the game) in a video game that already exists on the mobile communication device. These are also examples of what Patent Owner argues are “skins” that correspond to existing ad units and that do not alter any function of the game. Patent Owner’s construction, then, would exclude the ’202 patent’s preferred embodiment. “Such an interpretation is rarely, if ever, correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary support, which is wholly absent in this” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedReference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“unpatentable 1 or more claims of a patent only on a ground that could be raised under section 102 or 103 and only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.” 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). Patent Owner argues that “[e]ach of Hays and Choi is only a ‘printed publication’ under § 311(b) as of the date it became available to the public—i.e., after the June 26, 2007, priority date of the ’202 Patent.” PO Resp. 56. Patent Owner argues that a prior art reference under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) is a printed publication under Section 311(b) only as of its publication date and not as of its filing date. Id. at 56–58. The Federal Circuit has rejected this argument, holding that a published patent application is, by its literal terms, a “printed publication.” So, when § 311(b) permits IPR challenges based upon “prior art . . . printed publications,” it includes within its literal scope challenges based upon a published patent application. And, by virtue of § 102(e)(1), a published patent application—this specific type of “printed publication”—is deemed prior art as of its filing date. Therefore, the plain language of §§ 311(b) and 102(e)(1) permits IPR challenges based upon published patent applications, and such published patent applications can be deemed prior art in IPRs as of their filing date. Lynk Labs, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 125 F.4th 1120, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 2025). Thus, Petitioner asserts permissible grounds of unpatentability under 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) by arguing that claims 1–9 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) on the basis of Hays or Hays and Choi, which are prior art printed publications.” slip op. at 16
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner and Dr. Akl misunderstand Hays. In the soft drink example, “the advertisement management service system may send bots or electronic agents into the game as advertising units or real characters in the game.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 79. Thus, the service system inserts more than a skin; it inserts a bot or agent that was not part of the game before its insertion. Because Dr. Akl’s testimony (Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 63–64, 72–73) is inconsistent with Hays’s disclosure, we do not credit it. See Homeland Housewares, LLC v. Whirlpool Corp., 865 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e must disregard the testimony of an expert that is plainly inconsistent with the record . . . .”).” slip op. at 27
Patent outcomesUS 9,731,202 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,731,202 - PTAB · Apr 1, 2025 · IPR2024-01396 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–19 under all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on obviousness; the majority declined Fintiv denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“independent claims’ features. The vast majority of Petitioner’s assertions are uncontested at this stage. Further, Petitioner’s evidence shows that Bennett discloses “a first network stack Application Programming Interface (API), containing at least one first call accessible to each of a plurality of device applications, the first network stack API callable by each of the plurality of device applications to open and use data packet flows via the network stack, the wireless modem, and the at least one wireless network,” which is the only limitation that Patent Owner disputes at this stage of the proceeding. See infra, Section III.2. For the sole feature missing from Bennett—i.e., application-based data usage monitoring—Petitioner presents clear and uncontested evidence, backed by multiple prior art references, that the technique and its benefits were well known, as outlined below. Petitioner also articulates, with clear support from its expert and the prior art, not just one but several reasons that would have motivated a skilled artisan to combine Vadde’s application-based data monitoring technique in Bennett. For these reasons, we determine that the merits of at least one ground raised in the Petition are particularly strong. Thus, this factor weighs against exercising discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“challenge Petitioner’s obviousness analysis. We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and the underlying evidence cited in support and we are persuaded that, at this stage, Petitioner sufficiently demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of succeeding in its obviousness challenges to the challenged claims.” slip op. at 15
