- Apple Inc. v. DH International Ltd.InstitutedPTAB · Jun 25, 2025 · IPR2025-00172 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 10–12, and 19 are obvious over Suga and Gorsuch.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Under § 314, the Board may not institute review on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). If the Board institutes a review, it will institute “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we conclude the Petition demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim in the ’294 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–20 of the ’294 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“II. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends: A person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention of the ’294 Patent (“POSITA”) would have had a bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or in a similar discipline with at least two years of experience with wireless communication devices and networks. More education can substitute for practical experience and vice versa. Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 34). Patent Owner states that it “agrees with Petitioner on the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 8 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 26–29).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Both parties rely on the language of claim 1 and the ’294 patent specification to support their respective constructions, and they emphasize that a user’s selective triggering of the control device does not issue different activation commands or control which data conveyance operation is used. Claim 1 recites an “invariable activation command” as a command that is “issued when said control device is selectively triggered by the user.” selectively trigger a control device “via one of a button, a keypad, a tactile screen, and a biometric parameter detector,” e.g., by entering a PIN that is authenticated, in order for an invariable activation command to be issued. Id. at 8:43–50, 10:26–29, 19:3–5. The claimed function of an invariable activation command is to “initiate[]” either a “first data conveyance operation” or a “second data conveyance operation” depending on whether “said switching element is in said first state” or “in said second state.” As explained above, the state of the switching element depends on whether or not an “activation cue” has been received by a “cue receiver.” The ’294 patent specification confirms the operation. Id. at 10:26–36, 15:14–28. The parties joust over the proper terminology for characterizing an “invariable” activation command, but they appear to agree on how the claimed cell phone and method work. The ’294 patent specification makes clear that the activation command is “invariable” in the sense that whenever a user selectively triggers the control device on the cell phone, for example by pressing a button on a keypad, the same command is issued to initiate a data conveyance operation regardless of the “state” of the “switching element” (i.e., in a “first state” or “second state”). The user cannot select or issue different activation commands. The selection of which of the two possible data conveyance operations will be initiated by selectively triggering the control device depends not on the activation command—it is always the same—but on whether the switching element has received an activation cue (“first state”) or not (“second state”). The ’294 patent neatly summarizes that “[t]he same invariable activation command will thus be issued upon [the] control device being triggered, and it is the state of [the]” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The ’294 patent claims and specification make clear that the switching element switches between a “first state” and a “second state” depending on whether or not an activation cue is received. Ex. 1001, 9:28–41, 14:53–59. The state of the switch, in turn, “allow[s] data to be conveyed according to alternate data conveyance operations.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the claim limitation is recited as a “data conveyance switching element,” not a “data switch,” because the switching element allows the device to switch between alternate operations for conveying data from the cellular phone to an external data exchange device. Id. Patent Owner’s proposed construction “conflicts with the express disclosure of the ’294 Patent.” See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (The “specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’”) (citation omitted). On the present record, we determine that no further construction of claim terms is necessary to determine whether to institute a trial in this case. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. &” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,022,294 - Apple Inc. v. DH International Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · Jun 25, 2025 · IPR2025-00173 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Institution
Institution was denied for claims 1–13 because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Under § 314, the Board may not institute review on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 371 (2018). If the Board institutes a review, it will institute “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we conclude the Petition does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim in the ’333 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of claims 1–13 of the ’333 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “These factors are not exhaustive but are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). There is uncontested evidence in the record before us that reflects the knowledge and experience of a POSITA. We adopt the parties’ agreed level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the description in the ’333 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 10
