- PTAB · Dec 3, 2025 · IPR2025-01026 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–20 on all petition challenges because the Baliarda-543 challenges met the reasonable-likelihood threshold.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“to institute an inter partes review. We may institute an inter partes review only if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018- 01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). Based on the current record and for the reasons explained below, Petitioner has shown that there is a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we 1 Petitioner filed a confidential version of the Petition as Paper 3 and a public version of the Petition as Paper 4. We cite to the public version of the Petition. institute an inter partes review of claims 1–20 in the ’677 patent on all challenges included in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill as of the ’677 patent’s effective filing date would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar degree and at least four years of experience in applied electromagnetics with an emphasis on antennas.” Pet. 11 (quoting Ex. 1018 ¶ 32). Petitioner also asserts that “[a]lternatively, the person of ordinary skill in the art would have a master’s degree in electrical engineering (or similar discipline) and at least two years of similar experience.” Id. (quoting Ex. 1018 ¶ 32). Dr. van der Weide’s testimony supports Petitioner’s assertions. See Ex. 1007 ¶ 40. For purposes of the Preliminary Response only, Patent Owner employs Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan. Prelim. Resp. 17. Based on the current record and for purposes of this decision, we accept Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan because it comports with the technology and claims of the ’677 patent as well as the asserted references. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:26–6:47, 42:47–44:61, code (57); infra §§ III.E.1–III.E.2.” slip op. at 23
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“4. DISCUSSION “[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Based on the current record, we determine that no claim term, phrase, or limitation requires an explicit construction to decide whether Petitioner satisfies the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial.” slip op. at 26
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Although “Dou does not require its ‘diversity antenna architecture’ to provide spatial diversity,” Dou nevertheless requires a wireless device with some type of diversity antenna architecture. See, e.g., Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 14, 17–18, 22–24, 30, 32–34, codes (54), (57), claims 1 and 16. As an example, Dou’s independent claim 1 covering a “wireless device” requires a “first diversity antenna” and a “second diversity antenna.” Id. at claim 1. As another example, Dou’s independent claim 16 covering a “wireless device” also requires a “first diversity antenna” and a “second diversity antenna.” Id. at claim 16. As yet another example, Dou’s Abstract describes a “wireless device” including a “first diversity antenna” and a “second diversity antenna.” Id. at code (57). Petitioner does not explain how the proposed combination provides anything other than spatial diversity. See Pet. 33–35; Prelim. Reply 1–3; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 118–124. Based on the current record, we agree with Patent Owner that with Ciais-Quadband’s antenna used for Dou’s two antennas 206 and 208, the two identical quadband antennas would have:” slip op. at 46
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,031,677 - PTAB · Dec 3, 2025 · IPR2025-01027 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all petition challenges, finding a reasonable likelihood that Baliarda-543 anticipates or renders obvious those claims.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“to institute an inter partes review. We may institute an inter partes review only if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018- 01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential).” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Regarding spatial diversity, Dou explains that a first internal antenna and a second internal antenna “may be separated by a distance (D) that is no less than the quarter wavelength (>=λ/4) of the lowest frequency.” Ex. 1013 ¶ 24; see Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 35, 44. Consistent with Dou’s preference for at least a quarter-wavelength spacing between antennas at the lowest frequency, “a commonly accepted rule of thumb is that at least a quarter-wavelength spacing between antennas is necessary to provide effective spatial diversity.” Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 33, 35, 47. Effective spatial diversity requires sufficient spacing between antennas because that technique “uses multiple antennas to improve signal reliability and performance by mitigating the effects of multipath fading and other interference.” Ex. 2010 ¶ 33. “Multipath fading occurs when a wireless signal propagates along multiple different paths of differing lengths because of interactions with obstacles, resulting in portions of the signal energy arriving at a receiver with different phases slightly offset in time.” Id. Locations insufficiently separated in terms of wavelength “tend to experience similar fading and interference characteristics.” Id. Thus, closely spaced antennas “cannot provide effective spatial diversity.” Id. By providing sufficient spacing between antennas, however, “the likelihood increases that at least one of the antennas will be positioned at a location where the multipath or other interference is relatively low, thereby improving overall signal quality and reliability.” Id. As Patent Owner contends, the proposed combination modifies Dou’s ground plane 310 to replicate Jing’s ground plane with dimensions of 36 mm × 60 mm and limits “the extent of Dou’s ground plane 310 so that it [does] not extend behind Jing’s antenna at 306, just like Dou does not extend it behind antenna 308.” See Pet. 35–36; Prelim. Resp. 20 (quoting Pet. 35); Prelim. Sur-reply 1; Ex. 1007 ¶ 120; Ex. 2010 ¶ 45. The lowest frequency of Jing’s antenna is 900 MHz. Ex. 1011, 2657–58; see Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 118, 154; Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 37, 44. The wavelength (λ) corresponding to a frequency of 900 MHz is 333.3 mm, and a quarter wavelength (λ/4) is 83.3 mm. Ex. 2010 ¶ 44. In the proposed combination, a distance of 60 mm separates the” slip op. at 49