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Skill in the Art Petitioner argues a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related field, and (2) at least two years of industry experience in wireless communication network applications and software.” Pet. 2. Further, “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 8. For this Decision, we agree with and adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the level of skill reflected in both the prior art and the ’918 patent.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“modem, network stack, and Application Programming Interfaces. Pet. 19– 29. Petitioner further relies on Bennett for its disclosure of routing network data via a first network stack application programming interface (“API”) or a second API call to a proxy media service manager that interfaces with the network stack. See id. at 29–43. Petitioner adds Vadde for teaching managing data traffic for applications using a policy-based system that enforces restrictions based on an application’s data usage. Id. at 44–57. With support from its expert Dr. Traynor and a number of prior art references, Petitioner explains that “the benefits of data usage monitoring were well-known prior to the ’918 Patent and would have been part of a POSITA’s general knowledge.” Id. at 15 (citing Exs. 1003, 1044, 1045, 1062, 1063). Petitioner articulates a number of those benefits including, for example, to facilitate identifying and restricting data-intensive applications to reduce battery usage and to facilitate greater control over data-intensive application activities that risk degrading networks high costs for users. Id. at 15–17 (citing Exs. 1003, 1041, 1042, 1046). In addition, Petitioner explains that adding per-application data usage monitoring to Bennett’s device “would have enabled device manufacturers and service providers to incorporate additional applications and functionality into wireless devices while allowing users to retain control of aggregate device data usage.” Id. at 17 (citing Exs. 1003, 1042). Petitioner adds three references, Riggs, Hendrickson and Srikantan, for their disclosures of various dependent claim features including log generators/reports, storing data associated with played media content, and a network resource indicator that identifies the media object. Pet. 58–95.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,647,918 - Samsung Electronics America, Inc. / Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Collision Communications, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Mar 21, 2025 · IPR2024-01250 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1–5, 7, 9–16, or 20 unpatentable over the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner, supported by Dr. Min’s testimony, proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had “at least a bachelor’s [degree] in [electrical engineering, computer engineering, or computer science], physics, or equivalent, and two years of experience with cellular telecommunications, radio-access network architectures, protocols and signal propagation in wireless networks.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 59). Dr. Min testifies that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 59. Additionally, Petitioner contends that Dr. Min “exceeded this level of experience by the priority date.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1010 (curriculum vitae of Dr. Min)). In its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner does not take a position on the relevant level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding and on the present record, we adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, which we find consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’946 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Neither party contends that any claim terms require an express construction to resolve the present controversy. Pet. 8 (“For purposes of this Petition only, Petitioner does not believe any terms require a formal construction.”); see generally Prelim. Resp. Nonetheless, Petitioner explains that the Petition is structured such that “Ground 1 is based on Patent Owner’s infringement contentions in the district court litigation, where the claimed ‘MUD module’ is generally mapped to multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) receivers in a wireless network.” Pet. 2. Petitioner contends that “[u]nder this broad interpretation of a ‘MUD module,’ Walton’s MIMO receiver renders every challenged claim obvious.” Id. In contrast to Ground 1, the Petition states that “Ground 2 is based on the plain meaning of ‘MUD module,’ which is a component that detects, separates, and decodes signals from multiple users transmitting simultaneously over the same frequency band.” Id. Petitioner contends that, “[a]pplying the correct meaning of the term, Walton’s MIMO receiver does not necessarily comprise a MUD module.” Id. Therefore, Petitioner explains that “Ground 2 combines Walton with Learned, which expressly discloses [a] multi-user detector, and thus renders every challenged claim obvious in combination with Walton.” Id. at 2–3.7 In other words, the Petition presents Ground 1 and Grounds 2/3 as alternatives depending on the meaning of 7 Although not specifically relevant to claim construction, Petitioner explains that “Ground 3 further combines Walton and Learned with Quigley, to the extent Patent Owner argues Walton does not disclose providing a burst control input.” Pet. 3. “MUD module,” where Ground 1 is based on Petitioner’s understanding of Patent Owner’s interpretation of the term and Grounds 2 and 3 are based on Petitioner’s interpretation of the term as having its plain meaning. Petitioner further contends that “[e]very other claim term carries its ‘ordinary and customary meaning’ . . . .” Id. at 8. Although Petitioner presents a potential dispute regarding the meaning of “MUD module,” we need not construe this term expressly because the determination we reach herein does not depend on which meaning MUD module is applied. Accordingly, we do not construe any claim terms expressly because express constructions are not necessary to resolve the controversy before us. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Not reached
