• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 2, 2026 · PGR2025-00021 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3–7, and 12–20 are unpatentable: the Board found the asserted Kim, Kim–Yang, Lee, and Lee–Haller obviousness grounds proved, but not Lee–Park.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “(e.g., an advanced degree may substitute for professional experience).” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 36–37). Petitioner further contends that a “POSITA would also have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D memory’s structure, its component parts, and how it operates.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA. PO Resp. 9. Based on our review of the complete record, we adopt Petitioner’s uncontested definition of a POSITA.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “The plain language of claim element [1.A] recites “wherein the first material layer is disposed over a first portion of the second material layer;” and claim element [1.B] recites “a landing pad disposed over a second portion of the second material layer.” Thus, the plain language of the claim merely recites that the first material layer is disposed over a first potion of the second material layer and the landing pad is disposed over a second portion of the second material layer. The plain language does not define what constitutes the first or second portions of the second material layer or define the first or second portions of the material layer by what is disposed above the layers. We agree with Petitioner that the term “portion” has a straightforward plain and ordinary meaning: a “part” of a larger whole. Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1077, 406 (defining “portion” as “a part of a whole”)). The ’838 patent itself repeatedly uses the term “portion” this way. Ex. 1001, 5:40–43 (discussing both “an upper portion” and “lower portion” of a “staircase”), 5:66–6:1 (referencing “a portion of a top surface of a layer”); see also 4:39– 40, 7:15–17, 8:20–33, 8:34–65, 11:60–64, 12:38–59. Thus, we understand that the first and second portions of the second material layer are portions of (i.e., a part of the whole) second material layer. Neither the claims nor the Specification define what can constitute a first portion or a second portion of a second material layer.” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Dr. Giapis, argues Petitioner’s proposed modification of Lee requires a POSITA to (1) start with an oxide-based insulating layer 22 as shown in Figure 5B of Lee, (2) introduce an oxidant gas into the adjacent openings, and (3) oxidize a surface that is already oxide-based to form a curved surface. PO Resp. 78–81. Patent Owner provides credible evidence supporting its argument that a POSITA would not have been motivated to make these changes to Lee, as they are technically infeasible. Id. at 79 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 191–208). Dr. Giapis credibly explains that in Park’s process, an oxygen gas would be used to oxidize the silicon nitride or polysilicon, but “introducing such an oxidant into the openings of Lee’s structure above will not promote further oxidation to the existing oxide the relevant region . . . so nothing remains to be oxidized.” Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 192–193. We credit Dr. Giapis testimony that “[i]t is not possible to further oxidize a solid oxide material with oxygen gas as in Park. That is why Park’s thermal oxidation process is performed on silicon nitride or polysilicon, which are not oxides to begin with but they can be oxidized to form silicon dioxide.” Id. ¶ 193 (citing Ex. 2028 (Plummer) at 345–350). According to Dr. Giapis, a POSITA would have understood this and not expected the combination of Lee and Park to achieve any change in shape or any rounding in Lee’s Figure 5B. Ex. 2019 ¶ 193.” slip op. at 60

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Patent Owner, however, with persuasive supporting testimony from Dr. Giapis, argues Petitioner’s proposed modification of Lee requires a POSITA to (1) start with an oxide-based insulating layer 22 as shown in Figure 5B of Lee, (2) introduce an oxidant gas into the adjacent openings, and (3) oxidize a surface that is already oxide-based to form a curved surface. PO Resp. 78–81. Patent Owner provides credible evidence supporting its argument that a POSITA would not have been motivated to make these changes to Lee, as they are technically infeasible. Id. at 79 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 191–208). Dr. Giapis credibly explains that in Park’s process, an oxygen gas would be used to oxidize the silicon nitride or polysilicon, but “introducing such an oxidant into the openings of Lee’s structure above will not promote further oxidation to the existing oxide the relevant region . . . so nothing remains to be oxidized.” Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 192–193. We credit Dr. Giapis testimony that “[i]t is not possible to further oxidize a solid oxide material with oxygen gas as in Park. That is why Park’s thermal oxidation process is performed on silicon nitride or polysilicon, which are not oxides to begin with but they can be oxidized to form silicon dioxide.” Id. ¶ 193 (citing Ex. 2028 (Plummer) at 345–350). According to Dr. Giapis, a POSITA would have understood this and not expected the combination of Lee and Park to achieve any change in shape or any rounding in Lee’s Figure 5B. Ex. 2019 ¶ 193.” slip op. at 60