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“To satisfy the written-description requirement, the inventor must have possession of the claimed invention as interpreted to encompass an allegedly infringing product. See Rivera, 857 F.3d at 1319–22; ICU Med., 558 F.3d at 1372–73, 1377–79. For purposes of the written-description requirement, the “invention” is “whatever is now claimed.” Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1564 (emphasis omitted). Based on the current record, and as Petitioner asserts, LTE band 12 was not available for “use with mobile communications” or “use in any cellular communication, let alone LTE or 4G communication,” as of the ’429 application’s December 21, 2006, filing date. See Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 229, 231; Pet. 76–77. For instance, a Federal Communications Commission report adopted on July 31, 2007, notes that the 698-806 MHz spectrum “currently is occupied by television broadcasters in TV Channels 52-69.” Ex. 1045, 1, 3; see Ex. 1007 ¶ 231. The 698-806 MHz spectrum includes LTE band 12 with 698-716 MHz for uplink and 728-746 MHz for downlink. See Ex. 1026, 11 (Table 1); Ex. 1039, 498 (Table 20.1). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute that as of July 31, 2007, the 698-806 MHz spectrum was “occupied by television broadcasters in TV Channels 52-69.” See Prelim. Resp. 2–3, 23–30; Prelim. Sur-reply 5. Thus, based on the current record, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that as of the ’429 application’s December 21, 2006, filing date, the ’429 application did not “reasonably convey[] to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession” of “an antenna configured to send or receive signals in the 698-806 MHz spectrum,” including LTE band 12 that Patent Owner relies on in the Geotab litigation, for “communication with any ‘4G communication standard’ because those frequencies were not usable for any mobile device communications at the time of filing.” See Pet. 78 (emphasis omitted); Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 231, 233–234, 236–237; Ex. 1045, 1, 3; Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. Accordingly, based on the current record, Petitioner demonstrates a” slip op. at 63
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“To satisfy the written-description requirement, the inventor must have possession of the claimed invention as interpreted to encompass an allegedly infringing product. See Rivera, 857 F.3d at 1319–22; ICU Med., 558 F.3d at 1372–73, 1377–79. For purposes of the written-description requirement, the “invention” is “whatever is now claimed.” Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1564 (emphasis omitted). Based on the current record, and as Petitioner asserts, LTE band 12 was not available for “use with mobile communications” or “use in any cellular communication, let alone LTE or 4G communication,” as of the ’429 application’s December 21, 2006, filing date. See Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 229, 231; Pet. 76–77. For instance, a Federal Communications Commission report adopted on July 31, 2007, notes that the 698-806 MHz spectrum “currently is occupied by television broadcasters in TV Channels 52-69.” Ex. 1045, 1, 3; see Ex. 1007 ¶ 231. The 698-806 MHz spectrum includes LTE band 12 with 698-716 MHz for uplink and 728-746 MHz for downlink. See Ex. 1026, 11 (Table 1); Ex. 1039, 498 (Table 20.1). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute that as of July 31, 2007, the 698-806 MHz spectrum was “occupied by television broadcasters in TV Channels 52-69.” See Prelim. Resp. 2–3, 23–30; Prelim. Sur-reply 5. Thus, based on the current record, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that as of the ’429 application’s December 21, 2006, filing date, the ’429 application did not “reasonably convey[] to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession” of “an antenna configured to send or receive signals in the 698-806 MHz spectrum,” including LTE band 12 that Patent Owner relies on in the Geotab litigation, for “communication with any ‘4G communication standard’ because those frequencies were not usable for any mobile device communications at the time of filing.” See Pet. 78 (emphasis omitted); Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 231, 233–234, 236–237; Ex. 1045, 1, 3; Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. Accordingly, based on the current record, Petitioner demonstrates a” slip op. at 63
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,349,200 - PTAB · Nov 19, 2025 · IPR2025-00947 · APJ Christopher G Paulraj · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of all challenged claims and grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Herrstedt and Bös.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialDenied
