• Arashi Vision (U.S.) LLC (D/B/A Insta360) v. Gopro, IncNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 25, 2025 · IPR2024-01164 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–21 were not shown unpatentable because Shi does not disclose the claimed low-light high-pass parameter required by the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Given the teachings of the specification, we agree with Patent Owner that a low-light high-pass parameter is a parameter of a smoothing function that favors high frequencies (high pass) when exposure times are long (low light). See Tr. 42:10–18 (Patent Owner’s counsel stating that “high-pass” means “there’s a bias or preference for high frequencies”); Ex. 2020, 93:23– 94:15 (Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Katsaggelos, agreeing that a high-pass system attenuates the low frequency of a signal). Although we acknowledge Petitioner’s position that the specification provides other ways or considerations in implementing a smoothing function, based on our above analysis of the specification, we find that the specification describes the lowlight high-pass parameter as a specific component of a smoothing function. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 21:17–25 (setting out several parameters besides the low-light high-pass parameter used in trajectory smoothing).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “position and a real device position. Id. at 18:27–40. In other words, the blur is addressed by analyzing the image to identify motion and then shifting the image. Shi, however, does not disclose how its parameter is based on low light (or the long exposure times indicative of low light). In its Petition, Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that “blurs can be caused by low light conditions.” Pet. 28 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 111). Although this is true, that does not mean that Shi’s blurs are identified by a parameter that considers low light. As we just described, Shi identifies the blur by quantifying the amount of motion of the points in an image, not by identifying low light. This is simply a different way to determine the presence of motion blur. In Shi, blur is measured, whereas in the ’840 patent, it is inferred based on low-light conditions (e.g., by observing the exposure time). See, e.g., Ex. 1007, 18:7– 26; Ex. 1001, 19:12–26. In its Reply, Petitioner does not point to any further disclosures. Accordingly, we find that Shi does not disclose the “low-light” aspect of the claimed low-light high-pass parameter. This is sufficient to determine that Petitioner’s ground does not meet all claim limitations. Similarly, we find that Shi does not disclose the “high-pass” aspect of the parameter. Shi’s blur compensation uses a spherical interpolation to modify the image. Ex. 1007, 18:27–40. The low-light high-pass parameter, as we have construed the term, allows more high frequencies. To allow more high frequencies, this necessarily means either allowing fewer low frequencies, or allowing more high frequences as opposed to some counterfactual situation in which fewer high frequencies were going to be allowed. See Ex. 2020, 94:23–95:15; Ex. 2022. We are directed to no persuasive evidence from Petitioner that Shi’s spherical interpolation favors high frequencies over low frequencies. Accord Ex. 2018 ¶ 107 (Patent Owner’s expert stating that Shi’s spherical interpolation “reintroduce[es] both high- and low-frequency motion”). Even if Shi allows the viewing window to track the camera position “consistent with the natural blur in the image” (Ex. 1007, 17:63–67), we are not provided with sufficient evidence to conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that providing a similar visual goal as a high-pass parameter (Ex. 1001, 22:16–18, “the output motion may include high frequencies that mask motion blur”) is the same as having a high-pass parameter. Again, merely preserving high frequencies is not the same as having a “high-pass parameter” because, as construed, a “high-pass parameter” also involves some degree of attenuation of low frequencies or relative increase of high frequencies. Accordingly, we find that Shi does not disclose the “high-pass” aspect of the claimed low-light high-pass parameter.” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 10,958,840 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,958,840
• Giesecke+devrient GmbH / Giesecke+devrient Currecy Technology GmbH et al. v. Lumenco, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 21, 2025 · IPR2024-00839 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 5, 6, and 12–20 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 3, 4, and 7–11 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish random mirror selection.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSITA because Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the types of problems encountered in the art, the prior art solutions to those problems, and the sophistication of the technology. For example, the ʼ863 patent provides, as relevant background, a discussion of anti-counterfeiting devices made up of arrays of lenses used to display unique images, placed on currency and labels for retail products. Ex. 1001, 1:31–43. The ʼ863 patent also discusses using lenses to create holograms. Id. at 2:7–20. Similarly, the prior art in this field, such as Fuhse847, relates to the use of lenses and mirrors to create hologram images for security purposes. Ex. 1022, 1–8. These descriptions demonstrate, consistent with Petitioner’s proposed definition, that a POSITA would need an educational background to understand optics, lenses, and mirrors along with professional experience with optical security features to understand the creation holograms and images using lenses and mirrors for the purpose of preventing counterfeiting of currency and other valuable products. Patent Owner’s proposed definition differs from Petitioner’s in that it includes “or a similar field” when describing the education level of a POSITA and it includes “with diffusive light” when describing the experience level of a POSITA. As to the first difference, the addition of “similar field” introduces vagueness and unnecessary uncertainty into the definition. Patent Owner does not explain what aspects of computer science would make it a field similar to the others listed, or what additional engineering coursework would suffice to make a person a POSITA. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 25. Nor does Patent Owner explain, generally, what makes a field “similar” to the ones listed or how to make that determination. As to the second difference, the addition of “with diffusive light”” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner did not move to exclude Dr. Hesselink’s testimony. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.62; Pet. Reply 25 (arguing that Patent Owner waived its ability to challenge Dr. Hesselink’s qualification.). At the hearing, Patent Owner explained that its argument that Dr. Hesselink is not a POSITA “goes to [the] weight” of Dr. Hesselink’s testimony. Tr. 37:8. In any event, Patent Owner’s argument is based on its proposed definition of a POSITA, which we do not adopt. We, therefore, are not persuaded that Dr. Hesselink testimony should be given little or no weight.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner contends that “no claim terms require express construction.” Pet. 11. Patent Owner agrees “that the terms do not require construction for purposes of evaluating the Petition.” PO Resp. 13. We do not need to construe any terms explicitly to reach our decision on institution. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (approving Board decision not to construe claim language where construction is not material to the dispute).” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “teaches the preamble and all of the limitations of claim 1. Pet. 12–34. Petitioner contends that it would have been obvious to a POSITA to automate the computations for designing micro mirror arrays in Fuhse847 with Rich’s teaching of a processor running software. Id. at 14–17. Patent Owner does not specifically dispute Petitioner’s contentions regarding the preamble, limitations 1b–1e, and the motivation to combine Fuhse847 and Rich. See generally PO Resp. We have reviewed Petitioner’s contentions and supporting evidence and are persuaded that the combination of Fuhse847 and Rich teaches the preamble and undisputed limitations 1b–1e, and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Fuhse847 and Rich in the manner set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 11,448,863 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,448,863
• Giesecke+devrient GmbH / Giesecke+devrient Currecy Technology GmbH et al. v. Lumenco, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 19, 2025 · IPR2024-00838 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–12 are unpatentable: claims 1 and 6 over Fuhse262, and the dependent claims over the additional asserted combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSITA because Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the types of problems encountered in the art, the prior art solutions to those problems, and the sophistication of the technology. For example, the ʼ191 patent provides, as relevant background, a discussion of anti-counterfeiting devices made up of arrays of lenses used to display unique images, placed on currency and labels for retail products. Ex. 1001, 1:27–42. The ʼ191 patent also discusses using lenses to create holograms. Id. at 2:6–21. Similarly, the prior art in this field, such as Fuhse262, relates to the use of lenses and mirrors to create hologram images for security purposes. Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 1–7. These descriptions demonstrate, consistent with Petitioner’s proposed definition, that a POSITA would need an educational background to understand optics, lenses, and mirrors along with professional experience with optical security features to understand the creation of holograms and images using lenses and mirrors for the purpose of preventing counterfeiting of currency and other valuable products.” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “spot. Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 95–96, Fig. 10. Dr. Hesselink credibly testifies that while Fuhse262 depicts rays that form a light spot, the rays depicted are “chief rays” that depict only the center rays of light for each optical element. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 178–179. Ambient light, however, reflects from the entire surface of the mirrors and forms reflected beams of light, not just the center rays aimed at the center point. Id. ¶ 178. According to Dr. Hesselink, the “chief ray” is representative of the larger bundle of rays that form the beams of light reflected off of the mirrors. See Id. ¶ 44. The volume of the voxel is set by the intersection of these beams and the center of the voxel is the point at which the center rays of each beam intersect. Id. ¶ 179. Although Dr. Lindstrand testifies “a POSITA would not have understood Fuhse262 to disclose creating a voxel” (Ex. 2004 ¶ 43), Dr. Lindstrand does not dispute Dr. Hesselink’s testimony that light would reflect off of the entire surface of Fuhse262’s mirrors and form reflected beams of light. See Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 42–58; Ex. 1055, 112:15–21 (“You also agree the ambient light would not just strike the center of the surface, it would strike the entire surface, correct? . . . THE WITNESS: I would say that that is a fair and accurate description.”) Dr. Hesselink’s testimony explaining that light beams would reflect off the entire surface of Fuhse262’s micromirrors and would create a voxel when they intersect with each other, provides sufficient support demonstrating how a POSITA would have understood Fuhse262’s disclosure of light rays being reflected off of mirrors and converging at a light spot shown in Figure 10. See Unification Techs. LLC v. Micron Tech. Inc., 2024 WL 3738401 at *7 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 9, 2024) (affirming the use of expert testimony to demonstrate how a skilled artisan would have understood a prior art reference’s disclosure as teaching a claim limitation).” slip op. at 18