  Patent outcomesUS 12,010,838 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 12,010,838
• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Co., Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 21, 2026 · IPR2025-00190 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3–11, 13, and 14 were not shown unpatentable because Dong did not disclose the claimed vertical wordline arrangement, and the proposed 3D NAND combination lacked support for motivation and reasonable expectation of success.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “understanding that the claim term “from bottom to top” refers to the vertical arrangement of word lines in the memory portions from bottom to top and not from source end to drain end, as asserted by Petitioner. Inst. Dec. 17. In other words, the claim terms describing the first and second portions having word lines “from top to bottom” refer to the relative vertical location of the word lines within the memory portions and not to location of the word lines relative to the source or drain. Our construction is based on the plain and ordinary meaning of the express language of the independent claims, which states that the second memory portion is formed either above or below the first memory portion. The forming of one memory portion above or below another portion establishes a top and bottom in relation to those portions. For example, claim 5 is directed to a “program method of memory” that requires a second portion formed above the first portion. A second memory portion that is formed above a first memory portion is on top relative to the first portion. Similarly, claims 1 and 1 and 11, which recite a memory having a second portion formed below a first portion, establish that the second portion is on the bottom relative to the first portion. Thus, the claim language itself establishes the vertical locations of the memory portions relative to each other (e.g., a second memory portion that is above the first portion is on top, relative to the first portion). It follows that claim terms referring to the top and bottom of word lines within the memory portions also refer to relative vertical locations of the word lines within the memory portions. Thus, we understand the plain and ordinary meaning of claim” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

    “In our Decision, we treated the preambles of claims 5 and 11 as limiting, noting that these preambles provide antecedent basis for the word line limitations recited in the body of their respective claim. Dec. 14–15, 8. Neither party disputes that the preambles of claims 5 and 11 are limiting. See PO Resp. 34–35 (agreeing that the preambles are limiting); see generally Reply 1–6 (not disputing that the preambles are limiting). We maintain our construction of the preambles in this Decision.” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “we consider the level of ordinary skill at the time of filing. 35 U.S.C. § 103; see also Graham, 383 U.S. at 17 (discussing pre-AIA obviousness). Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had a had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2–3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) NAND memory devices (including issues relating to the operation, e.g., programming, of said devices), or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience). Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 40–42). Petitioner also asserts that a POSITA would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about NAND memory’s structure and fabrication, its component parts, how it operates, and how it is controlled. Id. at 22–23 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 41). In the Institution Decision, we adopted the assessment offered by Petitioner, which Patent Owner did not contest. Inst. Dec. 13. Following institution, Patent Owner stated it does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA. PO Resp. 9 (citing Khatri Dec. ¶¶ 42–47). Because Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art appears consistent with the ’941 patent and the asserted prior art, we maintain it for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir 2001).” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedOther

    “We disagree and find that Dong’s Figure 5a does not depict wordlines in a physical vertical orientation, but rather depicts voltage diagrams. We agree with Patent Owner’s argument, supported by persuasive testimony by Dr. Khatri, that a POSITA would have understood that Dong’s voltage charts (e.g., Fig. 5a) simply represent which voltages are applied to which word lines and do not depict the physical orientation of the wordlines. See, e.g., Ex. 2028 ¶ 171 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 20; Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 52–54). As Dr. Khatri explains, Dong Figures 5a–5h depict different examples of self-boosting modes showing voltages applied differently to the wordlines and are not intended to depict the physical orientation of these word lines. Ex. 2028 ¶ 171; see also Sur-reply 11–12 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 47, 65, 63–67; Ex. 2028 ¶¶ 177–186). We agree with Dr. Kahtri’s persuasive testimony that a POSITA would understand that Figures 5a–5h are illustrated vertically, but do not represent the actual physical arrangement of the word lines in memory, which are shown to be horizontal in Dong’s Figure 4. See, e.g., Ex. 2028 ¶ 172 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 20, 45, 47, 87).” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 11,568,941 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,568,941
• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 20, 2026 · IPR2025-00228 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–18 are unpatentable: claims 1, 2, 4, 5, and 9–18 as obvious over Kim; claims 1–18 over Kim and Fang; claims 1–15 over Han and Fang; and claims 17–18 over Han, Fang, and Chen.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the critical time “would have had a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2-3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) monolithic 3D structures and NAND flash memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience).” Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶42). Petitioner further asserts that a POSITA “would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D NAND’s structure, how it is manufactured, and its component parts.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute this assessment. PO Resp. 7–8. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’276 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 6