“II. DISCUSSION A. Discretionary Denial Patent Owner filed a request for discretionary denial of institution. Paper 8. Petitioner opposed. Paper 9. The Acting Director denied the discretionary denial request. Paper 12 (September 19, 2025). Accordingly, we proceed with our analysis of the merits of Petitioner’s patentability” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelOther
“At this stage, we need not resolve the parties’ dispute with regard to the requisite level of skill in the art, as our analysis would be the same under either party’s definition of a POSA. We note, however, that Petitioner’s definition seems to be overly broad insofar as it would only require the POSA to be skilled in one of several broad fields, including “statistics” and “medical policy and decision making,” that do not directly relate to the claimed subject matter. At the same time, we do not agree with Patent Owner that the POSA needs specific clinical experience in the field of oncology. The claimed subject matter relates to the treatment of a side-effect associated with cancer therapy (CINV), and not the cancer itself. We also recognize that the prior art and the ’357 patent itself reflect the level of skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he absence of specific findings on the level of skill in the art does not give rise to reversible error where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown.”).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019). This standard requires that we construe claims “in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim[s] as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Id. Petitioner contends no terms need to be construed to find the claims unpatentable in view of the prior art. Pet. 9. Patent Owner also contends that no claim construction is necessary to resolve the parties’ disputes. Prelim Resp. 14. At this stage, we do not perceive a need to construe expressly any claim terms of the ’357 patent for purposes of determining whether to institute trial.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Herrstedt taught the use of aprepitant as an NK1 receptor antagonist that could be combined with dexamethasone and palonosetron to treat emesis. Nonetheless, based on Bös’s identification of netupitant (compound Ib) as a “potent and selective” NK1 antagonist with “valuable therapeutic properties,” the present record supports Petitioner’s argument that the POSA would have been motivated to replace aprepitant with netupitant in the combination therapy. Ex, 1014, 14:31–34. Bös indicates that the compounds disclosed therein have utility in the treatment of emesis, and that neutpitant in particular “is a potent antagonist of NK1 induced behaviors in Gerbil and blocks emesis in Ferrets and suncus murinus with similar potency.” Id. at 19:26–30. Bös further indicates that netupitant has a high affinity for the NK1 receptor and a prolonged half-life. Id. at 18:44–48, 19:31–38. In view of these properties, we find a POSA would have had good reason to consider netupitant as a potential replacement for aprepitant in the treatment of CINV.” slip op. at 28
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSRPatents in suitUS 9,186,357 - PTAB · Nov 6, 2025 · PGR2025-00040 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–9, 11–33, and 35–38 on all petition grounds, finding it more likely than not that Hassfjell-Hoff anticipates at least claim 1.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), a post-grant review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . demonstrate[s] that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Post-grant review is available for patents that issue from applications that at one point contained at least one claim with an effective filing date on or after March 16, 2013. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), §§ 3(n)(1), 6(f)(2)(A). After considering the briefing and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has shown that the ’437 patent is eligible for post-grant review and that it is more likely than not that at least one challenged claim of the ’437 patent is unpatentable under § 324(a). Accordingly, we institute a post-grant review of all challenged claims of the ’437 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther
“Here, Patentee Sciencons AS filed a statutory disclaimer of claims 10 and 34 of the ’437 patent. Ex. 2001; Prelim. Resp. 43. Based on our review of Exhibit 2001 and the Office’s public records, we find that the disclaimer of claims 10 and 34 complies with the above-listed requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a). Accordingly, we treat claims 10 and 34 as having never been part of the ’437 patent. See Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“This court has interpreted the term ‘considered as part of the original patent’ in [35 U.S.C.] § 253 to mean that the patent is treated as though the disclaimed claims never existed.”). Because post-grant review cannot be instituted based on disclaimed claims, claims 10 and 34 are outside the scope of this proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.207(e) (“No post-grant review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”); General Elec. Co. v. United Techs. Corp., IPR2017-00491, Paper 9 (PTAB July 6, 2017) (precedential) (denying institution in view of a statutory disclaimer of all the challenged claims). Thus, we confine our analysis in this Decision to claims 1–9, 11–33, and 35– 38, the remaining challenged claims that have not been disclaimed.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityGranted