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“element” (limitation [1(e)]) onto a McGregor “device” placed in an RF field generated by Palmer’s reader/writer device. Pet. 28–31 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 95–105), 41–42 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 125–127). The Petition is unclear as to which McGregor device is being referenced, e.g., the smart card of Figure 2, the wallet embodiment of Figure 4, or some combination of embodiments disclosed in McGregor and Palmer. Id. Regardless, the proposed modification of McGregor in view of Palmer, as we understand it, is based on conclusory reasoning and appears to be motivated by hindsight rather than the teachings of the applied references. Prelim. Resp. 38–40 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 97–102). 7 Ground 2 challenges independent claim 11 for asserted obviousness over McGregor, Palmer, and Tuttle. The Petition’s reliance on Tuttle for its teaching of distinct data transmitter, data receiver, and cue receiver ports does not alter our analysis for claim 11. Pet. 55–62. POSITA would have understood that a series of instructions would be programmed into McGregor’s microprocessor to function as a switching element (pursuant to Palmer’s teachings), and as described.in the ’333 Patent. See Claim [1(b)]; see ’333 Patent, 6:9-14. Accordingly, McGregor’s microprocessor is a switching element (1) that is placed into an activated state after receiving a handshake signal (an activation cue) that establishes a communication during the handshake process and (2) that remains in an inactivated state if no reader/writer device is detected (no activation cue). Ex. 1003 ¶ 127 (emphases added). Dr. Buehrer’s citation to the ’333 patent, without explaining his mapping of limitation [1(e)] onto McGregor-Palmer beyond a general reference to 10-plus pages of limitation [1(b)] “control device” analysis, suggests hindsight reasoning. Id; see also Pet. 42 (generally referring to limitation [1(b)]). The Petition’s analysis, moreover, does not address why or how McGregor’s microprocessor would “accordingly” act as a data conveyance switching element or why a POSITA would want to program McGregor’s microprocessor to execute such a switching function in view of Palmer. We find the Petition and Dr. Buehrer’s testimony lacking in articulated reasoning supported by rational underpinnings sufficient to support the conclusion that limitation [1(e)] reads on the proposed McGregor-Palmer combination. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (“there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”).” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“element” (limitation [1(e)]) onto a McGregor “device” placed in an RF field generated by Palmer’s reader/writer device. Pet. 28–31 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 95–105), 41–42 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 125–127). The Petition is unclear as to which McGregor device is being referenced, e.g., the smart card of Figure 2, the wallet embodiment of Figure 4, or some combination of embodiments disclosed in McGregor and Palmer. Id. Regardless, the proposed modification of McGregor in view of Palmer, as we understand it, is based on conclusory reasoning and appears to be motivated by hindsight rather than the teachings of the applied references. Prelim. Resp. 38–40 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 97–102). 7 Ground 2 challenges independent claim 11 for asserted obviousness over McGregor, Palmer, and Tuttle. The Petition’s reliance on Tuttle for its teaching of distinct data transmitter, data receiver, and cue receiver ports does not alter our analysis for claim 11. Pet. 55–62. POSITA would have understood that a series of instructions would be programmed into McGregor’s microprocessor to function as a switching element (pursuant to Palmer’s teachings), and as described.in the ’333 Patent. See Claim [1(b)]; see ’333 Patent, 6:9-14. Accordingly, McGregor’s microprocessor is a switching element (1) that is placed into an activated state after receiving a handshake signal (an activation cue) that establishes a communication during the handshake process and (2) that remains in an inactivated state if no reader/writer device is detected (no activation cue). Ex. 1003 ¶ 127 (emphases added). Dr. Buehrer’s citation to the ’333 patent, without explaining his mapping of limitation [1(e)] onto McGregor-Palmer beyond a general reference to 10-plus pages of limitation [1(b)] “control device” analysis, suggests hindsight reasoning. Id; see also Pet. 42 (generally referring to limitation [1(b)]). The Petition’s analysis, moreover, does not address why or how McGregor’s microprocessor would “accordingly” act as a data conveyance switching element or why a POSITA would want to program McGregor’s microprocessor to execute such a switching function in view of Palmer. We find the Petition and Dr. Buehrer’s testimony lacking in articulated reasoning supported by rational underpinnings sufficient to support the conclusion that limitation [1(e)] reads on the proposed McGregor-Palmer combination. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (“there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”). The Petition does assert an obviousness theory within the analysis of the “control device” limitation [1(b)]. Pet. 25–35 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 85– 109). The Petition asserts that a “POSITA would have been motivated to implement McGregor’s device pursuant to Palmer such that the security code would be automatically transmitted when the device detects the receive the security code.” Pet. 28; see also id. at 31 (“A POSITA would have been motivated to implement Palmer’s (1) RF field detection and handshake processes and (2) Palmer’s transceiver hardware in McGregor’s device.”) (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 95–105). We find the Petition’s obviousness theory to be inherently inconsistent and non-specific with regard to the “data conveyance switching element” recited in limitation [1(e)].” slip op. at 16