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “Dr. Campbell has a Ph.D. in physics, supplying the advanced degree that Petitioner’s definition of a person having ordinary skill in the art accepts as a replacement for some experience. Ex. 2006 ¶ 2. Dr. Campbell has significant experience in semiconductor technology, including in process technologies for submicron CMOS, years of research in semiconductor processing, materials, and device structures, and authored “[t]he leading textbook on semiconductor technology.” Id. ¶¶ 2–4. Dr. Campbell qualifies as a person of ordinary skill in the art under the parties’ agreed definition.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Patent Owner proposed that the terms “exposing portions” and “etching the exposed portions” require two different steps performed in that order. PO Resp. 7–10. Petitioner does not contest this characterization. Pet. Reply 1– 2. Patent Owner also proposes that this requires the exposure step not to perform any etching of the newly exposed layer. PO Resp. 10–12 (citing Ex. 1001, 10:2–5, 10:15–17 (stating that the etch-stop layer “protects the underlying structure until all the VIA openings 640 are formed” and that it “[t]he essence of an etch-stop layer dictates that contact-hole etching stops or slows down upon contact, i.e., exposing without penetrating it.” Pet. Reply 11. Based on the record before us, we determine that no claim term requires express construction for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “described in earlier embodiments would not be consistent with Kim’s statement that previously described elements are “omitted” in the Figures 17A to 22B section “for concise description.” As admitted by Patent Owner, it would be a “reasonable inference” that materials described in a first embodiment for a particular hypothetical layer L would also be used for that layer L in later embodiments absent an express statement to the contrary “because you have just omitted that sort of duplicative description.” Tr. 37:9–38:12. Kim’s Figures 17A–22B do not further address the underlying staircase structure that was detailed in the descriptions of the Figures 4–15 embodiments. Thus, it would similarly be a “reasonable inference” that aspects of the stack structure would be understood to apply to the same stack in the embodiments of Figures 17A–22B, which rely upon, in unaltered form, the earlier-described elements of the stack. stack on bottom, they “replace” and “exclude” any prior description of a gate-stack-on-top. PO Resp. 18–19 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 40–41; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 185–187 (describing the etch-stop layer as covering the sacrificial layers only at their end portions)). However, as admitted by Patent Owner, all of Kim’s Figures show only a gate-stack-on-bottom structure. Tr. 41:6–7 (“For the first embodiment, it is true that figures show the gate stack on bottom.”). The fact that Kim’s Figures 17A–22B, which add etch-stop and barrier layers to the gate stack, are shown only as gate stack on bottom is merely consistent with the uniform use of gate-stack-on-bottom in Kim’s Figures, which show the layer-by-layer construction of its device. Like Figures 4–15, Figures 17A–22B exemplify rather than limit the description of the previously described memory stack, and do not exclude the gate-stack-onbottom description of the memory stack. Kim can be used for all it realistically teaches, including descriptions in its disclosure that are not represented by specific Figures. See In re Chapman, 357 F.2d 418, 424 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (stating that a reference “is not limited to the disclosures in its specific illustrative examples.”). Accordingly, the record supports Petitioner’s assertion that Kim’s teaching of a gate-stack-on-top alternative for the memory stack would be understood by a POSITA as a memory stack option applicable to its other embodiments having that same memory stack.” slip op. at 11

  Patent outcomesUS 11,101,276 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,101,276
• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00191 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 3, 8, 11, 12, and 19 are unpatentable under §103; Petitioner did not show claims 6, 9, 10, 13–18, and 20 unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “at the critical time “would have had a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2–3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) monolithic 3D structures and NAND memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience).” Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶34–38). Petitioner further asserts that a POSITA “would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D NAND’s structure, how it is manufactured, and its component parts.” Id. Patent Owner does 5 Neither party presents evidence or arguments regarding objective evidence of non-obviousness. Pet. 100; PO. Resp. circuit design. PO Resp. 9–10 (citing Ex. 2021 ¶ 35). Neither Patent Owner nor Dr. Campbell considers the obviousness of the claims to turn on the precise definition of the level or ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 10; Ex. 2021 ¶ 35. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’322 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “C. Claim Construction Neither party proposes any express claim construction. Pet. 27 (stating claims should receive their “plain and ordinary meaning”); PO Resp. 10 (stating that Petitioner’s challenges fail “under any reasonable construction”). In an inter partes review, we construe a patent claim “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. [§] 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, the words of a claim generally are given their “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is the meaning the term would have to a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention, in the context of the entire patent including the specification. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). We determine no terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We determine that such a configuration would be neither inoperable nor significantly undesirable. Dr. Campbell testified that he does not argue that this configuration would be inoperable. Ex. 1106, 74:12–17; Ex. 2021 ¶60. Dr. Lee testifies that this configuration is “consistent with Nishikawa[123]’s Figure 14B.” Ex. 1105 ¶ 13. Dr. Lee further testifies that this configuration would not necessarily require a larger footprint, but instead, “could simply replace the trenches, abutting the device edge.” Id. Dr. Campbell testified that if the circular TAC replaced the rectangular trench, “I don’t know what it would be or exactly where it would be,” and therefore, “I can’t say what the size of the red circle would have to be.” Ex. 1106, 83:19–84:3. Therefore, the record does not support finding a circular TAC to have a larger footprint. Absent a larger footprint, there is no evidence that the end-connected TAC would be undesirable.” slip op. at 15