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that “no claim terms require express construction.” Pet. 15. “Patent Owner agrees that the terms do not require construction for purposes of evaluating the Petition.” PO Resp. 13. We do not need to construe any terms explicitly to reach our decision on institution. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (approving Board decision not to construe claim language where construction is not material to the dispute).” slip op. at 12

  • BurdenUnpatentable

    “off the entire surface of Fuhse262’s micromirrors and would create a voxel when they intersect with each other, provides sufficient support demonstrating how a POSITA would have understood Fuhse262’s disclosure of light rays being reflected off of mirrors and converging at a light spot shown in Figure 10. See Unification Techs. LLC v. Micron Tech. Inc., 2024 WL 3738401 at *7 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 9, 2024) (affirming the use of expert testimony to demonstrate how a skilled artisan would have understood a prior art reference’s disclosure as teaching a claim limitation). Patent Owner argues that light beams that intersect in an irregular or unintentional manner would not necessarily form a voxel, but does not explicitly show that Fuhse262’s light beams do, in fact, intersect in an irregular manner. PO Resp. 19. Petitioner has shown, as supported by Fuhse262’s disclosure, that Fuhse262’s mirrors are each oriented intentionally to point to a spot that allows them to create a light spot at the intended coordinates. See Pet. 27 (“In particular, Fuhse262 explains that ‘[t]he position of the mirror surfaces, i.e. the normal vector n, is to be determined in such a way that the light incident from a specified direction k ⃗ is reflected onto the focal point (x0, y0, z0) for all micromirrors 102 assigned to light spot 110.’”) (quoting Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 96–97). This disclosure, combined with Dr. Hesselink’s testimony that the intersection of light beams from the mirrors would create not just a spot but a voxel due to light reflecting off the entire surface of Fuhse262’s mirrors demonstrates that Fuhse262 teaches limitation 1b.5.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 10,901,191 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,901,191
• Giesecke+devrient GmbH / Giesecke+devrient Currency Technology GmbH et al. v. Lumenco, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 17, 2025 · IPR2024-00836 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 6–14, 28, and 32–39 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations of Fuhse262, Fuhse925, Jordan, and Fuhse172.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “ways: the first is the inclusion of “or a similar field” when describing the education level of a POSITA, and second is the inclusion of “with diffusive light” when describing the experience level of a POSITA. We decline to include either of these additional requirements in the definition of the level of ordinary skill. As to the first difference, Patent Owner does not explain what aspects of computer science would make it a field similar to the others listed, nor what additional engineering coursework would suffice. See Ex. 2004 ¶ 25. Nor does Patent Owner explain, generally, what makes a field “similar” to the ones listed or how to make that determination. We determine that Patent uncertainty into the definition and, therefore, do not adopt it. As to the second difference, Patent Owner proposes that the level of skill include two years’ experience with “diffusive light micro-optic security features.” The ʼ294 patent, however, does not mention “diffusive light.” Instead, the challenge claims and the written description of the ʼ294 patent use the term “ambient light.” See, e.g., Ex. 1001, Abstract, 20:50, 59. Ambient light, such as sunlight, includes both parallel and diffuse light. See Ex. 1055, 97:21–98:8; Ex. 1006 ¶ 54 (describing the use of sunlight or ceiling light). The ʼ294 patent mentions ambient light in an ordinary manner without discussing any distinctions between parallel light and diffuse light or giving any significance to the nature of diffuse light and its effects on the invention. We, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s definition of level of ordinary skill except that we find that the phrase “at least” in Petitioner’s proposed definition creates a vague, open-ended upper bound for the level of ordinary skill, and we therefore do not adopt that aspect of the proposal.” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “references expressly teach but what they would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made”) (quoting In re Lamberti, 545 F.2d 747, 750 (CCPA 1976)) (emphasis added); Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 407 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“What a reference teaches a person of ordinary skill is not . . . limited to what a reference specifically ‘talks about’ or what is specifically ‘mentioned’ or ‘written’ in the reference.”). Here, Petitioner has established that Fuhse262 discloses mirrors that reflect light rays converging at a light spot. Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 95–96, Fig. 10. Dr. Hesselink credibly testifies that while Fuhse262 depicts rays that form a light spot, the rays depicted are “chief rays” that depict only the center rays of light for each optical element. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 169–170. Ambient light, however, reflects from the entire surface of the mirrors and forms reflected beams of light, not just the center rays aimed at the center point. Id. ¶ 170. According to Dr. Hesselink, the “chief ray” is representative of the larger bundle of rays that form the beams of light reflected off of the mirrors. See Id. ¶ 44. The volume of the voxel is set by the intersection of these beams and the center of the voxel is the point at which the center rays of each beam intersect. Id. ¶ 171. Although Dr. Lindstrand testifies a POSITA would not have understood Fuhse262 to disclose creating a voxel (Ex. 2004 ¶ 43), Dr. Lindstrand does not dispute Dr. Hesselink’s testimony that light would reflect off of the entire surface of Fuhse262’s mirrors and form reflected beams of light. See Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 42– 58; Ex. 1055, 112:15–21 (“You also agree the ambient light would not just strike the center of the surface, it would strike the entire surface, correct? . . . THE WITNESS: I would say that that is a fair and accurate description.”) would reflect off the entire surface of Fuhse262’s micromirrors and would create a voxel when they intersect with each other, provides sufficient support demonstrating how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Fuhse262’s disclosure of light rays being reflected off of mirrors and converging at a light spot shown in Figure 10. See Unification Techs. LLC v. Micron Tech. Inc., 2024 WL 3738401 at *7 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 9, 2024) (affirming the use of expert testimony to demonstrate how a skilled artisan would have understood a prior art reference’s disclosure as teaching a claim limitation).” slip op. at 28