“Sciencons AS also states that ARTBIO, Inc. is responsible for defending the ’437 patent in this proceeding and requests that ARTBIO, Inc. be included in the caption for this proceeding.2 Paper 4, 1. ARTBIO, Inc. has signed powers of attorney appointing the same practitioners that were appointed by Sciencons AS to transact all business associated with the instant post-grant review review of the ’437 patent. See Paper 3. To date, no objection has been raised to Patent Owner’s request. Given Sciencons AS’s representation that ARTBIO, Inc. is currently the exclusive licensee of the ’437 patent and is responsible for defending the ’437 patent, we grant Sciencons AS’s unopposed request that ARTBIO, Inc. be included in the caption. For convenience we refer to Sciencons AS and the purported exclusive licensee ARTBIO, Inc. collectively as “Patent Owner.” As stated supra, to the extent any party disputes ARTBIO, Inc.’s right to participate in this proceeding or to be included in the caption, the party shall request authorization to brief the issue within 10 business days of this Decision.” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“nuclear chemistry, radiochemistry, or materials science, or a comparable field of study, plus approximately two to three years of professional experience with radioisotope generators, radiopharmaceutical chemistry, nuclear medicine, or other relevant industry experience” and that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 33; Ex. 1019 ¶ 27). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition nor provide a proposed definition of its own. See generally Prelim. Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed proposed definition of a POSITA.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 12,249,437 - Advancell Pty Ltd.InstitutedPTAB · Oct 14, 2025 · PGR2025-00029 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–6 and 8–20 on all asserted grounds, finding it more likely than not that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“After reviewing the parties’ briefs and supporting evidence, we determine that Petitioner has sufficiently shown that Hassfjell-Hoff discloses each element of claim 1. As such, Petitioner’s argument and evidence as set forth above and further discussed below, sufficiently shows that it is more likely than not that claim 1 is anticipated by Hassfjell-Hoff, notwithstanding Patent Owner’s arguments, also addressed below.” slip op. at 16
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther
“Here, Patentee Sciencons AS filed a statutory disclaimer of claim 7 of the ’603 patent. Ex. 2001. Based on our review of Exhibit 2001 and U.S. Patent and Trademark Office public records, we find that the disclaimer of claim 7 complies with the above-listed requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a). Accordingly, we treat claim 7 as having never been part of the ’603 patent. See Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“This court has interpreted the term ‘considered as part of the original patent’ in [35 U.S.C.] § 253 to mean that the patent is treated as though the disclaimed claims never existed.”). Because post-grant review cannot be instituted based on disclaimed claims, claim 7 is outside the scope of this proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.207(e) (“No post-grant review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”); General Elec. Co. v. United Techs. Corp., IPR2017-00491, Paper 9 (PTAB July 6, 2017) (precedential) (denying institution in view of a statutory disclaimer of all the challenged claims). Thus, we confine our analysis in this Decision to claims 1–6 and 8– 20, the remaining challenged claims that have not been disclaimed.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityGranted
“Sciencons AS also states that ARTBIO, Inc. is responsible for defending the ’603 patent in this proceeding and requests that ARTBIO, Inc. be included in the caption for this proceeding.2 Paper 4, 1; Paper 7, 1. ARTBIO, Inc. has signed powers of attorney appointing the same practitioners that were appointed by Sciencons AS to transact all business associated with the instant post-grant review proceeding of the ’603 patent. See Papers 3, 4, 7, 8. To date, no objection has been raised to Patent Owner’s request. Given Sciencons AS’s representation that ARTBIO, Inc. is currently the exclusive licensee of the ’603 patent and is responsible for defending the ’603 patent, we grant Sciencons AS’s unopposed request that ARTBIO, Inc. be included in the caption. For convenience we refer to Sciencons AS and the purported exclusive licensee ARTBIO, Inc. collectively as “Patent Owner.” As stated supra, to the extent any party disputes ARTBIO, Inc.’s right to participate in this proceeding or to be included in the caption, the party shall request authorization to brief the issue within 10 business days of this Decision.” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in chemistry, chemical engineering, physics, nuclear chemistry, radiochemistry, or materials science, or a comparable field of study, plus approximately two to three years of professional experience with radioisotope generators, or other relevant industry experience” and that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 33; Ex. 1017 ¶ 27). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition nor provide a proposed definition of its own. See generally Prelim. Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed proposed definition.” slip op. at 10
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 12,125,603 - PTAB · Jul 25, 2025 · IPR2025-00191 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review on all challenged grounds for non-disclaimed claims 3, 6, 8–20; it found a reasonable likelihood of success for claims 8–12 and 19.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons discussed below, we determine that Petitioner has sufficiently shown a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail as to the unpatentability of claims 8–12 and 19 of the ’322 patent but has not sufficiently shown a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail as to the unpatentability as to claims 3, 6, 13–17, and 20. Because Petitioner has sufficiently shown a reasonable likelihood that at” slip op. at 2