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedMixed

    “nor significantly undesirable. Dr. Campbell testified that he does not argue that this configuration would be inoperable. Ex. 1106, 74:12–17; Ex. 2021 ¶60. Dr. Lee testifies that this configuration is “consistent with Nishikawa[123]’s Figure 14B.” Ex. 1105 ¶ 13. Dr. Lee further testifies that this configuration would not necessarily require a larger footprint, but instead, “could simply replace the trenches, abutting the device edge.” Id. Dr. Campbell testified that if the circular TAC replaced the rectangular trench, “I don’t know what it would be or exactly where it would be,” and therefore, “I can’t say what the size of the red circle would have to be.” Ex. 1106, 83:19–84:3. Therefore, the record does not support finding a circular TAC to have a larger footprint. Absent a larger footprint, there is no evidence that the end-connected TAC would be undesirable.” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 11,581,322 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,581,322
• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00189 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 19 is unpatentable as obvious over Kim and over Nam; the challenge based on Lee and Park fails for lack of a reasonable expectation of success.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther

    “B. Patent Owner’s Disclaimer of Claims 17 and 20 As indicated above, Patent Owner filed a statutory disclaimer of claims 17 and 20 of the ’666 patent. See Ex. 2005. In view of Patent Owner’s statutory disclaimer, we treat claims 17 and 20 as having never been part of the ’666 patent. See Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., ‘considered as part of the original patent’ in [35 U.S.C.] § 253 to mean that the patent is treated as though the disclaimed claims never existed.”). Because inter partes review cannot be instituted based on disclaimed claims, we do not consider claims 17 and 20 to be within the scope of this proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e) (“No inter partes review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”); General Elec. Co. v. United Techs. Corp., IPR2017-00491, Paper 9 (PTAB July 6, 2017) (precedential) (denying institution in view of a statutory disclaimer of all the challenged claims). Thus, we confine our analysis in this Decision to claim 19, the challenged claim that has not been disclaimed.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “(“POSITA”) “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2–3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) 3D memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may substitute for professional experience).” Pet. 24–25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 34–37). Petitioner further contends that the “POSITA would also have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D memory’s structure, its component parts, and how it operates.” Id. at 25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 34–37).” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “evidence from the complete record now before us, we determine that the claim term “curved side surface” encompasses any outer surface of the structure with curvature. See Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc. v. F’real Foods, LLC, 908 F.3d 1328, 1338–1339 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding that it is acceptable for the Board to adopt its own claim construction where the parties “had notice of the contested claim construction and an opportunity to be heard”). We do not adopt Patent Owner’s position that “curved side surface” requires the side surface to be curved along a direction perpendicular to the top surface of the structure (e.g., the z-axis).” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “curved side surface” are premised on its proposed claim construction which, as set forth above, we decline to adopt. Instead, we determined that “curved side surface” as used in the challenged claim encompasses any outer surface of the structure with curvature, which does not need to be curved in any specific direction. See § II.B.1, supra. Kim states: Embodiments of the inventive concepts in which the protrusion pad PAD_P has a rectangular parallel[] shape is illustrated, but the protrusion pad PAD_P is not limited thereto and, in some embodiments, may have a shape including a curved surface based on a virtual rectangular parallel[] shape, a cylindrical shape, or any shape. Ex. 1005, 8:29–34 (emphases added). Dr. Lee testifies that “[a] POSITA would have recognized that this includes configurations where the sides of the protrusion pads are curved, particularly to optimize electrical connectivity and mitigate stress at material interfaces.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 201. Dr. Lee further testifies that a POSITA would have understood Kim’s disclosure “teaches a variety of different protrusion pad PAD_P shapes” including “pads with curved sides when viewed in cross-section or pads with curved sides when viewed from above.” Id. ¶ 202. Accordingly, we determine that Kim discloses a cylindrically-shaped PAD_P that has a “curved side surface” as required by the challenged claim. slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 11,145,666 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 11,145,666
• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00118 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–14 were not shown unpatentable because the Petition did not establish the claimed adjacent pad groups, common ESD bus, or pad-to-pad bonding wires.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “would have had a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering or similar discipline, and 2–3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, analyzing, designing, or teaching) ICs, or equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience and vice versa). This POSITA would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about IC design, layout, manufacturing, packaging, and ESD protection. Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 29–33). Patent Owner states that it “does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of a” POSITA “for purposes of this IPR.” PO Resp. 10. In the Institution Decision, we adopted the assessment offered by Petitioner. Dec. 7. Because Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art is consistent with the ’164 patent and the asserted prior art, we maintain it for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, claim terms are generally given their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Only those terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Based on our review of the complete trial record and the arguments raised by the parties, we determine that it is not necessary to expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ dispute. Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 7