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner argues that “no claim terms require express construction to resolve the challenges here.” Pet. 13. Patent Owner “agree[s] that the terms Resp. 13–14. Having reviewed the record and the arguments before us, we determine that no claim terms require express construction to resolve the dispute between the parties.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “As to Petitioner’s more general allegations regarding motivation to combine the embodiments of Fuhse262 and reasonable expectation of success, we agree with Petitioner for the reasons provided in the Petition and summarized above. Specifically, we agree with Petitioner that Fuhse262 concave mirrors and lenses with embodiments that use micromirrors. See Ex. 1006 ¶ 83 (“In order to still obtain a higher resolution in the produced light-spot image with an unchanged high floating height, the large mirrors or lenses used in the previous exemplary embodiments are each replaced by a plurality of smaller micromirrors or microprisms, which together have essentially the same optical effect as the original optical element.”). We also agree that the embodiments of Fuhse262 build on each other and often refer back to each other. For example, Fuhse262 expressly refers back to “previous exemplary embodiments” when explaining that micromirrors may replace other optical elements in the various embodiments. Ex. 1006 ¶ 83. Fuhse262’s Figures 8(a) through 8(d) build on each successive example, adding and modifying the configuration of mirrors disclosed in the previous figure. See Id. ¶¶ 88, 94 (explaining that Figure 8(b) is based on Figure 8(a) but shows mirrors arranged in checkerboard-like manner and Figures 8(c) and 8(d) further modify the configuration with every “fourth field” and “ninth field” respectively being assigned to specific light spots.) Fuhse262 also explains that Figure 9 is a sectional view of Figure 8 and that Figure 10 illustrates the “calculation of the flat mirror surfaces of the micromirrors” of Figures 8 and 9. Id. ¶¶ 91, 95. For the aforementioned reasons, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the relied upon embodiments of Fuhse262.” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 10,189,294 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,189,294
• Apple Inc. v. Resonant Systems, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 23, 2025 · IPR2024-00983 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6, 10, 17, 19, and 20 are unpatentable under § 103 over Alexander and Cosper; the alternative Gregorio-based grounds did not establish unpatentability.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for patent owner

    “112(f). Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015). But if the term does not use the word “means,” then it is presumed not to be subject to Section 112(f). Id. “That presumption can be overcome, but only if the challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.” Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. v. Prisua Eng’g Corp., 948 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2020). “The correct inquiry, when ‘means’ is absent from a limitation, is whether the limitation, read in light of the remaining claim language, specification, prosecution history, and relevant extrinsic evidence, has sufficiently definite structure to a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2014).” slip op. at 12