“IV. DISCRETIONARY DENIAL Patent Owners contends that the factors set forth in Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 9 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential), weigh heavily in favor of discretionary denial. Prelim. Resp. 40–46; Paper 10. Petitioner disagrees. Pet. 74–77; Paper 9. In light of the conclusion reached above, we need not address the parties’ arguments regarding discretionary denial.” slip op. at 25
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,089,946 - Samsung Electronics America, Inc. / Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Collision Communications, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Mar 21, 2025 · IPR2024-01248 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1–11, 16, and 21 unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“At this stage of the proceeding and on the present record, we adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, which we find consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’071 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither party proposes a specific construction of any claim term, although Petitioner contends each term should be construed according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 16; see generally Prelim. Resp. Accordingly, we need not construe any claim terms expressly because the meaning of the terms is not in dispute and an express construction is not necessary to resolve the controversy before us.” slip op. at 13
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“We find the Petition lacking in particularity because it does not clearly identify what aspect of Jin is alleged to teach the unique signal parameters (or unique estimated signal parameters) recited in claim 1. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (“A petition filed under section 311 may be considered only if — (3) the petition identifies, in writing and with particularity, . . . the evidence that supports the ground for the challenge to each claim . . . .”). First, as reflected above, the Petition asserts that something called a “unique pilot parameter” teaches the recited unique estimated signal parameters. But “unique pilot parameter” is not a term or phrase recited in Jin. See Prelim. Resp. 19 (arguing the same). So, when Petitioner states “Jin discloses that the base station uses the unique pilot parameter (i.e., ‘unique estimated signal parameters’) to ‘identify which user (i.e., mobile terminal) has transmitted the received data,’” it is not clear what element in Jin Petitioner intends to identify by the term “unique pilot parameter.” Dr. Min’s testimony does not help resolve the ambiguity in the Petition. In particular, Dr. Min also refers to a “unique pilot parameter (i.e., ‘unique signal parameter’) for each user.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 89. But, as noted above, Jin does not disclose an element referred to as a “pilot parameter” and it is not clear what element Dr. Min intended to identify in Jin.8” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,814,071 - PTAB · Mar 20, 2025 · IPR2024-01407 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claim 26 on the Shell and Cole §103 ground, finding a reasonable likelihood that the combination renders the claim obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Based on a holistic analysis of the Fintiv factors taking into consideration “whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review” (Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6), we decline to exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Considering these disclosures together with the cited paragraphs of Petitioner’s declaration, Petitioner sufficiently shows on the present record that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that, in Shell, when a user attempts a voice call, the user can cause a current data connection to disconnect, because (1) a voice-related connection request will be made, (2) the request for voice connection will be prioritized over data requests, and (3) the request will also be prioritized if it is coming from an active application rather than an application running in the background. Pet. 47; Ex. 1003 ¶ 140; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 8, 13, 14, 57. On the preliminary record, the relied-upon portions of Shell adequately show a determination of whether an application is an active application for prioritization purposes and disconnecting a current data connection due to a user attempting to make a voice call. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 8, 13, 14, 57. The attempt to make a voice call would be a user interaction resulting in a request for a voice connection that would be prioritized over the data request of another application using the current data connection. See Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 8, 13, 14, 57. The attempt to make a voice call also involves a user interacting with an application to make it an active background. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 140. Petitioner, thus, sufficiently shows for institution that Shell’s processor is “configured to determine that the different application is an active application based on a user interaction with the different application,” as required by claim 26. Pet. 47; Ex. 1003 ¶ 140.” slip op. at 26