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther
“B. Patent Owner’s Disclaimer of Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7 As indicated above, Patent Owner filed a statutory disclaimer of claims 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7 of the ’322 patent. See Ex. 2006. In view of Patent Owner’s statutory disclaimer, we treat claims 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7 as having never been part of the ’322 patent. See Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“This court has interpreted the term ‘considered as part of the original patent’ in [35 U.S.C.] § 253 to mean that the patent is treated as though the disclaimed claims never existed.”). Because inter partes review cannot be instituted based on disclaimed claims, claims 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7 are outside the scope of this proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e) (“No inter partes review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”); General Elec. Co. v. United Techs. Corp., IPR2017- 00491, Paper 9 (PTAB July 6, 2017) (precedential) (denying institution in view of a statutory disclaimer of all the challenged claims). Thus, we confine our analysis in this Decision to claims 3, 6, and 8–20, the challenged claims that have not been disclaimed.” slip op. at 3
- Other 314aDenied
“Patent Owner filed a Brief on Discretionary Denial, and Petitioner filed a brief in opposition. Papers 10 and 18. The Director considered the briefing and determined that discretionary denial was not warranted. Paper 21.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“at the critical time “would have had a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2–3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) monolithic 3D structures and NAND memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience).” Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 34–38). Petitioner further asserts that a POSITA “would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D NAND’s structure, how it is manufactured, and its component parts.” Id. Patent Owner does not provide any such assessment in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 8; Ex. 2007 ¶ 22 (reserving the right to opine as to an alternative level of a POSITA). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’322 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,581,322 - PTAB · Jun 16, 2025 · IPR2025-00231 · APJ Matthew J Mcneill · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–6, 9, 10, 13, and 16–20 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Strub, Woo, Nagai, and Gleissner.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“following factors to assess “whether efficiency, fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding”: 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5–6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential). In evaluating these factors, we take “a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id. at 6.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot reached
“Pursuant to our authorization provided by email (Ex. 3003), Patent Owner filed a motion to terminate on the basis that the Petition is time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). Papers 15 (confidential), 16 (public redacted). Petitioner filed its response on June 5, 2025. Paper 20. The parties’ briefing did not permit sufficient time to decide the motion prior to the three-month statutory deadline for determining whether to institute an inter partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(b). We express no opinion at this time on Patent Owner’s motion to terminate, which will be decided in due course.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“inter partes review unless the information in the petition and preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). For the reasons that follow, we institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–6, 9, 10, 13, and 16‒20 of the ’902 patent on all grounds of unpatentability asserted with respect to those claims in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel does not applyDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner based on the current record. Although the Lectrosonics IPRs involved the ’902 patent and other patents from the same family as the ’902 patent, which recite many similar claim limitations, the Lectrosonics IPRs were all decided using the BRI standard, not the Phillips standard. Thus, no claim interpretation has been made using the standard that will be applied in this case, and the asserted prior art has not been applied to claims interpreted according to the standard in this case. Accordingly, on this record, we are not persuaded that collateral estoppel applies to any of the disputed issues in this proceeding. See DDR Holdings, LLC v. Priceline.com LLC, 122 F.4th 911, 918–919 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (“‘Because the Board applies the broadest reasonable construction of the claims while the district courts apply a different standard of claim construction as explored in Phillips,’ a party is not collaterally estopped in district court proceedings by the Board’s constructions during IPR.”); SkyHawke, 828 F.3d at 1376. Regardless, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its asserted ground as to claim 1 based on the preliminary claim interpretations applied herein. See infra Section II.E.5.h.” slip op. at 29