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “both parties have asserted in the Apple Litigation that the “control component” requirement is a means-plus-function limitation subject to 35 U.S.C. §112(f), despite the fact that the control component limitation does not recite “means for.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1012, 3–8; Ex. 1013, 13); PO Resp. 6–7. Indeed, the court in the Apple Litigation has concluded that the control component requirement is subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), and has construed that requirement accordingly: Function: receiving control signals input to the oscillating resonant module; receiving outputs from the one or more sensors; controlling oscillation of the mass to produce a vibration response according to the received control signals by generating, using one or more of the received sensor outputs, control outputs to an actuator that drives the mass to oscillate. Structure: a microcontroller, a processor, a microprocessor, or a CPU that performs the algorithm shown in Figure 45 or the algorithm described in the corresponding text. See, e.g., 31:19–32:13, and equivalents thereof. Ex. 2001, 10; Ex. 2002, 40. Because of the Apple Litigation record, Petitioner presents its challenges in the alternative, first applying a plain meaning approach to the control component requirement, and also analyzing the requirement under the construction adopted in the Apple Litigation. Pet. 3–5. We adopt the court’s construction in the Apple Litigation. 35 U.S.C.” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner’s expert declarant contends that person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would have had a degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, physics, or a related technical field, and at least 2–3 years of experience related to the design or development of vibration-generating systems; additional years of experience could substitute for the advanced-level degree.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 27. Patent Owner offers “a similar level of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 2. Based on a review of the record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and ’882 patent specification.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “(1) Analogous Art Our reviewing court has stated that “[t]wo separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor's endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotes omitted). While these two criteria are helpful in many instances, we must not lose sight of the key question at hand: what is “prior art” as that term is used in 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)? References that are “too remote to be treated as ‘prior art’” are excluded from the obviousness analysis. In re Sovish, 769 F.2d 738, 741, 226 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The non-analogous art test provides helpful insight on the underlying question of what is “prior art” within the meaning of the statute; we should not, however, be blind to the reality of the circumstances of the case before us. In re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036 (CCPA (1979). Nor should we adhere to rigid and mandatory formulas that overly limit the inquiry. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 419.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 11,152,882 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,152,882
• Shenzhen Root Technology Co., Ltd. v. Willow Blossom Holdco Limited And Willow Innovations, Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Oct 14, 2025 · IPR2025-00554 · APJ Barry L Grossman · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted review of claims 17–19 and 21–33 on every asserted ground, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 17 is unpatentable over Furrer alone and Furrer with Alvarez.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “After considering the Petition and the evidence of record, based on the analysis in this Decision, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims and on all grounds asserted in the Petition. PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (stating that a decision to institute is “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”).” slip op. at 3

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or a similar field and at least two years of experience designing human breast pump equipment. More education could substitute for experience and vice versa.” Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 30–33). Mr. Bauer’s Declaration testimony states he considered some of the factors listed above. Ex. 1003 ¶ 32. Mr. Bauer testifies that based on his background and experience, in his opinion, the level of ordinary skill is as stated by Petitioner. Id. at 33. For purposes of this Decision, based on the prior art, the sophistication of the disclosed technology in the ’381 patent, and Mr. Bauer’s undisputed testimony, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill.6” slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner asserts that “[a]ll claim terms should be construed according to the Phillips standard,” and that “no formal claim constructions are necessary for purposes of resolving controversies in this proceeding. Pet. 3. We agree. Given the lack of dispute on this record, we do not perceive the need to construe any claim limitation. Claims must be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 19 F.4th 1325, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. American Science & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe the claim preambles here where the construction is not ‘material to the [obviousness] dispute.’” (citations omitted)).” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

    “Mr. Bauer further testifies: For electric-powered breast pumps, the only two options for providing electricity to the pump was either via a wire plugged into an outlet or via a battery, as would have been well-known to a POSITA. It would have been obvious for a POSITA to utilize a battery as the power source for Furrer’s pump as it was one of the two available options and would have provided known benefits. Ex. 1003 ¶ 93. As to why this a person of ordinary skill would have chosen the option of a battery powered breast pump, Mr. Bauer testifies that: Selection of battery power for Furrer’s pump would have beneficially provided a portable system that was usable during travel. Additionally, such a configuration would have allowed the user to move freely about a room, or be positioned in a location within a room without being tethered to a wall plug, allowing the user to, for example, sit or lay in the most convenient location while using the system without having to worry about being close to an outlet. Such mobility provided by selecting battery power for Furrer’s pump would have particularly aligned with Furrer’s suggestion for a ‘hands-free’ and discrete solution. Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 138, 143, 145 (further discussing the motivation to combine Furrer and Alvarez in the context of Ground 1B). Based on the record before us, without any evidence or argument to the contrary, we determine that Petitioner shows sufficiently for purposes of trial institution that Furrer, alone or in combination with Alvarez, discloses the claimed control unit comprising a battery, and a pump.” slip op. at 23