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“One of ordinary skill in the art, Petitioner argues, would have, thus, been motivated to look to references, such as Cole, that provided mobile devices with network access while addressing cost, power, and network selection. Pet. 13–14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 68; Ex. 1006, code (57), ¶¶ 14–15, 78, 83, 88, 98). Petitioner also argues that Cole describes Internet access control techniques based on conditions, such as power state change and load on current communication links, and that applying Cole to Shell would have “promoted more efficient communications and network access connectivity.” Id. at 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 68; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 83, 98). Using Cole’s techniques, the proposed combination, Petitioner explains, would have evaluated network and power conditions, determined whether to apply an Internet access control, evaluated further conditions, such as whether the application is running in the foreground or background, and then determined the priority of packets traveling over the selected network. Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 68; Ex. 1005 ¶ 92; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 11, 78, 83, 88, 98). Petitioner also argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would have incorporated Cole’s communication manager 260 into Shell’s connection manager modules 210 and would have incorporated Cole’s connections.” Id. at 14–15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 70; Ex. 1005 ¶ 32, Fig. 1; Ex. 1006 ¶ 31). Petitioner further argues that the proposed combination would have included the processors, non-transitory memory, and display, as taught by both references, to perform the recited operations. Id. at 15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 71–72; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 38–44, Fig. 1; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 34, 40, Fig. 2). Petitioner additionally argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in making the proposed combination because it “would have required only routine programming knowledge well within [ordinary] skill,” “would have amounted to nothing more than the use of a known technique to improve similar devices . . . in a similar way,” and would have been “combining prior art elements according to known methods to yield predictable results.” Pet. 15–16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 73, 74; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 36, 40; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 34, 35, Fig. 2).” slip op. at 21
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Petitioner’s declarant opines that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related field, and (2) at least two years of industry experience in services and application implementation in communication networks.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 15. The declarant also opines that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and vice versa.” Id. “For purposes of [its] Preliminary Response, Patent Owner does not challenge that definition.” Prelim. Resp. 5 (citing Pet. 13 n.2; Ex. 1003 ¶ 15); see also Ex. 2010 ¶ 27 (stating “[f]or purposes of . . . my analysis, I do not disagree with this proposed level of skill in the art”). Based on the” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 9,179,359 - PTAB · Mar 13, 2025 · IPR2024-01337 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–30 on all presented grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that the Jobs, Jones, and Rao combination renders at least claim 1 obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would have had “(1) at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field, and (2) at least two years of industry experience in wireless communications security.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 24. The declarant also opines that “[a]dditional advanced education could compensate for a deficiency in work experience, and vice-versa.” Id. As noted above, Patent Owner has not yet responded. Based on the record at this stage, we preliminarily adopt the level of ordinary skill provided by Petitioner’s declarant to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesTerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“several “means for” performing functions without reciting structure and, thus, those limitations should be construed under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1001, 165:20–38). Petitioner also contends that the ’110 patent describes a device with a processor, service processor 115 being implemented on the processor, and the implementation being accomplished (citing Ex. 1001, 26:43–37:2, Figs. 9–15). According to Petitioner, “[s]ince the service processor is implemented on the processor, the corresponding structure for each of the ‘means for’ elements is a processor configured to perform respective algorithm steps for the recited function corresponding to each element.” Id. at 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 52). Petitioner specifically asserts with citations to the record the functions and corresponding structures for each of the “means for” limitations. Pet. 5– 11. After reviewing Petitioner’s arguments and evidence, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed interpretations. In particular, regarding “means for obtaining, through a user interface of the wireless device, a user input specifying at least an aspect of a first service policy,” we preliminarily agree that the function is “obtaining, through a user interface of the wireless device, a user input specifying at least an aspect of a first service policy” and “the corresponding structure includes a [user interface (UI)] and a processor configured to perform the algorithm steps of providing the user with information and accepting user choices or preferences on, e.g., service plan selection or change, and/or other service related information, settings, and/or options.” Pet. 6–7 (citing Ex. 1001, 27:15–29, 28:41–48, 65:41–51, Fig. 42D; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 53–55).