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “includes segmented ground rails 350, 355. . . . The package substrate 310 includes a package common ground rail 360, and the segmented SoC ground rails 350, 355 are independently connected to the package common ground rail 360 via separate connections 370, 375 respectively.”). As set forth above, Dr. Foty describes the three ground lines in Saint Figure 7-7 as “segmented rails” when discussing the combination of Saint and Haralabidis, thus equating the three ground lines in Saint Figure 7-7 with Haralabidis’ segmented ground rail. Ex. 1003 ¶ 368. Neither Petitioner nor Dr. Foty, however, adequately addresses how or why a POSITA would have understood that the three separate grounds lines in Saint Figure 7-7 were “segmented rails” like the segments of the single ground line described in Haralabidis. In contrast, Dr. Khatri credibly testifies: Haralabidis teaches the use of a “common ground rail” to connect “segmented ground rails.” Haralabidis, 3:9–22, 3:34– 40, 3:65–4:12. A POSITA would understand “segmented ground rails” to refer to a single ground signal that has been “segmented.” That is fundamentally different from the design of Saint’s Figure 7-7 that Dr. Foty relies on, which uses three different ground signals, GND1, GND2, and GND3—not a single ground signal that has been “segmented.” Because of that, a POSITA would not have been motivated to change the Figure 7-7 design completely to connect three separate signals (GND1, GND2, and GND3) together as Dr. Foty proposes. Ex. 1003 ¶ 368. Indeed, for these reasons, a POSITA would have understood Haralabidis’ teachings of a “common ground rail” are inapplicable to Saint’s Figure 7-7. Ex. 2010 ¶ 129. Petitioner’s arguments and Dr. Foty’s testimony with respect to the modification of Saint Figure 7-7 leave an analytical gap that does not apprise us of why a POSITA would have modified Saint Figure 7-7 to include a common ESD bus as described in Haralabidis.” slip op. at 37