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,806,454
• Apple Inc. v. Resonant Systems Inc., D/B/A/ RevelhmiAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 9, 2025 · IPR2024-00698 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 based on the asserted combinations of Izumi, Cosper, Rossi, Ibuki, and Aldrich.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have had a degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, physics, or a related technical field, and at least 2–3 years of experience related to the design or development of systems incorporating linear actuators; additional years of experience could substitute for the degree. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 30–31). Patent Owner contends a POSITA would have had (1) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, or a comparable field of study, and (2) at least two years of professional experience with electro-mechanical control systems, or other similarly relevant industry experience. PO Resp. 2–3. Additional relevant industry experience may compensate for lack of formal education or vice versa. Id. Patent Owner further contends this is similar to Petitioner’s POSITA contention. Id. at 3. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’767 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). Our reasoning herein would be the same under Patent Owner’s similar proposal.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for petitioner

    “Claim 1, Preamble. Both parties agree that the preamble of claim 1 is limiting. PO Resp. 6. We agree that claim 1’s preamble is limiting. We also note that the parties agreed that this preamble is limiting in the District Court case. Dist. Ct. Const. 10.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “Because neither party asserts that construction of “driving component” or “control component” is necessary to resolve the issues before us, we decline to expressly construe these claim terms. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). For clarity, because Petitioner argues that plain and ordinary meaning is appropriate and because Patent Owner does not dispute that construction, we adopt the plain and ordinary meaning of these claim terms when comparing the challenged claims to the prior art. Other claim terms. It is unnecessary for us to expressly construe other claim terms for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have combined Izumi’s module to include multiple sensors in accordance with Cosper’s teachings. Pet. 15. Petitioner argues that the sensors would monitor the moving element and generate a control signal in accordance with Izumi. Id. at 15–16. Petitioner further argues that Izumi’s controller would have been implemented using a microprocessor and memory as Cosper suggests. Id. at 16. Petitioner argues three reasons why a person having ordinary skill in the art would have combined Izumi with Cosper’s teachings. Id. at 16–19. First, Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have looked to Cosper as a way to further Izumi’s objective of having a sensor that detects the and controls the movement of the moving element. Id. at 16–17. Second, Petitioner argues that the combination of Izumi and Cosper would have enhanced reliability of the feedback sensors by capturing “data specific to different operating parameters.” Id. at 17–18. Third, combining the references’ teachings would “facilitat[e] implementation of software instructions” by using a microprocessor and memory. Id. at 18–19. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s rationale to combine the references’ teachings. Based on our review and consideration of the record, we determine that a preponderance of the evidence supports that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of Izumi and Cosper in the manner Petitioner argues (“the Izumi-Cosper combination”).” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 8,093,767 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,093,767
• Apple Inc. v. Resonant Systems Inc., D/B/A/ RevelhmiAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 9, 2025 · IPR2024-00697 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 are unpatentable under § 103 based on the combinations of prior art listed in the decision.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “physics, or a related technical field, and at least 2–3 years of experience related to the design or development of systems incorporating linear actuators; additional years of experience could substitute for the degree. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 30–31). Patent Owner contends a POSITA would have had (1) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, or a comparable field of study, and (2) at least two years of professional experience with electro-mechanical control systems, or other similarly relevant industry experience. PO Resp. 2–3. Additional relevant industry experience may compensate for lack of formal education or vice versa. Id. Patent Owner further contends this is similar to Petitioner’s POSITA contention and states that “Patent Owner does not believe that any of the arguments herein would change if the Board were to adopt Petitioner’s definition for the level of ordinary skill rather than Patent Owner’s.” Id. at 3. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’767 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). Our reasoning herein would be the same under Patent Owner’s similar proposal.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for petitioner