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,929,902 - PTAB · Jun 16, 2025 · IPR2025-00230 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–4, 7–9, 15, 17, 19, 20, and 22–27 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable over Strub, Woo, Nagai, and Gleissner.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Paper 8 at 20 (PTAB Sept. 12, 2018) (precedential); Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019), 58 & n.2, available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated. We consider the following factors to assess “whether efficiency, fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding”: 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5–6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential). In evaluating these factors, we take “a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id. at 6.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“inter partes review unless the information in the petition and preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). For the reasons that follow, we institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–4, 7‒9, 15, 17, 19, 20, and 22‒27 of the ’443 patent on all grounds of unpatentability asserted with respect to those claims in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We conclude that interpretation of the term “wearable” is necessary to resolve the parties’ dispute. Patent Owner argues that the ’443 patent describes wearability of local audio devices and requires the local audio device to include an audio input device, such as a microphone, that is worn by the performer and connects to the performer’s local audio device to capture the performer’s isolated audio track. Prelim. Resp. 24 (citing Ex. 1001, code (57), col. 7, l. 65‒col. 8, l. 4, col. 8, ll. 59‒62, col. 21, ll. 60‒61). Patent Owner further argues that the prosecution history of the ’443 patent “clarifies that ‘wearable’ requires the audio device to be ‘suitable to be worn by the performer’ and excludes devices that are merely portable (e.g., able to be carried in a backpack).” Prelim. Resp. 24. Patent Owner argues that the Notice of Allowance for the ’443 patent distinguishes 5 In the district court case, Petitioner argued that “wearable” means “suitable and in a condition to be worn” and Patent Owner argued that the term means “[s]uitable to be worn by a performer.” See Ex. 2006, 13–14. between “portable” and “wearable” where the prior art of record taught a portable device that could be carried in a backpack, which the Examiner found did not teach a “wearable” limitation of the claims at issue. Id. at 25 (citing Ex. 2017). We agree with Patent Owner’s analysis to the extent it specifies that the audio device is “suitable to be worn,” but do not include “performer” in the interpretation, as claim 1 recites an audio device wearable by a “creator of said locally generated audio.” See Prelim. Resp. 24‒25. Based on the current record, we interpret “wearable” as “suitable and in a condition to be worn.”” slip op. at 18
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We conclude that no express interpretation of “locally generated audio” is necessary to determine whether to institute an inter partes review because, even if Patent Owner’s interpretation is adopted, Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Strub teaches “locally generated audio.” See infra Section II.E.5.c; Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe [a particular claim limitation] where the construction is not ‘material to the . . . dispute.’” (citation omitted) (emphasis added)). The parties, however, are encouraged to address interpretation of the phrase during trial.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,711,443 - PTAB · Jun 13, 2025 · IPR2025-00160 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–5, 7, 8, 10–13, 15–18, and 20–31 because ResMed showed a reasonable likelihood of proving at least one challenged claim obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“We are not persuaded by these arguments. We are aware of no regulation, rule, case law, or Office guidance that prohibits a party from filing both an ex parte reexamination and an inter partes review, or deems doing so “an abuse of the patent system” or a due process violation. Prelim. Resp. 7–8. Indeed, the Office has previously permitted parallel reexaminations and inter partes reviews, even when filed by the same party. See, e.g., CBS Interactive et al. v. Helferich Patent Licensing, IPR2013- 00033, Paper 15, 2 (PTAB Nov. 6, 2012) (“four of the five Petitioners [in the inter partes] are also the third-party requesters who filed the request for reexamination”); Arctic Cat, Inc. v. Polaris Indus. Inc., IPR2015-01781, Paper 78, 2 (PTAB Sept. 25, 2018) (denying patent owner’s motion to stay or terminate ex parte reexamination 90/013,999, which was filed by same petitioner in the related inter partes review); Emerson Electric Co. v. Sipco, LLC, IPR2017-00359, Paper 62, 5, 19 (PTAB Mar. 21, 2019) (declining to terminate two ex parte reexaminations filed by a party who previously filed an inter partes review on the same patent). The Office’s April 2019 Notice Regarding Options for Amendments by Patent Owner Through Reissue or Reexamination During a Pending AIA Trial Proceeding provides information as to how the Office may handle parallel reexamination and AIA proceedings involving the same patent. See 84 Fed. Reg. 16,654, 16656–58 (Apr. 22, 2019). The existence of this Notice indicates that there is nothing per se improper about parallel ex parte reexaminations and inter partes reviews. Accordingly, on this record, we are not persuaded to discretionarily deny this Petition based on” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“We find that although the parties engaged in some discovery and briefing in the Ohio case, the bulk of the work remains, including the completion of fact discovery, expert discovery, motion practice, trial preparation, and trial. Additionally, prior to the stay, the district court had not issued orders related to claim construction or the validity of the ’680 patent. Accordingly, the relatively minimal investment in the Ohio case weighs against exercising discretion to deny institution. Fintiv, Paper 11, 10.” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“A patent claim is unpatentable for obviousness if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). In Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966), the Supreme Court set out a framework for assessing obviousness that requires consideration of four factors: (1) the “level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art,” (2) the “scope and content of the prior art,” (3) the “differences between the prior art and the claims at issue,” and (4) “secondary considerations” of nonobviousness such as “commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, determination requires finding a reason to combine accompanied by a reasonable expectation of achieving what is claimed in the challenged patent. See Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “[A]ny need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 419–20. We analyze the asserted grounds of unpatentability in accordance with these principles to determine whether Petitioner has met its burden to establish a reasonable likelihood of success at trial.” slip op. at 20
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“On this record, these arguments are unavailing. “[A] given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate a motivation to combine.” Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Thus, even if Patent Owner is correct that the proposed combination would no longer have the ability to push information directly to physician-side client devices, or would have duplicative storage, this does not necessarily obviate Petitioner’s proffered motivations to combine, which we find sufficient for purposes of institution.” slip op. at 36
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,786,680 - PTAB · Jun 13, 2025 · IPR2025-00158 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–20 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable over Ciulla and Orbach.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Ohio case pending completion of Office proceedings (various inter partes reviews and ex parte reexaminations) concerning the ’512 patent and the other asserted patents. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 5; Prelim. Reply 4. Because “[a] district court stay of the litigation pending resolution of the PTAB trial allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts” 2 Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 11, 2020) (precedential). 3 Petitioner filed the initial complaint in a different court; the case was subsequently transferred to Ohio. See Prelim. Resp. 3.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“After considering all of the arguments and cited evidence of record, we determine that, for purposes of institution, Petitioner sufficiently shows that the combination of Ciulla and Orbach teaches or suggests each limitation of the challenged claims, and that a person of ordinary skill in the with a reasonable expectation of success, for the reasons asserted in the Petition. See, e.g., Pet. 9–64. Accordingly, on this record, Petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on Ground 1. At this early stage, we offer the following observations on Patent Owner’s arguments.” slip op. at 32
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“On this record, these arguments are unavailing. Whether a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the art’s teachings with a reasonable expectation of success in arriving at the claimed subject matter is a fact-intensive inquiry. Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“The presence or absence of a motivation to combine references in an obviousness determination is a pure question of fact”); Par Pharm., Inc. v. TWi Pharm., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The presence or absence of a reasonable expectation of success is also a question of fact.”). Petitioner supports its challenge with evidence-backed reasoning, including the testimony of Dr. Kirkness and Dr. Chatterjee, and Patent Owner’s responsive attorney argument is unavailing at this stage. Patent Owner offers no evidence from either an expert or the cited references to support the underlying premise––namely, absent an express statement by Ciulla that its sensors may send the same output to various devices including a PDA (see Prelim. Resp. 21), a skilled artisan would not” slip op. at 34
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner does not propose construction of any terms. Petitioner states that the Board need not construe any terms, and the “Petition establishes the prior art meets each of the claim limitation[s] under any reasonable construction.” Pet. 9. Patent Owner does not propose construction of any terms. See generally Prelim. Resp. We determine that no express construction of any claim term is necessary to determine whether to institute inter partes review. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). To the extent further discussion of the meaning of any claim term is” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,690,512
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.