§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,628,333 - PTAB · Jun 13, 2025 · IPR2025-00351 · APJ Beth Z Shaw · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–26 on all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“A district court stay of the litigation pending resolution of the PTAB trial allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts.” Fintiv Order 6. That is the case here. Thus, the first Fintiv factor strongly weighs against exercising the authority to deny institution. Id. Under the second Fintiv factor, the proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision weighs against exercising our authority to deny institution because there is no trial date scheduled. Id. at 9; see Ex. 1031, 3. slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The Board, however, has discretion to deny a petition even when a petitioner meets that threshold. Id.; see, e.g., Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016) (“[T]he agency’s decision to deny a petition is a matter committed to the Patent Office’s discretion.”). For the reasons that follow, we grant institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelOther
“have a bachelor’s or equivalent degree in computer science or a related field and at least 2 years of experience in multimedia processing or delivery using internet protocols.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 67–68). Petitioner further states that “a person with less formal education but more experience, or more formal education but less experience, could have also met the relevant standard for a POSITA.” Id. Patent Owner submits a similar definition (see Prelim. Resp. 13–14), but states that a POSITA “would understand that . . . the subject of the patent is a software-based solution to broadcasting multimedia streams, and the skillset and expertise in hardware-based systems would not make one knowledgeable about software-based systems.” Prelim. Resp. 13–14. We determine that no express finding is necessary, on the present record, and that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). The difference in how each party characterizes a POSITA’s work experience does not change our analysis or conclusions based on the present record. Should Patent Owner dispute Petitioner’s definition during trial, we encourage Patent Owner to explain how a software-focused definition would affect any obviousness analysis in our final written decision.” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“Claim 1 does not limit the “caching unit” in any way. With this in mind, we preliminarily agree that Farber discloses the subject matter of limitation 1a sufficiently to meet Petitioner’s burden on institution. b.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,140,441 - PTAB · Jun 13, 2025 · IPR2025-00350 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–13 for all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“After Patent Owner made these arguments, though, the district court in the Florida Litigation (1) stayed all deadlines indefinitely and (2) said that the October trial will not go forward as scheduled. Ex. 1028, 3. “A district court stay of the litigation pending resolution of the PTAB trial allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts.” Fintiv Order 6. That is the case here. Thus, the first Fintiv factor strongly weighs against exercising the authority to deny institution. Id.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Conclusion At this stage and on this record, it is reasonably likely that Petitioner would prevail in showing that claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Avellan. The Petition’s merits are compelling because Petitioner’s challenge plainly leads to a conclusion that claim 1 is unpatentable.” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelOther
“B. Merits 1. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art According to the Petition, Here, a Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art (“POSITA”) at the time of the claimed invention would have a bachelor’s or equivalent degree in computer science or a related field and at least 2 years of experience in multimedia processing or delivery using internet protocols. . . . A person with less formal education but more experience, or more formal education but less experience, could also meet the standard. Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 68–69). Patent Owner provides a different definition: A person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the inventions in the ‘002 Patent would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a related field, and at least two years of experience working in the field of software systems used in generating and broadcasting multimedia streams. An individual with less technical education but more experience, or vice versa, could also qualify as a person of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 2006 ¶ 59) (emphasis added). Patent Owner argues that the definition must include experience in software systems because the invention is a software-based solution. Id. at 12–13 (citing Ex. 2006 ¶ 60). At this stage, our decision would be the same under either definition. Should Patent Owner dispute Petitioner’s definition during trial, we encourage Patent Owner to explain how a software-focused definition would affect any obviousness analysis in our final written decision.