    “Claim 1, Preamble. Both parties agree that the preamble of claim 1 is limiting. Pet. 6; PO Resp. 6. We agree that claim 1’s preamble is limiting. We also note that the parties agreed that this preamble is limiting in the District Court case. Dist. Ct. Const. 10.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “Because neither party asserts that construction of “driving component” or “control component” is necessary to resolve the issues before us, we decline to expressly construe these claim terms. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). For clarity, because Petitioner argues that plain and ordinary meaning is appropriate and because Patent Owner does not dispute that construction, we adopt the plain and ordinary meaning of these claim terms when comparing the challenged claims to the prior art. Other claim terms. It is unnecessary for us to expressly construe other claim terms for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “Our reviewing court has stated that “[t]wo separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor's endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotes omitted). While these two criteria are helpful in many instances, we must not lose sight of the key question at hand: what is “prior art” as that term is used in 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)? References that are “too remote to be treated as ‘prior art’” are excluded from the obviousness analysis. In re Sovish, 769 F.2d 738, 741, 226 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The non-analogous art test provides helpful insight on the underlying question of what is “prior art” within the meaning of the statute; we should not, however, be blind to the reality of the circumstances of the case before us. In re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036 (CCPA (1979). Nor should we adhere to rigid and mandatory formulas that overly limit the inquiry. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007).” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 8,093,767 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,093,767
• Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Ltd. / Apple Inc. v. Marlin Semiconductor Ltd.Instituted
  PTAB · Oct 9, 2025 · IPR2025-00847 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution

  Instituted IPR on claims 1–11 because Petitioners showed a reasonable likelihood of proving at least one challenged claim unpatentable across the asserted grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose of determining whether Petitioners meet the threshold for initiating review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Any arguments not raised by Patent Owner in a timely-filed response may be deemed waived. For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We hereby institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–11 of the ’847 patent based upon Petitioners’ asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “would have had a master’s degree in electrical engineering, physics, chemistry, materials science, or a related field and three years of work experience in semiconductor manufacturing, such as, for example, in integrated circuit device (or transistor) design and/or manufacturing,” and “[a]dditional relevant education could substitute for professional experience, and significant work experience or training could substitute for formal education.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 38). Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’847 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner does not propose any claim constructions, except to explain that the claim 7 limitation “the spacer further comprises an offset spacer, positioned between the gate and the spacer,” is “satisfied if one layer (an ‘offset spacer’) of the claimed ‘spacer’ lies between another layer of the ‘spacer’ and the gate.” Pet. 11. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s assertions or offer any claim constructions. See generally Prelim. Resp. Because resolution of Petitioner’s proposed construction is unnecessary to our analyses for purposes of this decision, we do not address the proposal here. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We do not discern a need to construe any other claim language at this juncture because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

    “a. Claim 1 Petitioner contends that claim 1 is anticipated by Lan or, alternatively, obvious in view of Lan. Pet. 18–26. Petitioner explains how Lan teaches or suggests each recitation of claim 1, and Petitioner’s position is supported by adequate evidence for institution. Id. (citing, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 100–125). Petitioner, for example, persuasively compares the structure of Figure 12 of Lan to each limitation of claim 1. Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contentions except to argue that Lan (and the Petition’s other asserted references) “Do Not Mention, Describe, or Concern ‘Raised Epitaxial Layers.’” Prelim. Resp. 22–24. Patent Owner does not persuasively undermine Petitioner’s position.” slip op. at 13

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,745,847
• Apple Inc. v. Resonant Systems, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 9, 2025 · IPR2024-00806 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–8, 15–17, and 20 are unpatentable under § 103; claims 14 and 19 were not shown unpatentable because the proposed paramagnetic flux paths in Wakuda lacked adequate support.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner’s expert declarant contends that person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have had a degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, physics, or a related technical field, and at least 2–3 years of experience related to the design or development of systems incorporating linear actuators; additional years of experience could substitute for the advanced-level degree. Ex. 1003 ¶ 33. Patent Owner offers “a similar level of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 3. Based on a review of the record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and ’830 patent specification.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner