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“In particular, regarding “means for obtaining, through a user interface of the wireless device, a user input specifying at least an aspect of a first service policy,” we preliminarily agree that the function is “obtaining, through a user interface of the wireless device, a user input specifying at least an aspect of a first service policy” and “the corresponding structure includes a [user interface (UI)] and a processor configured to perform the algorithm steps of providing the user with information and accepting user choices or preferences on, e.g., service plan selection or change, and/or other service related information, settings, and/or options.” Pet. 6–7 (citing Ex. 1001, 27:15–29, 28:41–48, 65:41–51, Fig. 42D; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 53–55). Regarding “means for identifying that the wireless device is connected to the first wireless network,” we preliminarily agree that the function is “identifying that the wireless device is connected to the first wireless network” and “the corresponding structure includes a processor configured to perform the algorithm steps of recognizing the type of network to which the device is currently connecting, e.g., by looking up the 51:4–13; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 56–59). Regarding “means for identifying an intended, attempted, or successful data communication over the first wireless network, the intended, attempted, or successful data communication being associated with the first service activity,” we preliminarily agree that the function is “identifying an intended, attempted, or successful data communication over the first wireless network, the intended, attempted, or successful data communication being associated with the first service activity” and “the corresponding structure includes a processor configured to perform the algorithm steps of implementing traffic inspection points between the applications and the networking stack application interface using a T-buffer at socket connections and feeding the side traffic into a traffic flow analyzer.” Pet. 8–9 (citing Ex. 1001, 29:10–32, 53:51–55, 53:58–63, Fig. 16; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 60–64). Regarding “means for applying the first service policy,” we preliminarily agree that the function is “applying the first service policy” and “the corresponding structure includes a processor configured to perform the algorithm steps of performing a service control that reduces traffic speed for all applications and traffic types successively until the service usage projections are within service usage limits for the present service billing period.” Pet. 9–11 (citing Ex. 1001, 43:38–49:1, Fig. 16; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 65– 68).” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 8,588,110 - PTAB · Mar 7, 2025 · IPR2024-01176 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 1–23 on all petition grounds; the Board found a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one claim based on MPEG-1.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to all claims challenged in the Petition. Thus, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the ’148 Patent would have had a (1) Bachelor’s degree in Electrical or Computer Engineering, Computer Science, or a comparable field of study such as Physics, and (2) approximately 2-3 years of practical experience with video and/or image processing or coding. More education could substitute for experience, and vice versa. Pet. 5–6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 23–24). Patent Owner applied Petitioner’s definition in the Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 16 (Pet. 5–6). At this stage, we adopt Petitioner’s uncontested assessment of the level of skill in the art because (1) it is consistent with the ’148 patent and the asserted prior art and (2) it is supported by the testimony of Dr. Eli Saber.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“For purpose of institution, we preliminarily determine that claim 1 requires a sequence-level parameter. The claims themselves provide “substantial guidance” regarding the meaning of claim language. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Here, claim 1 recites that the level is for encoding a “sequence.” Ex. 1001, 25:56–60. Claim 1 expressly recites that “the digital video sequence compris[es] a number of frames.” Id. at 25:43–44. In this way, claim 1 defines a sequence to exclude a single picture. This reading is consistent with the specification’s focus on a sequence-level solution. According to the ’148 patent, “The present invention improves prior art solutions for indicating QP related information by introducing a sequence level QP” (SQP). Id. at 11:25–27 (emphasis added). Indeed, Petitioner acknowledges that the SQP is the purported improvement. See Pet. 5. Patent Owner agrees. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 8–9, 25–26. Claims are not normally interpreted “in a way that excludes embodiments disclosed in the specification.” Oatey Co. v. IPS Corp., 514 F.3d 1271, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008). A trial could produce additional evidence that may support a determination in the Final Written Decision that defining a picture-by-picture quantization level is somehow “for use in encoding of the digital video sequence.” But, at this stage, the parties have given us little reason to adopt such a construction. There is no dispute that H.263 signals PQUANT at the Picture layer. Pet. 51; Prelim. Resp. 25. Indeed, the basis for Petitioner’s challenge is that PQUANT defines the quantizer for a picture and is updated for GOBs or macroblocks within the picture. Pet. 53. We disagree with the interpretation used in Petitioner’s challenge: a picture-layer quantization parameter falls within the scope of the claim. Id. at 51. Rather, for the reasons discussed above, we preliminarily determine that the claims require a sequence-level parameter. And Petitioner has not sufficiently explained why PQUANT is a sequence-level parameter. Thus, we cannot conclude that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its challenge to claim 1 with respect to H.263. See id.; Prelim. Resp. 25.