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“There is no dispute that (1) Avellan’s user initiates the request and eventually receives the stream and (2) gateway server 134 receives a request for a media stream for playback on a broadcast channel. See id. at 32–39; Pet. 22. The issue here is whether claim 1 requires that the recited “content provider” originates the request. We agree with Petitioner that claim 1 does not require this. Prelim. Reply 7. Apart from being received from the content provider, claim 1 does not limit the request’s origin in any way. Rather, claim 1 only requires that the request is received from the content provider. Ex. 1001, 14:51–54. Claim 1 recites “comprising” in the preamble of the method (id. at 14:50), which is a encompasses user-originated requests that are received from other entities. With this understanding of the claim, we preliminarily agree with Petitioner that Avellan discloses limitation 1a through its communication path from network 150 to user computers 1041–104n via gateway platforms 1301–130n. Pet. 22. That is, Avellan’s gateway platform 134 receives a request for at least one media stream, and claim 1 does not exclude user-originated requests. See id. We agree that the content can be video from CNN, BBC, ESPN, or other live-streaming television feeds. Id. at 24 (citing Ex. 1003, 8:18–21). Thus, at this stage and on this record, we agree with Petitioner that Avellan discloses limitation 1a. See id. at 22. ii. Remaining Limitations Apart from the arguments discussed above, Patent Owner does not present arguments specifically directed to the other limitations of claim 1. See Prelim. Resp. We determine that Petitioner’s arguments made in connection with those limitations are sufficient at this stage and on this record. Pet. 24–32. We agree with Petitioner that Avellan teaches obtaining content from the networks 150 and 152, as recited in 1b; rendering a webpage by a browser at gateway 134, as recited in 1c; generating the screen captures at gateway 134, as recited in 1d; and assembling and providing the media stream when gateway server 134 compresses the image or video format and sends it to the browser 106, as recited in 1e and 1f. Id. at 24–29. Petitioner has provided a sufficient rationale at this stage why a method with the subject matter recited in lg and 1h would have been obvious. Id. at 29– 32. Conclusion At this stage and on this record, it is reasonably likely that Petitioner would prevail in showing that claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Avellan. The Petition’s merits are compelling because Petitioner’s challenge plainly leads to a conclusion that claim 1 is unpatentable.” slip op. at 12
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,524,002 - PTAB · May 21, 2025 · IPR2025-00038 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–7, 10–13, 16, 17, 19, and 20 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“§ 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons provided below, we determine, based on the record before us, there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioner would prevail in showing at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“We do not adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction. The disputed claim language merely requires that the display on the first or second screen is different in each image capture mode. Consistent with the claim language, the ’842 Patent discloses numerous examples of image capture modes in which a display on the first or second screen is different. See e.g., Ex. 1001, Figs. 12, 14A–14B, 15A–B, 16A–B, 20. Patent Owner’s construction is narrower than the claim language and incorrectly adds a requirement for a different display on the first screen between image capture modes or a different display on the second screen between image capture modes. See also Prelim. Resp. 16–17 (arguing that the claim requires the same screen to present different displays in different image capture modes). Patent Owner’s citations to the ’842 Patent are directed to an embodiment disclosing a preview image 1108 on first display 1200 that is in the portrait orientation in Figure 12 that, upon rotation of device 100, changes to preview image 1108 in landscape orientation 2004. See Ex. 1001, 35:65–36:2, 36:32–37:6; Figs. 12, 20, 21. Although claims are interpreted in light of the specification, it is improper to read an extraneous limitation into a claim from the specification. See e.g., Commark Comm’s Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.2d 1182, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1998); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.3d 1430, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1988). An extraneous limitation is “a limitation read into a claim from the specification wholly apart from any need to interpret what the patentee meant by particular words or phrases in the claim.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 849 F.2d at 1433. As demonstrated in the analysis below, at this stage of the proceeding, we need not explicitly construe “screen,” display,” “wherein in each image capture mode a display on the first or second screen is different,” or any other claim term or phrase. See, e.g., Realtime, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“found either expressly or inherently in a single prior art reference.’” King Pharm., Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Celeritas Techs. Ltd. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). “Anticipation requires the presence in a single prior art disclosure of all elements of a claimed invention arranged as in the claim.” Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Because Chin specifies that the preview is shown on one screen or the other, and not on both screens in both modes, it is at least suggested and would have been obvious to a POSITA that the display on each of the screens changes between modes. Indeed, a POSITA would have understood that the screen not described as showing the preview would either be on or off. . . . And a POSITA would have been motivated to turn off (disable) that other screen, as the screen would not be facing the user and doing so would save power and avoid inadvertent inputs on the other touch screen during the image capture process. . . . Turning off power to one screen in a multi-screen device was a known design option and well within the ability of a POSITA. Pet. 55 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 257, 258).” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,836,842 - PTAB · May 21, 2025 · IPR2025-00039 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–6, 11–14, and 16 over Aono under § 103, despite finding the showing for claims 11–14 and 16 insufficient.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“At this stage of the proceeding, we determine Petitioner shows sufficiently for the purpose of institution that the preamble and foregoing limitations of claim 1 are satisfied by the teachings of Aono. For the purpose of institution and based on the record before us, Petitioner establishes sufficiently that the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious over Aono. Accordingly, there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioner would prevail in showing that claim 1 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103.” slip op. at 22
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Petitioner asserts that Aono discloses, suggests, or would have rendered obvious “presenting a first display for the image capture function based on a physical device state, a display mode and a device orientation” based on Aono’s disclosure of determining whether device 1 is closed, fully opened or partially opened (in steps S140, S160), whether device 1 is configured to display an image on one screen, more than one screen, or enlarged across one or more screens (steps S142, S145, S146, S149, S150, S161, S164, S165, S168, S169), and whether the device is in portrait or landscape orientation. See Pet. 27–40 (reproducing Ex. 1004, Fig. 1 (with Petitioner’s annotations added), Fig. 2 (with Petitioner’s annotations added), Fig. 60 (with Petitioner’s annotations added), Fig. 61 (with Petitioner annotations added), Figs. 26, 27, 37, 41; citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 73–106; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 40, 143–145, 148–154, 203, 208, 225–227, 231–235, 272–288, 385– 417).4 Petitioner contends that Aono discloses, suggests, or would have rendered obvious “the physical device state at least including open, closed[,] easel[,] or modified easel,5 the display mode at least including portrait single, portrait dual, landscape single, landscape dual, portrait max[,] or landscape max,” based on Aono’s disclosure of digital assistant 1 that can be in a terminal opened state 4 Petitioner also asserts “[t]o the extent that it is deemed that the disclosures discussed with respect to this limitation relate to different embodiments of Aono, although such an interpretation would be wrong, a POSITA nonetheless at minimum would have found it obvious to combine different disclosures of Aono in the manner described above. Pet. 39; see Pet. 39–40. 5 Petitioner also asserts “[t]o the extent [Patent Owner] contends, incorrectly, that Aono does not disclose any one or more of the listed “physical device states,” at minimum Aono suggests and would have rendered obvious to a POSITA a device that can be configured in these states.” Pet. 45; see Pet. 45–46.” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“construction standard as that applied in federal courts in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), which is generally referred to as the Phillips standard. See 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103 effective March 16, 2013. Because the ’589 Patent has a filing date prior to the effective date of the applicable AIA amendment, we refer to the pre-AIA version of § 103. 2 US 2012/0139815 A1, published June 7, 2012, filed July 12, 2011 (Ex. 1004). 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Under the Phillips standard, “words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. Petitioner points out the express definitions for the terms “screen” and “display” set forth in the ’589 Patent. See Pet. 16–17 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:64–65, 3:29–30; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 38–43). As demonstrated in the analysis below, at this stage of the proceeding, we need not explicitly construe “screen,” display,” or any other claim term or phrase. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019).” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that [a] person of ordinary skill in the art . . . (‘POSITA’) would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field plus at least two years of work or post-graduate experience in image capture, image processing, image display, user interfaces, or a related field. Pet. 16. Petitioner also offers that “[a]dditional education could offset a lesser amount of experience and vice versa.” Id. For the purpose of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’589 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,146,589 - PTAB · May 21, 2025 · IPR2025-00061 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–5, 9, 10, 16, 17, and 20 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable over Purcell and Nicholas.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–5, 9, 10, 16, 17, and 20 of the ’007 patent on all presented challenges. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2024) (“When instituting . . . review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”); see also SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science or a related field along with two years of work experience in the field of user interface technologies, including e.g., graphical user interface technologies, or a related field” and that “[m]ore education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 20, 21). As noted above, Patent Owner has not yet responded. Based on the preliminary record, we adopt Petitioner’s asserted level of ordinary skill to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that in the Petition.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“At this stage, we do not need to adopt a particular interpretation of “[first or second] configurable area” to determine whether to institute review. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Also, at this stage, we do not need to interpret expressly any other claim term. Id. For our analysis below, we apply Petitioner’s interpretations of “first configurable area” and “second configurable area” based on Patent Owner’s infringement contentions. Pet. 12–13; Ex. 1007, 1–33. The parties, however, are encouraged to explore further Petitioner’s proposed interpretations in their subsequent briefs.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“In Petitioner’s view, one of ordinary skill in the art would have known how to implement Nicholas in Purcell and the advantages of doing so would have been readily apparent, thereby motivating the modification. Pet. 22–23 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 95; Ex. 1010 ¶ 10). Petitioner contends there would have been a reasonable expectation of success in making the proposed modification because of the known use of Microsoft Windows OS and the “modification would have been a predictable application of known Ex. 1002 ¶ 96; Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 13, 17). Petitioner notes that the proposed combination discloses, suggests, or would have rendered obvious “wherein the first image is in focus, wherein input options for the first application are displayed in a first configurable area, wherein input is allowed from the first configurable area and the first display,” consistent with Patent Owner’s interpretation from its infringement contentions. Id. at 24–25 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 99). b) Petitioner Shows a Reasonable Likelihood of Prevailing Based on the present record, Petitioner sufficiently shows that the combination of Purcell and Nicholas teaches, suggests, or would have been understood to disclose the limitations of claim 1 and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined these references in the manner asserted with a reasonable expectation of success. Petitioner, thus, shows a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its challenge to claim 1 as unpatentable over Purcell and Nicholas.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 9,792,007 - PTAB · May 21, 2025 · IPR2025-00059 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–3, 5–9, 15, 16, 19, and 20 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the present record and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science or a related field along with two years of work experience in the field of user interface technologies, including e.g., graphical user interface technologies, or a related field” and that “[m]ore education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Pet. 5–6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 20, 21, 22–34). “Patent Owner applies [Petitioner’s] definition of a [person of ordinary skill in the art] for the purposes of [its] preliminary response but expressly reserves the right to urge a different definition . . . and support such definition with evidence including expert testimony.” Prelim. Resp. 9 (citing Pet. 5–6). Based on the preliminary record, we adopt Petitioner’s as yet undisputed level of ordinary skill to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“displays information selectively” has a meaning broader than Patent Owner’s proposal. In particular, claim 3 depends from claim 1 and recites: wherein modifying the display of the annunciator window further includes: displaying the changed state across a portion of the annunciator window; and masking at least one icon representing the device status, connectivity status, or messaging status, wherein the first display is on a first screen of the multi-display device, and wherein the second display is on a different second screen of the multi-display device. Ex. 1001, 30:1–9 (emphasis added). Dependent claim 8 and unchallenged dependent claim 12 recite similar limitations. Id. at 30:56–64, 32:8–14. The limitation “masking at least one icon representing the device status, connectivity status, or messaging status” of these dependent claims indicates that “displays information selectively” recited by the independent claims has a meaning broader than Patent Owner’s