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “For these reasons, we find that Yoshinaga’s statement that “[r]eference potential pads are not shown to simplify the drawing” indicates that reference potential pads are not depicted in Yoshinaga Figure 6, and determine that Yoshinaga Figure 6 does not disclose “a plurality of pad groups, adjacent and connected to the plurality of ESD buses” as recited in claim 6. Petitioner also argues that a POSITA would have understood that power supply pads 3, 4, and 58 in Yoshinaga “could just as readily be used as reference pads” and it would have been obvious “to use the pads immediately next to the saved areas as reference pads (e.g., pads 5 and 6) as pad assignments were left to the designer’s discretion.” Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 137–139). Petitioner asserts that “selecting which pads to use for ground, power signals, etc. is a design choice that depends on factors like chip size, the number of I/O signals, and the number of pads available.” Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 137–139). Petitioner states that such discretion would be to preserve Yoshinaga’s saved area for other circuitry as taught by Saint. Pet. 31–32 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 137–139; Pet. 19–23 (§ IX.A)). Neither Petitioner nor Dr. Foty adequately explain, however, why a POSITA would have made this specific design choice, namely, replacing power supply pads 3, 4, and 58 with reference pads. Pet. 31; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 137–139; see also Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1069 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Merely stating that a particular placement of an element is a design choice does not make it obvious.” (quoting Cutsforth, Inc. v. MotivePower, Inc., 636 Fed. Appx. 575, 578 (Fed. Cir. 2016))). Petitioner offers the general proposition that pad assignments are left to the designer’s discretion, but this does not provide a reason why a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Yoshinaga Figure 6 as proposed. Pet. 31; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 137–139. We have determined that Yoshinaga does not show (rather than does not label) reference pads. Because all of Yoshinaga’s illustrated pads are power supply pads, Petitioner’s proposed reassignment of pads would not be a simple matter of rearrangement of an existing mixture of power supply and reference pads, but require that reference pads be imported from elsewhere, and power supply pads be moved to some unspecified location. Petitioner’s arguments and Dr. Foty’s testimony with respect to the modification of Yoshinaga Figure 6 leave an analytical gap that does not apprise us of why a POSITA would have modified Yoshinaga Figure 6 to include reference pads in the place of power supply pads 3, 4, and 58. We agree with Patent Owner that none of Petitioner’s rationales” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 10,879,164 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 10,879,164
• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 1, 2026 · IPR2025-00117 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–19 are unpatentable: claims 1–9, 11–16, 18, and 19 as obvious over Kim; claims 10 and 17 as obvious over Kim and Fang, Park, and Park and Fang.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “at the critical time “would have had a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2-3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) monolithic 3D structures and NAND flash memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience).” Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 42). Petitioner further asserts that a POSITA “would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D NAND’s structure, its component parts, how it operates, and how it is controlled.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition. PO Resp. 7. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed 4 Neither party presents evidence or arguments regarding objective evidence of non-obviousness. Pet. 103; PO Resp. the ’711 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the record before us, we agree with Petitioner that “on a surface” should be interpreted in line with the definition of “on” set forth in the ’711 patent. Ex. 1001, 4:1–6. We particularly note that the ’711 patent states that “‘on’ . . . should be interpreted in the broadest manner” and that “on” is not limited to “directly on.” Id. Instead, the ’711 patent states that “‘on’ also includes the meaning of ‘on’ something with an intermediate feature or layer therebetween.” Id. Patent Owner agrees that this definition controls the “standalone ‘on’” term such that A may be on B even if there is an intervening layer between them. Tr. 55:8–11 (“The standalone ‘on,’ we agree in the context of the patent, you can have intervening layers. I think the patent is clear about that.”). Claim 14 recites that the etch-stop layer is “on” something; i.e., “on a side surface and a top surface of each step.” Ex. 1001, 16:20–22. Patent Owner agrees that a surface is a “something.” Tr. 56:5–8 (“surface obviously is a something”). Substituting the “a “‘on’ something with an intermediate feature or layer therebetween” results in claim 14 reading as, “on a surface with an intermediate feature or layer therebetween.” Unlike “directly on,” which specifies the relation between two things, “a surface” may merely indicate the thing that something is “on,” particularly when “on” is “interpreted in the broadest manner” as expressly required by the ’711 patent.” slip op. at 7