    “The parties agree that independent claims 1, 19, and 20 include means plus function limitations under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.8 Pet. 3–7; PO Resp. 6–14. An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means . . . for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof. 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. In particular, the parties agree that the “driving component” and “control component” requirements of independent claims 1, 19, and 20 are means plus function limitations. Pet. 3–7; PO Resp. 6–14. Construing a means plus function limitation under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 involves two steps: 1) identifying the claimed function and 2) identifying in the specification the corresponding structure that performs the claimed function. Med. Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 296 F.3d 1106, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2002).” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Therefore, the specification clearly links the function of “control[ing] supply of power from the power supply to . . . cause the moveable component to oscillate at a frequency . . . specified by one or more stored values” at least to portions of steps 706 and 708 of the flow diagram algorithm of Figure 7A, as described above. Thus, the control component requires a microprocessor and memory with algorithmic structure including a timing algorithm or similar coding for creating a control output signal that flips to control the direction of current flow through a coil (e.g., coil 514, Fig. 5, coil 626, Fig. 6), where the coil is structure that corresponds to the recited “driving component,” as noted above.11 We adopt the District Court’s conclusion in the Apple litigation that the “control component” structure itself does not require an H-bridge switch, but only requires that the processor generates the “d” inputs to the switch; and further that the structure does not require does not require computing initial default values as specified in step 702 of Figure 7A (i.e., values not specified by a user). Ex. 3001, 30–33, 35. This is in accord with settled law 11 “Rather than using a formal timer mechanism, certain implementations may simply employ counted loops or other simple programming techniques for periodically carrying out tasks.” Ex. 1001, 7:17–20. that limits the structure to that necessary to perform the claimed function. 12 By the same token, we modify the District Court’s construction to the extent it would require, based on such steps as 706, 710, and 716, a specific order of the steps of generating the “p” and “d” values. The claims only require the control component to control the power supply to cause oscillation at a specified frequency and amplitude, but do not require the frequency value to be generated before the amplitude value, or vice versa.” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “to include the ability disclosed in Ramsay to allow a user to customize and store parameters associated with haptic effects, such as creating “haptic track files” that specify variations in the amplitude and frequency of the effect over time to achieve a desired effect. Pet. 46–47 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 15, 25– 28, 37; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 192–193). Petitioner argues that this combination would have been motivated by the desire to expand the functionalities of haptic devices to allow end users to create and customize haptic effects, to provide a fuller haptic experience, and to be able to store haptic effects to save processing power compared to real-time generated effects. Id. at 47–49 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 14–15, 30, 47, 53–57; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 194–196). Petitioner argues that this making combination would have had a reasonable expectation of success given that both references deal with linear actuators, both disclose storing frequency and amplitude values, and the combination involves routine knowledge of software techniques. Id. at 49–50 (citing Ex. 1004, 2:3–9; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 17, 26–28; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 197–198). Petitioner further argues that it would have been obvious to use the H-bridge switch of Rossi as part of the Gregorio actuator drive circuit 16 in the asserted Gregorio-Ramsay combination to periodically switch the polarity of drive signals to electric coil 28 of Gregorio, and thus oscillate magnet 27, under the control of a signal from processor 12 of Gregorio. Pet. 56 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 211). Petitioner argues that this combination would have been motivated because Gregorio does not disclose implementation details and therefore one of ordinary skill would have looked toward teachings like Rossi to fill in those details, and that an H-bridge switch was a well-known example circuit for implementing a change in “current flow direction/polarity” for “push” and “pull” actions in a system, and was a simple, cost-effective, and reliable circuit design. Id. at 56–58 (citing Ex. 1020, Abstr., Figs. 4, 6, 1:65–3:54; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 212–217). Petitioner argues that making this combination would have had a reasonable expectation of success given that it involved known techniques through routine circuit design considerations and software instructions for generating the control signal. Id. at 58 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 218). Petitioner further argues that it would have been obvious to modify the Gregorio-Ramsay-Rossi combination, using the control algorithm disclosed in Aldrich, to replace the monitoring technique of Gregorio with that of Aldrich to maintain a resonance frequency by incrementing or decrementing the drive frequency. Pet. 58–59 (citing Ex. 1004, 4:22–28, 4:42–48; Ex. 1021, 2; Ex. 1003 ¶ 219). Petitioner’s expert provides implementation details of Aldrich, including that the Aldrich hill-climb technique would use a Boolean value to indicate whether the frequency was being increased, with local variables set to default values, and use integer values when processing sensor signals. Id. at 59–60 (citing Ex. 1021, 2; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 220–222). Petitioner argues that these modifications would have been motivated to improve the Gregorio system using the Aldrich feedback algorithm for targeting a resonant frequency, given that the Gregorio approach had shortcomings that required a monitoring period with reduced haptic feedback, receiving weak EMF signals. Id. at 61–62 (citing Ex. 2004, 3:65–5:55, 5:63–65; Ex. 1021, 1–3; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 223–227). Petitioner argues that making this combination would have had a reasonable expectation of success given that it involved known techniques for improvement to yield predictable results, readily implemented via software executed by the microprocessor. Id. at 62–63 (citing Ex. 2004, 2:44–50; Ex. 1021, 2; Ex. 1003 ¶ 229). Patent Owner does not address Petitioner’s arguments regarding the” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 9,941,830 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,941,830

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.