proposal of “display[ing] information in a way that involves intentionally choosing some information to display and not others.” Prelim. Resp. 7. At this stage, on the preliminary record, we determine that, in view of the language of dependent claims 3, 8, and 12, the phrase “wherein the modified display of the annunciator window displays information selectively across the annunciator window” of the independent claims has a meaning broader than Patent Owner’s proposed interpretation. Prelim. Resp. 7–8. slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Also, on the present record, Petitioner argues sufficiently that Yook’s status bar on screen 140 displays information showing device status and connectivity status. Pet. 33. Furthermore, on the present record, Petitioner sufficiently argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to implement and pre-configure Yook’s status bar to display dynamically the device status and connectivity status, so that Yook discloses or suggests “wherein the modified display of the annunciator window displays information selectively across the annunciator window.” Id. at 33–36, 38–39. In other words, as we understand the argument, Petitioner associates dynamically updating a status via a status icon with “display[ing] information selectively.” See id. at 38–39; Ex. 1002 ¶ 67. Moreover, even if we adopted Patent Owner’s proposed interpretation for “displays information selectively,” Petitioner’s arguments for dependent claim 3 include contentions that Yook modified by Bauer would have “mask[ed] at least one icon representing the device status, connectivity status, or messaging status.” Pet. 53–55 (citing Ex. 1001, 26:45–50; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 82, 83; Ex. 1007, 6:14–29, 6:33–42 (describing that “the interactive indicator (e.g., the icon 204 and the corresponding preview) are superimposed over the static indicators” and that “[o]nce the preview intensity of the static indicators may be restored”), 6:47–61, 7:22–27, Fig. 2A). At this preliminary stage, based on the arguments presented for dependent claim 3, Petitioner sufficiently shows that Yook and Bauer would have rendered obvious an annunciator window that “displays information selectively across the annunciator window,” as recited by claim 1, under an interpretation of that limitation meaning “displays information in a way that involves intentionally choosing some information to display and not others,” as proposed by Patent Owner. For the reasons above, Petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its challenge to claim 1 as unpatentable over Yook.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 9,141,135 - Google LLC v. Metarail, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Apr 24, 2025 · IPR2024-01271 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–21 were unpatentable over either asserted obviousness ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and any response thereto shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Considering the arguments presented and the evidence of record, we conclude that there is not a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in challenging at least one of claims 1–21 of the ’342 patent as unpatentable under the grounds presented in the Petition. Pursuant to § 314, we hereby do not institute an inter partes review as to these claims of the ’342 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“(3) Discussion We observe first that “[Halevy’s] first step in processing a web source is to locate the forms in the source and to extract the text corresponding to the fields in the form.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 53. According to Halevy, the “web source is subsequently classified into the ontology classes.” Id. ¶ 55. Then, the “forms on the page are classified into the classes in the ontology.” Id. ¶ 57 (emphasis added). Halevy explains that this classification is used to predict what kinds of objects are in the databases queried by the form. Id. For “Schema Matching,” Halevy discloses “a mapping between the fields in the form and the SO-properties of the SO-classes[.]” Id. ¶¶ 61–62. Missing, however, from Halevy’s disclosure is any teaching or suggestion that fields are mapped “to one another using normalized variables stored in a normalized variable data database” as required by claim 1.” slip op. at 21
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Petitioner contends that a POSITA “would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a related field, and at least two years of experience with web programming and search engine systems[; m]ore education could substitute for experience, and vice versa.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 32). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposal. Prelim. Resp. 9 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 35–36) (“Patent Owner and its expert apply this definition.”). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner present claim construction in the Petition or Preliminary Response. Pet. 9; see generally Prelim. Resp. Nonetheless, Petitioner contends that Patent Owner’s construction of “universal variable map” is too narrow, but does not appear to offer an alternative construction other than to state that a “universal variable map” includes “a database that links variables from different websites to each other.” See Reply 1-2 (emphasis omitted) (“PO’s arguments for why Halevy’s ‘form database’ is not a universal variable map are all premised on improperly narrowing the term’s scope by adding restrictions that are unsupported by the intrinsic record.”). In the Sur-Reply, Patent Owner reiterates that it has not proposed a construction for “universal variable map.” Sur-Reply 1 (“Patent Owner did not present any claim construction arguments regarding that term, nor does that term’s construction have any bearing on the arguments set forth in the POPR for denying the Petition.”). Based on our review of the preliminary record, we do not need to construe any terms expressly to reach our decision. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,262,342 - Google LLC v. Metarail, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Apr 24, 2025 · IPR2024-01272 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Google did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–20 were unpatentable under any asserted obviousness ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“In an inter partes review, the burden of persuasion is on the petitioner to prove ‘unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence,’ 35 U.S.C. § 316(e), and that burden never shifts to the patentee.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015)); see also Aqua Products, Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2017 (en banc (quoting Magnum Oil)). A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)). Obviousness is resolved based on underlying factual determinations, including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness, i.e., secondary considerations. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17– 18 (1966). A party who petitions the Board for a determination of obviousness must show that “a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention, and that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.” Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “These factors are not exhaustive but are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). There is uncontested evidence in the record before us that reflects the knowledge and experience of a POSITA. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the level of ordinary skill in the art described in the Petition and applied in the Preliminary Response, which is consistent with the description in the ’626 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“While [Dr. Fox] asserts that Oldham’s external engine is the required “networked data source,” he does not identify any teaching in Oldham that there are any “field identifiers” in Oldham’s external engine. Dr. Fox then goes on to argue that “POSAs would have recognized that the SO-properties mapped to the keywords are determined ‘field identifiers of the networked data source stored in the universal variable data database’ based on the dynamic data because the SO-properties for each class are defined by the form engine and mapped to corresponding fields from various forms stored in the form database.” EX1003, ¶ 102. First, Halevy’s SO-properties obviously cannot be “field identifiers” of Oldham’s external engine, because Halevy’s SO-properties do not come from Oldham’s external engine. Rather, they are generated in Halevy’s system as part of the “database schema” of Halevy’s form database. See EX1006, [0038] (“In one embodiment of the present invention, the database describes web sources in terms of an ontology of classes and properties, which is referred to as the ‘search ontology’ (SO).”). In addition, Halevy’s SO-properties are not “field identifiers” at all. Rather, the SO-properties are simply search filters that assist Halevy’s search engine in determining a form’s degree of relevancy to the user’s keyword search query. See EX1006, [0137] (“[T]he system performs a lookup based on the structured query in the form database to identify forms of interest (step 608) and ranks these forms (step 610).”). Also I note that Dr. Fox argues elsewhere in his declaration that SO-properties are “normalized variables,” which even he recognizes are different from “field identifiers.” See, e.g., EX1003, ¶ 101 (“Halevy’s form engine determines field identifiers . . . by mapping keywords in the query to SO-properties (i.e., normalized variables) . . . .”). As described in the ’734 patent, “normalized variables” are used to create associations between field identifiers of different forms, but they are not themselves “field identifiers.” See EX1001, 15:65-16:3 (“In this way, once a site’s category is defined, the variable mapping exercise can be simplified to match which variables or identifiers match up with which normalized variable . . . .”). Thus, Dr. Fox fails to show any teaching or suggestion in the combination of Oldham and Halevy of the claim limitation “determining . . . field identifiers of the networked data source stored in the universal variable data database.” Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 59, 61–64 (underlining added). We adopt Dr. Malek’s testimony and reasoning above as our own.” slip op. at 25
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentable
“b. Halevy’s schema-mapping search engine Although Halevy’s schema-mapping system uses a common set of SO-properties for the form fields in each SO-class, there is no disclosure, teaching, or suggestion in Halevy to use schema-mapping for “mapping,” linking, or integrating the field identifiers (parameter names) of different forms on different websites to one another to generate deep-links. We find the Petition’s reasoning and the cited testimony of Dr. Fox on this crucial point to be conclusory. We also find the Preliminary Response to be persuasive, Dr. Malek’s testimony (Ex. 2001) to be credible, and the reasoning of both consistent with the disclosures in Halevy.” slip op. at 30
§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,152,734
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.