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Although Dr. Campbell testified in his deposition in response to Petitioner’s counsel that “on the surface” requires direct contact with the surface, his interpretation was based on “embodiments of” the patent rather than a general understanding of a person skilled in the art confronted with that term. Ex. 1027, 122:6–25, 124:6–23 (“I’m not sure if there are other sources for that, but it was on the ’711, so I’ve taken it there.”). Dr. Campbell, upon questioning from Patent Owner’s counsel, later stated that “an expert in semiconductor fabrication” would understand “on the surface” to mean “contact between one layer and another . . . with nothing in between.” Id. at 146:25–147:6. However, Dr. Campbell did not explain why such an interpretation is particular to the semiconductor fabrication art, or provide other explanation or support for this statement, which is in tension with the definition of “on” in the ’711 patent. Accordingly, we significantly discount the weight accorded to that statement. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318 (stating, “conclusory, unsupported assertions by experts as to the definition of a claim term are not useful to a court. Similarly, a court should discount any expert testimony ‘that is clearly at odds with the claim construction mandated by the claims themselves, the written description, and patent.’”). On balance, Dr. Campbell’s testimony is best understood as a description of certain Figures of the ’711 patent rather than a representation of an ordinarily skilled person’s understanding of the term “on the surface.” See Ex. 2009 ¶ 47 (describing Figs. 1, 3, and 4 as depicting layers in contact with the underlying layer or substrate). For example, Dr. Campbell describes Figure 9A as having a barrier layer “on and directly contacting the top and side surfaces of each step.” Id. ¶ 28 (emphasis added) (citing inter alia Ex. 1001, 7:6–67). Dr. Campbell does not explain why, beyond the fact that many Figures show layers as adjacent and in contact, a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would understand those Figures to limit the claim language rather than illustrating particular embodiments that fall within a broader scope of claims 14 and 15. See Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“While we read claims in view of the specification, of which they are a part, we do not read limitations from the embodiments in the specifications into the claims.”).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “We agree with Petitioner that Kim’s first and second section are described as compatible, not mutually exclusive, embodiments. Kim’s second section builds further layers upon the structure of its first section, and states: In these embodiments, the same elements as in the embodiments previously described with reference to FIGS. 5A through 14A and FIGS. 5B through 14B will be denoted by the same reference numbers therein, and for concise description, overlapping description of elements previously described with reference to FIGS. 5A through 14A and FIGS. 5B through 14B may be omitted. Ex. 1005 ¶ 184 (emphasis added). Patent Owner argues that only the embodiments in Figures 17A–22B describe an etch-stop layer and a barrier layer (as claimed), and that the language cited for a gate-stack-on-top configuration (e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 90, 91, and 240) is “conspicuously absent from the description of Figures 17A–22B.” PO Resp. 20 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 36). However, Figures 17A–22B do not further address the underlying staircase structure that was detailed in the descriptions of the Figures 4 through 15 embodiments. While Figures 17A–22B show a gate-stack-on-bottom configuration, this merely continues the gate-stack-on-bottom illustrations that were used in all of the previous Figures, even for those in which it is undisputed that a gate-stack-on-top configuration is a described alternative. The Figures exemplify rather than limit the description of the gate-stack-on-bottom view in Figures 4–15 and do not exclude the gate-stack on bottom description of the embodiments exemplified by those figures.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 10,672,711 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,672,711
• Mediatek Inc. v. Parkervision, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 22, 2026 · IPR2024-00796 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Nevo and Avitabile, Young and Estabrook, and Young, Estabrook-1988, and Estabrook-1989.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Network LLC, 929 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2019). On its face, the language “energy transfer signal” does not specify any restrictions on the type of system in which it is utilized, nor its characteristics. In the context of claims 1 and 11, the “energy transfer signal” is the basis on which the “switch” operates, so as to “sub-sample and transfer energy from a first electromagnetic (EM) signal.” Ex. 1001, 50:63–65, 51:56–58. Accordingly, based on the claim language, the term “energy transfer signal” need only be a signal for operating a switch to sub-sample and transfer energy from an electromagnetic signal. That is its plain and ordinary meaning.” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “’686 patent broadly includes knowledge and experience as to RF circuit design. See supra § III.B. Petitioner contends that “Nevo’s transceivers [102a/102b] are for Bluetooth and IEEE 802.11,” and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that both protocols “required down-conversion in their receivers to obtain a baseband signal.” Id. at 35 (citing Ex. 1004, 4:45–50; Ex. 1002 ¶ 118). Nevo’s disclosure would have motivated a person of ordinary skill in the art to look to Avitabile, which provides the circuit level detail for down-converters. See Ex. 1006, Abstract. Avitabile specifically provides circuitry for down-conversion in the s-band frequency range, which is in the range of Bluetooth and IEEE 802.11 (2.4 GHz). Id. at Abstract, Figs. 6, 7. Accordingly, we determine a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to look to down-converters in the range of frequency needed, and would have been motivated to combine Avitabile’s teachings with those of Nevo, with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 55

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

  Patent outcomesUS 7,483,686 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,483,686
• Shenzhen Ronglida Technology Co. Ltd. v. Pathway IP LLCInstituted
  PTAB · Jan 15, 2026 · IPR2025-01231 · APJ Mary C Hoffman · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–13 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

    “petition identifies all real parties in interest. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2). Whether an unnamed party is a real party in interest “is a highly fact-dependent question.” See Applications in Internet Time, LLC v. RPX Corp., 897 F.3d 1336, 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“AIT”); Ventex Co., Ltd. v. Columbia Sportswear N. Am., Inc., IPR2017-00651, Paper 152 at 4–5 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (precedential) (citing Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 13 (2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/tpgnov.pdf (CTPG). “A common consideration is whether the non-party exercised or could have exercised control over a party’s participation in a proceeding.” CTPG at 16. Other considerations include whether the non-party is funding or directing the proceeding; the non-party’s relationship with the petitioner; the non-party’s relationship to the petition itself, including the nature and/or degree of involvement in the filing; and the nature of the entity filing the petition. Id. at 17–18.” slip op. at 8