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,175,148 - PTAB · Mar 4, 2025 · IPR2024-01181 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–20 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been shown obvious over Rao and Scahill.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“accessible to each of the plurality of executable applications, the API callable by each of the executable applications to request an execution time according to the corresponding network access policy controls for that application.” Ex. 1001, 107:41–45. Petitioner argues that Scahill teaches that limitation and that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of Rao and Scahill with a reasonable expectation of success. Pet. 13–19, 24–27; see also Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 60–72, 81–85. After reviewing Petitioner’s arguments and evidence, which are not addressed by Patent Owner at this stage, we are persuaded that Petitioner sufficiently demonstrates, for purposes of this Decision, that Scahill teaches that limitation and that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have combined the Rao and Scahill with a reasonable expectation of success. Our specific preliminary findings are set forth below.” slip op. at 22
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have (1) held at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field, and (2) had three to five years of experience with networking, power consumption of networked computing devices, and/or wireless digital communications systems.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 24–26). Petitioner further argues that “[m]ore related education would compensate for fewer years of work experience (and vice versa).” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 24–26). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s formulation of a person having ordinary skill in the art, which is not disputed and consistent with the invention claimed in the ’700 patent.7” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner asserts “no terms need to be expressly construed.” Pet. 4. For the purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms.8 See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,749,700 - PTAB · Mar 4, 2025 · IPR2024-01180 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–16 were unpatentable, chiefly because Rao did not teach blocking network access.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the briefing and the evidence of record, we determine that the information presented in the Petition does not establish a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have (1) held at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field, and (2) had three to five years of experience with networking, power consumption of networked computing devices, and/or wireless digital communications systems.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 24–26). Petitioner further argues that “[m]ore related education would compensate for fewer years of work experience (and vice versa).” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 24–26). Patent Owner “does not challenge the Petition’s proposed definition.” Prelim. Resp. 8. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s formulation of a person having ordinary skill in the art, which is not disputed and consistent with the invention claimed in the ’076 patent.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Patent Owner argues that the term “disallow[]” should be given the same construction the parties agreed upon during the district court proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 9. For the purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“However, Petitioner does not sufficiently explain where Rao teaches “allow[ing] or disallow[ing]” as recited in claim 1. See Pet. 13–18, 25–30. To the extent Petitioner and Dr. Bims cite to Rao, they reference paragraphs 191 through 193, which discuss how Rao’s filter 322 is used to implement prioritization. See Pet. 15; Ex. 1003 ¶ 65. More specifically, those paragraphs recite using prioritization to place the network packets in different queues based on their priority. See Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 191–193. We see nothing in Rao that teaches or suggest that the network packets would be disallowed, as opposed to simply delayed, based on priority. Id. And, as Patent Owner argues, this finding is consistent with factual findings made by a different panel considering the teachings of Rao in an inter partes review of a related patent. See Prelim. Resp. 16–18 (citing Samsung Elecs. Co v. Headwater Research LLC, IPR2023-01361, Paper 8 (PTAB Mar. 29, 2024) (Decision Denying Institution)). Even if one reads the Petition as arguing that a person having ordinary skill would have modified Rao to include Araujo’s blocking—which we do not—we would not be sufficiently persuaded by that argument. Although Petitioner explains why a person having ordinary skill in the art would want to consider power usage along with whether the application is in the foreground or background, Petitioner does not explain why a person having ordinary skill in the art would have changed prioritization to blocking. See Pet. 13–18. Indeed, such a modification appears to be one that would render Rao “inoperable for its intended purpose.” In re Gordon, 733 F.2d 900, 902 (Fed. Cir. 1984).” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,198,076
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.