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a related field and at least two years of experience with lighting technology.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1017 ¶ 35). Petitioner makes additional contentions about what a POSITA would have understood. Id. (“A POSITA would understand that all types of cameras (e.g., analog and digital, photo and video) generally involve the same lighting considerations . . . . [and] that it is important to provide light that evenly illuminates the target subject or object to minimize reflected glare and shadows.”). Patent Owner contends that a POSITA would have at least: (a) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, optical engineering, or a related field; (b) two years of practical experience in designing and developing lighting systems, particularly those integrated with electronic devices such as webcams or computer monitors; and (c) knowledge of user-interface considerations for consumer electronics . . . . Additional experience can substitute for education and vice versa. Prelim. Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 2036 ¶ 48). Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s contentions regarding what a POSITA would have understood. Prelim. Resp. 12–13 (“[O]ne of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that analog and digital cameras have different operating principles and lighting requirements [and] Petitioner’s lack of appreciation for the suitability and unsuitability of different lights for different applications infects and dooms its invalidity analysis.” (citing Ex. 2036 ¶¶ 36–47)). and years of experience required for a POSITA. Pet. 2; Prelim. Resp. 12. For purposes of this Decision, we consider a person of ordinary skill in the art to have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or related field and two years of practical experience in lighting technology, and that additional experience may substitute for education and vice versa, which is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the ’729 patent and prior art of record. See Exs. 1001, 1005–1010, 1012–1015; see also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Patent Owner agrees that the Board need not formally construe any claim terms in order to adjudicate the merits of the Petition and argues Petitioner fails to show unpatentability of any claim under any reasonable construction of the claims. Prelim. Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 2036 ¶ 51). We determine that no express claim construction is necessary to determine whether institution is warranted in this proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only terms in controversy must be construed “and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 14

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “claimed subject matter and the prior art are “such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). When a ground in a petition is based on a combination of references, we consider “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” Id. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). We base our obviousness inquiry on factual considerations including (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, (3) the level of skill in the art, and (4) any objective indicia of obviousness or non-obviousness that may be in evidence.14 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18.” slip op. at 24

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,841,729
• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 5, 2026 · IPR2024-00911 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 10 was not shown unpatentable under § 103 over Toyama because the challenge did not remedy the deficiencies in its nonobvious base claim 8.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Petitioner’s proposed definition appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and the disclosure of the ’806 patent, and we adopt it for purposes definition of a POSITA.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “In our Decision on Institution, we noted that the parties disputed construction of “each local contact” found in dependent claim 10, and “dielectric structure” recited in independent claim 8. Inst. Dec. 8–9. We determine that no express construction of “each local contact” recited in claim 10, or any other claim term, is required to resolve the issues in dispute in this proceeding.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “independent claim 8 would have been obvious for the reasons set forth in its petition in the 791-IPR. See id. at 1 (stating the present Petition maintains the same grounds set forth in IPR2024-00791). As explained in our Final Written Decision (Ex. 3001) in the 791-IPR issued concurrently, Petitioner did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that independent claim 8 would have been obvious over Toyama under any of Petitioner’s three alternative arguments. None of Petitioner’s arguments set forth in the present Petition, including the arguments directed to claim 10, remedy the deficiencies regarding its base claim 8. See Pet. 53–31, 98–101, 124–125; see also Reply. Accordingly, for the same reasons set forth in the Final Written Decision in the 791-IPR issued concurrently, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that independent claim 8, and therefore dependent claim 10, would have been obvious over Toyama. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Dependent claims are nonobvious under section 103 if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious.”); Ex. 3001.” slip op. at 14

  • Expert testimonyNot reached

    “Petitioner relies on the Declaration of Jack C. Lee, Ph. D. (Ex. 1003) and the Reply Declaration of Jack C. Lee, Ph.D. (Ex. 1043) in support of its 2 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), revised 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 effective March 16, 2013. Because the ’806 patent has an effective filing date after March 16, 2013 (Ex. 1001, codes (22), (63)), we refer to the AIA version of Sections 102 and 103. 3 Toyama, US Pub. No. 2017/0179026 A1, published June 22, 2017 (Ex. 1005). 4 Petitioner characterizes its alternative arguments of unpatentability of claim 10 as based on three “grounds.” See Pet. 15. Because each of Petitioner’s arguments are based on the same reference, albeit different embodiments, we characterize Petitioner’s challenges as three alternative arguments based on a single ground because each argument relies on the same reference. Ph.D. (Ex. 2005). Transcripts of the depositions of Dr. Lee (Exs. 2006, 2010) and of Dr. Yang (Ex. 1044) have also been submitted into the record.” slip op. at 7

  Patent outcomesUS 10,937,806 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 10,937,806

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.